Merritt-Ruth et al v. Latta et al

Filing 39

OPINION AND ORDER denying 31 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 32 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 20 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 26 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARION MERRITT-RUTH and
SIDNEY GURLEY, JR.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 14-12858

OFFICER LATTA, OFFICER CATO,
OFFICER BLAIR, ANIL PRASAD,
ROSILYN JINDAHL, SAVITHIV
KAKAN, DANIEL DUCATT, PAULA
MEYER, KIMBERLY MCQUIRE,
BETH FRITZ, and JAMES
MACNAMARA,

Hon. Patrick J. Duggan

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
The present civil rights action, instituted by Marion Merritt-Ruth
(“Plaintiff”) as personal representative of the estate of Sidney Gurley (“Gurley” or
“Decedent”), arises from events transpiring while Gurley, a former Michigan
Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) prisoner, was incarcerated at the Gus
Harrison Correctional Facility (“GHCF”) in Adrian, Michigan. Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint alleges that Gurley became ill after consuming a prison meal,
that he repeatedly sought medical treatment, that the treatment provided was
inadequate, and that less than one week after falling ill, Gurley was found deceased

in his jail cell. Plaintiff, filing suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeking
attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, contends that Defendants – various
GHCF personnel (the “MDOC Defendants”) and healthcare contractors (the “NonMDOC Defendants”) – violated Gurley’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by displaying deliberate indifference to Gurley’s serious medical needs. The
Amended Complaint also endeavors to state a gross negligence claim arising under
the laws of the State of Michigan.
Presently before the Court are (1) the MDOC Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss and (2) the Non-MDOC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, both filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Each motion has been fully
briefed. Having determined that oral argument would not significantly aid the
decisional process, the Court dispensed with oral argument pursuant to Eastern
District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons stated herein, the Court
will grant in part and deny in part the MDOC Defendants’ Motion and will deny
the Non-MDOC Defendants’ Motion.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Parties
Plaintiff, who was appointed the as the personal representative of the Estate

of Sidney Gurley on September 21, 2011 in the Oakland County Circuit Court,1

1

Case No. 2011-338,502-DE. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.)
2

filed this civil rights and wrongful death action in both her individual and
representative capacities. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16.)
Although there were initially eleven named defendants named in the present
action (as reflected by the case caption), Plaintiff explains that Defendants Paula
Meyer, Rosilyn Jindahl, Daniel Ducatt, and Anil Prasad are not named as
defendants in the Amended Complaint, and, therefore, “are no longer parties.”2
(Pl.’s Resp. to Non-MDOC Defs.’ Mot. ¶ 9.)
The remaining defendants, who are “being sued in their individual
capacities[,]” (Am. Compl. ¶ 25), are separated into two groups.3 First, there are
the MDOC Defendants: Corrections Officers Thomas Blair and Susan Frye-Latta,
and Registered Nurses Beth Fritz, Kimberly McGuire,4 and James MacNamara.5
These individuals work, or at least worked, at GHCF as MDOC employees at the
time of the events giving rise to the instant action. Also included in this group of
defendants is an individual identified as “Officer Cato” (who is alternatively
2

Accordingly, these four individuals are DISMISSED from this action.

3

Because the Amended Complaint specifies that each Defendant is being
sued in their individual capacity, the Court need not address the MDOC
Defendants’ claimed entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
4

Defendant McGuire is referenced once in the Amended Complaint at
paragraph 39.
5

Defendant MacNamara is also referred to as McNamara. Other than
including his name in the case caption, there are no allegations in the Amended
Complaint that mention him.
3

referred to as Ciats or Ciato). However, according to the MDOC Defendants’
Brief, this individual “has not been located to be served.” (MDOC Defs.’ Br. 1
n.2.)

Having abandoned claims against other the healthcare contractors, the only
remaining Non-MDOC Defendant is physician’s assistant Savithiv Kakani,6 who is
an employee of Corizon, a medical contractor of the MDOC.
B.

