Villeneuve v. Romanowski

Filing 33

OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Declining to Issue A Certificate of Appealability, and Granting Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOHN VILLENEUVE,
Petitioner,
v.

Civil No. 2:14-CV-13768
HONORABLE DENISE PAGE HOOD
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

WILLIS CHAPMAN,
Respondent,
____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY, AND GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA
PAUPERIS
John Villeneuve, (“Petitioner”), confined at the Thumb Correctional
Facility in Lapeer, Michigan, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his application, filed pro se, petitioner
challenges his convictions for first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
M.C.L.A. 750.520(b). For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of
habeas corpus is DENIED.
I. Background
Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct in the Alpena County Circuit Court. Petitioner was originally

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sentenced to life in prison.
In 2012, petitioner filed a post-conviction motion for relief from
judgment with the trial court, in which he raised several claims related to
his plea and sentencing. The trial judge appointed counsel for petitioner.
At the motion hearing, petitioner’s appellate counsel informed the judge
that petitioner no longer wished to withdraw his guilty plea but proceed with
re-sentencing. Counsel essentially asked the trial court to treat petitioner’s
motion for relief from judgment as a motion for re-sentencing. Petitioner
agreed on the record that he wished to proceed simply with re-sentencing.
The judge agreed to order a re-sentencing, noting that he had mistakenly
believed that petitioner was subject to a mandatory minimum 25 year
prison term. (Tr. 1/4/13, pp. 3-8).
On March 13, 2013, petitioner was re-sentenced to fifteen to thirty
years in prison. The judge advised petitioner that he could file an
application for leave to appeal from the re-sentencing. (Tr. 3/13/13, pp. 5051).
Petitioner’s counsel appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals,
raising a single claim that the court violated petitioner’s due process rights
by considering uncharged allegations made by another victim that had

2

been mentioned in the pre-sentence investigation report, where petitioner
denied the allegations and the judge failed to make findings of fact with
respect to those allegations. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied the
appeal “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” People v. Villeneuve,
No. 316173 (Mich.Ct.App. December 18, 2013). Petitioner did not seek
leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court. 1
On January 24, 2014, petitioner filed his application for writ of habeas
corpus.
Petitioner subsequently requested to file an amended or
supplemental habeas petition, seeking to raise additional issues. This
Court granted the motion to amend the petition and held the petition in
abeyance so that petitioner could return to the state courts to properly
exhaust these claims. The Court administratively closed the case.
Villeneuve v. Romanowski, No. 2:14-CV-13768, 2015 WL 4429733 (E.D.
Mich. July 20, 2015).
Petitioner filed a second motion for relief from judgment, which was
denied. People v. Villeneuve, Nos. 10-003487-FC, 10-003489-FC (Alpena
Cty. Cir. Ct., Sept. 15, 2015). The Michigan appellate courts denied

1

See Affidavit from Larry Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court. [Dkt. # 8-14].

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petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Villeneuve, No. 331464 (Mich.Ct.App.
July 25, 2016); lv. den. 500 Mich. 1000, 895 N.W. 2d 183 (2017).
On August 31, 2017, this Court lifted the stay of proceedings and
permitted petitioner to amend his habeas petition a second time.
In his original and amended habeas petitions, petitioner seeks
habeas relief. Because petitioner’s claims in his original and amended
petitions often overlap or are duplicative, the Court will paraphrase the
claims rather than recite them verbatim. The Court will also address the
claims as they happened chronologically in petitioner’s case and not in the
order that he presented them: (1) petitioner’s guilty plea should have been
set aside because it was involuntary and coerced, (2) trial counsel was
ineffective, (3) petitioner was sentenced based on inaccurate information,
(4) petitioner’s original and amended pre-sentence reports contained
inaccurate information, and (5) petitioner was denied the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.
II. Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of
review for habeas cases:

