Hill v. Western Wayne Family Health Centers et al

Filing 25

OPINION and ORDER Granting 20 Supplemental Brief to Strike; Granting 16 Defendants' MOTION for Summary Judgment ; and Denying as Moot 22 MOTION In limine - Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MIGNON HILL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 14-12154
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
Magistrate Judge David R. Grand

WESTERN WAYNE FAMILY HEALTH
CENTERS, a domestic for-profit
corporation, and MARVA HAIRSTON
in her official and unofficial capacity,
jointly and severally,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE [20],
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [16], AND
DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE [22]
Plaintiff Mignon Hill alleges that she was illegally terminated from her employment with
Defendant Western Wayne Family Health Centers (“WWFHC”) due to her pregnancy. She
asserts a claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and a claim for
“discrimination.” But several undisputed facts preclude her claims. After Hill became pregnant,
she received a raise as well as a positive year-end performance review. At the time of her
termination, Hill had been out on maternity leave for approximately eighteen weeks despite only
being eligible for twelve. No employee in the history of WWFHC had ever been granted so
much leave. And Hill admitted in her deposition that she was not subjected to any schedule
changes or other adverse actions before going out on leave. Her attempts to create a genuine
issue regarding these material facts fall short. And based on these facts, the Court finds that
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both of Hill’s claims. Therefore,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted.

I. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE
Before the Court addresses the substance of Defendants’ summary-judgment motion, it
must decide whether to consider the affidavit of Sherri Miller. (Dkt 19.) Plaintiff filed this
affidavit on May 6, 2015—a week after Defendants filed their reply brief. (Id.) Defendants argue
that despite the fact that Miller was included in Plaintiff’s Rule 26(a) disclosures, Plaintiff never
disclosed her intention to use this witness and never disclosed the “knowledge this witness
supposedly possessed[.]” (Dkt. 20 at 2.) Plaintiff responds that her “counsel was only able to
obtain the affidavit of Sherri Miller after her signature was notarized in May of 2015, otherwise
such would have been produced prior.” (Dkt. 21 at 2.) The Court is not impressed by this
explanation—surely Plaintiff’s counsel had access to a notary during discovery as all the other
affidavits are notarized, and Plaintiff does not say that Miller was unavailable to sign the
affidavit for the entirety of discovery in this case. Plaintiff also argues that “Defendants have had
several months to take the deposition of Sherri Miller yet did not do so.” (Id.) But the same logic
applies to Plaintiff’s failure to secure Miller’s affidavit before the summary-judgment cutoff.
Both parties argue that there is no authority as to the proper recourse in this situation—
this is, where a Plaintiff seeks to introduce a new affidavit from a witness, who was disclosed
from the beginning, after summary-judgment briefing is complete. The Court has found some.
See, e.g., Miami Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Town of Sunman, Ind., 960 F. Supp. 1366, 1371
(S.D. Ind. 1997) (collecting cases); Lawrence v. Norton, No. CV-04-0203-EFS, 2006 WL
850878, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2006) aff’d sub nom. Lawrence v. Dep’t of Interior, 525
F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2008). The Miami Valley case is similar to this situation: the Defendant there
submitted supplemental exhibits after the summary-judgment motion was fully briefed. 960 F.
Supp. at 1371. The court granted a motion to strike the exhibits because the defendant did not

