Shaya v. Belcastro et al

Filing 29

ORDER Denying 10 Motion to Remand. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (Monda, H)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STEVE SHAYA,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-cv-11112
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
DAVID BELCASTRO, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND
On February 13, 2014, Plaintiff Steve Shaya filed a 7-count Complaint
against the Defendants – the City of Hamtramck and several of its current or
former officials and/or employees – in the Wayne County Circuit Court. The
Complaint asserted several state-law claims and one federal claim under 42 U.S.C.
§1983. Defendants timely removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§1441 and 1446 on the ground that this Court would have had original federal
question jurisdiction over the action.

Plaintiff has since filed an Amended

Complaint and a Second Amended Complaint. (See ECF #9 & #24.) The Second
Amended Complaint asserts four federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 12

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state-law claims. Plaintiff now moves to remand the state-law claims to the Wayne
County Circuit Court. The motion is DENIED1.
It is undisputed that this Court has original jurisdiction over this action. The
only question is whether it should retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims. The governing statute, 28 U.S.C. §1367(a) provides that, “in any civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” This statute gives
district courts a “broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction over other [related]
claims.” Exact Software N. Am. Inc. v. DeMoisey, 718 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir.
2013), quoting Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558559 (2005). Another statute, 28 U.S.C. §1367(c), allows district courts to decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim if: “(1) the claim raises
a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates
over the claims or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3)
the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or

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While the Court, at this time, declines to remand Plaintiff’s state-law claims,
should Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants be resolved before trial,
through motion practice or otherwise, the Court may, at that time, revisit whether it
would be appropriate to remand any then-remaining state-law claims.
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(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.”
A district court’s decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is
“discretionary [in] nature.” City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).

In exercising this discretion, a district court should

consider “values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id,
quoting Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). In this
action, these factors weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction over the state-law
claims at this time.
Most importantly, there appears to be substantial overlap in the factual
predicates of the federal and state claims. For instance, the federal claims arise out
of alleged discrimination (based on Plaintiff’s status as a Chaldean American) and
on alleged retaliation for Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment right (see,
e.g., Sec. Am. Compl., ECF #24, at ¶¶141-142; 168-172), and many of the state
claims arise out of these same allegations. (See e.g., id. at ¶¶77-84; 124-135.) It
would be inefficient, unfair, and would undermine judicial economy to litigate
such closely-related claims in two different courts at the same time. Likewise, it
would be inconvenient for the parties to engage simultaneously in parallel, largelyduplicative litigation. And there is no unfairness to Plaintiff in litigating all of his
claims before this Court.
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Plaintiffs cites two cases, Stuart v. Village of New Haven, 2009 WL 4065039
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2009) and Miller-Webb v. Genessee County, 2013 WL
5500071 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2013), in support of his request to remand. Those
cases, however, are distinguishable. In Stuart, the court found it “significant” that
the case had been pending in state court for several months before it was removed,
Stuart, 2009 WL 4065039 at *3; there is no similar state-court history in this
action. In Miller-Webb, the court stressed that Plaintiff’s claims involved “novel
issues of state employment law,” Miller-Webb, 2013 WL 5500071 at *2; Plaintiff
here does not suggest that any of his claims present novel or difficult state law
questions. Indeed, aside from citing the governing legal standard and the Stuart
and Miller-Webb cases, Plaintiff makes no effort to show why a remand would, in
fact, serve the interests of judicial economy, fairness, convenience and comity.
For these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Motion
to Remand is DENIED.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: June 3, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on June 3, 2014, by electronic means and/or ordinary
mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]
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