Ivezaj v. Detroit Public Schools
Filing
115
OPINION AND ORDER Granting Defendants' Second 95 Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing Amended Complaint With Prejudice. Signed by District Judge David M. Lawson. (SPin)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FRANO IVEZAJ,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case Number 14-12286
Honorable David M. Lawson
DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
KAREN RIDGEWAY, LAURI
WASHINGTON, and SHIRLEY
MOBLEY WOODS,
Defendants.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING
AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
This matter is before the Court on the defendants’ second motion for summary judgment,
filed upon leave granted. After he was demoted, the plaintiff filed a three-count complaint, once
amended, which sets forth claims for (1) denial of procedural due process, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Count I), (2) gender and national origin discrimination contrary to Title VII and the Michigan
counterpart (Count II); and (3) breach of contract (Count III). In their first summary judgment
motion, the defendants sought dismissal of Count II only. The Court granted that motion. In their
second motion, which the plaintiff opposes, the defendants seek dismissal of the remaining counts.
The motion papers adequately set forth the relevant facts and law, and oral argument will not aid in
the disposition of the motion. Therefore, it is ORDERED that the motion be decided on the papers
submitted. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). The undisputed facts show that the plaintiff was afforded
timely and adequate process under law before the defendants took any adverse job action against
him, and the defendants did not breach the plaintiff’s employment contract when they demoted and
then terminated him for violating a specific term that constituted just cause for termination. The
Court, therefore, will grant the defendants’ second motion for summary judgment and dismiss the
case.
I.
The facts of the case were set forth in detail in the Court’s earlier opinion and need not be
repeated here. The following summary will suffice. Plaintiff Frano Ivezaj, an Albanian American
citizen, was employed by defendant Detroit Public Schools for 27 years, which included 15 years
as a teacher and 12 years as a school administrator, under a series of one-year contracts. His last
contract covered the period from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013. His employment contract stated that
he could not be terminated except for just cause, and the grounds constituting just cause were
specified. They included “violations of Work Rules and District policies and procedures, and poor
job performance”; “misconduct in office”; “fraud”; and “violation of any District policies,
procedures, or directives, including . . . failure to disclose [] conflicts or potential conflicts.”
In the fall of 2011, after defendant Karen Ridgeway was appointed as Superintendent of
Academics for defendant Detroit Public Schools, the plaintiff was accused of several contract and
District policy violations. The accusations came after an investigation conducted by Marilyn Beard,
an investigator from the district’s Office of Inspector General. Lauri Washington, from the
District’s human resources department, sent the plaintiff a letter on May 30, 2012 informing him of
the alleged violations and scheduled a hearing for June 12, 2012.
DPS Human Resources Assistant Director Mary Anderson conducted the hearing on June
12, 2012. The plaintiff and his attorney of record were present and participated. The plaintiff
testified and offered evidence. Also present were defendant Ridgeway, defendant Beard, and
witnesses Tracy Joshua, Gwendolyn Washington, Gregory Stokes, Jacquelyn Benson, Sheryl Jones,
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Marcia Jenkins, Claudia Laura-Martinez, Juan Patino, Teresa Wesley, and Leticia Rangel (all
employees of the District in various positions). The hearing officer considered the testimony of each
of the witnesses present at the hearing, more than forty items of documentary evidence, and the
plaintiff’s own testimony as well as his responses to the charges and the arguments of his attorney
in support of his position. Hearing officer Anderson prepared a written summary of the testimony
and evidence presented, along with her findings and conclusions from the hearing. Defendant
Washington then discussed the written findings with Anderson and the two agreed to recommend
to Vicky Hall, the Chief Human Resources Officer for the District, to terminate the plaintiff’s
contract.
The hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff had violated the District’s contracting and
procurement policy by, among other things: (1) attempting to increase the purchase allocation for
a foreign language program in Mandarin Chinese to be provided by MyLanguage360 Corporation
from $6,000 to $44,000, without following the usual contracting and bidding procedures or engaging
the District’s Office of Contracting and Procurement; (2) attempting to bypass the Request for
Proposal process eventually set up for the Chinese language program by sending an unauthorized
email to District principals informing them of the availability of the MyLanguage360 Corporation’s
program, just one day after the RFP inviting vendors to bid on providing such a program was
opened; (3) purporting to inform the Office of Contracting and Procurement in May 2011 that the
MyLanguage360 program had been selected from among the RFP applicants, without providing any
explanation as to the basis for the selection; and (4) after the competing bidders demonstrated their
products for evaluation in July 2011, informing the president of MyLanguage360 Corporation of the
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score assigned to the company’s product by evaluators and advising him that his company may want
to adjust the pricing of its proposal in order to secure the bid.
