Signal IP, Inc. v. Fiat U.S.A., Inc. et al

Filing 56

OPINION AND ORDER (1) Construing Disputed Claim Terms; and (2) Denying as Moot Defendant FCA US LLC's Motion for Collateral Estoppel Against Signal IP on Certain Terms (Dkt. 38 ). Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Sandusky, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIGNAL IP, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14-cv-13864
v.
HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH
FIAT U.S.A., INC., et al.,
Defendants.
________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
(1) CONSTRUING DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS; AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT
DEFENDANT FCA US LLC’S MOTION FOR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AGAINST
SIGNAL IP ON CERTAIN CLAIM TERMS (Dkt. 38.)
This is a patent infringement case in which Plaintiff Signal IP, Inc. alleges that Defendant
FCA US LLC has infringed upon four of its patents.
Pursuant to this Court’s standard procedure, the parties were to identify the disputed
claim terms within the four patents that they feel are material to the infringement and validity
issues in this case. The parties have submitted written briefs explaining their positions on how
the disputed claim terms should be construed (Dkts. 32, 39, 41). On August 3, 2016, the Court
held oral argument. In this opinion and order, the Court will construe the disputed claim terms
identified by the parties, pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
Also before the Court is FCA’s motion for collateral estoppel against Signal on certain
claim terms (Dkt. 38).

The issue is whether Signal should be collaterally estopped from

litigating the construction of the claim terms “unlock threshold” and “at a level indicative of an
empty seat” in U.S. Patent No. 6,012,007 because the United States District Court for the Central
District of California has already construed the terms, in whole or part, in another case involving

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Signal. For the reasons explained below, the Court denies as moot FCA’s motion for collateral
estoppel.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On or about April 23, 2014, Signal filed 13 similar cases alleging patent infringement in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California against most of the major
automobile manufacturers, including this case against FCA.1 In this case against FCA, Signal
has asserted four patents involving three different types of technologies: (i) automobile airbag
deployment systems, (ii) a radar detection system to detect blind spots while driving, and (iii) a
tire pressure monitoring system. The four patents are: (i) U.S. Patent No. 6,012,007, entitled
“Occupant Detection Method and Apparatus for Air Bag System” (“’007 Patent”); (ii) U.S.
Patent No. 5,732,375, entitled “Method of Inhibiting or Allowing Airbag Deployment” (“’375
Patent”); (iii) U.S. Patent No. 5,714,927, entitled “Method of Improving Zone of Coverage
Response of Automotive Radar” (“’927 Patent”); and (iv) U.S. Patent No. 5,463,374, entitled
“Method and Apparatus for Pressure Monitoring and for Shared Keyless Entry Control” (“’374
Patent”).
On October 7, 2014, Judge John A. Kronstadt of the United States District Court for the
Central District of California transferred this case to the Eastern District of Michigan (Dkt. 4).
This case was originally assigned to Judge Arthur J. Tarnow, but it was reassigned to this Court
on January 30, 2015 (Dkt. 17). On April 17, 2015, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California issued an order construing thirty six disputed patent claim terms,
including some of the claim terms at issue in this case.

1

On or about December 16, 2014, Chrysler Group LLC changed its named to FCA US LLC.
“FCA” stands for “Fiat Chrysler Automobiles.”
2

On May 11, 2016, FCA filed a motion for collateral estoppel against Signal on certain
claim terms (Dkt. 38). In the motion, FCA argues that Signal should be estopped from relitigating the constructions of two disputed claim terms in this case because those claim terms
were already construed by Judge Kronstadt in cases involving Signal against other automobile
manufacturers. FCA argues that it would be a waste of judicial resources to re-litigate the proper
construction of those claim terms in this case. Because FCA’s motion involves the construction
of disputed patent claim terms, the Court will consider FCA’s motion as part of this order on
claim construction.
On August 3, 2016, the Court heard oral argument from the parties regarding the proper
construction of the disputed claim terms, as well as FCA’s motion for collateral estoppel. At oral
argument, the parties, working with the Court’s special master, were able to come to an
agreement on the proper construction for some of the disputed claim limitations.
II. LAW OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Claims of a patent are short and concise statements, expressed with great formality, of the
metes and bounds of the patent invention. Each claim is written in the form of a single sentence.
Claim construction is the manner in which courts determine the meaning of a disputed term in a
claim. “The construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim
language: in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claim.” Scripps
Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991), overruled in
part on other grounds by Abbott Labs v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en
banc). The construction of key terms in patent claims plays a critical role in nearly every patent
infringement case. Claim construction is central to both a determination of infringement and