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seek leave to file them, offered “no justification” for its failure to produce them earlier, and
“[p]lainly” understood that it needed to provide the type of evidence it sought to add to the
record before summary-judgment briefing closed. Id. The same is true here—Plaintiff did not
seek leave to file the supplemental affidavit, has not offered a convincing justification for her
failure to produce the affidavit earlier, and the fact that Miller’s affidavit is very similar to the
other ones Plaintiff relies on (e.g. Def.s’ Ex. BB, Bellazer Aff.) indicates that Plaintiff had plenty
of notice that this affidavit would be useful in responding to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. For these reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to strike. (Dkt. 20.) The
Miller affidavit will not be considered.1
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
WWFHC is a federally qualified health center serving uninsured and underinsured
patients. (Def.s’ Ex. B., Atkins Dep. at 82.) Mignon Hill worked there from February 7, 2011
through February 3, 2012, when she left for maternity leave. (Def.s’ Ex. C, Hill Dep., at 66–67.)
During Hill’s employment, Marva Hairston was WWFHC’s Human Resources Director. (Atkins
Dep. at 81.) According to payroll records, WWFHC had 45 employees as of January 27, 2012.
(Def.s’ Ex. G, Payroll Records at Jan. 27, 2012.) The Employee Handbook noted, “WWFHC is
NOT covered under the FMLA due to its size.” (Def.s’ Ex. E, Employee Handbook at 22.)
Hill became pregnant around fall 2011. She testified that after becoming pregnant (and
giving Hairston notice of that fact), she received a raise as well as a positive year-end
performance review. (Hill Dep. at 80–85.) Nonetheless, she says that she was “treated

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Even if the Court were to consider the affidavit, its substance is largely the same as the
affidavit that Brittany Bellazer swore out. And, as discussed below, all of the assertions from
Bellazer’s affidavit—i.e. that Hill was not allowed to use the bathroom or take breaks—were
squarely contradicted by Hill’s own admissions in her deposition testimony. So the Court would
not reach a different result even considering Miller’s affidavit.
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differently” at work following her pregnancy. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 1.) First, she says that she was
not allowed to take breaks or use the bathroom. (Id.) She cites the affidavit of Brittany Bellazer
in support of this assertion; Bellazer claims to have witnessed denials of bathroom breaks in her
affidavit. (Def.s’ Ex. BB, Bellazer Aff. at ¶ 3.) However, Bellazer actually retreated from her
affidavit during her deposition: she only recalled one time that Hill was not allowed to go to the
bathroom, and that was because it was WWFHC’s policy for a front desk person to wait for
someone else to cover the desk before leaving for a bathroom break. (Def.s’ Reply Ex. 6,
Bellazer Dep. Excerpt.) And in her deposition, Hill admitted she was “allowed to sit as needed”
and “allowed to use the bathroom as needed” and “no schedule changes were made” after she
became pregnant. (Hill Dep. at 133.)
Hill also says that she was harassed. For example, before Hill’s pregnancy leave, on
November 18, 2011, she presented Hairston with documentation from her doctor and Hairston
became upset and started “raging, like roaring, yelling, telling me I had to go and I couldn’t
work.” (Hill Dep. at 140.) Apparently Hairston also threatened to call the police for some reason.
(Id.) But Hill also testified that she was paid for that day of work and that the conversation did
not result in any personnel action being taken against her. (Id.) Bellazer and Gail McGlory
witnessed her crying on other occasions, and attributed it to general mistreatment by Hairston.
(Bellazer Aff. at ¶ 3; Pl.’s Ex. 2, McGlory Dep. at 12.)
Finally, Plaintiff points to Linda Atkins’ testimony (the CEO of WWFHC) that she had
stated, in regards to Kia Morgan, another pregnant WWFHC employee, that she would have had
concerns about hiring a pregnant employee because the organization would inevitably have to fill
the position during that employee’s maternity leave. (Pl.’s Ex. 9, Atkins Dep. at 19.) The record
reflects that Morgan also went out on maternity leave for eight weeks, returned to work without

