Taylor, derivatively on behalf of Flagstar Bancorp, Inc. v. Campanelli et al

Filing 25

OPINION AND ORDER Granting 11 Motion to Stay; Deeming as Moot 14 Motion to Intervene. Signed by District Judge Sean F. Cox. (JMcC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Kenneth Taylor, derivatively
on behalf of Flagstar Bankcorp, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Joseph P. Campanelli, Michael J.
Tierney, Paul D. Borja, Todd M.
McGowan, Daniel Landers, Matthew
A. Kerin, Walter N. Carter, Gregory
Eng, Jay J. Hansen, David J. Matlin,
James A. Ovenden, Mark Patterson,
Michael J. Shonka, David J. Treadwell,

Case No. 14-10313
Honorable Sean F. Cox

Defendants.
v.
Flagstar Bancorp, Inc.,
Nominal Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY CASE
PURSUANT TO COLORADO RIVER DOCTRINE
This is a shareholder derivative case. Plaintiff Kenneth Taylor (“Plaintiff” or “Taylor”),
derivatively on behalf of Flagstar Bancorp, Inc. (“Flagstar”), alleges that certain individuals on
Flagstar’s Board of Directors breached their fiduciary duties to Flagstar, and that Flagstar suffered
financial harms as a result.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Or, In the Alternative To
Stay (Doc. #11), and Motion to Intervene by State Court Lead Plaintiff Joel Rosenfeld (Doc. #14).

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The motions have been fully briefed by the parties. The Court finds that the issues have been
adequately presented in the parties’ briefs and that oral argument would not significantly aid in the
decisional process. See Local Rule 7.1(f)(1), U.S.D.C., E.D. MI. The Court therefore orders that
the motion will be decided upon the briefs. For the reasons set forth below, the Court shall GRANT
Defendants’ Motion to Stay and DENY Joel Rosenfeld’s Motion to Intervene as MOOT.
BACKGROUND
A.

The Federal Court Case
Plaintiff in this case is Kenneth Taylor, a Flagstar shareholder. Taylor is a resident of

Wyoming. Flagstar is a Michigan-based company.
Taylor brought this shareholder derivative action against Flagstar’s Board of Directors after
Flagstar entered into a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”). The DOJ alleged
that Flagstar fraudulently approved residential home mortgage loans for government insurance.
(Compl., at 2). The settlement required Flagstar to pay up to $133 million, as well as revise its
internal controls and procedures. (Compl. at 2-3).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following counts against all Defendants:
(1)

Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Disseminating False and Misleading
Information

(2)

Breach of Fiduciary Duties for Failing to Maintain Internal Controls

(3)

Breach of Fiduciary Duties for Failing to Properly Oversee and Manage the
Company

(4)

Unjust Enrichment

(5)

Abuse of Control

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(6)

Gross Mismanagement

(Compl. at 23-26). Taylor requests the following relief:
A.

Against all Defendants in favor of the Company in the amount of damages
sustained by the Company as a result of Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary
duties;

B.

Directing Flagstar to take all necessary actions to reform and improve its
corporate governance and internal procedures to comply with applicable laws
and to protect the company and its shareholders from a repeat of the
damaging events described herein . . .

C.

Awarding Flagstar restitution from Defendants, and each of them, and
ordering disgorgement of all profits, benefits and other compensation
obtained by the Defendants;

D.

Awarding to Plaintiff the costs and disbursements of the action, including
reasonable attorneys’ fees, accountants’ and experts’ fees, costs, and
expenses; and

E.

Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

(Compl. at 27).
B.

