Syzak v. Dammon et al
Filing
74
OPINION AND ORDER (1) Sustaining Defendants' Objections (Dkt. 57 ); (2) Rejecting the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 55 ); (3) Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 44 ); and (4) Dismissing the Claims Against Defendants Collins, Sheridan, and Montoya with Prejudice. Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Sandusky, K)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SCOTT SYZAK,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 14-CV-10245
HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH
vs.
COLLINS, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) SUSTAINING DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS (Dkt.
57); (2) REJECTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION (Dkt. 55); (3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS (Dkt. 44); AND (4) DISMISSING THE CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS
COLLINS, SHERIDAN, AND MONTOYA WITH PREJUDICE
I. INTRODUCTION
This pro se prisoner civil rights case comes before the Court on a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris (Dkt. 55),
recommending that the Court deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 44). Defendants filed
objections to that recommendation (Dkt. 57), Plaintiff filed a response (Dkt. 59), and Defendants
filed a reply in support of their objections (Dkt. 62).1 For the reasons described more fully
below, the Court sustains Defendants’ objections, rejects the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, and
dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
1
Following Defendants’ reply (dated October 5, 2015), Plaintiff continued to file papers
concerning the Magistrate Judge’s R&R and Defendants’ objections. See “Response to
Defendant’s [sic] Motion filed 10/5/15” (Dkt. 64); “Supplemental Brief re [ ] Response to
Defendant’s [sic] Motion filed 10/5/15” (Dkt. 65); “Memorandum (Argument) in support of
defendants misleading the Court” (Dkt. 68). The Local Rules permit only a response to a party’s
objections. See E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). Plaintiff has neither requested nor been granted leave to
file additional responses. In any case, the Court reviewed the filings and finds no new arguments
set forth. Accordingly, the Court strikes these filings.
1
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Scott Syzak, a prisoner, alleges that he suffered unprovoked physical abuse at
the hands of various law enforcement officers while being transported from the St. Clair County
detention center to Plaintiff’s sentencing hearing at the St. Clair County courthouse on July 1,
2011. See Compl. at 3-6 (Dkt. 1). Approximately two and a half years later, on January 17,
2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court, chronicling those alleged abuses in § 1983 claims
against various named and unnamed defendants. The named defendants included Dan Damman,
Plaintiff’s defense attorney, Mona Armstrong, prosecuting attorney, the Honorable Cynthia
Lane, Circuit Judge for St. Clair County, and Mike Wendling, Chief Prosecutor. Id. at 1-2. The
unnamed defendants included two “John Doe” Bailiffs and two “John Doe” Deputy Sheriffs, all
of whom were allegedly employed by St. Clair County. Id. Pursuant to the Court’s screening
obligations under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Damman, Armstrong, Lane, and Wendling were dismissed sua sponte, leaving only
the “John Doe” Defendants. See 6/24/2014 Order (Dkt. 11).
As described in more detail in two R&Rs issued by the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff
experienced substantial difficulty in discovering the identity of his alleged assailants.
See
1/8/2015 R&R (Dkt. 27); 8/28/2015 R&R (Dkt. 55). When Plaintiff failed to identify a named
defendant almost a year after filing suit, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff’s
complaint be dismissed sua sponte for want of prosecution. 1/8/2015 R&R. Plaintiff filed
objections to the R&R, and in his objections, as well as in other communications to the Court, he
identified Bailiffs Collins, Sheridan, Montoya, and Sheldon as named defendants. See 6/16/2015
Order (Dkt. 39). Accordingly, the Court rejected the Magistrate Judge’s January 2015 R&R,
ordered the case caption changed, and directed service on the newly-named defendants. See id.
2
The newly-named Defendants executed a waiver of service and filed a motion to dismiss
(Dkt. 44). Defendants’ motion argued: (i) that the complaint failed to state a claim against any of
the Defendants because it did not connect specific factual allegations to any of the named
individuals; and (ii) that any attempt to add the named individual Defendants to the complaint is
barred by the statute of limitations, specifically, because a change in parties cannot “relate back”
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) to the filing of the original complaint. See Defs.
Mot. at 4, 5-6.
The Magistrate Judge agreed that replacing the “John Doe” defendants with the
individually-named Defendants does not invoke the doctrine of relation-back under Rule 15(c).