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An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal
law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by
the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a
case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).
An “unreasonable application” occurs when “a state court decision
unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a
prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not “issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 410-11.
The Supreme Court has explained that “[A] federal court’s collateral
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review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due
state courts in our federal system.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340
(2003). The “AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for
evaluating state-court rulings,’and ‘demands that state-court decisions be
given the benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773
(2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997);
Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)(per curiam)). “[A] state
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of
the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In order
to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show
that the state court’s rejection of his or her claim “was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.
Petitioner raised his sentencing claims on the appeal from his resentencing. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application
for leave to appeal on petitioner’s direct appeal in a form order “for lack of

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merit in the grounds presented.” The AEDPA deferential standard of
review applies to petitioner’s claims where the Michigan Court of Appeals
rejected petitioner’s appeal “for lack of merit in the grounds presented,”
because this order amounted to a decision on the merits. See Werth v.
Bell, 692 F. 3d 486, 492-94 (6th Cir. 2012).
Petitioner raised his remaining claims in his second motion for relief
from judgment. The trial judge denied the claims, on the ground that “No
substantive argument has been offered to demonstrate the defendant’s
counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or was
otherwise ineffective.” People v. Villeneuve, Nos. 10-003487-FC, 10003489-FC, * 1 (Alpena Cty. Cir. Ct., Sept. 15, 2015). The judge found
that petitioner’s other claims were without merit. Id., * 2. The Michigan
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal, finding that “defendant failed
to establish that the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief from
judgment.” People v. Villeneuve, No. 331464 (Mich.Ct.App. July 25, 2016).
The Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioner’s post-conviction appeal
pursuant to Mich.Ct.R 6.508(D). People v. Villeneuve, 500 Mich. 1000,
895 N.W. 2d 183 (2017).
The Sixth Circuit has held that the form order used by the Michigan

7

Supreme Court to deny leave to appeal in this case is unexplained
because the citation to Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D) is ambiguous as to
whether it refers to a procedural default or a rejection on the merits. See
Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 291–92 (6th Cir.2010)(en banc).
Consequently, under Guilmette, the Court must “look through” the
unexplained order of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision to determine
the basis for the denial of state post-conviction relief.
The trial judge rejected petitioner’s claims without citing to Rule
6.508 or any other procedural bar when he denied the motion for relief
from judgment. This Court therefore presumes that the trial court
adjudicated these claims on the merits for purposes of invoking the
AEDPA’s deferential standard of review.
I. Discussion
A. The involuntary plea claim.
Petitioner first claims that his guilty plea should be set aside because
it was involuntary and coerced.
Initially, the Court observes that petitioner has no federal
constitutional right to withdraw his guilty plea. See Hynes v. Birkett, 526 F.
App’x. 515, 521 (6th Cir. 2013). Unless a petitioner’s guilty plea otherwise

8

violated a clearly-established constitutional right, whether to allow the
withdrawal of a habeas petitioner’s plea is discretionary with the state trial
court. See Shanks v. Wolfenbarger, 387 F. Supp. 2d 740, 748(E.D. Mich.
2005).
A guilty plea that is entered in state court must be voluntarily and
intelligently made. See Shanks, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 749; Doyle v. Scutt,
347 F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (E.D. Mich. 2004)(both citing Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)). In order for a plea of guilty to be
voluntarily and intelligently made, the defendant must be aware of the
“relevant circumstances and likely consequences” of his or her plea. Hart
v. Marion Correctional Institution, 927 F. 2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1991).
When a petitioner brings a federal habeas petition challenging his or her
plea of guilty, the state generally satisfies its burden by producing a
transcript of the state court proceedings showing that the plea was made
voluntarily. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F. 2d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 1993). The
factual findings of a state court that the guilty plea was properly made are
generally accorded a presumption of correctness. A habeas petitioner
must overcome a heavy burden if the federal court is to overturn these
findings by the state court. Id.