The State Court Case
Before Plaintiff brought the present suit, he filed suit in the Oakland County Circuit Court

based on the same factual allegations against identical defendants.
Shortly after Taylor had filed his state action, another Flagstar shareholder, Joel Rosenfeld
(“Rosenfeld”), filed a derivative action in state court against Flagstar’s Board of Directors.
Rosenfeld’s derivative action was based on the same factual allegations and requested the same
relief as Taylor’s action.
Rosenfeld moved to consolidate his case with Taylor’s, to be named lead plaintiff, and to
have his counsel named as lead counsel. (Defs.’ Mo. to Dismiss, Doc. # 11, at 5). Taylor objected
to both the consolidation and the nomination of Rosenfeld as lead plaintiff.
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Judge James M. Alexander in the Oakland County Circuit Court granted Rosenfeld’s motion
over Taylor’s objections. (See Op. and Order Re: Mot. for Consolidation, attached to Defs.’ Mo.
at Ex. A). Rosenfeld then filed a consolidated amended complaint, naming him and Taylor as
plaintiffs.
After Rosenfeld filed his consolidated amended complaint, Taylor filed a “withdrawal” with
the state court.1 (Notice of Withdrawal, attached to Defs.’ Mo. at Ex. E). Taylor then proceeded to
file the present suit in federal court.
C.

The State Court Consolidated Amended Complaint
The state court consolidated amended complaint contains six counts against the same

Defendants that are named in this federal action:
(1)

Breach of Fiduciary Duties for Failing to Maintain Internal Controls

(2)

Breach of Fiduciary Duties for Failing to Properly Oversee and Manage the
Company

(3)

Breach of Fiduciary Duties for Disseminating False and Misleading
Information

(4)

Gross Mismanagement

(5)

Unjust Enrichment

(6)

Breach of Fiduciary Duties in Connection With Their Abuse of Control

(See State Ct. Consol. Amd. Compl., attached to Defs.’ Mo. at Ex. F). The state court consolidated
amended complaint is based on the same core factual allegations as this action, and requests nearly

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It is unclear what effect Taylor’s “Notice of Withdrawal” had on the state court action,
if any, or whether Taylor is still technically a party in that case.
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identical relief as Taylor requests here:
A.

Awarding against all Defendants and in favor of Flagstar the amount of
damages sustained by it as a result of Defendants’ breaches of statutory and
common law fiduciary duties and gross mismanagement;

B.

Directing the Special Committee to complete its report by a date certain and
furnish to Lead Plaintiff’s counsel a copy of the report, together with copies
of the documents reviewed and notes of interviews taken by the Special
Committee or its counsel;

C.

Directing Flagstar to take all necessary actions to reform and improve its
corporate governance and internal control practices and procedures to
comply with applicable laws and best practices and to protect the Company
and its shareholders from a repeat of the damaging events described herein…

D.

Awarding Flagstar restitution from Defendants, and each of them, and
ordering disgorgement of all profits, benefits and other compensation
obtained by the Defendants;

E.

Awarding to Plaintiff the costs and disbursements of the action, including
reasonable attorneys’ fees, accountants’ and experts’ fees, costs, and
expenses; and

F.

Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

(Defs.’ Mo. at Ex. F, pp. 44-45).
D.

Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Dismiss
Defendants now move to dismiss or stay this federal court case under the Colorado River

doctrine. (Doc. #11). Defendants claim that the state and federal cases are parallel for purposes of
Colorado River because the cases arise from the same factual background, allege the same or similar
causes of action, and involve substantially similar parties.
Taylor responds that the two cases are not parallel because, according to him, Rosenfeld does
not have standing to bring a derivative action against Flagstar’s Board of Directors. (Pl. Resp., Doc.
# 19).

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Defendants reply that the issue of standing has already been resolved by the state court, and
that the state case will likely resolve all of the claims Taylor has brought in this federal action.
(Defs.’ Reply, Doc. # 21).
E.

