Shunia v. Greyhound Lines Inc et al
Filing
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ORDER denying 16 Motion to dismiss, granting in part 18 Motion to dismiss and transferring case to the Western District of Tennessee. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (DPer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NASSER SHUNIA,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14-cv-12441
v.
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
GREYHOUND LINES, INC., and
A.S.A.P. SECURITY STAFFING AND
TRAINING, LLC,
Defendants.
/
ORDER DENYING A.S.A.P.'S MOTION TO DISMISS (document no. 16),
GRANTING IN PART GREYHOUND'S MOTION TO DISMISS (document no. 18),
AND TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
Nasser Shunia brings claims against Greyhound Lines, Inc. ("Greyhound") and
A.S.A.P. Security Staffing and Training, LLC ("A.S.A.P.") arising out of events that occurred
at a Greyhound bus station in Memphis, Tennessee on June 24, 2013.1 Because the Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over A.S.A.P., and because all events in question occurred in
Tennessee, venue in the Eastern District of Michigan is not proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
The Court will therefore transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Nasser Shunia, is a truck driver and resident of Michigan. Compl. ¶ 1,
8, ECF No. 1. On or around June 23, 2013, Shunia was working in Texas when his truck
broke down. Id. ¶ 8. He consulted with his employer and they decided Shunia should take
a Greyhound bus to get home to Michigan. Id. He purchased a ticket in Texas and rode a
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The complaint states the events in question occurred on June 24, 2012, but the Court
believes Shunia meant to say 2013.
bus to Memphis, Tennessee, where he was to change buses for the final leg of his trip to
Michigan. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. The bus from Memphis to Michigan was scheduled to leave at
midnight on or about June 24, 2013. Id. ¶ 9. While standing in line to board the bus, a
Greyhound representative advised Shunia that the bus was overbooked and that several
passengers, including Shunia, would not be allowed to board. Id. Instead, they would have
to wait for another bus scheduled to leave at 5:00 p.m. the next day. Id.
Shunia spoke to a ticket agent at the ticket counter and asked to either be allowed on
the midnight bus or given a refund. Id. ¶ 10. His request was denied, and Shunia was told
to step out of line. Id. ¶ 11. It is unclear what happened immediately thereafter, but soon
two security officers, employed by A.S.A.P., were summoned to the ticket counter. Id. ¶ 12.
They allegedly assaulted Shunia, knocked him down, jumped on top of him, pepper
sprayed him, kicked him, and dragged him to a room down a hallway, where they struck
him repeatedly. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. Shunia states that witnesses attempted to videotape the
incident. Id. ¶ 16. Shunia was transported to a Memphis hospital where he was diagnosed
with a shoulder injury and contusions. Id. ¶ 17. Subsequently, Shunia was charged with and
prosecuted for assault and battery—charges that were voluntarily dismissed by the
prosecutor at a preliminary hearing. Id. ¶ 18.
The complaint alleges the A.S.A.P. security officers were operating as agents for and
under the direction of Greyhound. Id. ¶ 19. Citing diversity of citizenship and an amount in
controversy in excess of $75,000, Shunia brings claims against the defendants for
respondeat superior, negligence, gross negligence, assault and battery, intentional and/or
negligent infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, racial discrimination and
intimidation, and negligent training. A.S.A.P. filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
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jurisdiction. ECF No. 16. Greyhound filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, or, in the
alternative, to transfer venue. ECF No. 18. The Court, having reviewed the briefs,
concludes that a hearing is not necessary to decide the motion. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). For
the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the parties' motions to dismiss and transfer
the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.
LEGAL STANDARD
Venue for civil actions brought in district courts of the United States is governed by
28 U.S.C. § 1391. In general, a civil action may be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents
of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the
subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as
provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject
to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
Id. § 1391(b).
Natural persons are "deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is
domiciled." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). "[E]ntit[ies] with the capacity to sue and be sued . . .
shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant
is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question." Id.
§ 1391(c)(2).
Courts analyze whether personal jurisdiction exists over a non-resident defendant
under the laws of the forum state, typically a "long-arm" statute. Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d
433, 436 (6th Cir. 1998). Personal jurisdiction in Michigan is governed by Mich. Comp.
Laws § 600.711 and § 600.715. The former establishes general personal jurisdiction over
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any corporation that is incorporated in Michigan, consents to jurisdiction, or "carry[s] on .