The hearing officer found, based on reports from officers of Canadian Customs, that the
plaintiff was seen entering Canada on August 2, 2011, a day for which he received his full regular
pay, and he did not report his time for the day as vacation or notify his supervisor that he was absent
from work.
The hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff violated the District’s policies on nepotism
and conflicts of interest disclosure by repeatedly misrepresenting or concealing that his niece, Liria
Ivezaj, was related to him, when she applied for and eventually was hired to a position in the
Department of Multicultural-Multilingual Education that the plaintiff oversaw.
The hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff used state funds without authorization by
providing an invalid PCN number to Gregory Stokes of the District Human Resources division,
which was used to promote his administrative assistant to a Bilingual Executive Assistant —
Technical Level IV, despite the fact that the plaintiff had earlier been informed that no funds were
available to fund such a position. The plaintiff contends that the Office of Budget and Compliance
has “glitches” in its system and he thought that the PCN number he used was valid.
The hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff violated District policies governing the use
of the “P-Card” (presumably a type of credit card) issued to him by making more than $1,000 in
purchases of personal or prohibited items between August 19, 2011 and March 6, 2012. The
District’s policy requires that all personal or prohibited purchases using the P-Card must be reported
to the Office of Purchase Card Management and reimbursement in full paid by the employee within
48 hours of any such purchase.
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The hearing officer further concluded that the plaintiff violated the policy on use of a taxexempt Sam’s Club membership card issued in his name, under the authority of the District, by using
the card to purchase personal items at Sam’s Club between February 27, 2011 and March 27, 2012.
The hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff violated the School Safety Act, 2005 P.A.
129-131, 138, Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1230d, by failing to report to the District, within three
business days, his October 15, 2008 conviction for Operating a Vehicle While Impaired. That
statute states that if any school district employee “is charged with a crime listed in section 1535a(1)
or 1539b(1) or a violation of a substantially similar law of another state, a political subdivision of
this state or another state, or of the United States,” the employee must submit a written report of the
crime charged within “3 business days after being arraigned for the crime.” Mich. Comp. Laws §
380.1230d(1). The enumerations in sections 1535a and 1539b, Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1535a,
1539b, do not specifically include operating a vehicle while impaired.
The hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff provided his email password to his
administrative assistant, contrary to the District’s policy regarding password security.
The hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff intimidated staff and interfered with the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation by discussing its progress with Gregory Stokes (of
the Human Resources division), and Cheryl Jones and Viviana de Bonafede (direct reports under
the plaintiff’s supervision), and asking those employees what questions the OIG investigator had
asked them. The plaintiff also told Ms. de Bonafede that his “job was on the line,” asked her to
review favorable letters written by other staff members to be presented for his benefit at the hearing,
and told her that she was the only member of his staff that refused to discuss with the plaintiff her
encounter with the OIG investigator. Gregory Stokes and Claudia Lara-Martinez testified that the
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plaintiff spoke with them about the OIG investigation, and that they saw him speaking to other
employees about it. Sheryl Jones testified that two days before the disciplinary hearing the plaintiff
approached her in an “inappropriate and unprofessional manner,” showed her the notice of the
hearing, and “accused her in an angry tone” of reporting to defendant Ridgeway her concerns
regarding the organization of a multicultural gala event. Ms. Jones testified that the plaintiff asked
her why she did not come to him first with her concerns, and stated, “You have caused me
problems.” Ms. Jones found the plaintiff’s approach to be “intimidating and disturbing.”
After the day-long hearing, the plaintiff was fired from his administrative position.
Washington sent the plaintiff and his attorney a letter on July 27, 2012 telling the plaintiff that his
administrative employment contract was canceled immediately. In that same letter, the plaintiff was
told that he could have a teaching position for the 2012-13 school year. He accepted that offer and
was given a teaching position at a substantially reduced salary. The plaintiff continued in that role
until he retired from DPS with 32 years of service in July 2013.
In the counts of the amended complaint that remain, the plaintiff alleges that he was denied
procedural due process when the school district terminated him from his administrative position,
because the defendants did not conduct an adequate pretermination hearing or provide him with
sufficient notice of the grounds for termination. He alleges in Count I of the amended complaint that
he was deprived of a property interest; he does not mention a liberty interest. In Count III, he
alleges simply that the defendants“wrongfully breached” his employment contract “on July 27,
2012.”