State Court Lead Plaintiff Joel Rosenfeld’s Motion to Intervene
Rosenfeld has filed a Motion to Intervene in this federal case. (Doc. #14). Rosenfeld argues

that the Court should find that he may intervene as of right pursuant to FRCP 24(a)(2) because
Rosenfeld has a substantial interest in this litigation that will not be protected absent his
involvement. In the alternative, Rosenfeld argues that he should be permitted to intervene pursuant
to FRCP 24(b) because there are common questions of law and fact between the state and federal
cases, his interests are not adequately protected by Taylor, and no other adequate remedy is
available.
Taylor responds, generally, that Rosenfeld is not entitled, and should not be permitted, to
intervene because he has not properly complied with Michigan’s demand requirement for derivative
actions.
ANALYSIS
1.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Or Stay Pursuant to Colorado River
“In Colorado River, the Supreme Court noted that, despite the virtually unflagging obligation

of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them, considerations of judicial economy and
federal-state comity may justify abstention in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of
jurisdiction by state and federal courts.” Romine v. Compuserve Corp., 160 F.3d 337, 339 (6th Cir.
1998).
Of course, “[t]he pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning
the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.” Doe v. Ann Arbor Public School, 2012
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WL 1110015 (E.D. Mich. April 3, 2012) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817). There are,
however, situations in which a federal court may defer to a parallel concurrent state court
proceeding, when the decision to do so is “based on wise judicial administration, giving regard to
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.” Id., citing Colorado
River, 424 U.S. at 817.
“When a district court decides to dismiss or stay under Colorado River, it presumably
concludes that the parallel state-court litigation will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and
prompt resolution of the issues between the parties.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983). “If there is any substantial doubt as to this, it would be a serious
abuse of discretion to grant the stay or dismissal at all.” Id.
Accordingly, a court should abstain only “in extraordinary and narrow circumstances.” Id.
at 813. Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. Crown
Equip. Corp. v. Supplies & Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 100 (6th Cir. 1999), citing Moses H. Cone, 460
U.S. at 14; see also Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813.
a)

Are The State Court And Federal Court Proceedings Parallel?

For the first step in determining whether a Colorado River stay is appropriate, this Court
must find that the concurrent state and federal actions are parallel. See Crawley v. Hamilton County
Comm’rs, 744 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1984). “[E]xact parallelism is not required; [i]t is enough if the two
proceedings are substantially similar.” Romine, 160 F.3d at 340 (citations omitted).
Two cases are substantially similar “where (1) the parties are substantially similar, and (2)
[Plaintiff’s] claims against [Defendants] are predicated on the same allegations as to the same
material facts . . . .” Ann Arbor Public Schools 2012 WL 1110015 at *3, citing Romine at 340.

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The parties in both proceedings need not be identical, however. See Heitmanis v. Austin, 899
F.2d 521, 528 (6th Cir. 1990). Rather, “[p]arties with ‘nearly identical’ interests are considered
‘substantially the same’ for Colorado River purposes.” Clark v. Lacy, 376 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir.
2004).
Here, Defendants argue that the cases are parallel because the parties to this case and the
parties to the state court case are substantially similar, the state and federal cases allege the same
causes of action, and the state and federal cases are based on the same material facts. (Defs.’ Mo.
at 1).
The Court finds that the state and federal cases are parallel for purposes of the Colorado
River doctrine analysis. First, the parties in the two cases, Rosenfeld and Taylor, are substantially
similar. As derivative-action plaintiffs, they have nearly identical interests as Flagstar shareholders.
Additionally, the named Defendants are identical in both the state and federal cases.
Next, the claims in both cases arise out of the settlement between Flagstar and the United
States Department of Justice resolving litigation concerning Flagstar’s improper lending practices.
Thus, the factual allegations in both cases are nearly identical.
Furthermore, Taylor and Rosenfeld allege the same six causes of action against the same
defendants. For example, Count One in the state court action and Count Two in this action are both
entitled “Breach of Fiduciary Duty–Failure to Maintain Internal Controls.” Count Two in the state
case and Count Three in the federal case are both entitled “Breach of Fiduciary Duty–Failure to
Oversee and Manage Company.” The remaining causes of action in this case are extremely similar,
if not identical, to the other causes of action alleged in the state case.
Finally, Taylor and Rosenfeld request the same relief in both cases. For example, they both