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any problems, and eventually left WWFHC on good terms when she moved out of state.
(Hairston Dep. at 41–42.)
In any event, Hill was approved for maternity leave beginning on February 3, 2012.
During her leave, she was not paid, but retained her fringe benefits. (Employee Handbook at 22.)
While her leave was authorized for only eight weeks (with the possibility of a four-week
extension), she remained out of work longer, without contacting WWFHC directly. (Def.s’ Ex.
F, Termination Letter.) Then, approximately eighteen weeks after starting her leave, on June 8,
2012, she was notified that her employment had been terminated. (Id.) The letter read as follows:
In accordance with our employee handbook, which our records show you received
a copy of on February 7, 2011, you were eligible to receive a leave of absence for
eight (8) weeks with a possible extension of four (4) additional weeks. . . . As of
this date, we have not heard from you and must assume you have abandoned your
position. You have also been off work for more than twelve (12) weeks, the
maximum period of leave allowable.
(Id.) Hill admitted in her deposition that she understood the reasons for the termination to be
those set out in the June 8 letter. (Hill Dep. at 202.) Additionally, no employee in the history of
WWFHC had ever been given over 12 weeks of leave—until Hill. (Def.s’ Ex. J., Resp. to
Interrog.)
Hill filed suit in this Court on May 30, 2014. (Dkt. 1, Compl.) She alleged one count of
“Discrimination.” (Compl. at ¶ 23.) She also alleged a violation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act (“FMLA”). (Compl. at ¶¶ 36–57.)
Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on March 30, 2015. (Dkt. 16.) The
motion is fully briefed. After careful consideration of the briefs and thorough review of the
record, the Court finds that oral argument will not aid in resolving the pending motion. See E.D.
Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2).

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III. ANALYSIS
The Court finds that Hill cannot survive summary judgment on any of her claims. The
undisputed facts reflect that Defendants fired her because she did not return to work well after
exhausting the maximum amount of leave allowable under WWFHC’s policies as well as under
FMLA. So the Court will grant Defendants’ motion.
A. Count I: Discrimination
Plaintiff’s Complaint cited both Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act
(“ELCRA”), and in her response brief, she states that her “sex discrimination claim [is] based on
her being treated differently due to her pregnancy.” (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 11.) She asserts that she
“plead both a disparate treatment claim and a mixed motive claim,” and argues both theories in
her brief. (Id.) Because “[c]ases brought pursuant to the ELCRA are analyzed under the same
evidentiary framework used in Title VII cases,” the Court analyzes the two claims together.
Rodriguez v. FedEx Freight East, Inc. (In re Rodriguez), 487 F.3d 1001, 1007 (6th Cir. 2007);
but see Acker v. Workhorse Sales Corp., No. 06-CV-14467, 2008 WL 4104499, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 2, 2008) aff’d, 327 F. App’x 628 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “the Sixth Circuit chose
not to extend its “mixed-motive” holding [in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381,
400 (6th Cir. 2008)] as a part of Michigan law.”)
“Title VII’s prohibition on employment practices that discriminate ‘because of [an]
individual’s sex,’ applies with all its force to employers who discriminate on the basis of
pregnancy.” Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 657 (6th Cir. 2000); EnsleyGaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he [Pregnancy Discrimination Act]
transforms improper distinctions based on pregnancy or potential pregnancy into overt sex
discrimination violative of Title VII.”).

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In a mixed-motive claim, “a Title VII plaintiff . . . need only produce evidence sufficient
to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the
plaintiff; and (2) “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor” for the
defendant’s adverse employment action. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400
(6th Cir. 2008).
It is undisputed that Hill was terminated—and it is “obvious” that “firing an employee
constitutes an adverse employment action.” Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 394 (6th
Cir. 2010). And just as clear, Hill took leave because she was pregnant. However, “the White
analysis does not hinge on whether [Hill’s] pregnancy was a link in the chain of events that
resulted in her firing. Rather, White directs [the Court] to examine whether there is evidence that
[Defendants were] motivated by [Hill’s] pregnancy in making [their] decision to terminate her.”
Id.
On this record, there is no such evidence. Defendants say that Hill was terminated
because she had exhausted all of her leave and had failed to return to work—indeed, these are the
reasons set forth in Hill’s termination letter. According to the Employee Handbook, Hill was
eligible for eight weeks of maternity leave with the possibility to extend for four additional
weeks. (Employee Handbook at 22.) Hill remained on maternity leave for nearly eighteen
weeks—the most ever allowed for an employee of WWFHC. (Def.s’ Ex. J., Resp. to Interrog.)
There is no evidence that Hill would have been eligible or had ever applied for additional leave
under the Personal Leave policy. (Employee Handbook at 22–23.) And Defendants did not tell
Hill not to come back to work; from the record, it appears that there was no direct
communication between Hill and Defendants after she went out on leave until the Termination
Letter. Nor is there any evidence that other, non-pregnant employees were able to return to work

