Watson v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 26

OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS 23 , ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 22 , GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 19 , DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 , AND AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONERS DECISION Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TBan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MELISSA WATSON,
Case No. 14-cv-13481

Plaintiff,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES E. BINDER

Defendant.
/

OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS [23], ACCEPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [22], GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [19], DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT[17], AND AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION
Melissa Watson (“Watson” or “Plaintiff”) brought this action against the Commissioner
of Social Security (“the Commissioner” or “Defendant”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3) on September 8, 2014. See Dkt. No. 1. In the complaint, Watson challenged the
Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (“the Act”).
This Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge David R. Grand on September 9, 2014. See
Dkt. No. 4. The case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder on March 30, 2015
pursuant to Administrative Order 15-AO-027.
Watson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 11, 2015. See Dkt. No. 17.
The Commissioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 12, 2015. See Dkt. No.
19. On May 18, 2015, Watson filed a “Reply Brief” to the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. See Dkt. No. 21.
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On May 26, 2015, Magistrate Judge Binder determined the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) decision was supported by substantial evidence, and that Watson retained the residual
functional capacity for a limited range of sedentary work. See Dkt. No. 22. Accordingly,
Magistrate Judge Binder recommended that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [17]
be denied and the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [19] be granted. See id.
On June 1, 2015 Watson submitted her “Objections to Magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation.” See Dkt. No. 23. The Commissioner responded to Watson’s objections on
June 4, 2015. See Dkt. Nos. 24, 25. After reviewing Watson’s Objections to Magistrate’s Report
and Recommendation, the Court will OVERRULE Watson’s Objections [#23] and ACCEPT
Magistrate Judge Binder’s Report and Recommendation [#22].
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Where a party has objected to portions of a Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, the Court conducts a de novo review of these portions. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b); Lyons v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). In reviewing
the findings of the ALJ, the Court is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence and made pursuant to proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .”); Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234,
241 (6th Cir. 2007).
“A reviewing court will affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on substantial
evidence, even if substantial evidence would also have supported the opposite conclusion.”
Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Colvin v. Barnhart,
475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007).

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (internal quotations omitted); see also
McGlothin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 299 F. App’x 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that
substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
B. Legal Analysis
Watson raises one objection with three different arguments in her “Objections to
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation.” See Dkt. No. 23 at 1. Watson objects, arguing that
the Magistrate’s Report fails to address the following: (1) that the ALJ’s Decisions failed to give
controlling weight to the opinions of treating physicians Dr. Akbar and Dr. Ahmed and treating
psychiatrist Dr. Kondapaneni, (2) that the ALJ’s Decision failed to give good reasons for not
giving those physicians’ opinions controlling weight, and (3) that the ALJ Decision failed to
state what weight it did give to those physicians’ opinions. See Dkt. No. 23 at 1.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that it is in agreement with Magistrate Judge
Binder’s ultimate conclusion. When reviewing the decision of the ALJ pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), the district court is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ employed the proper legal standards.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401. The Magistrate Judge acknowledged that there is
medical evidence on both sides, but after review, the Magistrate Judge could not say that the
Commissioner’s conclusion was not supportable. See Dkt. No 22 at 9.
Specifically, Judge Binder found that “[g]iven the lack of objective clinical evidence of
disability during the relevant period, the [ALJ] could reasonably find that Plaintiff’s impairments

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did not prevent her from performing a reduced range of sedentary work.” Id. at 9. In reaching
that conclusion, the Magistrate Judge discussed two of the physicians specifically, and ultimately
concluded that there was “substantial evidence on the record supporting the Commissioner’s
conclusion that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity during the relevant period for a
restricted range of sedentary work. . . .” Dkt. No 22 at 6; see also id. at 6-10 (explaining in detail
the finding that the ALJ’s finding was supported by substnaial evidence.”).
Notably, Watson does not point out any flaws in the reasoning of Magistrate Judge
Binder’s Report and Recommendation. Instead, Watson reiterates arguments that were within her
Motion for Summary Judgment [17] and her Reply Brief [21]. Compare Dkt. No. 23 (making the
present argument), with Dkt. No. 17 at 8-25 (arguing the same in Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment), and Dkt. No. 21 (arguing the same in Plaintiff’s Reply Brief).
Magistrate Judge Binder likely did not specifically address these arguments made by
Watson, because it is readily apparent from the record that they lack merit. Watson’s arguments
can best be summed up as follows: (1) the ALJ did not give “good reasons” for not giving the
opinions of Dr. Akbar, Dr. Ahmed, and Dr. Kondapaneni controlling weight, and (2) the ALJ
“failed to state what weight it did give to those physicians opinions.” But a review of the record
shows that the ALJ did give “good reasons” for not giving those physicians opinions controlling
weight, and did state exactly what weight was given.
With respect to Dr. Akbar’s opinion, for example, the ALJ explained: “I have given it
some weight.” Dkt. No. 12-2 at 37. The ALJ did not give Dr. Akbar’s opinion controlling weight
because the ALJ found that “the claimant’s consistently normal gait and functional range of
motion weighs against a finding that she would need to alternate between sitting and standing.”

