AS et al v. Grosse Pointe Public Schools System Board of Education et al
Filing
29
OPINION AND ORDER finding as moot 23 Motion to Certify Class; finding as moot 14 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; granting 16 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KAREN STREHLKE, as a friend of AS, a minor,
LAURA BUCKLEY, as a friend of CB, a minor,
RENEE CICERONE, as a friend of JC, a minor,
GINA LIVERPOOL, as a friend of OL, a minor,
NENITA OZORMOOR, as a friend of ZC, a
minor, and YVONNE MADDEN, as a friend of
ZM, a minor, on behalf of themselves and all
Similarly situated members of the class,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 14-11183
Hon. Patrick J. Duggan
GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOLS SYSTEM,
BOARD OF EDUCATION, JOAN DINDOFFER,
President of GPPSS Board of Education, in her
Official Capacity, THOMAS HARWOOD,
Superintendent of GPPSS School District, in his
Official Capacity, and C. JON DEAN, GPPSS
Deputy Superintendent for Administration, in his
Official Capacity,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (2) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFFS’
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND CLASS CERTIFICATION
In this civil rights action, instituted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs –
each of whom is a minor filing suit through a parent as next of friend – claim that
Defendants – a school board and various school officials – violated their rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as
well as various provisions of the Michigan Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs
challenge the school system’s demarcation of its high school attendance areas as
well as an intra-district high school transfer policy on the basis that the policies
violate the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment. Plaintiffs also endeavor to state claims under the corresponding
provisions of the Michigan Constitution.
The following motions are presently before the Court: (1) Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, which, despite its label, also serves as a summary judgment
motion; (2) Plaintiffs’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, which Plaintiffs filed
in the same document as their Response to Defendants’ Motion;1 (3) Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction; and (4) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification. With the exception of the class certification motion, all pending
motions have been fully briefed and were the subject of a lengthy hearing
conducted on August 12, 2014. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants
Defendants’ Motion and denies each of the three motions filed by Plaintiffs, two of
them on mootness grounds.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1
Citations in this Opinion and Order to Plaintiffs’ Response (“(Pls.’ Resp.)”)
dually refer to the response and the cross motion.
2
A.
The Parties
Plaintiffs are parents representing the interests of their school-aged children,
all of whom reside in the northwest corner of the City of Grosse Pointe Farms.
Grosse Pointe Farms is one of six cities comprising the Grosse Pointe Public
School System (“GPPSS”), a general powers public school district in Wayne
County, Michigan (the “School District”). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 12, ECF No. 7.)
“Defendant [GPPSS] Board of Education (the ‘Board’) governs the GPPSS
school district[.]” (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant Joan Dindoffer is the President of the
Board, Defendant Thomas Harwood is the Superintendent of the School District,
and Defendant C. Jon Dean is the Deputy Superintendent for Administration. (Id.
¶¶ 9-11.) Dindoffer, Harwood, and Dean (the “Individual Defendants”) are sued
only in their official capacities.2
B.
The School District
The School District serves several communities in eastern Wayne County,
Michigan, specifically, the cities of Grosse Pointe, Grosse Pointe Farms, Grosse
Pointe Park, Grosse Pointe Woods, all but a small area of Grosse Pointe Shores,
2
The Court notes that the claims asserted against the Individual Defendants
in their official capacities are in actuality claims against the entities they represent.
See, e.g., Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against
the official but rather a suit against the official’s office . . . as such, it is no
different from a suit against the State itself.”) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989)). Naming the Individual
Defendants, therefore, is redundant where the entity has also been sued.
3
and a portion of the City of Harper Woods. (Id. ¶ 12; Def.’s Br. 2 n.3.) Until
1968, one high school, located in Grosse Pointe Farms, served the students in the
School District. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) In 1967, presumably in response to
population growth, the District created a second high school, which was built in
Grosse Pointe Woods.3 (Id.) Today, the original high school is known as Grosse
Pointe South High School (“South”) and the school created in 1967, which opened
in 1968, is aptly named Grosse Pointe North High School (“North”).
C.
The Attendance Areas
1.
Plaintiffs’ Allegations
Plaintiffs allege that “upon the creation of the second high school, the six
cities that make up the District were” placed either in the North or South
attendance area and that “no municipal boundaries were breached” in the process.
(Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Thus, any student residing in Grosse Pointe Woods, Grosse Pointe
Shores, and the portion of Harper Woods included in the School District attended
North and any student residing in Grosse Pointe, Grosse Pointe Farms, and Grosse
Pointe Park attended South. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs further allege that because the
3
There are no GPPSS high schools in Grosse Pointe Park, Gross Pointe,
Grosse Pointe Shores, or Harper Woods. (Fenton Aff. ¶ 5, Def.’s Mot. Ex. A.)
Other schools are similarly distributed among the constituent municipalities. The
nine elementary schools are situated in Grosse Pointe Park (two schools), Grosse
Pointe (one), Grosse Pointe Farms (two), Grosse Pointe Woods (three), and Harper
Woods (one). (Id.) GPPSS operates three middle schools, one located in each of
the following: Grosse Pointe Park, Grosse Pointe Farms, and Grosse Pointe
Woods. (Id.) No GPPSS schools are in Grosse Pointe Shores. (Id.)
4
high school attendance areas were divided along municipal boundaries – with “the
north municipal boundary of the Farms” becoming “the de facto line of
demarcation” between the two high schools – there was, “upon information and
belief,” no “expectation or objective to equalize enrollment [between] the two high
schools[.]” (Id. ¶ 15.)
