American Furukawa, Inc. v. HOSSAIN

Filing 161

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION AND/OR CLARIFICATION 141 . Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TBan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

AMERICAN FURUKAWA, INC.
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14-cv-13633
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

ISTHIHAR HOSSAIN and
HT WIRE & CABLE AMERICAS, LLC,
Defendants.
________________________________

/

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION AND/OR
CLARIFICATION [141]
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 23, 2016, this Court entered an Order on the parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment [138], granting in part the Defendants Hossain and HT Wire
Cable Americas, LLC’s (“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment [117] and
denying Plaintiff American Furukawa, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Summary
Judgment [119]. On July 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Reconsideration. For
reasons given below, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motion.

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II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed its Complaint [1] against former
employee, Defendant Hossain. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged eight Counts: (1)
violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030; (2)
fraud; (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) misappropriation of
trade secrets under MICH. COMP. LAWS §445.1902; (6) conversion; (7) tortious
interference; and (8) civil conspiracy.
On April 19, 2016, the Defendant and Plaintiff filed cross Motions for
Summary Judgment. The Court partially granted the Defendants’ Motion,
dismissing the Plaintiff’s conversion claim, and denied Plaintiff’s Motion. American
Furukawa, Inc. v. Isthihar Hossain, HT Wire & Cable Americas, LLC, No. 14-cv13633, 2016 WL 3444079 (E.D. Mich. June 23, 2016). The Plaintiff now moves the
Court to reconsider denial of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s CFAA claim, denial
of its contract claim, and dismissal of its conversion claim.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court cannot grant a motion for reconsideration which merely presents
the same issues the Court already ruled on. LR 7.1(h)(3)(E.D. Mich. July 1, 2013).
Additionally, a movant must demonstrate a palpable defect in the opinion or order
under attack and that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the
case. Id.; Indah v. U.S. S.E.C., 661 F.3d 914, 924 (6th Cir. 2011). “A ‘palpable

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defect’ is a defect which is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or
plain.” Hawkins v. Genesys Health Systems, 704 F. Supp. 2d 688, 709 (E.D. Mich.
2010) (quoting Ososki v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 162 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718
(E.D. Mich. 2001)). A motion for reconsideration that merely presents “the same
issues ruled upon by the Court, either expressly or by reasonable implication” shall
be denied. Hence v. Smith, 49 F.Supp.2d 547, 551 (E.D.Mich.1999)).
IV.

DISCUSSION

A. CFAA Claim
The Plaintiff first contends that the Court erred in denying summary judgment
on the Plaintiff’s CFAA claim. See Dkt. No. 141 at 1–2 (Pg. ID No. 3570–71).
Plaintiff contends that the Court erred when it declined to consider evidence attached
to the Plaintiff’s Response [125] to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
See Dkt. No. 138 at 17–18 (Pg. ID No. 3518–19). This argument is without merit.
Concerning summary judgment, a movant bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact, and all
inferences should be made in favor of a non-movant. Hardenburg v. Dunham’s
Athleisure Corp., 963 F. Supp. 2d 693, 699 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (citing Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (providing
“a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the
assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record[.]”). Further, a court

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“need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the
record.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).
The Plaintiff fails to cite any authority requiring the Court to consider
evidence extrinsic to a motion for summary judgment. Indeed, the Court was
obligated only to consider any cited evidence filed with the Plaintiff’s own motion
when determining whether Plaintiff had met its initial burden. Hardenburg, 963 F.
Supp. 2d at 699; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3). Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
merely cites interrogatories. The Court determined such interrogatories did not
constitute “documents detailing expenses.” American Furukawa, 2016 WL 3444079
at *8.
The Court did not, and was not required to, consider any evidence attached to
Plaintiff’s other filings. Absent a compelling reason to liberally construe Rule
56(c)(3), the Court finds no palpable defect in its denial of summary judgment on
the Plaintiff’s CFAA claim.
B. Contract Claim
Plaintiff next contends the Court improperly denied Plaintiff’s claim as to
liability for breach of contract where Plaintiff failed to prove damages. The Plaintiff
contends it moved for summary judgment for its breach of contract action on liability
alone and not on damages. See Dkt. No. 141 at 2 (Pg. ID No. 3571). This argument
has no merit.