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It is only when the consensual character of a guilty plea is called into
question that the validity of a guilty plea may be impaired. Mabry v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1984). A plea of guilty entered by one
fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any
commitments made to him or her by the court, prosecutor, or his or her
own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to
discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled
or unfulillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature
improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business
(i.e. bribes). Id. Federal and state courts will uphold a state court guilty
plea if the circumstances demonstrate that the defendant understood the
nature and consequences of the charges and voluntarily chose to plead
guilty. See Thirkield v. Pitcher, 199 F. Supp. 2d 637, 652 (E.D. Mich.
2002).
Petitioner initially claims that his plea was involuntary because the
trial judge impermissibly participated in the plea negotiations. The Court
reviewed the plea transcript from August 20, 2010. There is no indication
from the record that the judge participated in any way in the plea
negotiations with the parties. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 proscribes judicial

10

participation in plea discussions, but it was adopted as a prophylactic
measure and is not impelled by the Due Process Clause or any other
federal constitutional requirement. United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct.
2139, 2149 (2013). Although Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1) prohibits judicial
participation in plea negotiations, it is not a federal constitutional rule;
therefore, its prohibition on judicial participation in plea bargaining in the
federal courts does not necessarily invalidate every instance of judicial
participation in the negotiation of a guilty plea in state courts. Alvarez v.
Straub, 21 F. App’x. 281, 283 (6th Cir. 2001)(quoting Frank v. Blackburn,
646 F. 2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1980)). In the present case, the judge merely
ascertained from the parties whether there had been a plea agreement.
The judge further advised petitioner of the rights he would be giving up by
pleading guilty. (Tr. 8/20/10, pp. 3-9). The evidence in the record indicates
that the trial court judge’s remarks, on their face and in light of the
surrounding environment in which they occurred, were not inherently
coercive or prejudicial to petitioner’s rights, because there is no evidence
which demonstrates that the trial court judge’s remarks “were stern,
overbearing or determined to intimidate” petitioner into pleading guilty. See
Caudill v. Jago, 747 F. 2d 1046, 1050-51 (6th Cir. 1984).

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Petitioner further claims that his defense attorney coerced him into
pleading guilty. At the time of the plea, however, petitioner indicated on
the record that no one had threatened him or pressured him into pleading
guilty. (Tr. 8/20/10, p. 10). Petitioner’s bare claim that he was coerced into
pleading guilty is insufficient to overcome the presumption of verity which
attaches to petitioner’s statements during the plea colloquy, in which he
denied that any threats had been used to get him to enter his plea. See
Shanks, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 750-51. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has noted
that “[w]here a defendant is aware of the condition or reason for a plea
withdrawal, at the time the guilty plea is entered, a case for withdrawal is
weaker.” United States v. Spencer, 836 F. 2d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1987).
Because petitioner knew about this alleged coercion at the time that he
entered his plea, his unexplained delay in bringing this alleged coercion to
the attention of the trial court until over two years later and after he had
been sentenced undermines the credibility of his claim that he was
coerced into pleading guilty. See United States v. Ford, 15 F. App’x. 303,
309 (6th Cir. 2001).
Petitioner next claims that his guilty plea was illusory because he
was originally sentenced to life in prison.

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A plea agreement is entered into involuntarily and unknowingly if the
defendant is unaware that the prosecution’s promise is illusory. See
United States v. Randolph, 230 F.3d 243, 250-51 (6th Cir. 2000). Illusory
representations made by the prosecutor to induce a defendant to waive
his or her right to trial and enter a guilty plea have been found to constitute
coercion justifying the withdrawal of a guilty plea. See Spearman v. United
States, 860 F. Supp. 1234, 1249 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
Petitioner’s plea agreement was not illusory. The prosecutor agreed
to dismiss one of the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charges against
petitioner and agreed to bring no further charges in exchange for his plea.
(Tr. 8/20/10, p. 3). The plea agreement was not illusory because
petitioner was promised the dismissal of charges which therefore
amounted to a real, tangible benefit in consideration for the plea. See
Daniels v. Overton, 845 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1994). Because
petitioner derived a real benefit from his plea bargain in this case, his plea
was not illusory and he is therefore not entitled to habeas relief. See
McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F. 3d 487, 498 (6th Cir. 2004). Petitioner is not
entitled to relief on his claim.