8/28/2015 R&R at 6. However, the Magistrate Judge concluded that this alone did not preclude
Plaintiff from amending his complaint, observing that: (i) Plaintiff’s status as a pro se,
incarcerated plaintiff sharply limited his access to resources; (ii) the named Defendants have
been on notice of Plaintiff’s intention to include them in his complaint since the issuance of the
Court’s June 2015 Order amending the case caption; (iii) Plaintiff may have been under the
impression that changing the case caption was sufficient to state a claim for relief against the
named Defendants; and (iv) Defendants will suffer minimal prejudice from allowing Plaintiff to
amend his complaint. Id. at 6-8. The Magistrate Judge then recommended that Defendants’
motion to dismiss be denied.
Defendants timely objected to the recommendation; the Court reviews de novo any
portion of the R&R to which specific objections are filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants’
principal
objection
concerns
their
statute-of-limitations
defense.
Specifically, Defendants argue that while the Magistrate Judge recognized that an amendment to
3
add Defendants may not relate back, she erroneously applied the factors governing relation-back
to conclude that Plaintiff may amend his complaint and to recommend that Defendants’ motion
be denied. The Court agrees with Defendants. Because Plaintiff seeks to change the parties
named in his complaint after the statute of limitations expired, he cannot invoke the doctrine of
relation-back. Moreover, Michigan law contains no equitable tolling provision that would be
applicable here.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are time-barred and any
amendment would be futile.
A. Applicable Law
Statutes of limitations require plaintiffs to be diligent in exercising their rights, and to
bring their claims within a reasonable period of time, as determined by statute, so as to protect
defendants from having to defend against stale claims, where the passage of time may have
rendered much of the relevant evidence diminished or lost. See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co.,
380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is borrowed from
Michigan’s three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims. Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d
707, 713-714 (6th Cir. 2005). While state law governs the limitations period, federal law
controls when the limitations period begins to run. Id. at 714.
The filing of a complaint tolls the applicable limitations period as to the claims in that
complaint. See United States v. Wahl, 583 F.2d 285, 287 (6th Cir. 1978). Where a plaintiff
seeks to amend his or her complaint after the statute of limitations has expired, the plaintiff may
do so only if the amendment relates back to the date of the filing of the original complaint, in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
Evans v. Hanger Prosthetics &
Orthotics, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 785, 789 (N.D. Ohio 2010). As relevant here, Rule 15 permits
an amendment to relate back where:
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(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set
out--in the original pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party
against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied
and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the
summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be
prejudiced in defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have
been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the
proper party’s identity[.]
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).
B. The Parties’ Arguments
In their objections, Defendants argue that, regardless of whether Plaintiff is permitted to
amend his complaint, his claims arising out of his July 1, 2011 sentencing are barred by the
applicable three-year statute of limitations. Obj. at 8-10. Specifically, Defendants argue that the
case caption was not amended to reflect the named Defendants until eleven months after the
statute of limitations expired, and the substitution of named defendants in place of fictitious, or
“John Doe,” defendants may not relate back under Rule 15 to avoid a statute-of-limitations
defense. Id.2 Defendants further assert that none of the observations offered by the Magistrate
Judge in support of her conclusion that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend his complaint
suffices to defeat a statute-of-limitations defense. Id. at 10-12.
Defendants also argue that even incarcerated, pro se plaintiffs are still required to timely
file a lawsuit within the applicable statute of limitations, and that, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s
2
Along similar lines, Defendants also object to the Magistrate Judge’s apparent consideration of
the Rule 15(c) factors for relation-back on the grounds that it is erroneous to consider those
factors when the relation-back doctrine does not apply in the first instance. Obj. at 13-15.
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difficulties in prosecuting this lawsuit due to his incarceration, there is no equitable basis on
which to toll the statute of limitations. Id. at 15-16. Defendants contend that Michigan law is
the governing law for tolling purposes, and that Michigan law no longer considers incarceration
a disability warranting tolling. Id. at 16-18.
Plaintiff’s response recounts the numerous obstacles he has faced in uncovering the
identities of the “John Doe” defendants and his attempts to overcome those obstacles. Pl. Resp.
at 1, 7-9, 11-12. Plaintiff relies on the fact that his complaint was timely filed within the threeyear limitations period to argue that serving Defendants after that period does not render his
claim time-barred. Id. at 2, 3-4, 5.
