Dascola v. Ann Arbor, City of et al
Filing
25
ORDER finding as moot 2 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 8 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 12 Motion to Dismiss; granting 21 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by District Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff. (MVer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT DASCOLA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 2:14-cv-11296-LPZ-RSW
Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff
Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen
CITY OF ANN ARBOR and
JACQUELINE BEAUDRY,
ANN ARBOR CITY CLERK,
Defendants.
__________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
AT A SESSION of said Court, held in the United States Courthouse,
in the City of Port Huron, State of Michigan, on May 20, 2014
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Robert Dascola’s Amended Motion for
Summary Judgment [dkt 8]1 and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants City of Ann Arbor
and Ann Arbor City Clerk Jacqueline Beaudry (“Defendants”) [dkt 12].2 Also before the Court
is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to file his First Amended Complaint [dkt 21]. All three motions
have been fully briefed. The parties have indicated that oral argument is not necessary to resolve
1
Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt 2]. As Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Summary
Judgment supersedes his previous motion, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s original Motion for Summary Judgment
[dkt 2] as MOOT.
2
Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment also indicates the Court should consider their
Response as a Motion for Summary Judgment and request for declaratory judgment. As Defendants have not filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter, the Court is not required to consider their responsive pleadings as
such a motion. In the interest of justice, however, the Court’s opinion and order does take into account the relief
requested in Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
the pending motions [dkt 24]. Further, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are
adequately presented in the parties’ papers such that the decision process would not be
significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), it is
hereby ORDERED that the motions be resolved on the briefs submitted without oral argument.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motions are GRANTED and Defendants’ motion is
DENIED.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the fall of 2014, the city of Ann Arbor, Michigan (the “City”), will hold elections to
determine who will serve on the City Council. Plaintiff Robert Dascola (“Plaintiff”) wishes to
serve as a member of the City Council.
The issue presented in this case is whether the
requirements the City places on potential candidates for City Council—as set forth in the Ann
Arbor City Charter (the “Charter”)—may be validly enforced.
Section 12.2 of the Charter outlines the specific requirements a potential candidate for
City Council must satisfy before he or she may run for the office. Specifically, Section 12.2
states:
Eligibility for City Office—General Qualifications
SECTION 12.2 Except as otherwise provided in this charter, a person is eligible
to hold a City office if the person has been a registered elector of the City, or of
territory annexed to the City or both, and, in the case of a Council Member, a
resident of the ward from which elected, for at least one year immediately
preceding election or appointment.
This requirement may be waived as to
appointive officers by resolution concurred in by not less than seven members of
the Council.
2
In early March of 2014, Plaintiff obtained nominating petition forms from the City Clerk
to run as a Democratic candidate for the position of City Council Member representing the City’s
Third Ward. On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff received an e-mail from a member of the City Clerk’s
office, informing him that he was ineligible to run as a candidate for City Council in the fall
2014 elections. Specifically, Plaintiff was told that he did not meet the durational residency
requirement of Section 12.2 of the Charter. Plaintiff was subsequently told that he also did not
meet the voter registration requirement.3
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and subsequent
motions are based on the premise that these Charter requirements are unenforceable.
This is not the first time the provisions of Section 12.2 of the Charter have come before a
judge. Both parties agree that, in 1972, the constitutionality of the Charter’s durational residency
requirement and voter registration requirement was challenged in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan. In a 1972 decision, United States District Court Judge
Lawrence Gubow held that the durational residency requirement contained in Section 12.2 of the
Charter was unconstitutional. Daniel J. Feld, et al v. City of Ann Arbor and Harold Summers,
File No. 37342 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (“Feld”). Judge Gubow’s unpublished order explicitly stated:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and declared that the portion of Section 12.2 of the
[Charter] which requires all candidates for the office of councilman to have been
residents of the ward from which they are elected for at least one year
immediately preceding their election violates the equal protection clause of the
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional and
void.
3
The parties have submitted conflicting facts as to whether Plaintiff actually meets the durational residency and
voter registration requirements laid out in the Charter. The Court will not address these facts further, as the Court’s
order renders inconsequential Plaintiff’s ability to meet these requirements.
3
Likewise, in Human Rights Party, et al v. City of Ann Arbor, et al, File No. 37852 (E.D.
Mich 1972) (“Human Rights Party”), United States District Court Judge Ralph Freeman held
that the voter registration requirement contained in Section 12.2 of the Charter was
unconstitutional. Judge Freeman’s unpublished order also explicitly stated:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and declared that the portion of Section 12.2 of the
[Charter] which requires all candidates for the office of councilman to have been
registered electors of the [City] for at least one year immediately preceding their
election violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void.