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B. The ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.
Petitioner next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to investigate his case and for advising him to plead guilty.
To show that he or she was denied the effective assistance of
counsel under federal constitutional standards, a defendant must satisfy a
two prong test. First, the defendant must demonstrate that, considering all
of the circumstances, counsel’s performance was so deficient that the
attorney was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In so
doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
behavior lies within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Id. In other words, petitioner must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action might be sound trial strategy.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Second, the defendant must show that such
performance prejudiced his defense. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, the
defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Supreme Court’s holding
in Strickland places the burden on the defendant who raises a claim of

14

ineffective assistance of counsel, and not the state, to show a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different, but
for counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. See Wong v. Belmontes,
558 U.S. 15, 27 (2009).
Any allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel that took place
prior to petitioner’s plea of guilty have been waived by that plea. An
unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all pre-plea
non-jurisdictional constitutional deprivations. Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Pre-plea claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel are also considered nonjurisdictional defects that are waived by a
guilty plea. See United States v. Stiger, 20 F. App’x. 307, 309 (6th Cir.
2001); See also Siebert v. Jackson, 205 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733-34 (E.D.
Mich. 2002)(habeas petitioner’s claims regarding alleged deprivations of
his constitutional rights that occurred before his guilty plea, as a result of
his trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, were foreclosed by his
guilty plea, where he stated at plea that he was satisfied with counsel’s
representation, and he did not complain of counsel’s advice concerning
plea agreement). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on
these claims.

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Petitioner further claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for
advising him to plead guilty rather than go to trial. The Supreme Court has
noted that:
Acknowledging guilt and accepting responsibility by an early plea
respond to certain basic premises in the law and its function.
Those principles are eroded if a guilty plea is too easily set aside
based on facts and circumstances not apparent to a competent
attorney when actions and advice leading to the plea took place.
Plea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused
with uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful
strategic choices in balancing opportunities and risks. The
opportunities, of course, include pleading to a lesser charge and
obtaining a lesser sentence, as compared with what might be the
outcome not only at trial but also from a later plea offer if the
case grows stronger and prosecutors find stiffened resolve. A
risk, in addition to the obvious one of losing the chance for a
defense verdict, is that an early plea bargain might come before
the prosecution finds its case is getting weaker, not stronger.
The State’s case can begin to fall apart as stories change,
witnesses become unavailable, and new suspects are identified.
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124-25 (2011).
The Supreme Court further admonished:
These considerations make strict adherence to the Strickland
standard all the more essential when reviewing the choices an
attorney made at the plea bargain stage. Failure to respect the
latitude Strickland requires can create at least two problems in
the plea context. First, the potential for the distortions and
imbalance that can inhere in a hindsight perspective may
become all too real. The art of negotiation is at least as nuanced
as the art of trial advocacy and it presents questions farther
removed from immediate judicial supervision. There are,
moreover, special difficulties in evaluating the basis for counsel’s
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judgment: An attorney often has insights borne of past dealings
with the same prosecutor or court, and the record at the pretrial
stage is never as full as it is after a trial. In determining how
searching and exacting their review must be, habeas courts must
respect their limited role in determining whether there was
manifest deficiency in light of information then available to
counsel. AEDPA compounds the imperative of judicial caution.
Second, ineffective-assistance claims that lack necessary
foundation may bring instability to the very process the inquiry
seeks to protect. Strickland allows a defendant “to escape rules
of waiver and forfeiture,”. Prosecutors must have assurance that
a plea will not be undone years later because of infidelity to the
requirements of AEDPA and the teachings of Strickland. The
prospect that a plea deal will afterwards be unraveled when a
court second-guesses counsel’s decisions while failing to accord
the latitude Strickland mandates or disregarding the structure
dictated by AEDPA could lead prosecutors to forgo plea bargains
that would benefit defendants, a result favorable to no one.
Premo, 562 U.S. at 125 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In addition, to satisfy the prejudice requirement for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted
on going to trial. Premo, 562 U.S. at 129 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 58-59 (1985)). An assessment of whether a defendant would have
gone to trial but for counsel’s errors “will depend largely on whether the
affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at