Plaintiff also relies on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, stating that an action should
not be dismissed for failure to include the real parties in interest until a reasonable time has been
allowed to correct defects so as to avoid forfeiting just claims. Id. at 2. Plaintiff further argues
that Rule 17 makes no mention of a statute of limitations, and expressly contemplates the
addition of officers’ names, which is what he asserts was done here. Id. at 3. Plaintiff suggests
that, to the extent there is a more forgiving body of law than that of relation-back under Rule 15,
it should apply given Plaintiff’s status as a pro se prisoner. Id.
Plaintiff also seems to argue, in the alternative, that to the extent the statute of limitations
does bar his claim, the diligence with which he has pursued his rights, notwithstanding the
difficulties prompted by his incarceration, and his pro se status compel the Court to equitably toll
the statute of limitations. Id. at 5-7, 8. Plaintiff further references a Michigan law that suspends
the statute of limitations for individuals with legal disabilities until one year after the disability
has been removed. Id. at 8.
6
Plaintiff also seems to suggest that because he was unaware that the alleged conduct that
took place on the date of his sentencing amounted to a constitutional violation, his claims did not
“accrue” until approximately January 1, 2013, when he first learned that the Defendants’ alleged
actions were illegal and/or unconstitutional. Id. at 9-10.
Finally, Plaintiff describes the cases on which Defendants rely as “smoke and mirrors,”
contending that in those cases the plaintiffs did not file their complaint until well after the
expiration of the statute of limitations, or the plaintiff elected not to discover the identity of the
“John Doe” defendants; here, Plaintiff contends, he filed his complaint within the statute of
limitations, and he was diligent in attempting to locate the named defendants and included their
official titles in the complaint. Id. at 11-12.
Defendants’ reply reiterates their initial argument that, even though Plaintiff timely filed
his complaint, he did not add the named Defendants until after the statute of limitations had
expired. Because substituting named defendants in place of “John Doe” defendants may not
relate back, Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. Defs. Reply at 1 (Dkt. 62). Defendants also
dismiss Plaintiff’s invocation of equitable tolling on the grounds that tolling principles for a
§ 1983 claim are governed by Michigan and not federal law, and that there is no basis in
Michigan law for equitable tolling here. Id. at 1-2, 3-4.3 Lastly, Defendants argue that Rule 17
is inapplicable: Plaintiff did not sue a public officer as contemplated in Rule 17, such that he
could add the officer’s name at a later date, but, rather, Plaintiff sued unknown individuals. Id. at
5. Defendants also assert that naming a public officer would not protect an individual capacity
claim and that, here, Plaintiff must be suing the named Defendants in their individual capacities
3
However, Defendants add that if federal law were to govern, to equitably toll a claim a plaintiff
must have been diligent in protecting their rights and extraordinary circumstances must have led
to the untimely filing. Defs. Reply at 2. Defendants argue that ignorance of the law, lack of
education, or unavailability of legal assistance or materials do not constitute extraordinary
circumstances sufficient to satisfy the requirements for equitable tolling. Id.
7
because Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain the necessary allegations to make out a § 1983
claim against St. Clair County, the relevant governmental entity if Plaintiff had sued Defendants
in their official capacities. Id. at 5-6.
C. Discussion
Because Defendants’ alleged actionable conduct took place on July 1, 2011, the statute of
limitations expired on July 1, 2014. While Plaintiff suggests that his claims may not have
accrued until as late as January 1, 2013 — when he first became aware that his rights may have
been violated — this suggestion is without merit. The accrual date for purposes of statute of
limitations is the date the plaintiff became aware of the actual injury underlying his claim; it is
not the date that a plaintiff became aware of a potential legal injury. Campau v. Orchard Hills
Psychiatric Ctr., 946 F. Supp. 507, 511 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
While Plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed on January 17, 2014, approximately six
months before the statute of limitations expired, the present Defendants were not added to the
case caption, let alone named in the complaint, until June 16, 2015, almost a year past the threeyear limitations period. And these claims were not saved from the statute of limitations, because
“an amendment which adds a new party creates a new cause of action and there is no relation
back to the original filing for purposes of limitations.” In re Kent Holland Die Casting &
Plating, Inc., 928 F.2d 1448, 1449 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d
1057, 1064 (6th Cir. 1973)) (affirming the lower court’s holding that “the relation back provision
of [Rule] 15(c) did not apply where the amendment sought to add rather than substitute a party”).