More recently, the validity of the Charter’s durational residency requirement was
considered by a state court judge. In the 2003 decision Wojack v. City of Ann Arbor, a
Washtenaw County Circuit Court Judge granted the City’s motion for declaratory
judgment, finding that the Charter’s durational residency requirement for City Council
positions was constitutional.
Both parties agree that neither the Feld nor Human Rights Party decisions were appealed
by the City. Further, neither party argues that the Feld and Human Rights Party decisions were
ever explicitly overruled, vacated, or modified; indeed, these decisions have never been reviewed
or reversed, and thus remain intact. Plaintiff alleges he decided to run for City Council with the
knowledge that the durational residency requirement and voter registration requirement
contained in the Charter were previously found unconstitutional and void. Plaintiff also alleges
that the City informed him the provisions ruled on in Feld and Human Rights Party “are no
longer void in light of subsequent changes in federal and Michigan jurisprudence.”
4
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in this Court, alleging the
Defendants were improperly and illegally relying and acting upon provisions of Section 12.2 of
the Charter.
On May 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint clarifies that Plaintiff believes Defendants’ attempts
to enforce the previously voided provisions of Section 12.2 of the Charter violate his rights under
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court enjoining Defendants from enforcing the provisions of
Section 12.2 of the Charter previously declared unconstitutional and void when determining
Plaintiff’s eligibility to run for City Council. Plaintiff also seeks a writ of mandamus, requiring
Defendant Beaudry to accept and process any nominating petitions submitted by Plaintiff and
determine his eligibility without regard to the voided provisions of Section 12.2.
Finally,
Plaintiff seeks costs and actual attorney fees incurred in bringing this action.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. FED. R. CIV. P. 56
Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2001). The moving
party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact,
and all inferences should be made in favor of the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The moving party discharges its burden by “‘showing’—that is,
pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
5
party’s case.” Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
325).
Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party, who “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). The nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the
‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)). “[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s]
position will be insufficient [to defeat a motion for summary judgment]; there must be evidence
on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
B. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
A motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a party’s claims. The Court must
accept as true all factual allegations in the pleadings, and any ambiguities must be resolved in
that party’s favor. See Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575, 577–78 (6th Cir. 1992).
While this standard is decidedly liberal, it requires more than a bare assertion of legal
conclusions. See Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 176 F.3d 315,
319 (6th Cir. 1999).
A party must make “a showing, rather than a blanket assertion of
entitlement to relief” and “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” so that the claim is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the party pleads factual
6
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference the defendant is liable for the
alleged misconduct.” Id. at 556. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), this Court may only
consider “the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by
reference in the pleadings, and matters of which the [Court] may take judicial notice.” 2 James
Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 12.34[2] (3d ed. 2000).
C. FED. R. CIV. P. 15
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), leave to amend shall be “freely give[n] . . . when
justice so requires,” but “that window of opportunity does not remain open forever.” Shane v.
Bunzl Distribution USA, Inc., 275 F. App’x 535, 536 (6th Cir. 2008). “A motion to amend a
complaint should be denied if the amendment is brought in bad faith, for dilatory purposes,
results in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile.” Crawford v. Roane,
53 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962)).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. ANCILLARY ISSUES
Although the parties’ filings present numerous explanations and arguments, the Court has
previously established the issue it finds controlling in the present action: If a law is found
“unconstitutional and void” by a federal district court, must that law be officially re-enacted
before it is enforced? Prior to addressing the central issue in this case, however, the Court first
addresses several ancillary issues raised by both parties throughout the various filings.
At the outset, Defendants state in several filings that the durational residency requirement
and voter registration requirement contained in Section 12.2 of the Charter are constitutional.
Defendants argue that, since the Feld and Human Rights Party decisions were rendered, the
7
standard of review by which federal and state courts analyze such requirements have changed.
Defendants argue these “changes in law” require the Court to uphold and declare constitutional
all the provisions of Section 12.2.
Although Defendants spend a significant amount of time briefing this point, their focus is
misplaced. Deciding the constitutionality of the language contained in Section 12.2 of the
Charter as if it had been passed today is not the question before the Court. Indeed, Plaintiff does
not argue in his Amended Complaint or his Amended Motion for Summary Judgment that these
provisions, if passed today, would not survive constitutional analysis under the current standard
of review. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that, as the provisions contained in Section 12.2 of the
Charter were found unconstitutional and void in two separate federal court decisions that remain
intact, Defendants’ enforcement of those provisions prior to re-enactment is unconstitutional.