Events Giving Rise to the Instant Action
On August 6, 2011, Gurley, who was forty-nine-years old, died while

incarcerated at the GHCF. (Am. Compl. ¶ 36.7) According to a coroner’s report
attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint,8 Gurley “died of acute peritonitis caused by
perforated acute appendicitis.” (Coroner’s Report 4.) The medical examiner noted
that an autopsy performed the day following Gurley’s death revealed “pus
discharge in the peritoneal cavity and dilation of entire small bowel covered by
thin layer of fibrin. The appendix was dark to greenish necrosis with grossly
6

The Court’s docket shows a Savithiv Kakan, not Kakani, as a named
defendant. However, the parties both refer to a Savithiv Kakani, and the Court
shall do the same. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 1.)
7

Paragraph 29 of the Amended Complaint appears to erroneously state the
date of Gurley’s death as August 6, 2009.
8

The Court notes that the coroner’s report was not attached to Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint, but rather attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s original
complaint. However, the report is referenced in the Amended Complaint. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 30.) The Court further notes that the coroner’s report states that Gurley
was forty-six, not forty-nine, years of age at the time of his death.
4

recognizable hole in the mid shaft. The mesentery around ileo-cecal region also
appeared greenish swelling.” (Id.)
According to the allegations in the Amended Complaint, “[p]eritonitis is an
inflammation of the membrane that lines the inside of the abdomen and all of the
internal organs.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 31.) Those suffering from peritonitis typically
exhibit the following symptoms: “fever, severe abdominal pain, nausea and
vomiting.” (Id. ¶ 32.) “The usual sounds made by the active intestine and heard
during examination with a stethoscope will be absent [in an individual with
peritonitis], because the intestine stops functioning.” (Id. (underlining removed).)
Gurley exhibited these symptoms before his death. (Id. ¶ 33.)
Approximately six days before Gurley died, “and after having consumed a
meal[,]” Gurley began to complain of feeling ill. (Id. ¶ 34.) On August 3, 2011,
Gurley sought medical treatment from the healthcare unit at GHCF, indicating that
he believed he was suffering from food poisoning. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) Plaintiff
maintains that Gurley had been complaining of abdominal pain and expressed that
he was having difficulty passing a bowel movement. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35.)
Gurley also indicated that he had started to defecate, urinate, and vomit blood. (Id.
¶ 35.) On that day, Gurley informed the medical staff in the healthcare unit – nonparties Dr. Prasad and Jindahl, as well as Defendants Kakani, McGuire, and Fritz –
that he was vomiting, urinating, and defecating blood. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39.) After
5

sharing his concerns, Gurley “begged to be transferred to a hospital.” (Id. ¶ 42.)
Physician’s assistant Kakani and nurse Fritz “failed to treat” Gurley, despite
knowing of his serious medical condition. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41.)
Without any explanation, the Amended Complaint then alleges that “[t]he
cholesterol reducing medicine aggravated [Gurley’s] condition causing more
severe abdominal pains; so [Gurley] told Defendant GH[CF] staff that he needed to
go back to the GHCF healthcare unit.” (Id. ¶ 43.) “Despite their knowledge of”
Gurley’s “serious medical condition, Defendant GHCF medical staff told [Gurley]
that he would have to wait another 2-3 days before again allowing him to return to
the GHCF healthcare unit.” (Id. ¶ 44.)
Upon the expiration of this two to three day period, Gurley “was so
incapacitated and weak that other inmates had to help him walk to the healthcare
facility for a second visit.” (Id. ¶ 48.) As with the first visit, Defendants Kakani
and Fritz were involved in this second visit, as they both knew of his condition and
failed to treat him. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.) Instead, these Defendants instructed Gurley “to
return to his cell and ordered that he be conferred ‘medical lay in’ status; which
means he was to remain in bed.” (Id. ¶ 51 (underlining removed).)
Gurley continued to request treatment, as did other inmates who observed
Gurley’s degenerating health. Gurley’s “deteriorating condition was so apparent
that other inmates requested that GHCF staff” – Defendants Latta, Blair, and Cato
6