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ask for restitution in favor of Flagstar, reform of control policies, and costs and attorneys’ fees.
Taylor argues that this case is not parallel to Rosenfeld’s case in state court. Taylor claims
that because Rosenfeld does not allege that his demand was wrongfully refused or ignored by the
board of directors before he filed suit, Rosenfeld has no legal standing to file a derivative suit and
the state court case will be dismissed. (Pl.’s Resp. at 3-5). Therefore, Taylor argues, the state court
action will not adequately dispose of all of his claims.
The Court finds this argument without merit. Judge Alexander in Oakland County Circuit
Court has already held that Rosenfeld satisfied the demand requirement and may proceed with his
derivative action on behalf of Flagstar’s shareholders. That issue has already been settled in the
state court and is immaterial to whether the state and federal cases are parallel. (See Defs.’ Reply
at Ex. A, pp. 3,4).
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the state and federal cases are parallel.
b)

Do The Colorado River Factors Weigh in Favor of Abstention?

Having determined that the state and federal proceedings are parallel, this Court must address
the Colorado River factors and determine whether they favor abstention in this case. In determining
whether to invoke Colorado River abstention, a district court must consider such factors as (1)
whether the state court has assumed jurisdiction over any res or property; (2) whether the federal
forum is less convenient to the parties; (3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which
jurisdiction was obtained; (5) whether the source of governing law is state or federal; (6) the
adequacy of the state court action to protect the federal plaintiff’s rights; (7) the relative progress
of the state and federal proceedings; and (8) the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction.
Romine, 160 F.3d at 340-41 (internal citations omitted).

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“Additionally, courts considering application of Colorado River abstention may consider an
attempt by a litigant to shop for a more receptive forum . . .” Cherry Ridge, LLC v. Canton Charter
Twp., 2013 WL 5651423 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 2013) reconsideration denied, 2013 WL 5796174
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2013), quoting Preston v. Eriksen, 1997 WL 14418 at n.3 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Court should also consider the availability of complete relief in the state court.
Heitmanis, 899 F.2d at 528, citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26-27. “These factors do not
compose a mechanical checklist . . . they require a careful balancing of the important factors as they
apply in a given case.” Crown Equip., 181 F.3d at *2, quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 1.
1.

Has the state court has assumed jurisdiction over any property?

The state court has not assumed jurisdiction over any res or property. Thus, the Court finds
that this factor is “inapposite to the instant matter because no property is at issue.” Romine, 160
F.3d at 341.
2.

Is the federal forum less convenient to the parties?

Defendants argue that this factor weighs in favor of abstention, “albeit not overwhelmingly,”
because the Oakland County Circuit Court in Pontiac, Michigan is a more convenient forum to
litigate these claims than this federal court located in Detroit, Michigan. Plaintiff argues that the two
locations are equally convenient, so this factor weighs against abstention.
Plaintiff resides in Wyoming, but his counsel is located in Oakland County. Defendants’
attorneys’ offices are all located in Oakland County. Thus, presumably, Oakland County is a
slightly more convenient forum than Detroit, Michigan. The Court finds that this factor weighs
slightly in favor of abstention.
3.

Will abstention avoid piecemeal litigation?

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“Avoidance of piecemeal litigation,” which is the third Colorado River factor, is often the
most important factor in the analysis. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16. “Piecemeal litigation
occurs when different courts adjudicate the identical issue, thereby duplicating judicial effort and
potentially rendering conflicting results.” Romine, 160 F.3d at 341. Defendant contends that this
factor weighs in favor of abstention.
Plaintiff argues that there is no risk of piecemeal litigation, that the prevention of duplicative
litigation is not to be considered in abstention analysis, and that multiple derivative actions can
coexist in state and federal court.
Here, the Court finds that the danger of piecemeal litigation is substantial. This case is not
merely “duplicative” of the state court litigation, and the state and federal cases are not merely
coexistent derivative actions. A comparison of the Verified Consolidated Shareholder Derivative
Complaint filed in state court (Def. Ex. F) and the Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint filed
here (Def. Ex. G) shows that the causes of action are nearly identical, the underlying facts are nearly
identical, and the named Defendants are identical. Therefore, it is possible that Defendants could
be subject to wholly inconsistent judgments if the state and federal cases proceed simultaneously.
Such an outcome would constitute a waste of judicial resources and would undermine the credibility
of the judicial system. Therefore, the Court finds that this factor weighs heavily in favor of
abstention.
4.