17

59. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Hill to require a federal habeas court
to always analyze the substance of the habeas petitioner’s underlying
claim or defense to determine whether but for counsel’s error, petitioner
would likely have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty. See Maples v.
Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2003). The petitioner must show a
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not
have pleaded guilty, because there would have been a reasonable chance
that he would have been acquitted had he or she insisted on going to trial.
See Garrison v. Elo, 156 F. Supp. 2d 815, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(overruled on other grounds). A habeas petitioner’s conclusory allegation
that, but for an alleged attorney act or omission he or she would not have
entered a plea of guilty, is therefore insufficient to prove such a claim. Id.
Finally, “[W]hen a state prisoner asks a federal court to set aside a
sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining,”
a federal court is required to “use a “‘doubly deferential’” standard of
review that gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit
of the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013).
Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable probability that he could
have prevailed had he insisted on going to trial, or that he would have
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received a lesser sentence than he did by pleading guilty. See Shanks v.
Wolfenbarger, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
Petitioner argues throughout his two amended petitions that trial
counsel should have raised a misidentification defense. The problem with
raising any misidentification defense is that one of the victims in this case
testified at the preliminary examination that she had known petitioner since
she was five years old and he used to come over to her house to drink
with her father. This victim even indicated that she believed that petitioner
was her father’s nephew. The victim knew petitioner’s children, who would
come over to the house and play with her. (Tr. 6/28/10, pp. 9-12 [This
Court’s Dkt. # 8-3]). The second victim testified that she had known
petitioner since she was five years old because she was friends with his
children and would go over to stay at his house so that petitioner could
babysit her. (Tr. 6/28/10, pp. 5-9 [This Court’s Dkt. # 8-4]). Because these
two victims had known petitioner for an extended period of time, it is
doubtful that a misidentification defense would have been successful.
Petitioner also claims that his defense counsel should have
presented a defense that either petitioner’s brother or son was the actual
perpetrator.
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Petitioner has presented no evidence to suggest that his brother or
son were the assailants in this case. Since there was no evidence linking
either of these men to the sexual assaults, trial counsel was not ineffective
in failing to pursue a third party culpability defense. See e.g. Robins v.
Fortner, 698 F. 3d 317, 331 (6th Cir. 2012).
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, because any suggestion that he has a defense to these
charges is “unpersuasive and lack merit.” Holtgrieve v. Curtis, 174 F.
Supp. 2d 572, 587 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
C. The sentencing claims.
Petitioner brings several challenges to his sentence and to his presentence report.
Petitioner initially claims that the judge at his original sentencing and
at his re-sentencing considered false information in fashioning his
sentence, when the judge considered prior allegations of sexual
misconduct against petitioner which he denies committing. Petitioner also
alleges that the judge improperly considered petitioner’s move to Alabama
as evidence that petitioner had fled the State of Michigan to avoid arrest.
A criminal defendant possesses a constitutional right not to be
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sentenced on the basis of “misinformation of constitutional magnitude.”
Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980)(quoting United States
v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)); see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736, 741 (1948)(stating that reliance on “extensively and materially false”
information, which the prisoner had no opportunity to correct, violates due
process of law). In order to prevail on a claim that a trial court relied on
inaccurate information at sentencing, a habeas petitioner must
demonstrate that the sentencing court relied upon this information and that
it was materially false and that he or she was denied the opportunity to
correct the errors at sentencing. Collins v. Buchkoe, 493 F. 2d 343, 345-46
(6th Cir. 1974); Simpson v. Warren, 662 F. Supp. 2d 835, 851-52 (E.D.
Mich. 2009). Even on direct review of a federal criminal conviction, a
defendant is required to show that the disputed information “demonstrably
made the basis for his sentence.” United States v. Hitow, 889 F.2d 1573,
1582 (6th Cir. 1989)(emphasis original). “Mere awareness of prejudicial
information by a trial judge does not taint the sentence if the information
was not expressly relied on.” Id.
At the re-sentencing hearing, trial counsel argued that there were
problems with the pre-sentence investigation report, including the social