. . a continuous and systematic part of its general business within the state." Mich. Comp.
Laws. § 600.711. The latter establishes limited personal jurisdiction over any corporation
for matters arising out of conduct that establishes one of the following relationships:
(1) The transaction of any business within the state.
(2) The doing or causing of any act to be done, or consequences to occur,
in the state resulting in an action for tort.
(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real or tangible personal
property situated within the state.
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state
at the time of contracting.
(5) Entering into a contract for services to be performed or for materials to be
furnished in the state by the defendant.
Id. § 600.715.
If personal jurisdiction exists under the forum state's long-arm statute, the inquiry
then shifts to whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is within the constitutional
limits of due process. The party must have established "minimum business contacts" so
as not to "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Cole, 133 F.3d at
436 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The Sixth Circuit
employs a three-part test for analyzing whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
a defendant comports with the Due Process Clause.
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of
acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.
Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities
there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the
defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state
to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.
S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968).
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In general, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction must be analyzed and established over each
defendant independently." Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Patel, 445 F.3d 899, 904 (6th
Cir. 2006) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
Additionally, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating—by setting forth specific
facts—the existence of personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Theunissen v.
Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991). The Court may decide matters of
personal jurisdiction on the basis of affidavits alone. See Dean v. Motel 6 Operating
L.P., 134 F.3d 1269, 1272 (6th Cir. 1998).
DISCUSSION
Other than a conclusory statement that venue is appropriate in the Eastern District
of Michigan, Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1, the complaint makes no allegations concerning the
Court's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over A.S.A.P. To the contrary, Shunia
states only that A.S.A.P. "is a Tennessee Limited Liability Company . . . doing business
in the State of Tennessee." Id. ¶ 3.
Attached to A.S.A.P.'s answer is an affidavit of Byron T. Williams, A.S.A.P.'s
resident agent and sole member. A.S.A.P. Mot. Dismiss, Williams Aff., ECF No. 16-2.
He states A.S.A.P. is organized under the laws of the State of Tennessee, that the
company's principal place of business is (and always has been) in Tennessee, and that
A.S.A.P. provides security guard services and security staffing and training services
only in Shelby County, Tennessee. Id. ¶ 2, 4.
Williams' affidavit further states that A.S.A.P. does not advertise in Michigan, has
never solicited business in Michigan, has never been licensed to provide security in
Michigan, and has never provided any security guard services, security staffing or
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training, or conducted any other business, of any nature, in Michigan. Id. ¶¶ 8–10. All of
A.S.A.P.'s work on the date of the incident giving rise to Shunia's complaint was
performed in Tennessee. Id. ¶ 13. Furthermore, at the time, A.S.A.P. was working only
at the Greyhound bus terminal in Memphis, Tennessee, and all of the security
personnel on duty on the date in question were residents of Shelby County, Tennessee.
Id. ¶¶ 16–18. Williams also states he has never personally been to the State of
Michigan. Id. ¶ 21.
Shunia has failed to meet his burden of proving the existence of personal
jurisdiction over A.S.A.P. General jurisdiction pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws. § 600.711
is clearly lacking, as A.S.A.P. is not incorporated in Michigan, nor does it consent to
jurisdiction or carry on any part of its business in the state. Similarly, specific jurisdiction
is absent, as none of the relationships enumerated by Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715 are
present. The Court therefore concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over A.S.A.P.
Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over A.S.A.P., venue in the Eastern
District of Michigan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(1) is not appropriate, since not all
defendants are residents of Michigan. Additionally, venue is not appropriate pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1391(3). Even if Greyhound is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern
District of Michigan, both Greyhound and A.S.A.P. are residents of the Western District
of Tennessee, and so accordingly venue is proper there under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(1).
Venue in the Western District of Tennessee is also appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1391(2), because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred there. For all these reasons, the Western District of Tennessee is the
appropriate venue for Shunia's action.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will deny A.S.A.P.'s motion to dismiss,
grant in part and deny in part Greyhound's motion to dismiss, and transfer the action to
the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that A.S.A.P.'s Motion to Dismiss
(document no. 16) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Greyhound's Motion to Dismiss (document no.
18) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the action is TRANSFERRED to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.
SO ORDERED.
s/Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge
Dated: November 23, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on November 23, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Carol Cohron
Case Manager
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