At some point “in recent years[,]” the Board, having undergone personnel
changes since the initial division of the School District, and the GPPSS
Administration “arbitrarily, capriciously and for no rational reason adopted an
attendance policy to exclude . . . children in a corner area of the Farms north of
Moross Road between Chalfonte Avenue and Mack Avenue[]” from the South
attendance area. (Id. ¶ 19.) This corner of Grosse Pointe Farms is comprised “of
mostly low[er income] homes[]” and houses a “higher than average concentration
of minority residents.” (Id.) As a result of the attendance zoning decision,
Plaintiffs, who reside in Grosse Pointe Farms, do not attend South even though
South is situated within the municipal boundaries of Plaintiffs’ city of residence.
Rather, Plaintiffs attend North, located in neighboring Grosse Pointe Woods.
2.
Defendants’ Rebuttal
The decision to construct a second high school serving students in the
School District brought forth a necessary corollary: the creation of high school
attendance areas. In 1967, when the Board was devising its plan to divide students
5
in the School District between two high schools, GPPSS operated ten elementary
schools.4 (Fenton Aff. ¶ 6, Defs.’ Mot. Ex. A.) Minutes from a December 11,
1967 Board meeting reflect that the elementary school attendance areas influenced
the delineation of the high school boundary; in fact, the boundary between North
and South was based on the preexisting elementary school attendance zones and
was drawn such that there would be five elementary schools in each high school
attendance zone. (12/11/67 Bd. Minutes, attach. 1 to Fenton Aff. (“Each high
school would have five elementary school attendance areas in its district.”).) It
was at this Board meeting that “the current boundary between” North and South
“was established[.]” (Fenton Aff. ¶ 6; 12/11/67 Bd. Minutes.) Despite Plaintiffs’
unfounded protestations to the contrary, the boundary has not been altered since.5
(Fenton Aff. ¶ 8 (comparing map that shows high school boundary from 1968 to
the current attendance boundary and concluding that the attendance areas have
remained unchanged since first adopted).)
4
One elementary school has since been shuttered.
5
Plaintiffs alternatively contend that the Board, in the division decision, did
not consider that residents of the disputed area were assigned to Monteith, an
elementary school in Grosse Pointe Woods, because of concerns regarding traffic
safety. The Board knew that some parents elected to continue to send their
children to Kerby, located in Grosse Pointe Farms. This allegedly evidences that
the Board never intended to split Grosse Pointe Farms in two with respect to high
school assignments.
6
D.
The Transfer Policy 6
For students residing in the School District, high school assignment is
determined by residence within one of two attendance areas. (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.)
Students desirous of attending the high school outside of their attendance area may
submit an application to the GPPSS Administration. According to Plaintiffs, a
transfer “may be approved . . . depending on [the] availability of space.” (Id.)
Plaintiffs suggest that most intra-district transfer applications have been
made by students residing in the North attendance area who wish to attend South.
(Id. ¶ 18.) “Upon information and belief, for years in the past, . . . [a]ll students
resid[ing] in the Farms could request” a transfer to South “and were automatically
approved for enrollment” there.7 (Id.) With the purported enactment of, or
subsequent amendment to, the challenged transfer policy, the roughly fifteen high
school aged students residing in Plaintiffs’ area of Grosse Pointe Farms must now
6
Transfer is a bit of a misnomer, as children typically apply to attend the
high school outside of their attendance area prior to beginning high school. Thus,
the students are not transferring from one high school to another, but rather they
are seeking enrollment at a high school outside of their attendance zone. For
purposes of this Opinion and Order the Court shall refer to the policy as the
transfer policy, as this is the language employed by the parties.
7
The Court notes that this allegation is inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ assertion
that the entirety of Grosse Pointe Farms was, until some point in the recent past,
within the South attendance area. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.)
7
submit transfer applications.8 These students’ applications are given no preference
in the GPPSS Administration’s decisionmaking process. (Id. ¶ 20.) Instead, they
are required to compete with the students applying to transfer from other cities
within North’s attendance area. (Id.) “Upon information and belief, a greater
number of students resident outside the [S]outh district than the number of students
resident in Plaintiffs[’] area of the Farms are approved for transfers to … South
every year.” (Id. ¶ 21.)
Defendants respond to these allegations by submitting evidence relating to
various transfer policies implemented by the Board. In April of 1996, the Board
approved the amendment of a transfer policy referred to as “Policy JEC.” (Fenton
Supp. Aff. ¶ 6, Defs.’ Reply, Ex. B.) The amendment prospectively limited intradistrict high school transfers if total enrollment at either high school reached 1,500,
and/or if the difference in enrollment between the two schools exceeded 300
8
For the school year beginning in September 2014, “of the eleven 8th-grade
students residing in Plaintiffs’ geographical area, four (including AS) applied for a
transfer from North” to “South[,]” “while seven did not apply. All four transfer
requests were denied, per Policy 5111.” (Fenton Supp. Aff. ¶ 7, Defs.’ Reply, Ex.
B.) Somewhat curiously, Defendants have not included the corresponding figures
regarding the number of applicants in the North attendance area residing outside of
Plaintiffs’ area of Grosse Pointe Farms seeking to transfer to South nor the number
of transfer applications so approved. At the motion hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel
estimated that sixty-one students transferred to South in the 2013-2014 academic
year, and of those, only three or four were from the disputed area.
8
9
students. (Id. ¶ 4 (citing 4/15/96 Bd. Minutes attach. 2 to Fenton Supp. Aff.).)
