Sparr v. Colvin

Filing 37

ORDER Sustaining Plaintiff's 35 Objections to Report and Recommendation; Rejecting the Magistrate Judge's 34 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; Granting Plaintiff's 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment; Denying Defendant's 32 MOTION for Summary Judgment; and Remanding Case for Further Proceedings. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CYNTHIA L. SPARR,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-cv-11529
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
ORDER SUSTAINING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF #35);
REJECTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION (ECF #34); GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #30); DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #32); AND REMANDING
CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
In this action, Plaintiff Cynthia L. Sparr (“Sparr”) challenges the denial of
her application for Social Security disability insurance benefits. On June 23, 2015,
the assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”)
in which he recommended that this Court (1) grant summary judgment in favor of
Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”), and (2) deny
Sparr summary judgment. (See ECF #34.) Sparr has filed timely objections to the
R&R (“the “Objections”). (See ECF #35.) The Court has now conducted a de
novo review of the parts of the R&R to which Sparr has objected. For the reasons
stated below, the Court SUSTAINS Sparr’s Objections, REJECTS the R&R, and

REMANDS the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings in accordance
with sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sparr filed an application for Social Security disability insurance benefits on
June 13, 2007. (See ECF #14-5 at 294, Pg. ID 350.) Sparr claimed that she had
been unable to work since August 31, 2005, due to panic attacks, bipolar disorder,
post-traumatic stress disorder, and agoraphobia. (See id.; see also ECF #14-6 at
343, Pg. ID 400.)1 On September 17, 2012, Administrative Law Judge David F.
Neumann (the “ALJ”) found that Sparr was not disabled – and thus not entitled to
benefits – in a written decision (the “ALJ’s Decision”). (See ECF #14-2 at 20-31,
Pg. ID 73-84.) In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ determined that Sparr’s
impairments do not meet or medically equal the criteria of Listing 12.06 (anxietyrelated disorders). (See id. at 24, Pg. ID 77.) The ALJ further determined that
Sparr has residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light, indoor work and
that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
she can perform. (See id. at 24-31, Pg. ID 77-84.)
Sparr filed this action challenging the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.
(See #1.)

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment (“Sparr’s

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Sparr later added that she also suffers from back pain. (See, e.g., ECF #14-6 at
361, Pg. ID 418.) Sparr does not challenge the ALJ’s determination that she is not
disabled due to her back pain. (See ECF #30.)
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Motion” and the “Commissioner’s Motion”). (See ECF ##30, 32.) In Sparr’s
Motion, Sparr asks this Court to “reverse the [Commissioner’s] denial of …
benefits and remand this case pursuant to sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for
further proceedings….” (ECF #30 at 25, Pg. ID 830.) The Commissioner asks this
Court to uphold its denial of benefits. (See ECF #32 at 26, Pg. ID 858.)
The Magistrate Judge then issued his R&R in which he recommended that
the Court grant the Commissioner’s Motion and deny Sparr’s Motion. (See ECF
#34.) Among other things, the Magistrate Judge stated that “substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s determination that [Sparr’s] panic attacks and anxiety did not
meet or equal Listing 12.06.” (ECF #34 at 6, Pg. ID 872.) The Magistrate Judge
also determined that “substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff
retained the [RFC] to perform a reduced range of light work activity.” (Id.)
Sparr now objects to the R&R on two grounds. Specifically, Sparr contends
that the record does not support the ALJ’s conclusions that Sparr (1) fails to satisfy
Listing 12.06, and (2) has the RFC to perform light, indoor work. (See ECF #35 at
2-5, Pg. ID 877-80.) The Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s conclusions were
well reasoned and that the Court should adopt the R&R in its entirety. (See ECF
#36.)