– “obtain medical treatment for” Gurley “and/or check on his condition.” (Id. ¶
58.) These requests, however, went unanswered and no medical treatment was
provided. (Id. ¶¶ 57, 59.) As a result of not being able to obtain treatment, Gurley
“died an excruciatingly painful death in his prison cell[,]” where, on August 6,
2011, he was found after being ordered to remain on medical lay-in status. (Id. ¶¶
62-64.)
Plaintiff supports the assertions regarding Defendants’ knowledge of
Gurley’s condition and their disregard of his requests for treatment by including
statements from various inmates who were incarcerated with Gurley at the time of
his death. (Am. Compl. ¶ 65 (statements from Joseph Hamilton dated August 8,
2011, Bernard Fields on August 7, 2011, James Street, Jr. on August 5, 2011,
Daryl Young, Rodney Stevenson on August 8, 2011, and Robert James on August
10, 2011).)
C.

Prior Lawsuit
On November 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed case number 12-15251 in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and the undersigned
presided over that action (the “2012 Action). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint
in that lawsuit on April 25, 2013. The 2012 Action involved the same events and
substantially similar claims. The only new defendant in the present action is
Defendant Blair.
7

On July 24, 2013, the Court granted the Non-MDOC Defendants’ motion to
dismiss and dismissed the moving defendants with prejudice. Defendants Meyer
and Ducatt were dismissed from the 2012 Action on September 26, 2013, after
Plaintiff failed to show cause regarding the failure to serve them. On April 1,
2014, the Court issued an Opinion and Order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against
the MDOC Defendants. This dismissal was without prejudice. The Court also
used the April 1, 2014 Opinion and Order to sua sponte reconsider its July 24,
2013 dismissal of the Non-MDOC Defendants, and amended its previous order to
dismiss the Non-MDOC Defendants without prejudice. The Court’s Order,
therefore, dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice as to all defendants
and gave Plaintiff twenty-one days from receipt of the Opinion and Order to file a
second amended complaint.
D.

Institution of the Present Civil Action
In lieu of filing a second amended complaint in the 2012 Action, Plaintiff

instituted this action on July 22, 2014, filing the Amended Complaint on October
13, 2014. The Amended Complaint, filed using the statutory vehicle of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, contains the following counts: Count I – “Failure to Provide Medical
Treatment” pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; Count II – “Loss
of Life” pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; Count III – “Gross
Negligence – Wrongful Death”; and Count IV – “Acting in Concert.” Counts I and
8

II are repetitive, and the Court, therefore, shall address them as a single count
under the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.9
Jurisdiction is predicated upon federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §
1331, civil rights jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and supplemental jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1367.
II.

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a
court to assess whether a plaintiff’s complaint states a claim upon which relief can
be granted. As articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States, “[t]o survive
a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
9

The Court notes that paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint references a
violation of Gurley’s Fourth Amendment rights. Because the Fourth Amendment
is neither mentioned again nor relevant, the Court presumes this was a mere
typographical error.
Further, the Court presumes that the Fourteenth Amendment is referenced
in relation to the doctrine of incorporation, thus making the cruel and unusual
punishment clause applicable to the States. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 1420 (1962). To the extent this presumption is
inaccurate, it is of no moment. The Court does not believe that the Fourteenth
Amendment claim states a claim as the Eighth Amendment provides the proper
vehicle to analyze claims of inadequate medical treatment in the prison setting. Cf.
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1228 n.7 (1997)
(discussing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870-71
(1989), an excessive force case, and explaining that “Graham simply requires that
if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as
the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard
appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due
process”). Accordingly, the Court addresses only Plaintiff’s allegations concerning
the Eighth Amendment.
9

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 555, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). This facial plausibility standard
requires claimants to put forth “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of” the requisite elements of their claims.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. “The plausibility standard is not
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1950
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). In this regard, “[a] claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant” is responsible for the conduct
alleged in the complaint. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, even though a complaint
need not contain “detailed” factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Ass’n of Cleveland
Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).
While courts are required to accept the factual allegations in a complaint as
true, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, the presumption of truth does
not apply to a claimant’s legal conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s pleading for relief
10

must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters, 502
F.3d at 548 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
III.
A.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Parties’ Arguments
Both sets of Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on

the basis that (1) the action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, specifically
claim preclusion, and (2) that the pleading fails to state a viable federal claim
because it lacks the requisite factual enhancement required by Twombly and its
progeny. Further, because the federal claim fails, the Court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
B.