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despite exhausting all available personal leave. In fact, the Employee Handbook specifically
states that “there is no guarantee of a position being available upon return from the Personal
Leave of Absence.” (Id. at 23.)
Moreover, Hill has not identified any other adverse actions taken against her by Hairston
or WWFHC. By Hill’s own admission, she was “allowed to sit as needed” and “allowed to use
the bathroom as needed” and “no schedule changes were made” after she became pregnant. (Hill
Dep. at 133.) Though Bellazer said in her affidavit that Hill was not allowed to use the bathroom,
she clarified in her deposition that there was in fact only one such instance and Hill was merely
asked to wait for someone to cover the front desk before using the bathroom. (Bellazer Dep.
Excerpt.) Indeed, Hill’s team leader, Chris Hamilton, said: “I know first hand that Ms. Hill . . .
got up to go to the bathroom and/or to drink water . . . . There was never any different treatment
of Ms. Hill in that regard as compared to any other employee.” (Def.s’ Ex. T, Hamilton Aff.)
Hill also bases her mixed-motive claim on a November 18, 2011 conversation regarding a
doctor’s note that she presented to Hairston after she had been off work for a few days due to her
pregnancy. Hairston allegedly treated Hill “with disdain” and started “raging” and Hill began to
cry. (Hill Dep. at 138–41.) Bellazer and Gail McGlory also witnessed her crying. (Bellazer Aff.
at ¶ 3; Pl.’s Ex. 2, McGlory Dep. at 12.) But it is unclear what exactly was said during the
conversation, or whether any consequences resulted from the conversation—Hill testified that
there were no changes in her pay or schedule, nor was she disciplined as a result of the incident.
(Hill Dep. at 148.) Hairston testified—and Hill acknowledged—that she told Hill that she needed
clarification on what the note meant so that she could know “exactly what we needed to do to
help [Hill.]” (Hairston Dep. at 73 (emphasis added); Hill Dep. at 141.) Moreover, Hill returned to
work on that day with full pay. (Hairston Dep. at 85.) And to the extent that Hairston did “yell[]”

8

at Mignon (Hill Dep. at 140), mere yelling on one occasion is not “a materially adverse change
in the terms and conditions of employment because of the employer’s actions.” Steward v. New
Chrysler, 415 F. App’x 632, 640 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Further, multiple employees
testified that Hairston was rude to everyone, pregnant or not. (Bellazer Dep. at 62–63; McGlory
Dep. at 28.)
In the alternative, Plaintiff turns to the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework as
it applies to disparate treatment claims. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 14.) Under a disparate treatment
theory,
the plaintiff first establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by
showing that 1) she was pregnant, 2) she was qualified for her job, 3) she was
subjected to an adverse employment decision, and 4) there is a nexus between her
pregnancy and the adverse employment decision. In a termination case such as
this one, a plaintiff meets the second prong by showing that she was performing
“at a level which met [her] employer’s legitimate expectations.”
Cline, 206 F.3d at 658 (citations omitted). If the plaintiff makes this showing, “the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the McDonnell-Douglas presumption of intentional
discrimination ‘drops out of the picture’” and the plaintiff must show that “the legitimate reasons
offered by the employer were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for intentional
discrimination.” Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).
First, it is undisputed that Hill was pregnant (at least immediately prior to and during her
maternity leave.) Second, while Defendants do not specifically comment on the adequacy of
Hill’s performance, she did receive a positive performance review, and her former supervisor
Kim Smith said in her affidavit that Hill was “very good at her job[.]” (Def.s’ Ex. Z, Smith Aff.
at ¶ 3.) Third, again, termination is clearly an adverse employment action (the other allegedly
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adverse actions do not serve to meet Hill’s burden on this element for the reasons set forth
above). Finally, there is at least some nexus between the termination and the pregnancy, for Hill
took maternity leave because she was pregnant and she was terminated while still out on leave.2
See Megivern v. Glacier Hills Inc., 519 F. App’x 385, 396 (6th Cir. 2013).
Defendants have articulated the following nondiscriminatory reason for the termination:
Hill had exhausted her maternity leave without returning to work. Hill can demonstrate that
Defendants’ proffered reason was a pretext by showing that “the proffered reason (1) has no
basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct, or (3) was
insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.” Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th
Cir.2000). “At all times, ‘[Hill] retains the burden of persuasion.’” Megivern, 519 F. App’x at
396 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). Hill has made no such showing here.
Again, when Defendants terminated Hill, they wrote: “You have . . . been off work for
more than twelve (12) weeks, the maximum period of leave allowable.” (Termination Letter.) It
is undisputed that Hill was off work for nearly eighteen weeks. Further, the Employee Handbook
makes clear that after a personal leave of absence, “there is no guarantee of a position being
available[.]” (Employee Handbook at 23.) Both Defendants and Hill say that there were no nonpregnant employees who were able to return to work after taking eighteen weeks off. (Def.s’
Answers to Interrog.; Hill Dep. at 98–99.)
While Hill argues that Defendants should have known that she needed more leave time
due to the issues with her pregnancy, she relies on her communications with her benefits
provider, Lincoln Financial, not any communications with Defendants themselves. (Pl.’s Resp.
Br. at 14.) Hill testified that she did not know whether Lincoln Financial passed along her
2