21

history section which mentioned the alleged prior sexual misconduct and
the allegation that petitioner had fled to Alabama to avoid arrest. Counsel
also challenged the accuracy of petitioner’s prior sex offense convictions.
(Tr. 3/13/13, pp. 4-6, 11-20).
The trial court changed the number of prior sex offense convictions
from four to two. (Tr. 3/13/13, pp. 20, 23-24). The trial court denied
defense counsel’s objection regarding the alleged prior sexual misconduct,
but as a remedy of sorts added to the amended pre-sentence investigation
report “that Mr. Villeneuve denies any of this is true.” (Id., p. 10). Finally,
in response to the judge’s question, counsel conceded that petitioner had
been charged, although not convicted, in the State of Alabama with flight
to avoid arrest. (Id., pp. 12-13).
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim because there is no
indication that the judge considered these allegations of prior sexual
misconduct or petitioner’s flight to Alabama when re-sentencing him. The
judge noted that he had considered the prior victimization of children when
he originally sentenced petitioner to life in prison back in 2010. (Tr.
3/13/13, p. 50). The judge indicated that he would “remedy” that prior life
sentence by re-sentencing petitioner to fifteen to thirty years’
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imprisonment. (Id., p. 50). This suggests that the judge did not consider
the allegations of prior sexual misconduct or petitioner’s alleged flight from
Michigan when re-sentencing him. Because there is no indication from the
judge that petitioner’s alleged prior bad acts played a role in the resentencing, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim. See e.g. United
States v. Barbour, 629 F. App’x. 727, 734–35 (6th Cir. 2015). Petitioner is
not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
Petitioner next contends that the original and amended pre-sentence
investigation reports contained false or inaccurate information.
There is no federal constitutional right to a pre-sentence
investigation and report. See Bridinger v. Berghuis, 429 F. Supp. 2d 903,
909 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Allen v. Stovall, 156 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797 (E.D.
Mich. 2001). Therefore, the mere presence of hearsay or inaccurate
information in a pre-sentence report does not constitute a denial of due
process so as to entitle a petitioner to habeas relief. Allen, 156 F. Supp. 2d
at 797. Moreover, because the federal constitution does not require a
state court to prepare or consider a pre-sentence report, petitioner had no
federal constitutional right to review any such report prior to sentencing.
Bridinger, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
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To the extent that petitioner claims that the trial court failed to correct
the inaccuracies in his pre-sentence report, in violation of M.C.R. 6.429,
this would be noncognizable in federal habeas review, because it involves
an issue of state law. See e.g. Koras v. Robinson, 257 F. Supp. 2d 941,
955 (E.D. Mich. 2003); aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grds, 123 F.
App’x. 207 (6th Cir. 2005).
More importantly, even where there is an alleged factual inaccuracy
in a pre-sentence report, a court need not resolve the dispute when the
information is not relied on in arriving at the sentence that was imposed.
See Warren v. Miller, 78 F. Supp. 2d 120, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
In the present case, there is no evidence that the trial court relied on
the allegedly incorrect information contained within the pre-sentence
report in sentencing petitioner. A habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief
on his claim that a pre-sentence investigation report contained inaccurate
information where there is no indication that the sentencing judge relied on
this information in sentencing the petitioner. See Draughn v. Jabe, 803 F.
Supp. 70, 80 (E.D. Mich. 1992). Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his
claim.
The fact that the pre-sentence report may affect petitioner’s
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placement within the Michigan Department of Corrections does not
change this Court’s decision. The potential impact of a pre-sentence
reports on prison placement decisions is non-cognizable on habeas
review. See Locklear v. Holland, No. 98-6407, 1999 WL 1000835, at * 2,
194 F. 3d 313 (Table)(6th Cir. Oct. 28, 1999). Any claim that this allegedly
inaccurate information might be used to deny petitioner parole is noncognizable, because it is not ripe. “If a defendant claims to be
detrimentally affected by the use of an inaccurate PSR in decisionmaking
as to parole ... he should challenge such use in the parole proceedings.”