Does the order in which jurisdiction was obtained favor abstention?

Defendants note that the state court obtained jurisdiction nearly five months earlier than did
this Court. Plaintiff concedes that the state court obtained jurisdiction first, but argues that the two
cases have not “progressed beyond the filing of the respective operative complaints.”

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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s contention is factually inaccurate. The federal case here has
barely progressed beyond the pleading stage, but Defendants represent that Rosenfeld and the
Special Litigation Committee were ordered by the state court to engage in facilitation on March 4,
2014. (Defs. Br. at 8). On that basis, the state court litigation has made measurable progress, in
contrast to this federal litigation.
Even so, the progress of the actions is a separate and distinct consideration in the Colorado
River analysis. Thus, because it is agreed that the state court obtained jurisdiction before this Court,
this fourth factor weighs in favor of abstention.
5.

Does federal or state law govern the claims?

Defendants claim that this factor weighs in favor of abstention because all of Plaintiff’s
claims are governed by state law, and “a state court’s expertise in applying its own law favors a
Colorado River stay.” (Def. Br. at 16, quoting Day v. Union Mines, Inc., 862 F.2d 652, 660 (7th Cir.
1988)). Plaintiff responds that the federal court is capable of deciding routine issues of state law,
such as those found here, so this factor does not favor abstention.
This Court finds Defendants’ position persuasive. The state court case is being litigated in
the new Business Court division of the Oakland County Circuit Court. While the Court agrees that
this federal court is entirely capable of adjudicating issues of Michigan state law, the Oakland
County Circuit Court, Business Division, likely has more experience in applying Michigan law to
shareholder disputes. Thus, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of abstention.

6.

Will the state court action adequately protect the federal plaintiff’s
rights?
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Defendants argue that the state court will adequately protect Plaintiff’s rights because the
Business Court has “specialized procedures that render it particularly well-suited to provide timely
and adequate relief, if appropriate.” (Def. Br. at 17). Defendants point out that Plaintiff originally
filed his case in state court even though he had the option to file in federal court, implying that
Plaintiff knows that the state court forum is adequate.
Plaintiff responds that he no longer believes the state court is adequate because “the State
Court’s appointment of Rosenfeld as lead plaintiff all but extinguished Taylor’s right to argue that
the Taylor Demand was wrongfully ignored in the State Court.” (Pl. Resp. at 18). Plaintiff further
argues that Rosenfeld lacks standing to prosecute the shareholder derivative action because he does
not allege that he issued a demand on the Board of Directors and that demand was wrongfully
refused. (Pl. Resp. at 18).2
First, neither the Michigan statute that sets forth the demand requirement, nor any of
Plaintiff’s cited case law, supports the notion that a derivative plaintiff’s demand must be wrongfully
refused before that plaintiff can file a shareholder derivative suit. Rather, the statute simply provides
that the plaintiff must serve the demand and wait ninety days. See M.C.L. 450.1493a. Both
Plaintiffs have complied with this statute, as far as the record shows.