This does not undermine the Court’s determination in the mixed-motive analysis that
Hill did not present evidence that the pregnancy motivated the termination.
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communications to WWFHC, nor does she point to any deposition testimony from Hairston,
Atkins, or anyone else at WWFHC stating they had received updates from Lincoln Financial
while Hill was out on leave. And even if she had applied for additional maternity leave, she had
already exceeded the maximum amount of leave by the time she was terminated.
Finally, the Court is not persuaded by Hill’s argument that Defendants have a “pattern
and practice of discriminating against pregnant employees.” (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 15.) The Sixth
Circuit has considered such “pattern” or “me too” evidence in the context of the pretext step of
the McDonnell Douglas framework. See, e.g., Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154
F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998); Thompson v. UHHS Richmond Heights Hosp., Inc., 372 F. App’x
620, 625 (6th Cir. 2010); but see Schrack v. RNL Carriers, Inc., 565 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir.
2014) (discussing the admissibility of such evidence at trial).
Specifically, Plaintiff relies on the following passage from Atkins’ deposition, regarding
former WWFHC employee Kia Morgan:
Q: In regards to [Kia] Morgan did you ever make a statement something to the
effect of if you knew [Kia] Morgan was pregnant that you never would have hired
her?
A: Actually I was talking to one employee about that and it was just something I
said at the time. I didn’t really mean anything by it, but we were—I was
concerned that, you know, when she goes out on pregnancy we’d have to fill her
position.
(Atkins Dep. at 19.) But the record is clear that Morgan in fact continued to work for WWFHC,
took almost 8 weeks of maternity leave, returned to work, and then voluntarily resigned her
employment in order to move out of state. (Def.s’ Ex. 9, Lewis Aff. at ¶ 2; Hairston Dep. at 41–
42.) And nothing suggests that Atkins continued to harbor these concerns about pregnancy at the
time Hill was terminated.

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For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not carried her burden on either the
mixed motive or disparate treatment theory.
B. Count II: FMLA Violation
The FMLA only covers employers of a certain size. According to the statute, a covered
employer “means any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more
calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i); see
also Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The FMLA excludes from
coverage ‘any employee of an employer who is employed at a worksite at which such employer
employs less than 50 employees if the total number of employees employed by that employer
within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50.’” (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii)).)
Defendants insist, without citing any other authority, that this means that “the FMLA
applies ONLY to employers that, AS