Additionally, although Defendants seek a declaratory judgment that the Feld and Human Rights
Party decisions are no longer binding law, the Court must first determine whether the City may,
absent re-enactment, constitutionally enforce the provisions the Feld and Human Rights Party
courts found unconstitutional and void.
Next, the Court finds that many of the parties’ arguments have no bearing in determining
the controlling issue of the case. Specifically, the Court finds that issues of collateral estoppel
and res judicata are not relevant to the resolution of this matter. Likewise, the 2003 Wojack
decision—a state court ruling on the constitutionality of the Charter provisions—has little
bearing on the Court’s current decision. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.
673, 681 (1930) (“the plaintiff’s claim is one arising under the federal Constitution and,
consequently, one on which the opinion of the state court is not final.”). The parties have failed
to provide any binding authority indicating the Wojack decision should be viewed by this Court
8
as having binding precedential value. This lack of any binding precedential value from the
Wojack decision also makes a “revival doctrine” argument—that a subsequent court ruling
finding a state law constitutional “revives” a state law that was previously found
unconstitutional—unconvincing.
As such, the Court will not address any of the aforementioned arguments in its continued
analysis of the instant matter.
B. A LAW FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL MUST BE RE-ENACTED BEFORE ENFORCEMENT
The Court now turns to the crux of the issue before it: If a law is found “unconstitutional
and void” by a federal district court, must that law be officially re-enacted before it is enforced?
Plaintiff argues such re-enactment is required, asserting that laws found unconstitutional
and void by a federal district court should be treated as if they never existed, or void ab initio.
Plaintiff cites to the decisions of state courts throughout the country that assert this proposition.
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants fail to provide any authority indicating a
municipality may survey developments in the legal landscape and subsequently resume
enforcement of a law previously found unconstitutional and void once that municipality
concludes a fundamental change in the law has occurred.
Defendants present numerous arguments as to why re-enactment is not required to
enforce a law previously found unconstitutional and void, most forcibly asserting that a federal
court has no power to repeal Charter provisions and that prior federal court orders are only
effective for the plaintiffs in those cases such that future plaintiffs may not rely on such orders.
As is established below, the Court finds Defendants’ arguments unconvincing.
9
i. Legal Standard
As early the 19th century, the United States Supreme Court held that “[a]n
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed.” Norton v. Shelby Cnty., 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886). Additionally, the Sixth Circuit
has found that “[i]f a statute is unconstitutional as applied, the State may continue to enforce the
statute in different circumstances where it is not unconstitutional, but if a statute is
unconstitutional on its face, the State may not enforce the statute under any circumstances.”
Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 193 (6th Cir. 1997). Although this
decision did not deal directly with the issue of re-enactment, the Court finds persuasive the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning behind preventing the enforcement of a facially unconstitutional law.
While the central issue in this case appears to be a matter of first impression in this
circuit, at least five other circuits have addressed the issue currently before the Court. All five
found that a provision struck down as unconstitutional should be handled as though it had never
been enacted.4 The Third Circuit decision in Richardson v. United States best illustrates this
conclusion: “[m]ore importantly, if a law is unconstitutional, it is void and of no effect, and it
cannot alter an otherwise valid obligation of a governmental officer to a citizen.” Additionally,
the Court has not found—nor has either party presented—a case from any circuit indicating that
a law found unconstitutional and void that remains intact need not be re-enacted prior to
enforcement.5
4
See Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 418 U.S. 166 (1974);
Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 401 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ross, 9 F.3d 1182, 1193 fn. 10
(7th Cir. 1993) cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 511 U.S. 1124 (1994); McCoy v. Augusta
Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 593 F.3d 737, 744 (8th Cir. 2010); Journigan v. Duffy, 552 F.2d 283, 289 (9th Cir. 1977).
5
Defendants rely on Jawish v. Morlet, a decision of the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to
support the premise that re-enactment is not required to restore a law previously found unconstitutional to its
10
Finally, the second edition of the American Jurisprudence Encyclopedia of United States
law states that:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, whether federal or state,
though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law but is wholly void
and ineffective for any purpose. Since unconstitutionality dates from the time of
its enactment and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it, an
unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never
been passed and never existed; that is, it is void ab initio. Such a statute leaves the
question that it purports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been
enacted . . . Since an unconstitutional law is void, it follows that generally the
statute imposes no duties, confers no rights . . . and justifies no acts performed
under it . . . Once a statute is determined to be unconstitutional, no private citizen
or division of the state may take any further action pursuant to its provisions.
ii. Analysis
While Plaintiff seeks to employ the rationale espoused by the Supreme Court and
frequently applied by circuits throughout the country, Defendants ask this Court to adopt a
different approach. Defendants argue that a federal court has no power to “repeal” a Charter
provision and that a prior Court ruling is binding only between the parties for the purposes of
that case but does not alter the underlying statute.6 The Court finds neither of these arguments
persuasive.