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II.
In their second motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that the undisputed facts
demonstrate that the plaintiff was afforded all the process that was due in his termination hearing
before any adverse action was taken against a property interest, no liberty interest was implicated,
the individual defendants cannot be liable for breach of contract because they were not parties to the
plaintiff’s employment contract, and the school district did not breach the plaintiff’s employment
contract when it fired him from his administrative position for just cause.
Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When reviewing
the motion record, “[t]he court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party, and determine ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law.’” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 557-58 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).
“The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the
absence of a genuine dispute over material facts.” Alexander, 576 F.3d at 558. (citing Mt. Lebanon
Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002)). “Once that
occurs, the party opposing the motion then may not ‘rely on the hope that the trier of fact will
disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact’ but must make an affirmative showing with proper
evidence in order to defeat the motion.” Ibid. (quoting Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d
1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989)).
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“[T]he party opposing the summary judgment motion must do more than simply show that
there is some ‘metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Highland Capital, Inc. v. Franklin
Nat’l Bank, 350 F.3d 558, 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party opposing a motion
for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual
material showing “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party, after sufficient opportunity for discovery, is unable to
meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Irrelevant or unnecessary factual disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. St.
Francis Health Care Centre v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). A fact is “material” if
its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d
574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001). “Materiality” is determined by the substantive law claim. Boyd v.
Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2000). An issue is “genuine” if a “reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Henson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 14 F.3d
1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting 477 U.S. at 248).
A.
As noted earlier, the plaintiff alleges in Count I of the amended complaint that all of the
defendants deprived him of a property interest without affording him the procedural due process to
which he was entitled. He brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed
favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
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States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs.,
555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th
Cir. 2006)). To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must back up his stated claim with
evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact on all the elements of his claim. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252. The plaintiff must establish the liability of each individual defendant by that person’s
own conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is
inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). It is well
settled that “respondeat superior is not available as a theory of recovery under section 1983.” Doe
v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978)); see also Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist., 609 F.3d 392, 403 (6th Cir.
2010). “Section 1983 liability must be premised on more than mere respondeat superior, the right
to control one’s employees.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Shehee v.
Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)).
As noted in this Court’s earlier opinion, neither defendant Karen Ridgeway nor defendant
Shirley Mobley-Woods made the decision to terminate the plaintiff from his administrative position,
nor did they conduct the discipline hearing. The plaintiff contends that Ridgeway confronted the
plaintiff at the hearing, made clear that she was “not here for [him],” and sat near the witness chair.
However, those facts do not suggest any activity that amounts to a denial of procedural due process.
Because the plaintiff has not pointed to any other evidence that establishes the elements of his claim
against these two defendants, summary judgment must be granted to them on Count I of the
amended complaint.
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In order to establish a procedural due process violation, the plaintiff must show that he (1)
had a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) was deprived of that interest
by a state actor; and (3) was not afforded timely and adequate process under law. Waeschle v.
Dragovic, 576 F.3d 539, 544 (6th Cir. 2009). “Property interests are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.” Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (quotations omitted)). The
defendants concede for the purpose of the present motion that the plaintiff enjoyed a protected
property interest in his just-cause employment contract. In their briefs, the parties mention in
passing a possible claim related to a liberty interest, but such a claim does not appear in the amended
complaint and therefore plays no role in this litigation. As the plaintiff lost his administrative
position (and thus suffered a deprivation), the only remaining question is whether the school district
and its decision-maker, both state actors, afforded the plaintiff the procedural process to which he
was due. The Court believes that the undisputed facts show that they did.
“The right to procedural due process requires that when a state seeks to terminate a protected
interest it must afford notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Club
Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, Mich., 470 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2006)
(citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 570) (quotations omitted). When, as here, a plaintiff is entitled to due
process, “a court must then determine whether the plaintiff was provided with sufficient notice and
the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Benjamin v.
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Brachman, 246 F. App’x 905, 914 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976)).
In Mathews, the Supreme Court set forth three factors that a court must weigh in its
procedural due process analysis:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards and finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979),
the Supreme Court expanded upon the the flexible standard set forth in Mathews:
It is axiomatic that due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. [471, 481
(1972)]; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-163 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). The function of legal process, as that concept is
embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk
of erroneous decisions. Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term
must apply, flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the
quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need
to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976).
