Demyers v. ASTRUE et al

Filing 18

OPINION AND ORDER accepting Report and Recommendation 15 , overruling plaintiff's objections 16 , denying plaintiff's 13 Motion for Summary Judgment, granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 14 and dismissing case. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

AMY L. DEMYERS,
CASE NO. 14-cv-13543
HONORABLE GEORGE CARAM STEEH

Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
/

OPINION AND ORDER ACCEPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (DOC. #15),
OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (DOC. #16),
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (DOC. #13), GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. #14) AND DISMISSING CASE
This matter is before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiff Amy Demyers appeals from the final decision of the defendant Commissioner of
Social Security denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental
Security Income. Plaintiff alleges that, since July 1, 1997, she has been disabled due to
depression, bipolar disorder, and hepatitis C. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge
Mona Majzoub for issuance of a Report and Recommendation. The magistrate judge
recommends that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied, that the
commissioner’s motion for summary judgment be granted, and that the findings of the
commissioner be affirmed. Plaintiff has filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation. For the reasons that follow, the report and recommendation will be

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accepted, plaintiff’s objections will be overruled and her motion for summary judgment
denied, and the commissioner’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation incorporated the parties’ detailed
factual recitation given that there were no material differences between the parties. The
court also adopts and incorporates by reference the facts outlined in the parties’ factual
recitations without restating the facts in this order. The court discusses the facts necessary
to resolving the objections below.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Review of Commissioner’s Decision
An individual may obtain review of any final decision made after a hearing by the
Commissioner of Social Security by filing an action in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). The court may affirm, modify, or reverse the commissioner’s decision, with or
without remand. Id. Findings of fact by the commissioner are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. Id. The commissioner’s decision must be affirmed if the decision is
supported by substantial evidence in the record and the commissioner applied the correct
legal standard. Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005).
B. Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
A party may file timely written objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings
and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “A judge of the court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of a report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. “A judge of the court may accept, reject,

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or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.”
Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises three objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation. The court discusses the objections in turn.
A. Whether The ALJ’s Decision Was Supported By Substantial Evidence
First, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that the ALJ’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the
ALJ misconstrued medical evidence and testimony, ultimately resulting in an inadequate
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment. Relying on Bowen v. Commissioner, 478
F.3d 742 (2007), plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in applying a Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) regulation, and, therefore, a remand is appropriate. The court
disagrees.
After weighing all of the evidence, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s mental
impairments limited her ability to concentrate for extended periods of time, and affected her
ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions. Thus, the ALJ
concluded that any work plaintiff performs must be low stress without involving the general
public or work at a production pace.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s findings overlook her testimony describing the severity
of her depression and anxiety, and her history of substance abuse. Given her testimony,
plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have ordered a consultative examination by a qualified
psychologist or psychiatrist pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1503(e).

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The magistrate judge correctly concluded that the ALJ’s decision was based on
substantial evidence. The ALJ’s thoughtful analysis explaining how she reached the
decision about plaintiff’s RFC cites in detail to substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s
conclusion. See (Doc. #11-2 at 34–38). The Sixth Circuit has made clear that “[s]ubstantial
evidence exists when a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support
the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way.”
Casey v. Sec’y of HHS, 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, a reasonable mind
could accept the evidence as supporting the ALJ’s conclusion.
To the extent that plaintiff argues for remand because the ALJ did not order a
consultative examination by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist, her argument lacks
merit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1503(e) states, in pertinent part, that “in any case where there is
evidence which indicates the existence of a mental impairment, [a determination] will be
made only after every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that a qualified
psychiatrist or psychologist has completed the medical portion of the case review and any
applicable residual functional capacity assessment.”

The record reveals that, on

September 8, 2008, the plaintiff attended a consultative examination with Hugh D. Bray,
Ph.D, a state agency doctor who diagnosed plaintiff with bipolar disorder and a history of
substance abuse. The ALJ gave Dr. Bray’s report “great weight.” (Doc. #11-2 at 36). In
addition, Zahra Yousuf, M.D. completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form and a mental
RFC assessment of plaintiff on November 21, 2008, which the ALJ also gave “great
weight.” Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did not order the appropriate examinations is
without merit.

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For these reasons, plaintiff’s first objection will be overruled.
B. The RFC Determination
Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was in error because the
ALJ failed to consider the effect of plaintiff’s severe mental impairments on plaintiff’s
functional ability. As explained above, however, the ALJ thoroughly considered all of the
evidence in reaching her conclusion. The ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by
substantial evidence. Thus, plaintiff’s second objection will be overruled.
C. Weight Placed On Medical Evidence
Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in her assessment of the medical evidence
in the record. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion
of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Soverinsky. Dr. Soverinsky opined that plaintiff is
disabled from all work because her recurrent depression and polysubstance dependence
causes chronic and sporadic exacerbations. The ALJ reasoned that Dr. Soverinsky’s
opinion was entitled to little weight because (1) nothing in the record shows that plaintiff’s
depressive episodes occur more than one-to-two times per year, and (2) Dr. Soverinsky
did not support his opinion with any medical evidence. Dr. Soverinsky’s opinion was
contradicted by Dr. Yousuf’s mental RFC assessment.
The ALJ properly discounted Dr. Soverinsky’s opinion. An opinion of a treating
physician is entitled to deference unless it is inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in the record, Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2009), or there are
“good reasons” to reject the treating physician’s opinion. Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013). As explained above, the ALJ provided good reasons
for rejecting Dr. Soverinsky’s opinion. Thus, plaintiff’s objection will be overruled.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court ACCEPTS the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation (Doc. #15), OVERRULES plaintiff’s objections (Doc. #16), DENIES
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #13), GRANTS the commissioner’s motion
for summary judgment (Doc. #14) and DISMISSES this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 21, 2016
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
January 21, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Marcia Beauchemin
Deputy Clerk

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