Wright v. Best Recovery Services LLC et al

Filing 46

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 38 ; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 37 ; AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 39 . Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (DPar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-cv-12476

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

BEST RECOVERY SERVICES LLC,
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DAVID R. GRAND

Defendant.
/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE [38];
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE [37]; AND
DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE [39]
I. INTRODUCTION
Robert Wright (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on June 24, 2014 against Best
Recovery Services LLC (“Defendant”) and Americredit Financial Services, Inc.1 See Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is a debt collector and sought to repossess his vehicle in violation
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq.
Plaintiff has filed one Motion in Limine in preparation for trial [37] covering several
evidentiary issues, while Defendant filed two Motions in Limine [38, 39] covering two distinct
evidentiary issues. After reviewing and considering the parties Motions and supporting briefs,
and the entire record of this matter, the Court has determined that the relevant allegations, facts,
and legal arguments are adequately presented, and oral argument would not aid the decisional
process for the Motions in Limine.

1

Americredit Financial Services, Inc. was dismissed from this action without prejudice on October 20, 2014. See
Dkt. No. 22.

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Therefore, the Court will resolve Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [37] and Defendant’s
Motions in Limine [38, 39] “on the briefs.” See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons
discussed herein, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion in Limine [38]; GRANT in part
and DENY in part Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [37]; and DENY Defendant’s Motion in Limine
[39]. The Court’s Opinion and Order is set forth in detail below.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion in limine refers to “any motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude
anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.” Luce v. United States,
469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). The purpose of a motion in limine is to eliminate “evidence that is
clearly inadmissible for any purpose” before trial. Ind. Ins. Co. v. GE, 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846
(N.D. Ohio 2004). A district court rules on evidentiary motions in limine “to narrow the issues
remaining for trial and to minimize disruptions at trial.” United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966,
970 (6th Cir. 1999). The guiding principle is to “ensure evenhanded and expeditious
management of trials.” Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
Although neither the Federal Rules of Evidence, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
explicitly authorize a court to rule on an evidentiary motion in limine, the Supreme Court has
allowed district courts to rule on motions in limine “pursuant to the district court's inherent
authority to manage the course of trials.” See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 n.4.
A district court should grant a motion to exclude evidence in limine “only when [that]
evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
In cases where that high standard is not met, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so
that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper
context.” Id. Denial of a motion to exclude evidence in limine does not necessarily mean that the

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court will admit the evidence at trial. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. “[E]ven if nothing unexpected
happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a
previous in limine ruling.” Id. at 41–42.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed one Motion in Limine [37], but the motion contains three separate
evidentiary issues: Plaintiff’s state of mind as to the underlying debt, Plaintiff’s credit history,
and Plaintiff’s payment arrangement with the finance company. See Dkt. No. 37, p. 4 (Pg. ID
No. 219). Defendant filed two Motions in Limine: (1) to preclude assertions and introduction of
evidence of allegedly fraudulent vehicle purchase agreement [38], and (2) to preclude assertions
and introduction of evidence of alleged payment arrangements to avoid repossession [39]. A
discussion of the parties’ Motions is below.
A. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE [37]
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine seeks three things: (1) to preclude testimony or evidence
related to Plaintiff’s “state of mind as to the underlying debt”; (2) to preclude testimony or
evidence regarding “Plaintiff’s credit history”; and (3) to preclude testimony or evidence
regarding Plaintiff’s “payment arrangements with the finance company[.]” Dkt. No. 37, p. 4 (Pg.
ID No. 219). However, Plaintiff requests that if Defendant is allowed to introduce evidence on
any of these issues, he should be permitted to testify as to his understanding of the verbal
arrangement he made with the creditor. See id.
1. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to Excluding Plaintiff’s
State of Mind regarding the Underlying Debt.
First, Plaintiff contends that allowing Defendant to introduce Plaintiff’s state of mind
regarding the status of the debt would “disparage the character of the Plaintiff” and provide for a
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defense Congress never intended to offer collectors. See Dkt. No. 37, p. 3 (Pg. ID No. 218).
Plaintiff claims that his state of mind is not relevant. See id. at 4 (Pg. ID No. 219).
FDCPA is a strict liability statute, under which the collector’s state of mind is not
relevant. See Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 770 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2014),
as amended (Dec. 11, 2014). However, this does not imply that a debtor’s state of mind is
equally irrelevant. See Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 556 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted) (“So, while the FDCPA is a strict liability statute—a collector ‘need not be
deliberate, reckless, or even negligent to trigger liability,’—the state of mind of the reasonable
debtor is always relevant.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state of mind will not be excluded at this
juncture because it may be relevant to whether his state of mind resembled a reasonable debtor.
Thus the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [37] in regard to his state of mind.
2. The Court Will Grant in Part and Deny in Part Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as
to Excluding Plaintiff’s Credit History.
Second, Plaintiff asserts that introduction of Plaintiff’s credit history would be irrelevant
to the issues of whether or not Defendant engaged in a breach of the peace repossession. See Dkt.
No. 37, p. 3 (Pg. ID No. 218). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s credit history is relevant under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404, as it reflects on his knowledge, motive and intent. See id. at 2 (Pg.
ID No. 217).
FDCPA states that “[a] debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural
consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection
of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d). The statute defines “debt” as “any obligation or alleged
obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property,
insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family,