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12-13. In Mathews, the Court made clear that
[t]he judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most
effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances. . . . All that is necessary
is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to “the
capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. at 268-269 (footnote omitted), to insure that they are given a meaningful
opportunity to present their case.
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Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976). The Sixth Circuit likewise has explained that “the
fundamental requirement of procedural due process is that an individual be given an opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Morrison v. Warren, 375 F.3d 468, 475
(6th Cir. 2004) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (1976)).
In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), the Supreme Court reiterated
that due process simply requires notice and some sort of chance to be heard. “The essential
requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present
reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental
due process requirement.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). “The
predeprivation process need not always be elaborate, however; the amount of process required
depends, in part, on the importance of the interests at stake.” Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 742
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542; Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 20 F.3d 895, 899-901 (8th Cir. 1994)).
The plaintiff contends that his procedural due process rights were denied because the hearing
was concluded at the end of an extended presentation of the evidence gathered by the school
district’s investigator, and he was not allowed to present a number of witnesses and exhibits that he
wanted to offer to support his defense. But the Due Process Clause does not require that the plaintiff
be allowed the full-blown process of a trial; instead, it mandates only that he have “an opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Morrison v. Warren, 375 F.3d 468,
475 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (1976)). In this case, the “[p]laintiff was given
ample opportunity to be heard” during the course of the lengthy disciplinary hearing, and the
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opportunity he was given to confront and rebut the evidence against him was sufficient to meet the
flexible standard set forth in Mathews.
Similar to the plaintiff here, the discharged employee in Benjamin v. Brachman, 246 F.
App’x 905 (6th Cir. 2007), “complain[ed] that he was given only one afternoon to present his case
and was not permitted to discuss all of the patients who had been evaluated during the peer review.”
But the Sixth Circuit concluded that the process afforded was adequate and that the “[p]laintiff was
given ample opportunity to be heard,” where he was allowed to submit a written response to the
testimony that was taken at the hearing, “attended the third day of the hearings with his attorney,”
“had the opportunity to respond case by case to [the] testimony regarding his review of patient charts
and [to] answer questions posed by [the hearing board] members regarding those patients,” and
“presented his defense for approximately three hours.” Benjamin, 246 F. App’x at 916-17. Here
it is undisputed that the plaintiff received notice of and appeared at the day-long disciplinary
hearing. At the hearing, he was accompanied by his counsel of record, who was allowed to argue
on his behalf; heard the testimony of all the witnesses and saw the documents that were considered
by the hearing officer; and was allowed to testify and provide his own responses in opposition to the
charges, all of which were noted in the detailed written summary prepared by the hearing officer.
Also, on June 13, 2012, the day after the hearing, the plaintiff submitted to the hearing officer by
email a supplementary written response to the charges offering rebuttals and corrections on several
points.
The plaintiff also contends that the defendants’ failure to honor specific state law statutory
requirements for notification of “nonrenewal” of a school administrator’s contract in itself supports
his procedural due process claim. The plaintiff cites Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.471a(2), which states
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that “[n]otification of nonrenewal of [a school administrator’s] contract shall be given in writing []
at least 60 days before the termination date of the contract.” He argues that the defendants did not
provide him with the required 60-day notice, because his contract was “nonrenewed” by the
termination letter that was sent to him on July 27, 2012, but he received notice that his contract
would not be renewed at the earliest on May 30, 2012, when he received the notice of disciplinary
hearing. This argument is immaterial to the due process claim because the July 27 notice of
termination was just that — a notice of termination of the plaintiff’s then-effective contract of
employment. The plaintiff concedes that his contract — just like the contracts of all other
administrative employees of the district — was renewed in the usual course of business by the offer
and acceptance of a renewal contract for the 2012-13 year, which occurred as a matter of routine
several weeks before the disciplinary hearing. The notice sent to the plaintiff on July 27, 2012 was
not a notice of “nonrenewal” of his contract, but rather it was a notice of termination of the contract
that already had been renewed, pursuant to the “good cause” termination clause.
The process the plaintiff received in the form of a full-blown, pre-termination adversary
hearing satisfied the Due Process Clause many times over. There is no question that he was given
“notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity
to present his side of the story.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546. In fact, during his testimony, the
plaintiff actually admitted some of the conduct that formed the bases of the charges against him, as
detailed in the Court’s previous opinion. And all of that occurred before any adverse action was
taken. Certainly, the plaintiff was afforded an actual hearing “in a meaningful manner” and at a
“meaningful time.” Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 563 (6th Cir.1983), aff’d,
470 U.S. 532 (1985). The Due Process Clause requires no more.
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B.
