McGhee v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al
Filing
22
OPINION AND ORDER Granting Defendants' 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DARNITA MCGHEE,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14-cv-12753
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman
v.
MILLICENT WARREN, et al.,
Defendant.
__________________________________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #18)
Plaintiff Darnita McGhee (“McGhee”) was an inmate at the Women’s Huron
Valley Correctional Facility (“WHV”). She has brought a civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against WHV’s former Warden and Deputy Warden, Defendants
Millicent Warren and Jodie DeAngelo respectively (collectively “Defendants”).
McGhee claims that the Defendants violated her Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by reassigning her to administrative segregation – where she
spent 22 hours per day in her cell – and leaving her there for ten months without a
full classification review hearing. (See ECF #1-1 at 6-8, Pg. ID 10-12; ECF #18-9
at 3-6, Pg. ID 149-152.) McGhee also claims that she did not receive adequate
medical care while she was in administrative segregation. (ECF #19-1 at 46-47, Pg.
ID 226-27.)
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Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
(See ECF #9 at 5, Pg. ID 51.) On September 14, 2015, the Court held a hearing on
the motion and announced on the record that it would GRANT the motion. At that
same time, the Court explained the basis for its decision and indicated that it would
issue a written order memorializing its ruling. For the reasons explained on the
record at the conclusion of the hearing and in more detail below, the Court
GRANTS the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety and
DISMISSES this action with prejudice.
ESSENTIAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 21, 2013, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Michael Nowak
(“Nowak”) reviewed WHV video footage and saw McGhee engage in a drug
transaction and also expose herself to other prisoners. (See ECF #18-2 at 2, Pg. ID
106.) That same day, WHV Corrections Officer Donald (“Donald”) strip searched
McGhee and found four pills of Tegretol (a prescription medication for preventing
and controlling seizures) on her person. (See ECF #18-3 at 2, Pg. ID 108.) Nowak
issued McGhee a Class I misconduct violation for smuggling and for sexual
misconduct (see ECF #18-2 at 2, Pg. ID 106); Donald issued McGhee a Class I
misconduct violation for substance abuse. (See ECF #18-3 at 2, Pg. ID 108.) On
March 25, 2013, a Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) Hearing
Officer found McGhee guilty of the substance abuse charge and sentenced her to
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ten days in segregation – from March 25, 2013 until April 4, 2013. (See ECF #18-4
at 2, Pg. ID 110.)
On April 1, 2013, while McGhee was in segregation, another Hearing
Officer found McGhee guilty of sexual harassment. (See ECF #18-4 at 2, Pg. ID
112.) That Hearing Officer sentenced McGhee to an additional fifteen days in
segregation – from April 4, 2013 until April 19, 2013. (Id.)
Next, on April 16, 2013, WHV’s Security Classification Committee
(“SCC”) reclassified McGhee to administrative segregation on the basis that she
“[d]emonstrate[d] an inability to be managed with general population privileges.”
(See ECF #18-6 at 2, Pg. ID 114.) The SCC did not conduct a classification
hearing before transferring McGhee to administrative segregation because McGhee
had been found guilty of more than one Class I disciplinary offense. MDOC
regulations provide that “[a] prisoner may be classified to administrative
segregation after being found guilty of major / Class I misconduct” without an
additional hearing following the inmate’s initial misconduct hearing. (ECF #18-7
at 4, Pg. ID 118.)
McGhee remained in administrative segregation for approximately ten
months after the reclassification. (See ECF #18 at 8, Pg. ID 89.) During McGhee’s
first 60 days in administrative segregation, the SCC reviewed McGhee’s status on
a weekly basis. (See ECF #18-8 at 2-3, Pg. ID 129-30.) Thereafter, the SCC
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reviewed McGhee’s status on a monthly basis. (See ECF #18-8 at 17, Pg. ID 144.)
For nearly every “Segregation Behavior Review,” SCC officials interviewed
McGhee to determine whether she was prepared to return to general population
based her responses and her level of cooperation with prison staff and other
inmates. (See ECF #18-8 at 1-19; Pg. ID 128-46.) Each Segregation Behavior
Review concluded that McGhee demonstrated a “medium” “potential to honor the
trust implicit in less restrictive confinement.” (Id.)