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Id. The ALJ concluded “the record as a whole, including the claimant’s daily activities,
precludes this opinion’s entitlement to controlling weight.” Id.
For Dr. Ahmed’s opinion, the ALJ specifically stated: “I have given this opinion little
weight.” Dkt. No. 12-2 at 38. The ALJ noted that “although Dr. Ahmed has been treating the
claimant for approximately one year, there is no evidence that he has performed a comprehensive
physical examination, including assessment of her lumbar spine and peripheral joints.” Id. at 37.
The ALJ gave a particular emphasis to the fact that the findings “reported by other physicians . . .
do not support the extreme exertional limitations Dr. Ahmed describes.” Id. at 38.
Lastly, the ALJ specifically noted that “Dr. Kondapaneni’s opinion is entitled to some
weight[.]” Dkt. No. 12-2 at 38. However, the ALJ specified that Dr. Kondapaneni’s opinion was
only entitled to some weight “to the extent it is consistent with the residual functional
capacity[.]” Id. The ALJ did not give Dr. Kondapaneni’s assessment controlling weight for two
reasons: (1) because it could not “be readily translated into a residual functional capacity
determination,” id., and (2) because the ALJ noted that the opinion was “not fully consistent
with Dr. Kondapaneni’s records, which generally showed intact thought processes, normal
speech, and euthymic mood.” Id.
The Court emphasizes that the “ALJ need not set forth an exhaustive ‘factor-by-factor’
analysis as long as the ALJ gives ‘good reasons’ for the weight assigned to the treating sources
opinion.” Flowers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-11457, 2014 WL 4855037, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 30, 2014) (quoting Francis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 414 F. App’x 802, 805 (6th Cir. 2011).
“[T]he treating-source rule is not ‘a procrustean bed, requiring an arbitrary conformity at all
times[.]’” Francis, 414 F. App’x at 805 (quoting Friend v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x.
543, 551 (6th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). It is enough that “the decision permits the claimant and a

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reviewing court a clear understanding of the reasons for the weight given a treating physician’s
opinion[.]” Friend, 375 F. App’x at 551.
Here, the ALJ’s decision gives the claimant and this court a clear understanding of the
reasons for the weight given to the opinions of Dr. Akbar, Dr. Ahmed, and Dr. Kondapaneni. See
Dkt. No. 12-2 at 37-38. The ALJ gave reasoning for his findings and explained the weight given
to the opinions. Thus, the ALJ gave the “procedural safeguard of reasons—meeting the goal of
the regulation—and the only true disagreement lies within the merits of the reasons themselves.”
Francis, 414 F. App’x at 805.
To the extent, Watson challenges the merits of the ALJ’s “good reasons” this Court finds
the challenge to be without merit. The ALJ deemed the opinions of Dr. Akbar, Dr. Ahmed, and
Dr. Kondapaneni to be unsupported by substantial evidence, and cited specific inconsistencies
between each of the doctors’ opinions and Watson’s objective clinical findings in the record. Put
differently, the ALJ identified the opinions as being “incompatible” with the record and
identified “the specific discrepancies [] to explain why it is the treating physician’s conclusion
that gets the short end of the stick.” Friend, 375 F. App'x at 552. This being the case, this Court
finds that the ALJ set forth “good reasons” for not giving controlling weight to the opinions of
Dr. Akbar, Dr. Ahmed, and Dr. Kondapaneni. Because there was substantial evidence to support
the decision of the ALJ, the Court will OVERRULE Watson’s Objection.

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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court HEARBY OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections
[23]; ACCEPTS Magistrate Judge Binder’s Report and Recommendation [22]; GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [19]; DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [17], and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 22, 2015

/s/Gershwin A Drain
Hon. Gershwin A. Drain
United States District Court Judge 

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