To state a claim for breach of contract under Michigan law, a plaintiff first must establish
the elements of a valid contract. Pawlak v. Redox Corp., 182 Mich. App. 758, 765, 453, N.W.2d
304, 307 (1990). The elements of a valid contract in Michigan are (1) parties competent to contract,
(2) a proper subject matter, (3) a legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality
of obligation. Thomas v. Leja, 187 Mich. App. 418, 468 N.W.2d 58, 60 (1990). Once a valid
contract has been established, the plaintiff then must prove (1) the terms of the contract, (2) breach
of those terms by the defendant, and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. In re
Brown, 342 F.3d 620, 628 (6th Cir. 2003).
The employment contract stated that the plaintiff could be terminated for just cause. The
school district outlined several grounds that it believed satisfied the just cause rubric, but only one
is sufficient to establish that the contract was honored. See Young v. Am. Diabetes Assoc., 30 F.
App’x 360, 365 (6th Cir. 2002). As noted earlier, the contract expressly provided, among other
things, that the plaintiff could be terminated for violation of the specific nepotism provision in the
contract, as well as the other violations of District work rules and policies. The Court pointed out
in the earlier opinion that in finding that the plaintiff violated the District’s nepotism policies, the
hearing officer determined that, on March 2, 2011, the plaintiff emailed Gregory Stokes in the
District’s Human Resources division and asked him to add the name of Liria Ivezaj — the plaintiff’s
niece — to the eligibility pool for hiring as a Bilingual Education Technician in the Department of
Multicultural-Multilingual Education. The plaintiff later provided an authorization number to Mr.
Stokes for the hiring of Ms. Ivezaj to the Bilingual Education position. Liria Ivezaj asserts that she
found the job and applied for it without her uncle’s knowledge, but the hearing officer found, and
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the plaintiff does not deny, that Ms. Ivezaj sent an email to the District’s Human Resources division
on March 2, 2011 stating that the plaintiff “(no relation to me, common last name)” had told her that
she should inquire about the Bilingual Education position. Ms. Ivezaj admitted that after she applied
for the job, she discussed the District’s anti-nepotism policy with her uncle and asked if it would be
a problem, and he told her that as long as she did not directly report to him it would not be a
problem.
The plaintiff does not dispute that he recommended to Stokes that the district should hire Ms.
Ivezaj, or that he later provided an authorization number for her hiring. When a supervisor in the
HR division became suspicious of Mr. Ivezaj’s recommendation, he directed Stokes to ask Mr.
Ivezaj if the two were related. On March 17, 2011, Ivezaj stated in an email to Stokes, “consistent
with the DPS Conflict of Interest Policy, this is to certify that Liria Ivezaj is not related to me.”
However, in a 2012 email to defendant Ridgeway, concerning his niece’s assignment in the
Department of Multicultural-Multilingual Education, Ivezaj stated that he “may have misinterpreted
the [conflict of interest] policy” because “it does not list niece as a relative.” The plaintiff asserts
that he never supervised his niece and she reported to the principal at the school where she worked.
In her own affidavit, Liria Ivezaj stated that she was hired by the District and assigned to the
Farewell school, which was not one of the schools overseen by the plaintiff, and that she never
reported to the plaintiff.
The DPS Conflict of Interest Policy states that “[i]t is the policy of the Detroit Public Schools
that all [] employees shall report any actual or potential conflicts of interest, questions of conflicts
of interest, or the appearance of conflicts of interest in accordance with this policy for prompt
resolution.” The policy imposes a duty on all employees to “disclose any actual or potential
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conflicts of interest or matters that may give the appearance of a conflict of interest” at the time of
hiring and throughout their term of employment, and it states that “[i]t is the responsibility of each
Board member and each employee to report any actual conflicts of interest, potential conflicts of
interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest prior to their occurrence or immediately upon
becoming aware of the conflict of interest.” The policy states that violations could lead to
disciplinary action including termination.
As to “Nepotism,” the policy states in particular that “[a]t no time may any . . . employee be
directly responsible for the supervision or evaluation of a member of his or her immediate family,
domestic partner, relative, and/or significant other.” The term “relative” under the anti-nepotism
policy is defined to mean “a spouse, child, parent, sibling, grandparent, aunt, uncle, first cousin, or
corresponding in-law or step-relation.”