According to enrollment figures submitted by Defendants – figures that Plaintiffs
do not contest – 1,520 students enrolled at South during the 1999-2000 academic
year, thereby triggering implementation of Policy JEC. (Chart attach. 3 to Fenton
Aff.) By the 2002-03 school year, enrollment at both high schools exceeded 1,500.
Although North’s enrollment subsequently dropped below 1,500, the enrollment at
South remained above 1,500 until 2008, when the Board once again made changes
to the transfer policy.10 (Id.)
The Board’s amendment to Policy JEC is consistent with Plaintiffs’
evidence. Plaintiffs submitted affidavits from several long-term residents of the
northwest corner of Grosse Pointe Farms attesting to the fact that students in the
neighborhood routinely enrolled at South. The affidavits further indicate that the
affiants had children enrolled at South during the following periods and were not
required to surmount any hurdles in the enrollment process: 1980-1992, 19871993, 1990-1998, and 1996-2000. (Affs., Pls.’ Resp. Exs. 3-8.) This evidence is
9
Despite Plaintiffs’ assertions that the initial division of the School District
into two high school attendance areas was not motivated by a desire to equalize the
student populations between the schools, the desire for some sort of parity is made
manifest by these changes to Policy JEC. Thus, whether or not Plaintiffs are
correct that enrollment parity was an initial concern, it is irrelevant.
10
At the hearing, defense counsel indicated that Policy JEC remains in
place; however, an exhibit to Defendants’ Reply indicates the promulgation of a
new policy in 2008.
9
easily explained. For the child who began attending South in 1996 (the latest
year), Policy JEC had not yet been triggered, and, as defense counsel conceded at
the motion hearing, transfer applications submitted by students residing in the
disputed area were “rather routinely granted” prior to 1999 or 2000.
The Board did away with Policy JEC in 2008, when it overhauled the
transfer policy by passing Policy 5111. This policy provides: “Although students
will normally attend the school in their own attendance area, transfers will be
granted if class size, staffing, student groupings, or total enrollment in a particular
building are not adversely affected.” (Policy 5111 attach. 4 to Fenton Aff.)
E.
The “Unite the Farms” Campaign
In 2013, residents of the disputed area “attended School Board meetings and
spoke[ out] against the District’s attendance policy[,]” hoping that such action
would bring about a new policy allowing students in Plaintiffs’ neighborhood to
attend South with the rest of the students from Grosse Pointe Farms. (Am. Compl.
¶ 23.) “The Board and Administration [were] not . . . receptive to these demands.”
(Id.) Plaintiffs allege that one Board member “was reported to have stated that
their opposition to uniting” Grosse Pointe Farms in one attendance area “was
‘because to do so would drag the SEV of homes in the [S]outh district down into
the toilet[.]’” (Id.) Upon realizing that the “Unite the Farms” campaign had
reached the end of the road, Plaintiffs instituted this lawsuit.
10
F.
Legal Proceedings and Other Procedural Matters
On March 24, 2014, Plaintiffs filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
seeking to vindicate their equal protection rights secured by both the Michigan
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment (Count I), their rights to the privileges
and immunities of United States citizenship, as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment (Count II), and their First Amendment right to freedom of association,
which is also guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution (Count III).11 Plaintiffs
seek “a declaration of the right of school children” in the northwest corner of
Grosse Pointe Farms “to attend” South “just like other Farms residents, and for
injunctive relief permanently enjoining the District from excluding school children
residing in Plaintiffs’ area . . . from attending [South].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.)
On April 11, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, (ECF
No. 14), to which Defendants responded on April 28, 2014, (ECF No. 17).
Plaintiffs filed a supplemental reply brief on May 5, 2014. (ECF No. 18.)
On April 16, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 16.) Despite the label, and due to the
attachment of various exhibits, Defendants’ Motion alternatively seeks summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. After obtaining
permission to extend the response deadline, (ECF No. 19), Plaintiffs responded on
11
The lawsuit was originally filed on March 20, 2014, but the complaint was
subsequently stricken. An amended complaint was filed on March 24, 2014.
11
May 20, 2014, (ECF No. 20). In addition to serving as a response, Plaintiffs’ May
20 filing is styled as a cross motion for summary judgment.12 Defendants replied
to the motion to dismiss on June 3, 2014, (ECF No. 21), and responded to
Plaintiffs’ cross motion on June 9, 2014, (ECF No. 22).
The last motion filed in connection with this matter was a class certification
motion, filed on June 9, 2014. (ECF No. 23.) The filing of this motion prompted a
request for a status conference, which was held on June 18, 2014. At the status
conference, the Court informed counsel that it would address the Rule 12, but not
the Rule 56, arguments presented by Defendants on the basis that the discovery
period had not yet commenced. While reviewing the parties’ papers in preparation
for the August 12, 2014 motion hearing, however, the Court reconsidered this
position for two reasons. First, in lieu of objecting to Defendants’ request for
summary judgment or filing a Rule 56(d) motion requesting additional time to take
discovery, Plaintiffs both responded to Defendants’ Motion and filed a summary
judgment motion of their own. Second, and related to the first, in the respective
motions, both Defendants and Plaintiffs rely on evidence outside of the pleadings.
Having determined that the attached exhibits adequately illuminated the issues in
12
The Court takes this opportunity to note that the practice of coupling a
response with a motion violates Rule 5(e) of the Electronic Filing Policies and
Procedures of the Eastern District of Michigan, which provides, in pertinent part,
that “a reponse or reply to a motion must not be combined with a counter-motion.”