OF THE TIME THE LEAVE IS

REQUESTED,” meet that requirement. (Def.’s Reply at 1 (bolding, italics, underlining, and
sizing in original).) Not so. The text of the statute requires only that the employer employ 50 or
more employees for 20 or more workweeks “in the current or preceding calendar year”—the
time the plaintiff takes leave is relevant only to determining which years the Court is to examine.
Indeed, FMLA regulations provide, “A private employer is covered if it maintained 50 or more
employees on the payroll during 20 or more calendar workweeks (not necessarily consecutive
workweeks) in either the current or the preceding calendar year.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.105; see also
Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997) (“[T]he Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 . . . defines ‘employer’ as a person who ‘employs 50 or more employees for

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each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding
calendar year.’”).
Defendants have not presented the information the Court needs in order to evaluate
whether WWFHC is a covered employer under the correct standard. Defendants have provided
biweekly payroll records from January 2011 through June 2012. (Def.’s Ex. G.) Of these, there
are four payroll lists where there were over fifty employees:3 April 20, 2012, June 1, 2012; June
15, 2012; and June 29, 2012. (Id.) While that is only eight weeks, the Court does not have the
payroll records for July 2012 onward—leaving approximately 24 weeks unaccounted-for. And
further, Plaintiff cites Hairston’s deposition testimony that WWFHC employed an intern,
Anthony Cane, for “[a] year and a half,” and one other intern whose name Hairston could not
remember at some point during 2012. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 17.) Assuming two extra employees for
the entirety of 2012, it would tip the balance over fifty on two payrolls—March 23, 2012 and
April 6, 2012. That would give four additional weeks with over 50 employees. Given that the 20
consecutive weeks need not be consecutive, the Court cannot say that WWFHC is not a FMLAcovered employer as a matter of law.
Defendants next argue that Hill was not an “eligible employee” under FMLA. The statute
provides that an “eligible employee” is one who has been employed “for at least 12 months by
the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under section 2612 of this title” and “for at
least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period.” 29
U.S.C.A. § 2611. “The determination of whether an employee meets the hours of service
requirement and has been employed by the employer for a total of at least 12 months must be

3

Under FMLA regulations, “Any employee whose name appears on the employer’s
payroll will be considered employed each working day of the calendar week, and must be
counted whether or not any compensation is received for the week.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.105(b).
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made as of the date the FMLA leave is to start.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.1109(d). Plaintiff testified, and
the written documentation supports, that she worked from Monday, February 7, 2011 through
February 3, 2012. (Hill Dep. at 66–67; Termination Letter; Pl.’s Ex. 1, Offer Letter.) While
close, this is not a full year.
And even if it were, see 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(b) (“52 weeks is deemed to be equal to 12
months.”), the Court would grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Hill’s
FMLA claim fails on the merits. For eligible employees working for covered employers, FMLA
protects twelve weeks of leave within a 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B). “Once the
12–week period ends, however, employees who remain ‘unable to perform an essential function
of the position because of a physical or mental condition ... [have] no right to restoration to
another position under the FMLA.” Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, 607 F. App’x 461, 465 (6th Cir.
2015) (citations omitted); see also Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775,
785 (6th Cir. 1998).
It is undisputed that Hill took approximately 18 weeks of leave. Accordingly, her
termination cannot give rise to an FMLA claim. Coker v. McFaul, 247 F. App’x 609, 620 (6th
Cir. 2007) (“Once an employee exceeds his twelve work weeks (or sixty workdays) of FMLA
leave, additional leave in the twelve month period is not protected by the FMLA, and termination
of the employee will not violate the FMLA.”). Hill also admits that she was allowed bathroom
breaks and that her schedule did not change, and she does not identify any other way in which
Defendants interfered with her ability to take leave under FMLA—indeed, it would appear that
she was given all of the leave that FMLA would have covered.
Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the FMLA claim.

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IV. CONCLUSION
Hill has not met her burden on either of her two counts. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED
that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 16) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion in Limine (Dkt. 22) is DENIED AS MOOT.
This case is DISMISSED. A separate judgment will follow.
SO ORDERED.
s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: February 22, 2016

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served on the attorneys
and/or parties of record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on February 22, 2016.
s/Jane Johnson
Case Manager to
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson

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