Brown v. SSA, Commissioner of

Filing 17

ORDER Adopting Report and Recommendation denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Brenda K Brown and granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by SSA, Commissioner of Signed by District Judge Marianne O. Battani. (KDoa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRENDA K. BROWN,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 2:14-cv-13738
v.
HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_______________________ __________/

OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING THE PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS
AND ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I.

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are Plaintiff Brenda K. Brown’s objections (Doc. 15) to

Magistrate Judge David R. Grand’s November 24, 2015, Report and Recommendation
("R&R") (Doc. 14). In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Grand recommended that the Court
grant Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.
13) and deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 11). For the reasons that
follow, the Court OVERRULES the Plaintiff’s objections and ADOPTS the R&R.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As the parties have not objected to the R&R’s recitation of the facts, the Court

adopts that portion of the R&R. (See Doc. 14, pp. 2-9.)

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R&R

A district court must conduct a de novo review of the portions of a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The district “court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate” judge. Id. The requirement of de novo
review “is a statutory recognition that Article III of the United States Constitution
mandates that the judicial power of the United States be vested in judges with life
tenure.” United States v. Shami, 754 F.2d 670, 672 (6th Cir. 1985). Accordingly,
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) to “insure[ ] that the district judge would be the
final arbiter” of a matter referred to a magistrate. Flournoy v. Marshall, 842 F.2d 875,
878 (6th Cir. 1987).
The Sixth Circuit has made clear that “[o]verly general objections do not satisfy the
objection requirement.” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006). Only
specific objections are entitled to de novo review; vague and conclusory objections
amount to a complete failure to object as they are not sufficient to pinpoint those
portions of the R&R that are legitimately in contention. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636,
637 (6th Cir.1986) (per curiam). “The objections must be clear enough to enable the
district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v.
Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). "‘[O]bjections disput[ing] the correctness of the
magistrate's recommendation but fail[ing] to specify the findings . . . believed [to be] in
error' are too general.” Spencer, 449 F.3d at 725 (quoting Miller, 50 F.3d at 380).

B. Standard of Review Applicable to Social Security Cases

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This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative
decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review is limited to determining
whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and was
made pursuant to proper legal standards. Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d
234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla of evidence but
less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If
the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, "it must be affirmed
even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even if substantial
evidence also supports the opposite conclusion." Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
When reviewing the Commissioner's factual findings for substantial evidence, the
Court is limited to an examination of the record and must consider that record as a
whole. Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992).
There is no requirement, however, that either the Commissioner or this Court discuss
every piece of evidence in the administrative record. Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
167 F. App'x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, this Court does "not try the case de
novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility." Bass v.
McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s sole objection to the R&R challenges the weight the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) afforded to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Duncan Magoon,
M.D. On March 27, 2014, Dr. Magoon completed a Mental Residual Functional
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Capacity Report on Plaintiff’s behalf, indicating that she suffered marked limitations in
most work-related functions. (Tr. 550-51). According to Plaintiff, Dr. Magoon’s opinion
should have been afforded controlling weight pursuant to the “Treating Physician Rule,”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
Treating physician opinions are given controlling weight if they are “wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and
[are] not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). The Social Security regulations explicitly state that the length
of the treating relationship is to be taken into account in assigning weight, such that “the
longer a treating source has treated you and the more times you have been seen by a
treating source, the more weight we will give to the source's medical opinion.” Id. In
deciding not to afford Dr. Magoon’s opinion controlling weight, the ALJ observed that he
“appears to have only recently begun to treat the claimant; the record contains only one
examination report of Dr. Magoon (his initial December 2013 examination).” (Tr. 21
(emphasis added)). Plaintiff contends that this observation is inconsistent with the
R&R’s summary that “[a] review of the documentary evidence in the record
demonstrates that Dr. Magoon initially examined Brown in December 2013 (Tr. 480-82),
and according to her own testimony, he at most saw her on two other occasions before
drafting the above RFC [Residual Functional Capacity] assessment in March 2014.”
(Doc. 14, p. 13 (emphasis added)). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ inappropriately
premised her determination that Dr. Magoon’s opinion was not entitled to controlling
weight on the erroneous finding that this opinion was based only on one examination.

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During the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had seen Dr. Magoon
three times prior to the March 31, 2014, hearing date. (Tr. 54, 56). The ALJ was
correct, however, in stating that the record contains only one examination report by Dr.
Magoon. The R&R does not contradict the ALJ’s finding. Rather, it reasons that even if
Plaintiff’s testimony is to be credited, Dr. Magoon treated Plaintiff at most on two other
occasions before drafting his RFC assessment – and, therefore, for what remains a
short treating relationship.
Plaintiff also objects to the fact that the ALJ credited examination reports
rendered by her primary care physician, Donald Robinson, M.D., over Dr. Magoon’s
opinion. Plaintiff contends that as a specialist in the field of psychiatry, Dr. Magoon
should have been afforded greater weight than a primary care physician. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(5) (“We generally give more weight to the opinion of a specialist about
medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who
is not a specialist.”). Both the ALJ and the Magistrate Judge have observed that Dr.
Robinson’s notes indicate that Plaintiff has normal attention span and concentration.
The Magistrate Judge made specific and numerous citations to the record in observing
that “Dr. Robinson’s records indicate that, over the course of approximately one year,
Brown reported that she no longer suffered from depression, she denied having any
difficulty with concentration, and disclaimed any thoughts of anxiety or other mental
issues.” (Doc. 14, p. 13). Accordingly, the ALJ’s written decision and the R&R rely not
only on Dr. Robinson’s non-specialist observations but also on the inconsistencies
between Plaintiff’s own self-reports and her claims of disability. Taken together with
reports by one-time treating source Leslie MacAuley, M.D., and consultative examiner
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R. Scott Lazzara, M.D., the weight of substantial evidence could reasonably be said to
support the ALJ’s conclusions.
Finally, Plaintiff objects that, consistent with the little weight accorded to Dr.
Magoon’s opinion due to the brevity of the treatment relationship, the ALJ should have
also accorded little weight to one-time examining sources Drs. MacAuley and Lazzara.
This argument misses the mark. Dr. MacAuley’s and Dr. Lazzara’s opinions properly
offer support for the ALJ’s conclusion because they are consistent with the record as a
whole. See Winn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 514 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015) (“If an
ALJ decides that the opinion of a treating source should not be given controlling weight,
the ALJ must take certain factors into consideration when determining how much weight
to give the opinion, including . . . ‘consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole .
. . .’”) (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)).
Indeed, the ALJ noted in reference to Dr. Lazzara’s opinion that it “is supported by the
evidence in general and is not contradicted by other medical opinion evidence provided
by a treating or examining source.” (Tr. 21 (emphasis added)). Further, it is not
improper for an ALJ to afford greater weight to a reviewing source than to a treating
source, if the former is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., McGrew v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App’x. 26, 31-32 (6th Cir. 2009).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections and
ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to grant Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:

March 7, 2016

s/Marianne O. Battani
MARIANNE O. BATTANI
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Order was served upon counsel of record via the Court's ECF System to their
respective email addresses or First Class U.S. mail to the non-ECF participants on March 7, 2016.
s/ Kay Doaks
Case Manager

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