Are Plaintiff’s Claims Barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata?
Defendants contend that the 2012 Action precludes the instant lawsuit,

relying on the rule that “[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised
in that action.” Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S.
Ct. 2424, 2428 (1981) (citations omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit employs a four-part
test in “determining whether a subsequent action is barred by the doctrine of res
11

judicata, or to be more precise in this circumstance, claim preclusion.” Rawe v.
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521, 528 (6th Cir. 2006). As the Rawe Court
explained, “res judicata has four elements: (1) a final decision on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a subsequent action between the same parties
or their privies; (3) an issue in the subsequent action which was litigated or which
should have been litigated in the prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of
action.” Id. (alteration and quotation omitted).
The parties dispute whether this Court’s April 1, 2014 dismissal of the 2012
Action constituted a final decision on the merits. Certainly, the dismissal of an
action for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
can be a “judgment on the merits.” Moitie, 452 U.S. at 399 n.3, 101 S. Ct. at 2428
n.3 (citations omitted); Guzowski v. Hartman, 849 F.2d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 1988)
(“It is well established that the sustaining of a motion to dismiss for insufficiency
of the complaint serves as an adjudication on the merits unless the court specifies
otherwise.”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b) (“ . . . Unless the dismissal order state otherwise, a dismissal under this
subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule . . . operates as an
adjudication on the merits.”). However, when a district court dismisses an action
without prejudice, a subsequent suit is not barred by res judicata. 9 C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2373 (1971) (“The court may always
12

specify that a dismissal is without prejudice. This creates no problem and a suit is
not barred.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(b) (1982)
(“When any of the following circumstances exists, the general rule . . . does not
apply to extinguish the claim, and part or all of the claim subsists as a possible
basis for a second action by the plaintiff against the defendant: . . . The court in the
first action has expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the second
action. . . .”).
In its April 1, 2014 Opinion and Order, the Court dismissed the 2012 Action
without prejudice and gave Plaintiff twenty-one days to file a second amended
complaint. According to the MDOC Defendants, “[h]owever, the without
prejudice dismissal was premised on the opinion’s language that Plaintiff could
follow up with a Second Amended Complaint within [twenty-one] days. Plaintiff
did not file an [a]mended [c]omplaint within the time period established by the
Court. Hence, the decision in the 2012 case was a final decision on the merits that
cannot now be relitigated.” (MDOC Defs.’ Br. 4-5.) Similarly, the Non-MDOC
Defendants contend that the Court “stated that the dismissals were without
prejudice at that time for the purpose of giving Plaintiff the opportunity to file a
Second Amended Complaint; however, the Court ordered that Plaintiff would have
to file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty-one (21) days from receipt of
the Order. . . . Plaintiff never filed a Second Amended Complaint, and the case
13

was closed effective April 1, 2014.” (Non-MDOC Defs.’ Br. 2.) The Court is not
persuaded by Defendants’ position.
It is indeed true that the Court’s Order permitted Plaintiff to amend the
complaint in the 2012 Action, and provided a period of twenty-one days from
receipt of the Opinion and Order in which to do so. If Plaintiff had attempted to
file a second amended complaint after the expiration of that time period, an
argument that it was untimely would have been well-taken. In other words, if
Plaintiff failed to file a second amended complaint within the timeframe prescribed
in the Court’s Order, Plaintiff could not file a second amended complaint. This,
however, is not what happened. Plaintiff did not file a second amended complaint,
but rather instituted a new civil action. Because the Court dismissed the prior
action without prejudice, Plaintiff was within her rights to proceed as she did, as a
dismissal without prejudice contemplates, and indeed permits, a litigant to take
such a course of action.
The Court acknowledges the authority relied upon by Defendants,
specifically, Ohio Carpenters Central Collection & Administrative Agency v. B. P.
Jenkins, Inc., Nos. 90-3208, 90-3236, 1991 U.S App. LEXIS 4234 (Mar. 11, 1991)
(unpublished) (per curiam). In that case, the parties settled the underlying action,
and the district court entered an order of dismissal “without costs and without
prejudice to the right, upon good cause shown within sixty (60) days, to reopen the
14