Violations of this rule may result in the stricking of the offending paper. Id.
12
this case, and because consideration of these exhibits would have converted the
Rule 12 motion into one for summary judgment, see Rule 12(d), at the beginning
of the motion hearing, the Court inquired as to whether counsel would object if the
Court decided Defendants’ Motion on summary judgment grounds. The attorneys
answered in the negative. The Court, therefore, construes Defendants’ Motion as a
motion for summary judgment and considers Plaintiffs’ Cross Motion.
Lastly, the Court notes that because it has been called upon to issue a
decision regarding the parties’ dispositive motions at the same time as Plaintiffs’
Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification, it unnecessary to
address the latter motions, as both are rendered moot by the Court’s decision today.
II.
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs courts to “grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A court assessing the appropriateness of summary judgment asks “whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Amway
Distribs. Benefits Ass’n v. Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quotation omitted).
13
Courts evaluate cross motions for summary judgment under the same
standard. La Quinta Corp. v. Heartland Props., L.L.C., 603 F.3d 327, 335 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citing Beck v. City of Cleveland, 390 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 2004)).
When faced with cross motions for summary judgment, each motion is examined
on its own merits. Id.
III.
A.
ANALYSIS
Section 1983
With the exception of the claims arising pursuant to the Michigan
Constitution, Plaintiffs employ the statutory vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in an
effort to fasten liability to Defendants. Section 1983 confers a private right of
action against any person who, acting under color of state law, causes a deprivation
of a right secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United
States. Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2005). Where, as here,
the “person” allegedly causing the rights deprivation is a municipal entity, courts
determine liability by application of a two-pronged inquiry: “(1) Whether the
plaintiff has asserted the deprivation of a constitutional right at all; and (2)
Whether the [entity] is responsible for that violation.” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103
F.3d 495, 505-06 (6th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original). Because the Court
answers the first inquiry in the negative, the Court need not delve into the issue of
municipal liability.
14
B.
Count I – Equal Protection Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
and Article I, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution
In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the guarantee of equal
protection set forth in both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that
“no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.13 This provision is “essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985). “Under
the Equal Protection Clause, ‘the states cannot make distinctions [that] . . . burden
a fundamental right, target a suspect class, or intentionally treat one differently
from others similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference.’”
Schellenberg v. Twp. of Bingham, 436 F. App’x 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 312 (6th Cir. 2005) and citing
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074-75
13
Michigan’s equal protection provision provides that “[n]o person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws[.]” Mich. Const. 1963, art. I, § 2. Because
Michigan courts have interpreted the state constitution’s equal protection provision
“as being coextensive with [its] federal counterpart[,]” the Court analyzes the equal
protection claim by reference to federal constitutional law. Bass v. Robinson, 167
F.3d 1041, 1050 n.4 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Doe v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 439 Mich.
650, 487 N.W.2d 166 (1992) and Gora v. Ferndale, 217 Mich. App. 295, 551
N.W.2d 454 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)).
15
(2000)). As the Sixth Circuit has explained, the “threshold element of an equal
protection claim is disparate treatment; once disparate treatment is shown, the equal
protection analysis to be applied is determined by the classification used by government
decision-makers.” Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir.
2006).
The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is that is that Defendants
have denied students residing in Plaintiffs’ area of Grosse Pointe Farms equal
educational opportunities as compared to students residing in the rest of Grosse
Pointe Farms. (Am. Compl. ¶ 47 (“Defendants failed to provide opportunity for
public education to the school children resident in Plaintiff’s area of the Farms on
equal terms with other school children in the Farms as proposed by the Supreme
Court … in Brown v. Board of Education [], 347 U.S. 483 (1954)[.]”).14) The basis
of this claim, however, is not entirely clear. Plaintiffs do not allege that they are
14
The Court is slightly troubled by the attempt to compare the statemandated segregation in Brown to the attendance boundary at issue here. Plaintiffs
rely on Brown for the proposition that “[w]here a state has undertaken to provide
an opportunity for an education in its public schools, such an opportunity is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.” (Pls.’ Resp. 12 (citing Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 691 (1954).) This is indeed what
the Supreme Court said, but context matters. There is simply no indication that the
facts of this case at all mirror those of Brown, that this case at all involves explicit
racial classifications reminiscent of Jim Crow era, or that Defendants engaged in
racial gerrymandering of the school attendance zones. Further, while the
assumption underlying the filing of this suit must be that South is the superior high
school, Plaintiffs have never said as much or explained how attendance at North
implicates unequal educational opportunities.
16
members of a protected class; rather, the only allegation at all implicating any
class-based status is Plaintiffs’ assertion that the disputed area consists “of mostly
low[er income] homes[]” and houses a “higher than average concentration of
minority residents.”15 (Id. ¶ 19.) In fact, Plaintiffs appear to concede that the
attendance boundaries are not animated by any impermissible bias, as they
acknowledge that “high school enrollment in the GPPSS school district is based on
residency . . . in the attendance area of the high school[.]” (Pls.’ Resp. 10-11.)
Neither do Plaintiffs allege that the policies at issue impermissibly interfere
with the exercise of a fundamental right to public education, nor could they. San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1299 (1973)
(“We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District
15
It is beyond dispute that the Equal Protection Clause, passed in effort to
mitigate the effects of this nation’s history of race-based enslavement, prohibits
discrimination upon the basis of race. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., __ U.S. __,
133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (“Distinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people, and therefore are
contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.”) (internal quotations
and citations omitted); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S. Ct. 2040,
2047 (1976) (“The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause . . . is the
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”)
To the extent that Plaintiffs’ rely on socioeconomic status as a suspect class,
the Court notes that the Supreme Court “has never held that financial need alone
identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.” Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 471, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2381 (1977) (citations omitted); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1294 (1973) (“[T]his
Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an
adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny.”).