McGhee was ultimately
returned to the WHV general population on February 14, 2014. (See ECF #18 at 8,
Pg. ID 89.)
On July 15, 2014, McGhee filed her two-count Complaint in this action
against Defendants Warren and DeAngelo.
She alleges that her status
reclassification and the resulting time she spent in administrative segregation (1)
violated her rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment; (2) violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment; and (3) violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Additionally, McGhee now claims (but did
not allege in her Complaint) that during the ten months she spent in administrative
segregation, Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
A movant is entitled to summary judgment when it “shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact....” SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Services, Inc.,
712 F.3d 321, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)) (quotations omitted). When reviewing the record, “the
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
[that party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Summary judgment is not appropriate
when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury.” Id. at 251-252. Indeed, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drafting of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge…” Id. at 255.
ANALYSIS
A.
The Court’s Two-Pronged Qualified Immunity Analysis
“In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts
engage in a two-part inquiry.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014).
“[B]oth [parts] must be answered in the affirmative for the case to go to a
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factfinder . . . . If either one is not satisfied, qualified immunity will shield the
officer from civil damages.” Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951,
957 (6th Cir. 2013). “[U]nder either prong [of this inquiry], courts may not resolve
genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment.” Tolan,
134 S. Ct. at 1866. The Court is “permitted to exercise [its] sound discretion in
deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
“The first [prong] asks whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to
the party asserting injury show the officer’s conduct violated a federal right.”
Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1865. “The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis
asks whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
violation.” Id. at 1867.
“Governmental actors are shielded from liability for civil damages if their
actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.” Id. “The sources of clearly established
law to be considered are limited. [This Court must] look first to decisions of the
Supreme Court, then to decisions of [the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit]
and other courts within [that] circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits.”
Martin, 712 F.3d at 961.
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B.
Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on McGhee’s
Procedural Due Process Claim
McGhee alleges that the Defendants violated her procedural due process
rights by confining her in administrative segregation for ten months without
affording her a full classification hearing. The Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on this claim because it was not clearly established that the Due Process
Clause required Defendants to give McGhee such a hearing.
“The Due Process Clause does not protect every administrative slight that
occurs behind prison walls. It requires process only when a ‘life, liberty, or
property’ interest is at stake.” Hardin-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir.
2008) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.) A prison inmate does retain “a
‘liberty’ interest, guarded by due process, with respect to state-imposed prison
discipline that rises to the level of an ‘atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate.’” Id. (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Thus, prison
officials must provide some process before subjecting an inmate to an atypical and
significant hardship. Id. The question in this case is whether McGhee’s ten-month
confinement in administrative segregation amounted to an atypical and significant
hardship so as to trigger due process protection.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit have provided a clear
answer to that question.
The Supreme Court has held that thirty days in
segregation is not so atypical as to create a liberty interest protected by the Due
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Process Clause, see Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, but that Court has not addressed the
due process implications of confinement in administrative segregation for more
than thirty days.
The Sixth Circuit has held that 117 days in administrative
segregation in a Michigan prison is not so atypical as to create a liberty interest
subject to due process protection, see Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.
1997), but that court has also held that an inmate may have a protected liberty
interest where he has served three years of an indefinite assignment to
administrative segregation. See Hardin-Bey, 524 F.3d at 791. There are also a
number of unpublished Sixth Circuit decisions holding that an inmate’s placement
in segregation for several months does not impose an atypical and significant
hardship that gives rise to a protected liberty interest. See, e.g., McMann v. Gundy,
39 Fed. App’x 208, 210 (6th Cir. 2002) (five months in segregation did not give
rise to a liberty interest); Collmar v. Wilkinson, 187 F.3d 635 (Table), 1999 WL
623708, at *3 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding “six to eight months in Administrative
Control was not an atypical hardship” and did not give rise to a liberty interest).