action if settlement is not consummated.” Id. at *1-2. Fifteen months after the
entry of the district court’s order, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen the case,
which the district court denied. Id. at *2. The Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that the district court’s “without prejudice” language did not constitute
an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata. The Court explained:
We agree with the district court that the language of the order of
dismissal is properly interpreted to mean that the case was dismissed
without prejudice for the first 60 days only, and after expiration of the
60 days was converted to a dismissal with prejudice. Thus, the order
of dismissal operated as an adjudication on the merits after 60 days
because no further action was taken by the plaintiffs within that time
period. Because plaintiffs were precluded from reopening the case
after 60 days, they were precluded from refiling a second suit against
the defendant for claims arising before the expiration of the 60-day
period following the order of dismissal.
Id. at *3.
While the Ohio Carpenters case is persuasive authority, as an unpublished
opinion, it is not binding. Although the Court’s Order in the 2012 Action did not
expressly reserve Plaintiff’s right to maintain a second action, the Court did
explicitly state that the dismissal was without prejudice. Guzowski, 849 F.2d at
255. The dismissal without prejudice was not explicitly conditioned upon the
filing of a second amended complaint, as the Court did not indicate that the
dismissal without prejudice would be converted into one with prejudice should
Plaintiff choose not to file an amended pleading within the twenty-one day period.

15

Because a dismissal without prejudice is not a final adjudication on the merits, res
judicata does not bar the instant lawsuit.
C.

Does the Amended Complaint State a Viable Federal Claim?

1.

Governing Legal Standards: Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity
Plaintiff contends that Defendants are liable because their medical treatment

– or failure to treat – amounted to “deliberate indifference” of Gurley’s serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. This claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a civil cause
of action against individuals who, while acting under color of state law, deprive a
person of the “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States.”10 “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a
person acting under the color of state law.” Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437
F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “Section 1983 claims, however,
are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, which, if applicable,
shields individuals not just against liability, but against the suit itself.” Reilly v.
Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 623 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Once an official

10

Section 1983 “creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies
for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205
F.3d 303, 310 (6th Cir. 2000).
16

raises the defense of qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defense is unwarranted. Roth v. Guzman, 650 F.3d 603, 609
(6th Cir. 2011).
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials[,]”
including state prison employees, Reilly, 680 F.3d at 623, “performing
discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the facts as alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, must show that the defendant violated a constitutional right and that the
right was clearly established. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.
Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001).
2.

Governing Legal Standard – Deliberate Indifference and the Eighth
Amendment
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Gurley was deprived of his rights protected by the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.
Const. amend. VIII (“[C]ruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted.”).
The Eighth Amendment embodies “‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . .,’ against which [courts] must
evaluate penal measures.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290
17

(1976) (internal citation omitted). These principles give rise to a governmental
“obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration.” Id. at 103, 97 S. Ct. at 290; see also Grabow v. Cnty. of Macomb,
580 F. App’x 300, 307 (6th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“Pursuant to the Eighth
Amendment, ‘the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under
which he is confined are subject to scrutiny.’”) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 31, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2480 (1993)); Baker v. City of Detroit, 217 F. App’x
491, 495 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“The Supreme Court in Deshaney [v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S. Ct. 998,
1005 (1989)] recognized a line of cases ‘stand[ing] . . . for the proposition that
when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will,
the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety and general well-being.’”). Such an obligation arises
because inmates “must rely on prison authorities to treat [their] medical needs; if
the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103,
97 S. Ct. at 290. Even in non-life-threatening cases, “denial of medical care may
result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological
purpose.” Id.
To sustain a § 1983 claim arising from the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment and based on the adequacy of medical
18