17
Court’s finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found
those arguments unpersuasive.”). To the extent that Plaintiffs seek application of
strict scrutiny due to a deprivation of their fundamental right to associate, the Court
analyzes, and rejects this claim infra. This leaves one possible alternative: the
intentional differential treatment of Plaintiffs as compared to “others similarly
situated without any rational basis for the difference.” Schellenberg, 436 F. App’x
at 591 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This is known as a “class
of one” theory. Id.
Because no suspect class or fundamental right is implicated, the government
action at issue is subject only to rational basis review. TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 430 F.3d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2005). “To prevail on a ‘class of one’ equal
protection claim,” Plaintiffs “must prove that the government treated similarlysituated individuals differently [without a rational basis for the disparate
treatment].” Schellenberg, 436 F. App’x at 591 (citation omitted). “Materiality is
an integral” component to this demonstration. TriHealth, 430 F.3d at 790. It
appears that Plaintiffs argue that they are similarly situated to the students residing
in Grosse Pointe Farms, specifically those in the South attendance area. Assuming
for purposes of this analysis that the students are similarly situated in all material
respects, there is, in this Court’s view, nothing irrational about the attendance
boundary or the intra-district transfer policy.
18
Under rational basis review, a plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that
the government lacked a rational basis for its action. Id. at 791. In fact, a
governmental body “need not actually articulate at any time the purpose or
rationale supporting its [action].” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S. Ct.
2637, 2642 (1993) (internal quotation marks and quotation omitted). Rather,
“legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained in the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Spurlock v.
Fox, 716 F.3d 383, 402 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “When social or
economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide
latitude, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will
eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.” Id. Simply put, rational
basis review “is ‘a paradigm of judicial restraint,’ growing out of recognition that
‘equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness or logic
of legislative choices.’” TriHealth, 430 F.3d at 791 (quotation omitted).
When proceeding under a “class of one” theory, a plaintiff may demonstrate
the government action lacked a rational basis “either by negativing every
conceivable basis which might support the government action, or by showing that
the challenged action was motivated by animus or ill-will.” TriHealth, 430 F.3d at
788; Heller, 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S. Ct. at 2642 (citation omitted). Here, it appears
that Plaintiffs rely upon the former theory, as the Amended Complaint alleges that
19
there was never “any expectation or objective to equalize enrollment at the two
high schools[.]”16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) This allegation, while not entirely
inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ allegation that transfers between North and South are
approved “depending on [the] availability of space[,]” it is at least in tension with
it. (Id. ¶ 17.) Further, this speculative argument is the only argument Plaintiffs
put forth in effort to demonstrate the irrationality of the attendance zones.17
Irrespective of the veracity of Plaintiffs’ contentions that the attendance
areas were not strictly enforced in the past, the undisputed evidence clearly
establishes that the boundary was created so that each high school attendance zone
16
Plaintiffs allege that a School Board member remarked that placing all of
Grosse Pointe Farms into South’s attendance area “would drag the [value] of
homes in the south district down into the toilet[.]” (Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) However,
the Court is not persuaded that this comment demonstrates animus or ill-will.
17
Plaintiffs also suggest that the “adoption of an attendance area and policy
that exclude[s] students in Plaintiffs’ area of the Farms from the high school
located in their city was ultra vires and unlawful.” (Pls.’ Resp. 14, 13.) Although
Plaintiffs concede that Defendants have the authority to establish attendance areas,
they argue that the boundary here is arbitrary and capricious because it excludes
the disputed area from the South attendance zone, and it is therefore in
contravention of state law. (Id. at 13.) As support, Plaintiffs rely on Mason v. Bd.
of Educ., 6 Mich. App. 364, 149 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967). This case,
however, is not on point. In Mason, the court held that as long as attendance areas
are not arbitrarily fixed to exclude a particular segment of the population (that is, a
racial segment), children have “no constitutionally guaranteed right to attend a
public school outside of the attendance area in which he resides.” Id. at 371, 149
N.W.2d at 243 (citation omitted). In any event, it goes without saying that a state
entity does not violate the federal constitution by failing to adhere to its statutory
authority. Thus, even if the boundary is arbitrary, it is only relevant to the extent
that it informs whether there was a rational basis for the challenged action.
20
would correspond with the preexisting elementary school zones. When faced with
the question of how to split the School District in two, there is simply nothing
irrational about the decision to place five elementary schools in one area and five
in the other. Even assuming that this was not the most sensical means of dividing
the School District, “[t]he problems of government are practical ones and may
justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations -- illogical, it may be, and
unscientific.” Metro. Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 3 S. Ct. 441,
(1913). Because rational basis review does not require perfect decisionmaking,
rather, only rational decisionmaking, the boundary line withstands constitutional
scrutiny even though it severs Grosse Pointe Farms in two.
The transfer policy is equally constitutional. In fact, Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint, rather ironically, solidifies the rationality of the policy as it alleges that
approval of intra-district transfers is dependent upon the “availability of space[]” at
the receiving school. (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) To the extent Plaintiffs suggest that
there is no evidence the Board, in creating the attendance zones in 1967, intended
to equalize enrollment between the two high schools, this suggestion is irrelevant.