This principle applies when a plaintiff has named “John Doe” defendants. “Substituting a
named defendant for a ‘John Doe’ defendant is considered a change in parties, not a mere
substitution of parties.” Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996). “[A] plaintiff’s lack
8
of knowledge pertaining to an intended defendant’s identity does not constitute a ‘mistake
concerning the party’s identity’ within the meaning of Rule 15(c).” Moore v. Tennessee, 267 F.
App’x 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Smith v. City of Akron, 476 F. App’x 67, 68-69 (6th
Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff cannot avail himself of the relation-back doctrine, his
claims against the named Defendants are time-barred, notwithstanding the timeliness of his
initial complaint against the “John Doe” defendants.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 is also misplaced. Rule 17’s
provision regarding the “real parties in interest” imposes restrictions on the Court’s ability to
dismiss a case for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 17(a)(3). Here, there is no question that Plaintiff is the proper party to prosecute this matter.
Similarly, while Rule 17 permits a public officer to be designated by official title, rather than
name, and allows the Court to add the public officer’s name at a later date, that provision
presupposes that the public officer is a specifically identifiable individual whose name is
presently known, not a fictitious defendant who is used as a placeholder in lieu of the actual
defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(d).
Defendants are also correct in arguing that Michigan law governs any applicable tolling
rules. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (“We have generally referred to state law
for tolling rules, just as we have for the length of statutes of limitations.”). Thus, Plaintiff is
simply wrong in arguing that some federal tolling doctrine applies in this case.
Michigan law contains a comprehensive and exclusive statutory scheme that permits
tolling in certain, specified circumstances. See Trentadue v. Buckler Lawn Sprinkler, 738
N.W.2d 664, 670-671 (Mich. 2007). Those circumstances include allegations of professional
9
and medical malpractice, injuries arising out of unsafe property, and actions alleging that a
person who may be held liable for a claim fraudulently concealed the existence of the claim or
the identity of any person who is liable for the claim. Id. at 670. Only the last of these
circumstances could conceivably be at issue here, and, notably, while Plaintiff complains of
being “stonewalled” in his attempts to learn the identities of his alleged assailants, there is no
indication or suggestion that the identities of the named Defendants, or any other potential
defendant, were fraudulently concealed. According to Defendants, the Sheriff’s Department
complied with Plaintiff’s subpoena and did so in a timely manner. Defs. Reply at 4. Instead,
Plaintiff’s difficulties appear to stem from the fact that he is an incarcerated, pro se litigant, with
limited access to legal resources and knowledge. See generally Pl. Resp. at 1, 7-9.
While Plaintiff maintains that Michigan law suspends the statute of limitations for
persons with legal disabilities, id. at 8, the requisite statute no longer considers imprisonment
among those disabilities. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5851(9) (referring to former provisions
of the statute that included imprisonment as a disability); see also Johnson v. Candelas, 230 F.3d
1358, 2000 WL 1477503 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000) (table) (“The statutory provision for tolling
the statute of limitations for incarceration was repealed in Michigan effective April 1, 1994, and
a grace period expired one year after that date.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims cannot be tolled on
that basis.
Because Plaintiff added the now-named Defendants to the present action well after the
statute of limitations expired, and because there is no Michigan law that would toll the relevant
limitations period, Plaintiff’s claims against the named Defendants are time-barred.
10
Any
amendment to add those Defendants to the complaint would be futile; therefore the Magistrate
Judge erred in denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss.4
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 44) is granted, and
Plaintiff’s claims as to Defendants Collins, Montoya, and Sheridan are dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 3, 2015
Detroit, Michigan
s/ Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and
any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class
U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on November 3, 2015.
s/Karri Sandusky
Case Manager
4
Because the Magistrate Judge recommended denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s
case has continued to progress while the current R&R remained pending before this Court.
However, none of these developments, including a newly filed amended complaint, alters the
conclusions reached by the Court in this Opinion and Order.
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