treatment, Plaintiff must plead facts which, if true, demonstrate that a defendant
acted with deliberate indifference to Gurley’s serious medical needs in diagnosing
or treating him. See, e.g., Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th
Cir. 2004). Deliberate indifference claims consist of two components, one
objective and the other subjective. Id. “Satisfying the objective component
ensures that the alleged deprivation is sufficiently severe, while satisfying the
subjective component ‘ensures that the defendant prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675,
681 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).
To discharge the burden with respect to the objective prong, Plaintiff must
plead facts establishing the existence of a “sufficiently serious” medical condition.
Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895. A “sufficiently serious” medical need requires
Plaintiff to “show that [Gurley was] incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.
Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994); Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 571
(6th Cir. 2013). “Such a medical need has been defined as one ‘that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’”
Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625 F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harrison v.
Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008)).
19

Plaintiff then must establish the subjective element, which requires Plaintiff
to plead facts demonstrating that Defendants acted with “a sufficiently culpable
state of mind in denying medical care.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895. “Only
‘deliberate indifference’ to serious medical needs will implicate the protections of
the Eighth Amendment.”11 Reilly, 680 F.3d at 624. While deliberate indifference
entails something more than mere negligence or even gross negligence, the
standard is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the purpose of
causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 83536, 114 S. Ct. at 1978; Wright v. Taylor, 79 F. App’x 829, 831 (6th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished). In short, “[d]eliberate indifference is the reckless disregard of a
substantial risk of serious harm[.]” Wright, 79 F. App’x at 831 (citation omitted);
accord Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-38, 114 S. Ct. at 1978-79 (equating “deliberate
indifference” to the “recklessness” standard under criminal, not civil, law). Thus,
the subjective component requires proof that (1) “the official being sued
subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the [prisoner],”
(2) the official “did in fact draw that inference,” and (3) the official “then

11

It must be remembered that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits
mistreatment only if it is tantamount to punishment, and thus courts have imposed
liability upon prison officials only where they are so deliberately indifferent to the
serious medical needs of prisoners as to unnecessarily and wantonly inflict pain.”
Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
20

disregarded that risk.” Quigley, 707 F.3d at 681 (internal quotations omitted).12
“Indeed, ‘[k]nowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly
indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate
indifference.’” Reilly, 680 F.3d at 624 (quoting Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 896).
“Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is
over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second
guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort
law.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). The Sixth Circuit
acknowledges that “[a] claim of inadequate medical treatment[,]” as opposed to a
claim of a complete denial of medical treatment, “may state a constitutional claim”
but cautions that such claims are generally limited to situations where “the
treatment rendered is ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’”
Clark v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 98 F. App’x 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished)
(citing Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860-61); Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psychiatric
Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 843-44 (6th Cir. 2002) ([M]edical care which is so cursory as
to amount to no treatment at all may amount to deliberate indifference[.]”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

12

“Officials, of course, do not readily admit this subjective component, so ‘it
[is] permissible for reviewing courts to infer from circumstantial evidence that a
prison official had the requisite knowledge.’” Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d
531, 540 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th
Cir. 2001)).
21

3.

Application – Was there a Constitutional Violation?
a.

Objective Prong

In the instant case, Plaintiff has adequately pled the existence of a
sufficiently serious medical condition, as the medical examiner noted peritonitis
and appendicitis after conducting an autopsy. Gurley complained orally to both
correctional officers and the prison medical staff about sharp and severe stomach
pains over the period of several days. He also explained that he was vomiting,
urinating, and defecating blood – each of which is “a clear manifestation of
internal physical disorder.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 899 (describing vomiting as
such and further indicating that appendicitis was a serious medical condition
satisfying the objective prong of a deliberate indifference claim). Plaintiff has also
alleged that other inmates were aware of Gurley’s need for medical attention based
on his symptoms. These facts sufficiently plead that Gurley “had a serious medical
need for medical care that was ‘so obvious that even a layperson would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quotation omitted). Plaintiff
has therefore satisfied the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim.
b.