2

The Michigan statute governing demand provides that “[a] shareholder may not
commence a derivative proceeding until all of the following have occurred:
(a) A written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action.
(b) Ninety days have expired from the date the demand was made unless the shareholder
has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless
irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day
period.
M.C.L. 450.1493a.
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Additionally, Judge Alexander, who presides over the state court action, has already held that
Plaintiff Rosenfeld has satisfied the demand requirement, and therefore has standing to pursue
derivative claims on behalf of Flagstar’s shareholders. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s heavy
reliance on Rosenfeld’s purported “lack of standing” unpersuasive, as there is no factual basis for
concluding that Rosenfeld lacks standing to prosecute the shareholder derivative claims against
Flagstar’s Board of Directors.
Further, Plaintiff has come forth with no other evidence or argument indicating that the state
court will inadequately adjudicate the Flagstar shareholders’ derivative claims. On this basis, the
Court finds that the state court is an adequate forum, and this factors also supports abstention.
7.

Does the relative progress of the proceedings favor abstention?

Defendants argue that this factor slightly supports abstention because this federal action was
filed in January of 2014, whereas the state court action was filed in August of 2013. (Defs. Br. at
17-18). Moreover, Defendants claim that the state court judge has ordered the parties to engage in
facilitation, that a facilitator has been chosen and evidence has been exchanged, and that a
facilitation date of March 4, 2014 was chosen. Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. The Court
finds that this factor weighs in favor of abstention.
8.

Is there concurrent jurisdiction over the claims?

Finally, the eighth factor looks to whether the federal and state court have concurrent
jurisdiction. It appears undisputed that they do. This factor weighs in favor of abstention. See
Highland Park, LLC v. Golden, 20090WL 1704669 at *3 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (Cox, J.), citing Bates
v. Van Buren Township, 122 Fed. App’x 803, 807 (6th Cir. 2004).
Because the state and federal cases are parallel (indeed, nearly identical), and because nearly

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all of the Colorado River factors weigh in favor of abstention, the Court shall GRANT Defendants’
Motion to Stay Pursuant to Colorado River.
c)

Should the Court stay or dismiss Plaintiff’s case?

Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss, rather than stay, Plaintiff’s case, because
Plaintiff is guilty of forum shopping and because the state court litigation will effectively dispose
of all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff did not respond to this argument.
Although the Court agrees that the state court case will likely be dispositive of Plaintiff’s
claims, the Court must stay Plaintiff’s case. The Sixth Circuit has expressly held that when a court
invokes Colorado River abstention, a stay, rather than dismissal, is the “preferred course of action.”
Timeco Mach. Works v. S&M Machinery Sales Corp., 2014 WL 1308511 at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
31, 2014) (Rosen, J.), citing Bates v. Van Buren Township, 122 Fed. App’x 803, 808-90 (6th Cir.
2004) (“We therefore join other circuits in requiring a stay of proceedings rather than a dismissal
in Colorado River abstention cases.”).
2.

The Court Shall Deny Joel Rosenfeld’s Motion to Intervene As Moot.
The purpose of a Colorado River stay is to allow the state court to adjudicate the claims

before it so that judicial resources are not wasted and inconsistent outcomes are avoided. Because
the state and federal cases are nearly identical, the state court will likely dispose of all of Plaintiff’s
claims. Thus, once the state court litigation is complete, this Court will have nothing more to do but
dismiss this case.
On that basis, the Court need not decide whether Rosenfeld should be allowed to intervene
in this case. This action will be stayed while Rosenfeld’s derivative claims are adjudicated in state
court. Once Rosenfeld’s claims are fully adjudicated by the state court, he will have no reason to

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be party to this case. Therefore, the Court shall DENY Rosenfeld’s Motion to Intervene as MOOT.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Stay (Doc. #11)
and DENIES AS MOOT Joel Rosenfeld’s Motion to Intervene (Doc. #14).
Defendants are ORDERED to file a Notice of Status of State Court Proceedings once every
six (6) months until the parallel state court action has been fully adjudicated.
Defendants are further ORDERED to file a Notice of Completion of State Court Proceedings
as soon as the parallel state court action has been fully adjudicated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Sean F. Cox
Sean F. Cox
United States District Judge
Dated: June 30, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on June
30, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Jennifer McCoy
Case Manager

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