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or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692(a).
The collection of a debt is central to FDCPA’s prohibitions, making the debt a fact of
consequence in determining the action. See FED. R. EVID. 401. Accordingly, a debt related to the
2007 Cadillac STS (the “vehicle”) is relevant to this case. The Court will not exclude testimony
or evidence related to Plaintiff’s purchase, payments, or default on the vehicle which Defendant
sought to repossess because it is not “clearly inadmissible” at this time. See Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F.
Supp. 2d at 846. Nonetheless, any and all of Plaintiff’s credit history outside of his purchase and
payment history regarding the vehicle is irrelevant and prejudicial. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.
Thus the Court will GRANT in part and DENY Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [37] in regard to his
credit history.
3. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to Excluding Plaintiff’s
Payment Arrangements with the Finance Company.
Third, Plaintiff contends that the verbal payment arrangements he made with his creditor
are not relevant to the current proceedings. See Dkt. No. 37, p. 3 (Pg. ID No. 218). In the
alternative, Plaintiff claims that these arrangements are relevant if any of the other issues in his
Motion in Limine are permitted to be introduced. See id. at 4 (Pg. ID No. 218). Defendant seeks
to preclude similar assertions and evidence in its Motion in Limine. See Dkt. No. 39.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he made arrangements with his lender to get his
payments on schedule and prevent repossession of the vehicle. See Dkt. No. 1, p. 2, ¶ 11 (Dkt. ID
No. 2). However, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to disclose any documentation regarding
payment arrangements and relies entirely on Plaintiff’s own recollection of what a call center
employee said on the phone. See Dkt. No. 39, pp. 7–8 (Dkt. ID No. 242–43). Thus, Defendant

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claims that any allegations regarding payment arrangements would be inadmissible hearsay. See
id. p. 8 (Pg. ID No. 243).
Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines “hearsay” as “a statement that: (1) the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Accordingly, Plaintiff may
not introduce statements made prior to testifying that are being offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. Plaintiff may, however, introduce prior statements if they are being used to
illustrate his then-existing state of mind, rather than to prove the veracity of the fact remembered.
See FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
Since Plaintiff’s state of mind and understanding of chain of events involved in his
FDCPA may be relevant, so too is his understanding of whether his vehicle was eligible for
repossession. Accordingly, Plaintiff may testify to his personal knowledge of payment
arrangements, but not to any prior statements being used to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Thus the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [37] in regard to his personal knowledge
of payment arrangements with the finance company.
B. DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE [38, 39]
1. The Court Will Grant Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Assertions or
the Introduction of Evidence of the Alleged Fraudulent Vehicle Purchase
Agreement [38].
Defendant’s first Motion in Limine seeks an order “precluding Plaintiff and any of
Plaintiff’s witnesses from alleging his vehicle purchase agreement is fraudulent and that the car
dealership and salesman engaged in any fraudulent activity or misrepresentations in securing the
agreement[.]” Dkt. No. 38, p. 4 (Page ID No. 224). Defendant asserts any statements or evidence
on this matter should be precluded as hearsay under Rule 802. See id. at 8 (Pg. ID No. 228).

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Additionally, Defendant argues that the issue of misrepresentation or fraud in obtaining the
purchase agreement confuses the issues for the jury, as it is Defendant’s driver’s conduct that is
on trial, not the dealership’s conduct. See id. at 3 (Pg. ID No. 3). Defendant claims that Plaintiff
is the only witness who will testify regarding whether the car salesman engaged in fraudulent
conduct or misrepresented his payment obligations. Dkt. No. 38, p. 3 (Page ID No. 223).
Based on the complaint and pleadings in this case, it appears that the conduct of the car
salesman who sold Plaintiff the vehicle is irrelevant in this case. Plaintiff has not brought any
claims against the car salesman and the salesman is not a party or a witness in this case.
Information regarding the alleged fraud or misrepresentation does not make any of the factual
elements of Plaintiff’s FDCPA more or less probable and is of no consequence in determining
the action. See FED. R. EVID. 401. Thus the Court will GRANT Defendant’s first Motion in
Limine [38].
2. The Court will Deny Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Assertions or the
Introduction of Evidence of the Alleged Payment Arrangements to Avoid
Repossession [39].
Defendant’s second Motion in Limine seeks an order “precluding Plaintiff and any of
Plaintiff’s witnesses from alleging Plaintiff had any payment plans or promises to avoid
repossession of this vehicle[.]” Dkt. No. 39, p. 4 (Page ID No. 238). Defendant asserts any
statements or evidence on this matter should be precluded as hearsay under Rule 802. See id. at 8
(Pg. ID No. 242). Furthermore, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to disclose any evidence of
a payment agreement, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 7–8
(Pg. ID No. 241–42).
As discussed above, Plaintiff may testify to his personal knowledge of payment
arrangements, but not to any prior statements being offered to prove the truth of the matter

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asserted. Defendant may cross-examine Plaintiff about the absence of supporting documentation
supporting his testimony about a payment arrangement. Any assertions or evidence drawn from
prior statements about payment arrangements may not be introduced unless they fall under an
exception to the hearsay rule. Thus the Court will DENY Defendant’s Motion in Limine [39].
IV. CONCLUSION
These are the preliminary rulings of the Court. The Court emphasizes that “[a] ruling on a
motion in limine is no more than a preliminary, or advisory, opinion that falls entirely within the
discretion of the district court … the district court may change its ruling at trial for whatever
reason it deems appropriate,” and “where sufficient facts have developed to warrant the change.”
United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Luce, 713
F.2d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983) aff’d, 469 U.S. 38 (1984)).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Assertions
and Introduction of Evidence of Alleged Fraudulent Vehicle Purchase Agreement [38].
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [37] as to
Plaintiff’s credit history.
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [37] as to Plaintiff’s state of mind
regarding elements of his FDCPA claim and as to Plaintiff’s payment arrangements with the
finance company.
Likewise, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Assertions and
Introduction of Evidence of Alleged Payment Arrangements to Avoid Repossession [39].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 27, 2015
s/GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Court Judge
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