Subjective Prong

The remaining issue becomes whether the Amended Complaint supports
Plaintiff’s claim that each Defendant acted with the requisite culpability: that of
deliberate indifference to Gurley’s serious medical needs. In other words, the
22

Court must assess “(1) whether the facts when viewed in the light most favorable
to [Plaintiff] show that the Defendants had subjective knowledge of [Gurley]’s
serious need for medical attention; and (2) provided they did, whether the
Defendants disregarded that need.” Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 540
(6th Cir. 2008).
“Because it is well-settled that qualified immunity must be assessed in the
context of each individual’s specific conduct, this Court analyzes separately the
allegations concerning the conduct of each Defendant.” Reilly, 680 F.3d at 624-25
(citing Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011)
and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.”)).
i. Defendant Corrections Officers (Blair, Cato, and Frye-Latta)
Plaintiff claims that MDOC Defendants Blair, Cato, and Frye-Latta, all
corrections officers at GHCF, were deliberately indifferent to Gurley’s serious
medical needs. Because Defendant Cato has not been located, and therefore has
not been served, the Court dismisses Cato from this action.
The Amended Complaint alleges that both Blair and Frye-Latta were GHCF
employees and that they “acted within the scope of [their] employment and under
color of state law[.]” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20.) It further indicates that other
23

inmates at the facility requested that Blair and Frye-Latta obtain medical treatment
for Gurley, or that they at least check on his condition. (Id. ¶ 58.) These requests
went unanswered. (Id. ¶ 60.) In the MDOC Defendants’ Brief, it is contended that
these allegations are insufficient to state a claim because, in order to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, a pleading must allege with at least some degree of particularity
the overt acts engaged in that constituted the alleged constitutional rights violation.
(MDOC Defs.’ Br. 8 (citing, inter alia, Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567 (6th Cir.
2008)).) Specifically, the MDOC Defendants argue, the paucity of facts in the
Amended Complaint detailing the individual roles each corrections officer had in
Gurley’s requests for medical care is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim. While recognizing
the pleading is not teeming with facts, the Court concludes that the factual
allegations, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are sufficient to state
a claim against Defendants Blair and Frye-Latta.
A fair inference from any reading of the Amended Complaint is that Blair
and Frye-Latta worked in the unit at GHCF in which Gurley was housed. Gurley
fell ill on or about August 1, 2011 and was found dead in his cell less than one
week later. The Amended Complaint alleges that several other inmates were aware
of Gurley’s serious medical condition because his deteriorating condition was
obvious to a lay observer. While Blair and Frye-Latta have not admitted knowing
of Gurley’s condition, officials rarely make such admissions. Further, “it [is]
24

permissible for reviewing courts to infer from circumstantial evidence that a prison
official had the requisite knowledge.” Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 540
(6th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). For instance, “a factfinder may conclude that
a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was
obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981. Plaintiff has alleged that
the risk was obvious here.
In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that
Defendants Blair and Frye-Latta had been exposed to Gurley’s serious medical
condition between August 1 and August 6, therefore possessing the requisite
knowledge of Gurley’s serious medical condition. Their inaction in the face of
such knowledge is demonstrative of a disregard of Gurley’s serious medical needs.
Plaintiff has discharged her burden with respect to the subjective component of a
deliberate indifference claim against these Defendants.
ii. Medical Staff (Fritz, McGuire, McNamara, and Kakani)
Plaintiff also contends that nurses Fritz, McGuire, McNamara, and
physician’s assistant Kakani were deliberately indifferent to Gurley’s serious
medical needs. Defendants contend that dismissal is proper pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), because the Amended Complaint does not contain specific facts
regarding each individual’s role in Gurley’s alleged requests for medical care and
no facts setting forth what role they had in Gurley’s medical treatment.
25