The fact of the matter is that the Board subsequently determined that this was
necessary to preserve the educational mission of the schools. (See, e.g., Policy
5111 (“Although students will normally attend the school in their own attendance
areas, transfers will be granted if class size, staffing, student groupings, or total
21
enrollment in a particular building are not adversely affected.”).) There is nothing
irrational about enacting a policy for the legitimate purpose of achieving
enrollment balance and preserving educational resources.
In conclusion, “‘the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be made a refuge from
ill-advised laws,’ and ‘[t]he calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular
law reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility.’”
Spurlock, 716 F.3d at 403 (alteration in original) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281, 272, 99 S. Ct. 2281, 2296, 2292 (1979)). Thus, that
Plaintiffs want to attend South, the high school in their city of residence, does not
mean that there exists some constitutionally-guaranteed right to do so. “In the
absence of any constitutional infirmity, it is not the province of the courts to dictate
and supervise local school policy.” Id. There is no constitutional right to attend
the school of one’s choice with classmates of one’s choice and § 1983 does not
provide a vehicle for making every governmental decision with which one
disagrees a constitutional tort. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on Count I.
C.
Count II – Violation of Privileges and Immunities Clause
Plaintiffs also contend that the District’s attendance boundary and transfer
policy are unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
22
Fourteenth Amendment.18 Specifically, Plaintiffs indicate that they are United
States citizens and that the challenged policies “abridge[] their rights to equal
protection of the laws and freedom of association[,]” thereby abridging their
privileges and immunities. (Pls.’ Resp. 15.) This argument, rooted as it must be in
the perception that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects all of the rights
set out in the Bill of Rights, need not be addressed in any depth as for over a
century, “the question of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against state infringement has been analyzed under the Due Process Clause” or
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. 3021, 3030-31 (2010).
To the extent Plaintiffs argue that this Court should hold that the right to
attend public school in the city of one’s residence is one of the “privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States,” this the Court will not do. The
Supreme Court interpreted the Amendment’s reference to “the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States” shortly after the Fourteen Amendment
was ratified. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 36 (1873).19 The
18
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
ratified in 1868, provides, in pertinent part: “No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
19
“The Privileges and Immunities Clause has been largely dormant since the
Slaughter-House Cases[.]” Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002).
23
majority concluded that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only those
rights owing “their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws[,]” id. at 79; “other fundamental rights – rights . . . that
‘the State governments were created to establish and secure’ were not protected by
the Clause[,]” McDonald, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. at 3028 (quotation omitted).
Put differently, the protection afforded by the Clause “does not include rights
pertaining to state citizenship and derived solely from the relationship of the
citizen and his state established by State law.” Glicker v. Mich. Liquor Control
Comm’n, 160 F.2d 96, 98 (6th Cir. 1947).
It simply cannot be said that the right to attend a public school in an
attendance area in which a student does not reside merely because the desired
school is in the same city as the student’s residence is a privilege or immunity of
federal citizenship. This is because the provision of education has long been
thought to be within the province of the States. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493, 74 S. Ct.
at 691 (“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.”); Palmer v. Bloomfield Hills Bd. of Educ., 164 Mich. App. 573,
577, 417 N.W.2d, 505, 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). (“The federal constitution
ignores education because regulation of education and school is a traditional state
function.”)
24
In holding that education is a not privilege and immunity of national
citizenship, the Court does not intend to derogate the importance of education.
Sixty years ago, the Supreme Court wrote:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even in
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493, 74 S. Ct. at 691. This pronouncement, made “has lost
none of its vitality with the passage of time.” Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29, 93 S. Ct.
at 1295. That the Supreme Court has reiterated “an abiding respect for the vital
role of education in a free society” however, does not transform education into a
privilege or immunity of national citizenship. Id. at 30, 93 S. Ct. at 1295.20
Accordingly, Count II fails as a matter of law.
20
Rodriguez addressed the question of whether education was properly
considered a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the
issue of whether it was a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. However,
it cannot be said that education – which “is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution,” nor among the rights implicitly
protected therein – becomes a privilege and immunity of national citizenship
simply because it is important. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 35, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1298 (1973).
25
D.
Count III – Freedom of Association under the First Amendment and
Article I, § 3 of the Michigan Constitution
Plaintiffs contend that because the established boundary line places them in
the North attendance zone, their right to freedom of association, as guaranteed by
both the First Amendment and Michigan’s Constitution, has been abridged.
Neither the First Amendment nor the Michigan Constitution expressly
protects freedom of association.21 Despite the lack of textual support, Supreme
Court “cases have recognized that [the First Amendment] embraces such a right in
certain circumstances.” City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-24, 109 S. Ct.
1591, 1594 (1989). “The Constitution protects two distinct types of association:
(1) freedom of expressive association, protected by the First Amendment, and (2)
freedom of intimate association, a privacy interest derived from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but also related to the First Amendment.”
Anderson v. City of LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted).
Expressive association is best understood as “a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment – speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”
21
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
26
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3249 (1984). This
type of associational freedom is not implicated here, as Plaintiffs do not argue that
Defendants impaired Plaintiffs’ ability to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment. Rather, Plaintiffs’ allegations are directed towards Defendants’
alleged restriction of Plaintiffs’ freedom of intimate association.