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GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
The Court conducts a de novo review of the portions of a Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation to which a party has objected. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b); Lyons v. Comm'r, 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). In reviewing
the findings of the ALJ, the Court is limited to determining whether those findings
are supported by substantial evidence and made pursuant to proper legal standards.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as
to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive...”).
Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm'r, 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir.
2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th
Cir. 1994)).
A claimant is not necessarily entitled to an immediate award of benefits
when an ALJ’s denial of benefits is not supported by substantial evidence. See
Faucher v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994).
Indeed, if there is not “compelling evidence that [the plaintiff] is entitled to
benefits,” the Court “must remand for further consideration.” White v. Comm’r,
312 Fed. App’x 779, 790 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Hill v. Comm’r, No. 14-12624,
2015 WL 4389791 at *14 (E.D. Mich. July 15, 2015) (“Where there is insufficient
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support for the ALJ’s findings, the appropriate remedy is reversal and … remand
for further consideration” pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g))
(internal citations and punctuation omitted).
ANALYSIS
As noted above, Sparr’s sole request for relief in her Motion is that the Court
remand for further administrative proceedings, rather than for an immediate award
of benefits. (See ECF #30 at 25, Pg. ID 830.) For the reasons discussed below, the
Court finds this request for relief to be appropriate.
A. Sparr’s Objection to the ALJ’s Conclusion that She Does Not Have
Impairments that Meet or Equal Listing 12.06
As relevant here, a claimant has impairments that meet or medically equal
Listing 12.06 – and therefore is disabled – if the claimant has certain medicallydocumented findings that “result[] in complete inability to function independently
outside the area of one’s home.” 20 CFR § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.06(A), (C).
The ALJ concluded that Sparr does not have impairments that meet or equal
Listing 12.06 because “the record contains no evidence that [Sparr] is completely
unable to function independently outside the area of her home.” (ECF #14-2 at 24,
Pg. ID 77.) This assertion is factually incorrect.
The administrative record does contain evidence that Sparr is completely
unable to function independently outside her home.

For instance, at an

administrative hearing before the ALJ in 2012, Sparr testified that she has “never
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left [her] home by [her]self since 2005.”

(ECF #14-2 at 65, Pg. ID 118.)

Similarly, in 2007, Sparr told a psychologist that she “cannot go anywhere by
herself without having acute anxiety” and that she “ha[s] to have someone with
[her] at all times.” (ECF #14-7 at 466, Pg. ID 524.) At around the same time,
Sparr told a counselor that she had a panic attack when her husband left her alone
at Walmart. (See id. at 450, Pg. ID 508.) Moreover, Sparr’s statements about her
inability to function independently outside of her home are consistent with her
therapist’s comment on December 4, 2009, that Sparr’s “husband still needs to be
present in … sessions in order for her to feel safe” (id. at 596, Pg. ID 654) and with
numerous other references in Sparr’s medical record to her husband accompanying
her to medical appointments. (See id. at 536, 541, 637; Pg. ID 594, 599, 695.) The
ALJ failed to acknowledge this countervailing evidence in reaching his conclusion
that “the record contains no evidence” that Sparr could not function independently
outside her home.
The ALJ supported his conclusion with a single citation to a medical record
from Sparr’s visit to her therapist on December 8, 2009 (the “Therapist’s Note”).
(See id. (citing ECF #14-7 at 595, Pg. ID 653).)2 In that document, the therapist

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Elsewhere in the ALJ’s Decision, the ALJ cites Sparr’s “Function Report” to
support his assertion that Sparr “has attended sessions and doctors [sic]
appointments alone.” (ECF #14-2 at 27, Pg. ID 80 (citing ECF #14-6 at 357-71,
Pg. ID 414-28).) But the Function Report does not support the ALJ’s assertion.
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noted that Sparr “was able to attend the session alone.” (ECF #14-7 at 595, Pg. ID
653.) But the Therapist’s Note does not establish that Sparr left her home by
herself and traveled independently to the therapist’s office.