The Court agrees that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against
Defendant McNamara, as the pleading does not even allege that McNamara was
present in the healthcare unit when Gurley was there. The Court also agrees that
the single reference to Defendant McGuire is insufficient to state a claim against
her. The pleading does not allege that McGuire knew of Gurley’s medical needs,
only that she was present in the healthcare unit, and therefore fails to state a claim
against her. Cf. Reilly, 680 F.3d at 626 (“Plaintiff must state a plausible
constitutional violation against each individual defendant – the collective acts of
defendants cannot be ascribed to each individual defendant.”) (citations omitted).
The Court does not agree, however, that the claims against Fritz and Kakani
are subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). As the Sixth Circuit has
indicated, “[i]n cases involving mistreatment by medical personnel, this Court has
held that ‘less flagrant conduct [than that of other government officials] may
constitute deliberate indifference.’” Phillips, 543 F.3d at 544 (alteration in
original) (quoting Terrance, 286 F.3d at 843). The Phillips panel further
explained:
Although a government doctor may be entitled to qualified immunity,
to be so he “has a duty to do more than simply provide some treatment
to a prisoner who has serious medical needs; instead, the doctor must
provide medical treatment to the patient without consciously exposing
the patient to an excessive risk of serious harm.” LeMarble v.
Wisneski, 266 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2001).

26

Id. In order to determine whether a medical practitioner’s conduct rose to the level
described above, courts “ask whether a reasonable doctor in his position could
have concluded that a substantial risk of serious harm to [the patient] existed. Id.
(citing LeMarble, 266 F.3d at 439).
The facts as alleged by Plaintiff and taken in the light most favorable to her
give rise to a plausible claim that Defendants Fritz and Kakani knew of and
consciously disregarded a serious medical risk to Gurley. The Amended
Complaint alleges that Gurley told the medical staff that he was vomiting,
urinating, and defecating blood, which this Court has already concluded is
demonstrative of a serious medical condition. Instead of probing further or
sending Gurley to the hospital, the Amended Complaint alleges that Gurley was
given cholesterol reducing medicine. When this medication exacerbated Gurley’s
abdominal pain, the medical staff indicated that Gurley would have to wait another
two to three days to receive further treatment. The pleading specifically references
Fritz and Kakani’s knowledge of Gurley’s serious medical condition and their
disregard of that condition. The Court believes that these allegations, taken as true
for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, are sufficient to establish that this group of
Defendants possessed knowledge of Gurley’s serious need for medical attention
and disregarded that risk.
4.

Was the Law Clearly Established?
27

“For a right to be clearly established, the contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” Phillips, 534 F.3d at 545 (quotation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
At the time of Gurley’s death, the jurisprudence involving deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs was clearly established. See,
e.g., Warren v. Prison Health Servs., 576 F. App’x 545, 560 (6th Cir. 2014)
(unpublished) (“[A]n inmate’s right to receive medical treatment for a serious
medical need was clearly established by 2010.”) (footnote omitted).
5.

Summary
Plaintiff has sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

claim against MDOC Defendants Blair, Fritz, Frye-Latta, and Non-MDOC
Defendant Kakani.
D.

State Law Claims
Defendants contend that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. This contention is rooted in their
belief that Plaintiff has failed to state a viable constitutional claim. Because the
Court has determined that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Blair,
Fritz, Frye-Latta, and Kakani withstands dismissal, the Court will exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
28

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint states viable claims against Defendants Blair, Fritz, FryeLatta, and Kakani.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the MDOC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Non-MDOC Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Meyer, Jindahl, Ducatt,
McGuire, McNamara, Prasad are DISMISSED from this action WITH
PREJUDICE;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Cato is DISMISSED due to
a lack of service upon him or her.
Dated: February 20, 2015
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
29

Thomas E. Kuhn, Esq.
David A. Robinson, Esq.
A. Peter Govorchin, A.A.G.
Cori E. Barkman, A.A.G.
Carly A. Van Thomme, Esq.
Ronald W. Chapman, Esq.

30