“Decisions to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships
‘must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role such
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our
constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection
as a fundamental element of personal liberty.’” U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius,
705 F.3d 588, 598 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18, 104 S. Ct.
at 3249). The types of relationships qualifying for the greatest measure of
constitutional protection are “those that attend the creation and sustenance of a
family – marriage; childbirth; the raising and education of children; and
cohabitation with one’s relatives.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619, 104 S. Ct. at 3250
(internal citations omitted). “[C]ourts have [further] extended protection to
personal friendships and non-marital romantic relationships.” U.S. Citizens Ass’n,
705 F.3d at 598; Anderson v. City of LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2004)
(assuming for summary judgment purposes that a dating relationship between two
police officers qualified as an intimate association because the two were
27
monogamous, had lived together, and were involved romantically and sexually);
Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Personal friendship
is protected as an intimate association.”) (citing Corrigan v. City of Newaygo, 55
F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (6th Cir. 1995)).
The determination that a particular relationship should be accorded enhanced
protection is a function of certain shared characteristics: these relationships “are
distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity
in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in
critical aspects of the relationship.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620, 104 S. Ct. at 3250.
Generally, “only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the
considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an
intrinsic element of personal liberty.” Id., 104 S. Ct. at 3250-51. At the other end
of the spectrum, an association lacking the aforementioned qualities – “such as a
large business enterprise – seems remote from the concerns giving rise to this
constitutional protection[, a protection meant to shield intimate associations from
undue intrusion by the government].” Id., 104 S. Ct. at 3251.
“Between these poles, of course, lies a broad range of human relationships
that may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from particular
incursions by the State.” Id. Courts tasked with determining the limits of state
power over an individual’s freedom to enter into or maintain a particular
28
association, therefore, must engage in an analysis which “unavoidably entails a
careful assessment of where that relationship’s objective characteristics locate it on
a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.”
Id. (citation omitted). While the Supreme Court in Roberts specifically declined to
“mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with any precision[,]” the
Court did provide an illustrative list of relevant considerations. Id. Thus, when
analyzing whether a particular category of relationships is “worthy” of heightened
protection, courts consider the “size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality,
and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent[.]” Id.
It is beyond dispute that the relationships at issue in this case do not “attend
the creation and sustenance of a family[.]” Id., 468 U.S. at 619, 104 S. Ct. at 3250.
Accordingly, whether the relationships at issue qualify for the “greatest measure of
constitutional protection” requires this Court to locate the relationships’ place on
the spectrum described above. It is to this task that the Court now turns.
Plaintiffs insist that the high school attendance areas exclude “school
children from Plaintiffs’ area of the Farms from attending the high school in their
city,” and that Defendants, therefore, “arbitrarily and unreasonably deprived
Plaintiffs’ children and other school children in Plaintiffs’ area of the Farms of
their right to meet, interact and associate at school with their peers and other school
children in their community[.]” (Am. Compl. ¶ 57.) Based on these allegations, it
29
is not entirely clear what the alleged protected association is. Although Plaintiffs
appear to frame the association as one between “high school buddies and
sweethearts,” the Court is not convinced, as the main thrust of Plaintiffs’ argument
appears to be that residents of Grosse Pointe Farms should be able to attend the
high school located in Grosse Pointe Farms. If this is the case, then the association
stems from residence in Grosse Pointe Farms and the ability of school-aged
children to associate with peers residing in the same community. (See, e.g., Id. ¶
55 (alleging that challenged attendance policies exclude Plaintiffs from their
primary avenue of meeting, becoming acquainted with, interacting, and associating
“with their peers and other school children in their community”).)
To the extent that the claimed associational interest is predicated upon
Plaintiffs’ place of residence, this Court believes that the association’s “objective
characteristics” firmly place it closer to the attenuated end of the personal
attachment spectrum. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620, 104 S. Ct. at 3251. Looking to
some of the Roberts considerations, the Court first notes that the population of
Grosse Pointe Farms, and even that of the smaller population of school-aged
children residing therein, is larger than any collection of persons that any court has
deemed small enough to warrant heightened constitutional protection. Further,
while it is undoubtedly true that persons choose to reside in Grosse Pointe Farms,
this does not make city residents a highly-selective group of individuals. For
30
instance, one does not choose one’s neighbors. Relatedly, it is difficult to discern
any unifying purpose undergirding neighborhood choice. While the Court does not
intend to belittle the importance of community ties, a person’s city of residence is
more analogous to a large business enterprise than a close familial relationship. Id.
To the extent that Plaintiffs believe that school-aged children residing in
Grosse Pointe Farms form a protected association such that they should all attend
the same high school, this position fares no better. While the ability to choose
friends within one’s high school likely entails “a high degree of selectivity” and
while a given student’s close group of friends will likely be congenial and may
even be “relative[ly] small[],” the pool of students from which to choose from is
not. Id. at 619, 104 S. Ct. at 3250. Lastly, although there is Sixth Circuit case law
indicating that “[p]ersonal friendship is protected as an intimate association[,]”
Akers, 352 F.3d at 1039-40 (citing Corrigan, 55 F.3d at 1214-15), there is simply
no indication that the attendance boundaries interfere with either the continued
maintenance or future formation of any personal relationships.
As with cities of residence, large public high schools are more analogous to
large business enterprises than to the types of relationships typically accorded
protection as intimate associations. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620,104 S. Ct. at 3251.
Just as one does not have a constitutional right to select colleagues at work, neither
does an individual have a protected right to choose their classmates.
31
In sum, “a friendship based solely on geographical proximity is not one that
is so intimate and close as to be entitled to First Amendment protection.” (Defs.’