Indeed, Sparr’s

husband or another family member may have accompanied Sparr to the
appointment and waited outside while Sparr met with the therapist. Moreover,
even if the Therapist’s Note did support the conclusion that Sparr is able to
function independently, it would still be insufficient – standing alone – to
constitute substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to take into account the
evidence that Sparr could not function independently. Indeed, “[a] single piece of
evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the [Commissioner] ignores, or
fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.” Mason v. Shalala,
994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245,
249 (6th Cir. 1984) (“It is improper to base a [disability] decision on one single
piece of evidence and to disregard other pertinent evidence.”)
The Commissioner argues that other evidence in the record supports the
conclusion that Sparr is able to function independently outside of her home. For
instance, the Commissioner notes that Sparr has admitted that she performed some
painting work for her family business after her alleged onset date. (See ECF #32 at
12, Pg. ID 845 (citing ECF #14-6 at 334, Pg. ID 391).) But Sparr’s admission that

To the contrary, the Function Report states that Sparr “can’t be left alone” and that
she leaves her home “only with [her] husband.” (ECF #14-6 at 363, Pg. ID 420.)
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she performed limited painting work in 2006 does not establish that Sparr was able
to function independently outside of her home for the full duration of her alleged
disability. Moreover, Sparr specifically noted that she did the painting “along with
[her] son,” which is consistent with her testimony that she is not able to leave her
house alone. (ECF #14-6 at 334, Pg. ID 391.)
In sum, the ALJ relied solely on the Therapist’s Note to support his
conclusion that “the record contains no evidence that the claimant is unable to
function independently outside the area of her home.” That conclusion is factually
inaccurate.

Indeed, the record contains countervailing evidence that Sparr is

unable to function independently outside of her home, and the ALJ reached his
conclusion without acknowledging that evidence or performing any meaningful
analysis. Accordingly, the ALJ’s Decision is not supported by substantial evidence
and must be reversed.
Ultimately, the ALJ’s conclusion may be correct. Indeed, the ALJ may find
Sparr’s testimony that she has not left her home alone since 2005 to be not
credible, and the ALJ may have legitimate reasons for discounting other evidence
that Sparr is unable to function independently outside of her home. But if that is
the case, the ALJ needs to explain why he credits certain pieces of evidence and
not others. Therefore, the Court remands the action to allow the Commissioner for
further fact finding and analysis as to whether Sparr has an impairment or
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combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of Listing
12.06. See id.
B. Sparr’s Objection to the ALJ’s RFC Determination
Sparr also objects to the ALJ’s determination at Step Four of the analysis
that Sparr has the RFC to perform light, indoor work. Sparr argues that the ALJ
erroneously concluded that she is able to work indoors despite her agoraphobia and
panic attacks. (See ECF #35 at 4-5, Pg. ID 879-80.) Sparr contends that the RFC
adopted by the ALJ is incorrect and that she is precluded from all work because
she is unable to function independently outside of her home. (See ECF #30 at 24,
Pg. ID 829.)
As discussed above, the ALJ has not adequately considered evidence that
Sparr is unable to function independently outside of her home. This evidence is
relevant to Sparr’s RFC. Indeed, a vocational expert testified at a hearing before
the ALJ that “there appears to be no jobs” that a person with Sparr’s impairments
could perform if she were unable to leave the house. (ECF #14-2 at 81, Pg. ID
134.)
The Court concludes that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by
substantial evidence because the ALJ has not sufficiently considered all of the
relevant evidence. If the ALJ reaches Step Four of the analysis on remand, the

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ALJ must consider all of the evidence that Sparr is unable to function
independently outside of her home.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, the Court SUSTAINS Sparr’s Objections
(ECF #35) and REJECTS the R&R (ECF #34). IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
THAT Sparr’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #30) is GRANTED and the
Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #32) is DENIED.3
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT this matter is remanded to the
Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: August 31, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on August 31, 2015, by electronic means and/or ordinary
mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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The Court grants Sparr’s Motion to the extent that she seeks a remand for further
fact finding and for a new decision concerning her entitlement to benefits. If and
to the extent that Sparr seeks a remand for an immediate award of benefits (as
opposed to a remand for the proceedings described in the preceding sentence), the
Motion is denied.
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