OptimizeRX Corporation v. Stastney

Filing 26

OPINION and ORDER Granting 17 MOTION for Leave to File Jury Demand. Signed by District Judge Sean F. Cox. (JMcC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
OptimizeRx Corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 14-13612

Shadron Stastney,

Sean F. Cox
United States District Court Judge

Defendant.
________________________________/
OPINION & ORDER
This matter involves a dispute over a separation agreement. It is currently before the
Court on a motion seeking leave to file a late jury demand. The parties have briefed the issues
and the Court finds that oral argument would not aid the decisional process. See Local Rule
7.1(f)(2), U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan. The Court therefore orders that the
motion will be decided upon the briefs. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT
the motion and allow a trial by jury as to all issues triable by a jury in this matter.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant OptimizeRx (“OPRx”) filed this action against
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Shadron Stastney (“Stastney”) on September 17, 2014, asserting the
following claims: 1) “Declaratory Relief” (“First Cause of Action”); 2) “Preliminary and
Permanent Injunction” (“Second Claim for Relief”).
Stastney filed the following counterclaims against OPRx on March 26, 2015: 1) Breach
of Contract (Count I); and 2) Declaratory Judgment (Count II). Stastney’s counter-complaint
seeks monetary damages.
1

The action concerns disputes over a separation agreement. Neither party filed a jury
demand initially.
This Court held a Scheduling Conference on May 5, 2015, at which time the Court
ordered the case to facilitation. The Court did not issue a scheduling order at that time. The
parties went to facilitation on June 17, 2015, but the case did not get resolved.
On June 25, 2015 – less than 10 days after the unsuccessful facilitation – OPRx filed the
instant motion seeking leave to file a jury demand. Stastney opposes the motion and wishes the
action to proceed as a bench trial.
ANALYSIS
Where a party has a right to a trial by jury, on any issue, the party must demand one in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Under Rule 38, the party desiring a jury must make a
demand for jury within fourteen days after the last pleading directed to the issue is served. Here,
there is no dispute that OPRx did not file a jury demand within the time allowed by Rule 38(b).
However, under Rule 39(b), notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an
action in which a demand might have been made of right, the court in its discretion upon motion
may order a trial by jury “on any issue for which a jury might have been demanded.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 39(b); see also Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc., 915 F.2d 201, 207 (6th
Cir. 1990).
A district court has “broad discretion” in ruling on a Rule 39(b) motion. Moody, 915
F.2d at 207. “Moreover, the court’s discretion should be exercised in favor of granting a jury
trial where there are not compelling reasons to the contrary.” Id. (Emphasis added).
In opposing OPRx’s motion, Stastney contends that there are three “compelling” reasons

2

to deny this motion: 1) the only justification for the delay was inadvertence; 2) the Court should
not grant the motion here because Stastney suspects that OPRx intentionally waived its right and
then changed its mind; and 3) the case is highly complex and not suited for a jury. The cases it
offers to support its arguments focus on the first argument – that mere inadvertence is not
enough. (See Stastney’s Br. at 2).
It is true that, “[a]s a general rule, a district court will not abuse its discretion in denying
a Rule 39(b) motion if the only justification is mere inadvertence.” Misco, Inc. v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 784 F.2d 198, 205 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). But that is not to say that a district
court abuses its discretion in granting a motion to file a late jury demand where the delay was
due to inadvertence. See Kitchen v. Chippewa Valley Schools, 825 f.2d 1004, 1013 (6th Cir.
1987). In that case, Sixth Circuit affirmed a trial court’s ruling where the trial court invited and
granted a motion to file a late jury demand just before trial. In Kitchen, the Sixth Circuit noted
that
[g]enerally, a district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a 39(b) motion if the only
justification for delay is ‘mere inadvertence’” but went on to explain:
In none of these cases, however, nor in any case cited by the appellants, did the
appellate court reverse a district court’s decision to grant a jury trial. All of these
cases involved affirmances of denials of such motions. Therefore, given the lack
of precedent for reversing the grant of a jury trial, and the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial, we are extremely reluctant to reverse the trial court’s decision
to grant a jury trial, even though its actions were somewhat unorthodox.
Furthermore, the appellants have made only conclusory claims of prejudice and
have failed to convince us that they were discernibly prejudiced by the jury trial
on the state claim. Therefore, we affirm the grant of the jury trial.
Kitchen, 825 F.2d at 1013.
OPRx basically asserts that, given that the matter was going to facilitation prior to a

3

scheduling order it had little reason to file a motion before the facilitation proved to be
unsuccessful. It contends it filed it motion expeditiously after facilitation and that it filed the
motion in good faith. It also notes that there is no prejudice here because there has not even been
a scheduling order issued in this case.
Under the circumstances presented here, the Court concludes that it should exercise its
discretion to grant the motion, allowing a jury as to all issues triable by a jury in this matter.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that OPRx’s Motion for Leave to File
Jury Demand (Docket Entry No. 17) is GRANTED. The Court further ORDERS that OPRx
shall file its jury demand within seven (7) days of the date of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Sean F. Cox
Sean F. Cox
United States District Judge
Dated: September 18, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on
September 18, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Jennifer McCoy
Case Manager

4