Hili v. Sciarotta, 140 F.3d 210, 216 (2nd Cir.1998). Any further relief
should be brought by petitioner in a separate habeas action challenging
the denial of parole. Id., See also United States v. Martin, No. 89–3548,
1990 WL 136115, at * 1, 914 F. 2d 258 (Table)(6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1990).
The mere possibility that this information may affect parole eligibility in the
future, therefore, does not provide a cognizable basis for habeas relief at
this time.
D. The ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claim.
Petitioner lastly claims that the attorney appointed to represent him
in his first post-conviction motion for relief from judgment was ineffective.
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Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective for deciding to forego
the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Petitioner further claims that
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to inaccuracies in the original or
amended pre-sentence reports.
There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings. Consequently, a habeas petitioner cannot raise a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of such proceedings. Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); Hence v. Smith, 37 F. Supp. 2d
970, 979 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(i), in fact, states that the
ineffectiveness of counsel during federal or state post-conviction
proceedings “shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under
section 2254.” Petitioner’s claim that his post-conviction counsel was
ineffective is barred or noncognizable under § 2254(i). See Post v.
Bradshaw, 422 F. 3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 2005); Cooey v. Bradshaw, 338 F.
3d 615, 622 (6th Cir. 2003).
More importantly, even if this claim was cognizable, petitioner failed
to show that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. At the initial
hearing on petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment, counsel indicated
that he had advised petitioner to forego the motion to withdraw his plea but
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to proceed merely with re-sentencing. Petitioner agreed on the record
with counsel’s strategy. (Tr. 1/4/13, pp. 3-5). More importantly, this Court
already indicated that there was no indication that petitioner’s guilty plea
was involuntary. Petitioner failed to show any reasonable likelihood that
any motion to withdraw his guilty plea would have been granted.
Petitioner was not prejudiced by his post-conviction counsel’s failure to
move to withdraw his plea. See e.g. Franks v. Lindamood, 401 F. App’x. 1,
7 (6th Cir. 2010).
Finally, to the extent that petitioner claims that his post-conviction
counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the alleged inaccuracies in
the pre-sentence report, he is not entitled to relief on such a claim
because he failed to show that the judge considered any of this allegedly
erroneous information in re-sentencing petitioner. See United States v.
Stevens, 851 F.2d 140, 145–46 (6th Cir. 1988).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is
denied.
In order to obtain a certificate of appealability, a prisoner must make
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §
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2253(c)(2). To demonstrate this denial, the applicant is required to show
that reasonable jurists could debate whether, or agree that, the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner, or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). When a district court
rejects a habeas petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, the
petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims to be debatable or wrong.
Id. at 484. “The district court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254.
This Court denies a certificate of appealability because reasonable
jurists would not find this Court’s assessment of the claims to be debatable
or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 484. Petitioner may,
however, proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because an appeal could
be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
V. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That a certificate of appealability is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner will be GRANTED
leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Appointment of
Counsel (#31) is DENIED. See, Rules 6(a) and 8(c), Rules Gov. Sec.
2254 Cases.

S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: January 31, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon
counsel of record on January 31, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager

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