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Plaintiff fails to cite any authority for bifurcating judgment on the elements of
a breach of contract claim. For its sole precedent, Plaintiff cites Consolidated Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Local Union No. 6869, 362 F. Supp. 1073, 1075
(S.D. W.Va. 1973). This decision is not binding on this Court.
The Plaintiff’s argument also opposes the vast body of common law providing
breach of contract claims are inextricably linked to damages. See e.g. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Fedorov, No. 10-11061, 2010 WL 2944569, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 22,
2010) (holding that under Michigan law, breach of contract claims must necessarily
prove injury stemming from breach.). Thus, the Court finds no palpable defect in its
denial of summary judgment where Plaintiff failed to prove damage stemming from
Defendant Hossain’s breach. See Dkt. No. 138 at 25 (Pg. ID No. 3526). Accordingly,
this argument fails.
C. Conversion Claim
Finally, the Plaintiff contends that the Court improperly dismissed the
Plaintiff’s conversion claim in its Complaint. Specifically, the Plaintiff argues the
Court improperly applied the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“MUTSA”) in
determining that the Plaintiff’s conversion claim was preempted. See Id. at 13, 16–
17 (Pg. ID No. 3515, 3517–18). This argument fails.
Rather than demonstrate a palpable defect by the Court, the Plaintiff’s Motion
merely rejects the Court’s legal analysis. Specifically, the Plaintiff disputes this

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Court’s adoption of the “arguably cognizable” standard for preemption of tort claims
under MUTSA and proposes that claims based solely on the misappropriation of
information, later shown to not be trade secrets, should not be displaced.
The Plaintiff relies on inapposite authority in support of its argument. Plaintiff
cites Combined Metals of Chicago Ltd. Partnership v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 827,
830 (N.D. Ill. 1997) in support of a broader displacement standard. Plaintiff also
cites McKesson Medical Surgical, Inc. v. Micro Bio-Medics, Inc., which held
“MUTSA only preempts other civil remedies that involve trade secrets.” McKesson,
266 F. Supp.2d 590, 600 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
Combined Metals is unavailing to the Plaintiff. There, the court adopted a
broader standard due largely to the plaintiff’s failure to appropriately contest
displacement of the defendant’s counterclaims. Combined Metals, 985 F. Supp. at
830 n 3. (finding “…the court does not believe a fiduciary relationship existed. But,
because the issue was ignored by Combined Metals, the court will not inquire
further.”) (emphasis added). Here, neither Party has committed a similar forfeiture.
Nor does McKesson persuade. It is not clear under the holding in McKesson
whether claims “arguably cognizable” under MUTSA are distinguishable from
claims “involve[d] in trade secrets.” McKesson, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 600. Further, the
McKesson standard is not dispositive on the issue. The McKesson court in dismissed

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its plaintiff’s tort claim not on a theory of preemption, but for failure to provide
evidence in the record. Id.
The Court provided ample, unequivocal support for the “arguably cognizable”
standard. American Furukawa, 2016 WL 3444079 at *5 (citing Dura Global
Technologies, Inc. v. Magna Donnelly Corp., No. 07-10945, 2009 WL 3032594, *3
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2009); Bliss Clearing Niagra, Inc. v. Midwest Brake Bond Co.,
270 F. Supp.2d 943 (W.D. Mich. 2003); Easton Sports, Inc. v. Warrior Lacrosse,
Inc., No. 05-cv-72031, 2005 WL 2234559, *1–3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 14, 2005)). The
Plaintiff fails to show how the Court’s adoption of the “arguably cognizable”
standard is an “obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain” defect. Hawkins,
704 F. Supp. 2d at 709.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff has not argued that the application of the Court’s
standard was in any way erroneous. Therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
a palpable defect in the Court’s reasoning on this claim as well.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
[141] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 25, 2016
Detroit, MI

/s/Gershwin A Drain
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Court Judge

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys
of record on this date, October 25, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

/s/Tanya Bankston
Case Manager, [phone]

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