Given these decisions from the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit, it
would not have been clear to a reasonable prison official that a ten-month
placement in administrative segregation gives rise to a protected liberty interest.
Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on McGhee’s claim that they
violated her procedural due process rights by confining her in administrative
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segregation without providing sufficient process.1 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 202 (2001) (“The relevant inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”).
In support of her argument that her confinement in segregation gave rise to a
clearly-established liberty interest, McGhee cites only the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals in Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2000). In
that decision, the Second Circuit held that placing an inmate in segregation for 305
days “was ‘atypical’ and a ‘severe hardship’ within the meaning of Sandin.” Id. at
229. But this lone decision from another circuit is not enough to clearly establish
that McGhee’s ten-month stay in segregation gave rise to a protected liberty
interest. See, e.g., Eugene D v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[A]
single recent case from the court of appeals of another circuit is hardly sufficient to
make the law ‘clearly established’ in this circuit.”) Because McGhee has not
established that she had a clearly-established liberty interest sufficient to due
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Even if McGhee could establish that she had a protected liberty interest, she
would face a formidable obstacle in establishing that the process provided by
Defendants was insufficient. As described above, Defendants reviewed McGhee’s
placement in segregation on a weekly basis for the first 60 days of McGhee’s
confinement in segregation and then on a monthly basis thereafter. Defendants
completed reports documenting their reviews and the reasons for continuing to
confine McGhee in segregation. (See ECF #18-8 at 1-19; Pg. ID 128-46.) The
Sixth Circuit has held that similar reviews provide sufficient process to satisfy the
Due Process Clause. See Harris v. Caruso, 465 Fed. App’x 481, 485 (6th Cir.
2012).
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process protections, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on her
procedural due process claim.
B.
Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on McGhee’s Equal
Protection Claim
McGhee claims that her confinement in administrative segregation also
violated her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See ECF
#1-1 at 6, Pg. ID 10.) In support of this claim, McGhee argues that other inmates
who were found guilty of Class I misconduct offenses were not reclassified to
administrative segregation, but she was placed in segregation for ten months after
being found guilty of such violations.
(See ECF #19 at 10, Pg. ID 177.)
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because McGhee has
failed to demonstrate that she was similarly-situated to the other inmates and
because Defendants had a rational basis for their decision to place her in
segregation.
The Equal Protection Clause is “a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985). “Thus, to prevail on [her] equal protection claim,” McGhee “must
demonstrate” that her placement in segregation “constitutes disparate treatment of
similarly-situated individuals.” Robinson v. Jackson, __ Fed. App’x __, 2015 WL
3650196, at *4 (6th Cir. June 15, 2015) (rejecting inmate’s equal protection claim).
She has not carried that burden. While she asserts that other inmates were not sent
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to segregation after being found guilty of Class I misconduct violations, she does
not provide sufficient information from which the Court could conclude that those
inmates were, in fact, similarly-situated to her. For instance, she provides no
information concerning the specific violations committed by the other inmates nor
does she provide any information concerning the other inmates’ disciplinary
history and/or adjustment to prison life. The Court cannot conclude that inmates
found guilty of similar offenses with similar disciplinary and adjustment records
were treated differently than McGhee, and thus Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on McGhee’s equal protection claim.
Defendants are further entitled to qualified immunity on that claim because
they had a rational basis for assigning McGhee to segregation. See Jackson v.
Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Without question, prisoners are not
considered a suspect class for purposes of equal protection litigation.”); Trihealth,
Inc. v. Bd. of Commissioners, 430 F.3d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding rational
basis review applies to claims in which no suspect class or fundamental right is
implicated).
The Defendants had a rational basis for placing McGhee in
segregation because she had a history of committing serious misconduct offenses
and a history of poor adjustment to confinement in the general population. Thus,
McGhee cannot prevail on her equal protection claim.
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C.
Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on McGhee’s Eighth
Amendment Claims
The bases for McGhee’s Eighth Amendment claim are unclear on the face of
her complaint. However, McGhee appears to allege that (1) the conditions of
confinement in administrative segregation were so deplorable that her continued
confinement there constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and (2) the
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs while she
was in administrative segregation (which McGhee alleges in her deposition
testimony, not her complaint). Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity
on these claims for the reasons stated below.
1.
McGhee’s Placement in Administrative Segregation Was Not
Cruel or Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment
In order to prevail on a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth
Amendment, an inmate must establish that she was deprived “of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981). The restrictive conditions of administrative segregation do
such an extreme deprivation.
not
impose
On the contrary, “placement in administrative
segregation is part of the routine discomfort that is part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Harden-Bey, 524 F.3d at 795
(quoting Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 Fed. App’x. 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Thus, the Defendants did not violate McGhee’s Eighth Amendment rights by
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confining her in administrative segregation. Id. (affirming dismissal of Eighth
Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim that was based upon placement of
inmate in administrative segregation).
2.
McGhee Has Failed to Establish That the Defendants Were
Deliberately Indifferent to Her Serious Medical Needs
Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials are prohibited from
unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain on an inmate by acting with deliberate
indifference toward the inmate’s serious medical needs.” Baynes v. Cleland, __
F.3d __, 2015 WL 5000615 at * 14 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2015) (quoting Blackmore v.
Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004)). To establish deliberate
indifference, an inmate must satisfy “both an objective and a subjective
component.” Id. The Sixth Circuit recently explained an inmate’s burden with
respect to the two components as follows:
To satisfy the objective component, Plaintiff must show the existence
of a sufficiently serious medical need, meaning he is “incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976); Brown, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)). A serious medical
need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.“ Harrison v. Ash, 539
F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008).
The subjective component is met “where a plaintiff demonstrates that
prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a serious
medical need,” which “is the equivalent of ‘recklessly disregarding
that risk.’” McCarthy v. Place, 313 Fed. App'x 810, 814 (6th Cir.
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2008) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836). In other words, “[s]atisfying
the objective component ensures that the alleged deprivation is
sufficiently severe, while satisfying the subjective component ‘ensures
that the defendant prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind.’” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 681 (6th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 183–84 (2d Cir.
2003)).
A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when “the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.” Harrison, 539 F.3d at 518 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837). An official “must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.” Id.
Baynes, 2015 WL 5000615 at * 15.
Here, McGhee has presented evidence that (1) she suffered from fibroid
tumors before, during, and after her time in administrative segregation and (2) the
tumors caused her great pain while she was administrative segregation. (See ECF #
18-9 at 8, Pg. ID 154; ECF #19-1 at 17, Pg. ID 197.) The Court will assume
without deciding that these tumors amounted to a serious medical condition which
satisfied the objective component of her claim.
But McGhee has not presented any evidence that either of the Defendants –
both high-ranking prison administrators who had no involvement in the direct
delivery of healthcare to inmates – knew that she was afflicted with the tumors or
that she was suffering serious health issues while in administrative segregation.
McGhee says that a jury could infer Defendants’ knowledge from the fact that
someone in the prison administration authorized McGhee to be temporarily
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removed from the prison in order to obtain medical testing relating to her
condition. (See ECF #19 at 12, Pg. ID 179.) However, even if the Defendants
knew that McGhee had been taken for testing, that would not amount to knowledge
that McGhee was, in fact, suffering from a serious condition – especially in light of
the fact that there is no evidence in the record that the Defendants were ever made
aware of the test results.
Moreover, if, as McGhee stresses, the Defendants
authorized her to leave the prison for medical testing, that authorization would cut
sharply against McGhee’s claim that Defendants disregarded her medical needs.
The point of the test would have been to address those very needs. Simply put,
there is no evidence that the Defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), and
thus McGhee cannot prevail on her deliberate indifference claim.
D.
McGhee Has Withdrawn Her Fourth Amendment Claim
McGhee has withdrawn this claim (see ECF #19 at 6, Pg. ID 173.), and thus
the Court dismisses it.
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CONCLUSION
It is HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (ECF #18) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 24, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on September 24, 2015, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
(313) 234-5113
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