Defendants, relying on the Michigan Home Rules City Act, argue that the only way a
provision of a municipal charter in Michigan may be amended or repealed is through a vote of
operative force. The Jawish decision is based on the basic premise of the “revival doctrine” and thus is not
applicable to the instant matter.
6
Defendants raise two other arguments—citing a lack of authority in Michigan to support Plaintiff’s argument and
asserting collateral estoppel case law does not require re-enactment—that do not warrant extensive analysis. The
Court has already indicated that arguments regarding collateral estoppel are not material to the instant matter.
Further, Defendants’ argument referencing a lack of authority in Michigan case law is irrelevant to an interpretation
of the U.S. Constitution by a federal court and is simply false. See Stanton v. Lloyd Hammond Produce Farms, 400
Mich. 135, 144-45 (1977) (“It is a general rule of statutory interpretation that an unconstitutional statute is void ab
initio . . . That this rule has been consistently followed in Michigan there can be no doubt.”)
11
the residents. Defendants assert that a federal court’s finding that a charter provision conflicts
with the U.S. Constitution only makes that charter provision “unenforceable,” but does not strip
that provision from the body of the charter. Defendants seek to strengthen this argument by
stating that Plaintiff confuses the term “void” with “repeal,” referring to the Black’s Law
Dictionary definition of “repeal” as alleged proof that finding a law is “void” does not, in fact,
repeal the law. Defendants go so far as to claim the Feld and Human Rights Party decisions did
not attempt to repeal the Charter provisions, as evidenced by the use of the word “void” instead
of “repeal” in the court’s orders.
Defendants offer absolutely no explanation as to why this Court should ignore Supreme
Court precedent in favor of the Michigan Home Rules City Act. Aside from the fact that the
Michigan Home Rules City Act does not actually contain the argument Defendants purport it
stands for, Defendants’ assertion that “a court has no power to repeal Charter provisions in any
manner” is supported by no case law, federal law, state law, or any other type of authority. More
fundamentally, this argument is completely at odds with the system of checks and balances the
federal system of governance is based on: federal (and state) courts are called on every day in
this country to assess whether state and federal laws are in line with the requirements contained
in the U.S. Constitution. To suggest that federal courts do not possess this power is a serious
misstatement of law.
Furthermore, Defendants’ argument is premised on the flawed notion that the term “void”
is materially different than “repeal,” and that the only way a law may become unenforceable is if
the law is officially “repealed.” The 4th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary7 defines “void” as
“[n]ull; ineffectual, nugatory; having no legal force or binding effect; unable, in law, to support
7
The 4th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary was the most up-to-date version available at the time the Feld and
Human Rights Party decisions were made.
12
the purpose for which it was intended.” Regardless of the definition of “repeal,” this definition
of “void” demonstrates that the intent behind the Feld and Human Rights Party decisions was to
give the Charter provisions “no legal force or binding effect.”
Defendants’ next argument is equally devoid of persuasive reasoning. By arguing that
prior federal court orders are only effective for the plaintiff(s) in those cases, Defendants are
incorrectly attempting to apply a rule exclusively based on the Declaratory Judgment Act to all
decisions made by federal courts. Both cases Defendants use to support their argument explicitly
deal with the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Feld and Human Rights Party cases, however,
give no indication whatsoever that the district courts considered the Declaratory Judgment Act in
determining the Charter provisions at issue were unconstitutional and void. Instead, the district
court’s opinion in Human Rights Party starts with the phrase “[t]his is an action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) and (4).” 28 U.S.C. § 1343 is a federal law governing “civil rights and elective
franchise.” As such, arguments based on the Declaratory Judgment Act have no bearing in this
matter.
More importantly, the logic behind this argument is fatally flawed.8 Defendants are
essentially arguing that any federal court ruling on constitutionality is confined only to the
plaintiff(s) in that case.
