Lewis v. Romulus, City of et al

Filing 84

ORDER (1) Adopting 73 Report and Recommendation; (2) Overruling Plaintiff's 79 Objections; and (3) Granting 16 , 37 , and 52 Motions to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (TMcg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TAFT R. LEWIS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-cv-13146
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
CITY OF ROMULUS et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF #73);
(2) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF #79); AND
(3) GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS (ECF ## 16, 37, AND 52)
On August 15, 2014, Plaintiff Taft R. Lewis (“Lewis”) filed a pro se First
Amended Complaint against the City of Romulus, the Romulus Police Department,
the 34th District Court of Michigan, the Third Circuit Court of Michigan,
Carpenter Law, and numerous individual Defendants (the “Defendants”). (See
ECF #11.) Lewis alleges that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights and
caused him emotional distress after he was arrested and prosecuted following a
traffic stop in July 2007. (See id.) All of the served Defendants1 filed motions to
dismiss Lewis’s claims (the “Motions to Dismiss”). (See ECF ## 16, 37, 52.)

1

It appears that Lewis never served Defendant Teresa Smith (“Smith”) with the
Complaint or the First Amended Complaint. On September 2, 2015, the Magistrate
Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that the Court dismiss the claims
against Smith due to Lewis’s failure to serve her (the “Smith R&R”). (See ECF #
81.) The Court takes no position on the Smith R&R in this Order, and it will rule
on that report and recommendation after the time for filing objections has expired.
1

The assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (the
“R&R”) on July 14, 2015, in which she recommended that the Court grant the
Motions to Dismiss. (See ECF #73.) Specifically, the Magistrate Judge concluded
that all of Lewis’s claims against the Defendants were untimely because Lewis
filed this action after the applicable statutes of limitations had expired. (See id. at
3-5, Pg. ID 450-452.) The Magistrate Judge further determined that Lewis was not
entitled to invoke equitable tolling – or any other tolling doctrine – to save any of
his time-barred claims. (See id. at 5-7, Pg. ID 452-454.)
Lewis has now filed two numbered objections to the R&R (the “Objections”).
(See ECF #79.) In his first Objection, Lewis argues that the applicable statutes of
limitations should be tolled under the “continuing violation doctrine.” (See id. at 2,
Pg. ID 471.)

Lewis insists that he is seeking a remedy for an “ongoing

constitutional wrong” and that the statutes of limitations should not apply to his
claims because “the illegal conduct engaged in by the [D]efendants was continuing
from 2006-2011.” (Id.)
This Objection fails for two reasons.

First, Lewis has not alleged a

continuing violation as to him. In his Objections, Lewis cites to paragraphs 80-83
of his First Amended Complaint as support for his position that Defendants have
engaged in an ongoing criminal conspiracy. (See id. at 2-3, Pg. ID 471-472.) But
these allegations relate to actions Defendants may have allegedly taken against
2

other people, not Lewis. Because any alleged misconduct as to Lewis ended before
the statutes of limitations expired, Lewis cannot save his claims by relying on the
continuing violations doctrine.
Second, and in any event, the Court “must borrow state statutes of limitations
and tolling rules in a § 1983 action,” Guy v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t,
488 Fed. App’x 9, 18 (6th Cir. 2012), and the Michigan Supreme Court has held
that the continuing violations doctrine “has no continued place in the jurisprudence
of this state.” Garg v. Macomb County Community Mental Health Services, 696
N.W.2d 646, 662 (Mich. 2005). Lewis is therefore not entitled to invoke the
continuing violations doctrine.
Lewis also argues in his first numbered objection that “[b]ecause of
[Defendants’] actions, [he] was dissuaded from any access to information about his
case.” (Objections at 3, Pg. ID 472.) But Lewis fails to apply any of his cited case
law to the facts of his case and fails to explain why any of the cases he relied upon
are relevant. Furthermore, as the Magistrate Judge aptly pointed out in the R&R,
Lewis’s own allegations in the First Amended Complaint make clear that “Lewis
was cognizant of the injuries he alleges with respect to his arrest and prosecution
as they were occurring” in July 2007, and he could have ascertained his rights with
respect to all of his claims with reasonable diligence but did not. (R&R at 4-5, Pg.
ID 451-452.) Lewis’s first objection is therefore overruled.
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In Lewis’s second numbered objection, he argues that the Magistrate Judge
erred when she held that he could not invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling to toll
the statutes of limitations. (See Objections at 6-8, Pg. ID 475-477.) The Court
disagrees. Just as with his first objection, Lewis fails to apply his string cites of
case law to the facts of his particular case. Lewis has done no more than provide
authorities that explain what the equitable tolling doctrine is – he has not made any
argument as to why the Magistrate Judge erred or why the Court should apply the
doctrine here. His objection on this ground is therefore insufficient. See, e.g.,
Zimmerman v. Cason, 354 Fed. App’x 228, 230 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[V]ague, general,
[and] conclusory objections do[] not meet the requirement of specific objections
and [are] tantamount to a complete failure to object”).
Moreover, as the Magistrate Judge properly concluded (see R&R at 6-7, Pg.,
ID 453-454), Lewis has not pleaded the facts necessary to invoke the doctrine of
equitable tolling – especially given that the Michigan Supreme Court has severely
limited, if not completely eliminated, the equitable tolling doctrine Lewis attempts
to invoke. See Trentadue v. Buckler Lawn Sprinkler, 479 Mich. 378, 738 N.W.2d
664, 680 (Mich. 2007); Chabad–Lubavitch of Michigan v. Schuchman, 862
N.W.2d 648 (Mich. 2015) (peremptorily reversing Court of Appeals decision

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applying equitable tolling)2.

Therefore, the Court overrules Lewis’s second

objection.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF #73) is ADOPTED as the
Opinion of this Court, Lewis’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation
(ECF #79) are OVERRULED, and Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF ## 13,
37, 52) are GRANTED.

Dated: September 10, 2015

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on September 10, 2015, by electronic means
and/or ordinary mail.
s/Teresa McGovern
in the absence of Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

2

The Court is not making any ruling as to the current viability of equitable tolling
under Michigan law. The Court simply concludes that even if equitable tolling
does exist under Michigan law, Lewis has not provided any legal support for his
argument that the doctrine properly applies here.
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