The plaintiff’s employment contract contains a somewhat stricter specific prohibition on
nepotism. Under the section headed “responsibilities,” the contract states that:
Employee shall not directly or indirectly supervise any member of Employee’s
Immediate Family. For purposes of this Agreement, “Immediate Family” shall be
defined as mother, father, sister, brother, son, daughter, first cousin, nephew, niece,
significant other or any person residing with Employee. In the event a member of
Employee’s Immediate Family is assigned to Employee’s work location (or may be
subject to Employee’s supervision, even if not at the same location) as a result of
hiring, reorganization or transfer, Employee, in writing, shall immediately notify
Employee’s direct supervisor and the District Department of Human Resources for
resolution.
Administrative Employment Agreement 2012-13 ¶ 4.3 (Pg ID 687) (emphasis added).
The hearing officer highlighted as a “serious concern” the charge that the plaintiff repeatedly
lied about and misrepresented or concealed the fact that he was related to his niece, Liria Ivezaj,
during the course of her hiring into a department that he oversaw, and while he was actively engaged
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in recommending and authorizing her hiring. The plaintiff does not offer any substantive rebuttal
to the factual basis of this charge, but relies solely on his strained reading of the Conflict of Interest
policy, which he contends does not specifically include “niece” within the definition of “relative.”
That reading, however, neglects the overriding duty expressly imposed on all employees under the
policy, which requires proactive disclosure of any “matters that may give the appearance of a
conflict of interest.” Moreover, the District regarded its stance on nepotism as a sufficiently serious
concern that a more explicit and broader prohibition was incorporated into an express term of the
plaintiff’s employment contract, which prohibited him from directly or indirectly supervising any
member of his “immediate family,” specifically including “niece” in the definition of that term. The
plaintiff does not deny that, in response to pointed questioning from the District’s Human Resources
division he replied that he was “not related” to his niece. That was a lie. And it was a lie that
plainly was intended to procure the hiring of Ms. Ivezaj into a position that she was not allowed to
occupy under the terms of the plaintiff’s employment contract. There is no question that the
defendants had just cause to terminate the plaintiff’s administrative employment contract.
In his response to the present motion, however, the plaintiff does not question the validity
of the just cause dismissal. Instead, he contends that the termination of his 2012-13 contract is
“void” because the school district terminated him on July 27, 2012 (after he was offered and had
accepted a renewal contract for the upcoming school year) based on conduct that occurred during
the 2011-12 contract term. The plaintiff contends that the offer of the renewal contract one week
before the disciplinary hearing “demonstrated to Dr. Ivezaj that either there was a favorable finding
or that DPS acquiesced in Dr. Ivezaj’s continued employment even if they had found violations of
work rules, policies, or procedures,” and that he relied on that representation to his detriment by not
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seeking other employment for the 2012-13 school year. The plaintiff has not pointed to any
language in the contract that restricts application of the good cause termination provision to only
those situations in which misconduct occurs and is punished during the term of a particular contract
year. Any such interpretation would lead to an absurd result directly at odds with the plain language
of the agreement. Under the plaintiff’s reading, the school district would be barred from terminating
an employee whose contract was renewed in the usual course of business, unless it managed fully
to investigate and adjudicate any claims of wrongdoing before the close of the contract year in which
the violations occurred. The plaintiff has not identified any material distinction between the good
cause termination provisions of the 2011-12 and 2012-13 contracts of employment. Those
provisions do not contain any language imposing a temporal limitation on the school district’s
termination rights that would bar the school district from terminating an employee for misconduct
that occurred during a previous term. The routine renewal of the one-year employment contract is
immaterial to the question whether the defendants had just cause to terminate the plaintiff’s
employment as an administrator.
III.
The plaintiff has not presented admissible evidence that creates a triable issue of fact on the
essential elements of the claims presented in Counts I and III of the amended complaint.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendants’ second motion for summary judgment
[dkt. #95] is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the amended complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED that the motion hearing scheduled for December 3, 2015 is
CANCELLED.
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It is further ORDERED that the defendants’ motion in limine [dkt. #65], and the plaintiff’s
motion to file a supplemental response brief [dkt. #110] are DISMISSED as moot.
Dated: November 19, 2015
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on November 19, 2015.
s/Susan Pinkowski
SUSAN PINKOWSKI
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