This would mean that every single person affected by an
unconstitutional law would have to challenge that law in federal court before a state or
municipality would be compelled to stop enforcing that law against that individual. Such an
“individual challenge” requirement is completely inapposite to the basic principles of the federal
judicial system: “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.” Marybury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Defendants’ argument seeks to
8
The Court will not address the discrepancy between Defendants asking this Court for declaratory relief in finding
Section 12.2 of the Charter constitutional while arguing a prior court ruling is binding only on the parties to that case
but does not alter the underlying statute.
13
destroy this pillar of the legal system by confining this duty in constitutional cases to only those
plaintiffs bringing suit while allowing municipalities to say “what the law is.”
The Court is deeply troubled by this proposition. First, the Defendants fail to indicate
any authority granting the City the power to say “what the law is.” Further, the Defendants have
provided no indication as to when exactly these voided provisions of the Charter “became”
constitutional again. Additionally, the Defendants provided no evidence that notice as to “what
the law is” was ever given to the public. In sum, the Defendants have provided absolutely no
authority as to why this Court should simply abandon the basic principles of law that have
formed the foundation of the United States legal structure for over two hundred years. The Court
refuses to do so at this time.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s argument persuasive.9 As
such, the Court holds that a law found “unconstitutional and void” by a federal district court may
not be enforced until it is officially re-enacted, as that law is void ab initio. The Court thus holds
that Defendants may not enforce against Plaintiff or any other person the provisions of Section
12.2 of the Charter found unconstitutional and void by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan in Feld and Human Rights Party prior to the City re-enacting the
provisions therein.
C. RELIEF
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asks the Court to permanently enjoin the Defendants
from taking any action to enforce the provisions of Section 12.2 of the Charter held
unconstitutional and void by the decisions in Feld and Human Rights Party. Additionally,
9
The Court finds that, as this argument is contained in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Amended Complaint is
not futile, was not brought in bad faith or for dilatory purposes, and does not result in undue delay or prejudice to the
opposing party. As such, the Court thus GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file First Amended Complaint [dkt
21].
14
Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus from this Court requiring Defendant Beaudry to accept and
process any nominating petitions submitted by Plaintiff without regard to the voided provisions
of Section 12.2. Finally, the Plaintiff seeks costs and attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
i. Legal Standard
“According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent
injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
28 U.S.C. § 1651 provides that federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions, including writs in the nature of mandamus.”
Haggard v. State of Tenn., 421 F.2d 1384, 1385 (6th Cir. 1970) (internal citations omitted). “To
insure that the writ of mandamus is issued only in such extraordinary circumstances, the party
seeking the writ must satisfy two conditions . . . [f]irst, the party seeking the writ must have no
other adequate means to attain the relief he desires . . . [s]econd, the [plaintiff] must satisfy the
burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.” In re
Mechem, 880 F.2d 872, 874 (6th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
Finally, although a federal court does not have the power to compel state officials to
enforce state rights, it may “issue a writ of mandamus ordering a state official to enforce rights
protected by federal law.” Hoffman v. Stump, 97-2177, 1998 WL 869972, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2,
15
1998); see also CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975), State ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner,
588 F.Supp. 2d 828, 833, Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46, 53–54 (2d Cir. 1986).
ii. Analysis
The Court finds that Plaintiff satisfies the four-part test enumerated above for granting
permanent injunctive relief. Plaintiff has provided compelling evidence that Defendants have
used void provisions of the Charter in an attempt to preclude him from running for City Council.
Further, remedies available at law would not compensate Plaintiff for his inability to run for City
Council. Finally, as established above, the balance of hardships between the parties—and the
public interest at large–warrant this Court enjoining Defendants from enforcing a void law when
the City has failed to re-enact that law.
In the same vein, the Court finds that a writ of mandamus is warranted in this case.
Although reserved for extraordinary circumstances, Plaintiff has demonstrated that he has no
other adequate means to achieve the relief he desires. Plaintiff has also satisfied his burden of
proving to this Court that his right to the issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.
Additionally, taking into consideration the Defendants’ demonstrated inability (or unwillingness)
to follow the explicit orders issued by federal courts with regards to the constitutionality of the
provisions at issue, the Court finds that issuing a writ of mandamus is necessary to guarantee
Plaintiff receives the relief to which he is entitled.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt 8] is GRANTED and Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [dkt 12] is DENIED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded all reasonable costs and attorney's
fees. Eastern District of Michigan Local Rules 54.1 and 54.1.2 require that Plaintiff file these
motions, along with supporting authority, after entry of judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Lawrence P. Zatkoff
HON. LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Dated: May 20, 2014
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