Br. 22.) There is nothing intimate about the associations that Plaintiffs claim were
impermissibly abridged by Defendants. Section 1983 confers a private right of
action against a state actor who causes a deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution or federal law. Harbin-Bey, 420 F.3d at 575. Because the Court does
not believe that the associations implicated here are intimate, Plaintiffs have failed
to demonstrate that Defendants deprived them of their First Amendment rights.
Judgment as a matter of law in Defendants’ favor is appropriate for another
reason. Assuming that the attendance lines drawn in this case implicate the right to
intimate association, which they do not, this alone does not trigger heightened
judicial scrutiny. Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 385 F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir.
2004) (“[N]ot all government action affecting the right to intimate association
receives heightened scrutiny.”). Pursuant to Sixth Circuit case law, “[o]nly
government action that has a ‘direct and substantial interference’ on intimate
association receives heightened review,” id. (quoting Anderson, 371 F.3d at 882),
“while lesser interferences are subject to rational basis review[,]” Anderson, 371
F.3d at 882. In Anderson, the Sixth Circuit reiterated a general rule guiding courts
tasked with determining whether an interference is properly categorized as a
“direct and substantial” one. The court explained:
32
[T]his court has developed a general rule that we will find “direct and
substantial” burdens on intimate associations “only where a large
portion of those affected by the rule are absolutely or largely
prevented from [forming intimate associations], or where those
affected by the rule are absolutely or largely prevented from [forming
intimate associations] with a large portion of the otherwise eligible
population of [people with whom they could form intimate
associations].”
Id. at 882 (quoting Akers, 352 F.3d at 1040) (alterations in original).
In Anderson, the Sixth Circuit was confronted with a challenge to a city
policy barring “dating relationships between police department employees of
different ranks[.]” Id. Two police department employees commenced a romantic
relationship and were disciplined. Id. at 880. Assuming, for purposes of summary
judgment, that the dating relationship was an “intimate association[,]” the court
declined to apply strict scrutiny even despite the First Amendment implications.
Id. at 882. Rather, the Court applied rational basis review after determining that
the policy did not directly and substantially interfere with intimate associations.
Such an interference did not exist “[b]ecause [the plaintiff] continued to enjoy the
ability to form intimate associations with anyone other than fellow police
department employees of differing rank[.]” Id.
The Akers case involved a challenge to a Michigan Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”) rule “barring employees from ‘Improper Relationships
with Prisoners, Parolees or Probationers, Visitors or Families.’” 352 F.3d at 103334. This rule prohibited “improper or overly familiar conduct with [offenders] or
33
their family members or visitors.” Id. at 1034 (internal citations omitted). The
plaintiffs, MDOC clerical employees, violated this rule by, for example, providing
a former prisoner with a ride to a job interview and writing a letter to a former
boyfriend who had been incarcerated, and both were disciplined. Id. The
employees brought suit, arguing that MDOC’s rule interfered with their personal
friendships in violation of their associational rights. Id. at 1039. Recognizing that
preexisting and potential relationships were impacted, the court applied rational
basis review because the direct and substantial interference requirement had not
been met. The rule did “not prevent a large portion of MDOC employees from
forming intimate associations; all MDOC employees continue to enjoy the ability
to form intimate associations – just not with offenders [or their relatives or
visitors].” Id. at 1040. “Nor are those affected by the Rule absolutely or largely
prevented from forming intimate associations with a large portion of the otherwise
eligible population.” Id.
In the case at bar, there is no evidence that the attendance zones constitute a
direct and substantial interference to Plaintiffs’ associational rights. Defendants
point out that Plaintiffs do not allege that their enrollment in North “will prevent or
preclude them from forming or carrying on any sort of relationship with persons
who do not attend [] North.” (Defs.’ Br. 22.) Further, there is no indication that
34
Plaintiffs will be prevented from participating in Grosse Pointe Farms municipal
activities by virtue of attending North. (Id.; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 54.)
Instead of addressing these alternative avenues for socializing in a
meaningful way, or of even addressing the case law requiring a “direct and
substantial interference” prior to application of heightened review, Plaintiffs
dismiss Defendants’ arguments as “irrelevant.” (Pls.’ Resp. 20.) The Court
disagrees, as “Plaintiffs’ contention that they will not be able to form such
relationships is at the heart of their case[.]” (Defs.’ Reply 6.) Not only are other
opportunities for forming intimate associations relevant, the Court is required to
assess them, as the existence of other avenues for forming relationships negates a
showing that the policy creates a direct and substantial interference with their
allegedly intimate associations. Plaintiffs’ pleading demonstrates that other such
opportunities exist. Thus, even assuming that Plaintiffs’ associational rights have
been abridged in some way, rational basis review applies. As with Plaintiffs’ equal
protection claims, there are several “plausible policy reason[s]” for dividing the
School District in the way Defendants did here. Flaskamp, 385 F.3d at 943
(citation omitted). Thus, even if these reasons did not motivate the challenged
action, the governmental decision is supported by a rational basis. Id. (citation
omitted). As such, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IV.
REMAINING MOTIONS
35
Having determined that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment,
Plaintiffs’ Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification are moot.
V.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that the absence of a
genuine dispute as to any of the material facts renders judgment as a matter of law
in favor of Defendants appropriate on all counts.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 16) is GRANTED and that Plaintiffs’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 20) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motions for Preliminary
Injunction (ECF No. 14) and Class Certification (ECF No. 23) are DISMISSED
AS MOOT.
Dated: September 15, 2014
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Joseph T. Ozormoor, Esq.
Mark W. McInerney, Esq.
Nitya S. Lohitsa, Esq.
36
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?