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validity of a patent. The judge, not a jury, is to determine the meaning of the disputed claim
terms as a matter of law. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 391.
A court has two primary goals in construing the disputed claim terms. The first goal is to
determine the scope of the patented invention by interpreting the disputed claim terms to the
extent needed to resolve the dispute between the parties. The second goal is to provide a
construction that will be understood by the jury, which might otherwise misunderstand a claim
term in the context of the patent specification and prosecution history of the patent. See, e.g.,
Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The terms, as
construed by the court, must ensure that the jury fully understands the court’s claim construction
rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.”); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103
F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed
meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary, to explain what the patentee
covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement.”). The Court’s claim
construction ruling forms the basis for the ultimate jury instructions, although that is not to say
that the Court cannot modify its wording for the jury instructions after ruling on claim
construction. See IPPV Enters., LLC v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601 (D.
Del. 2000).
The seminal case setting forth the principles for construing disputed claim terms is
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). According to Phillips, the
words of the claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary” meaning, i.e. “the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of
the invention.” Id. at 1312-1313. The person of ordinary skill in the art views the claim term in
light of the entire intrinsic record, which is the entire claim, the other parts of the patent, and, if

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in evidence, the prosecution history of the patent before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (“USPTO”). Id. at 1313-1314. Although a claim must be construed in view of the entire
patent, the court should normally not read limitations or features of the exemplary embodiments
discussed in the patent specification into the claims. Id. at 1323-1324.
The prosecution history of the patent can often inform the meaning of the claim language
by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the
invention during the course of prosecution by his statements, making the claim scope narrower
than it would otherwise be. However, because the prosecution history is an ongoing negotiation
between the patent office and the patent owner, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it
often lacks the clarity of the patent itself and is generally less useful for claim construction
purposes. Id. at 1317.
In discerning the meaning of claim terms, resorting to dictionaries and treatises also may
be helpful. Id. at 1320-1323. However, undue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk that
it will be used to change the meaning of claims in derogation of the indisputable public records
consisting of the claims, the specification of the patent and the prosecution history, thereby
undermining the public notice function of patents. Id. In the end, the construction that stays true
to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will
be the correct construction. Id. at 1316.
It is proper for the Court to construe the disputed claim terms in the context of the
infringement or invalidity dispute by viewing the accused device or prior art. Viewing the
accused device or prior art allows the Court to construe the claims in the context of the dispute
between the parties, not in the abstract. “While a trial court should certainly not prejudge the
ultimate infringement analysis by construing claims with an aim to include or exclude an accused

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product or process, knowledge of that product or process provides meaningful context for the
first step of the infringement analysis, claim construction.” Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v.
Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1326-1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Federal Circuit has
held that without “the vital contextual knowledge of the accused products,” a court’s claim
construction decision “takes on the attributes of something akin to an advisory opinion.” Lava
Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 445 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS FOR THE DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
In their briefs, the parties have requested that the Court construe eight claim terms from
four patents. The Court will address each disputed claim term in the following sections and note
where the parties have resolved their dispute regarding certain terms.
A. Airbag Deployment System Patent: ‘375 Patent
1. Background on the ‘375 Patent
The USPTO issued the ‘375 Patent on March 24, 1998 to Delco Electronics Corporation,
which, according to publicly available information, was owned by General Motors Corporation
at that time and later spun off by General Motors Corporation into Delphi Corporation.
The ‘375 Patent is directed to a method of inhibiting or allowing deployment of an airbag
for a passenger seat of an automobile based on whether readings from sensors located in or on
the passenger seat indicate that the seat is occupied by an adult or a small child. The ‘375 Patent
explains that it is desirable to not deploy the airbag for a passenger seat if the seat is unoccupied
or occupied by a child. Moreover, research has shown that an airbag should not be deployed if
an infant carrier is facing rearward on a passenger seat. The ‘375 Patent teaches an improved
design for determining whether an adult or child is sitting in the passenger seat, or whether an
infant or child carrier located on the passenger seat is facing rearward, and then deciding whether

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to deploy the airbag based on the determination of who is located on the passenger seat. For
example, in the “Summary of the Invention” section, the ‘375 Patent states:
It is therefore an object of the invention to detect a comprehensive
range of vehicle seat occupants including infant seats for a
determination of whether an airbag deployment should be
permitted. Another object in such a system is to determine
whether an infant seat is facing the front or rear.
‘375 Pat. at col. 1:44-49 (Dkt. 33-3).
The ‘375 Patent teaches that locating sensors on the passenger seat in a symmetrical way
along the seat centerline can gather sufficient pressure and pressure distribution information to
allow determinations of the occupant type and infant seat position.

More specifically, a

computer is programmed to obtain pressure readings from each sensor, to sum the readings from
all the pressure sensors, and determine the patterns of pressure distribution by evaluating groups
of sensors. Based on this information, the computer can determine whether the occupant is an
adult or a child, whether an infant carrier is present and whether the infant carrier is facing
forward or rearward, and then decide whether or not to deploy the airbag. Reproduced below is
Figure 2 of the ‘375 Patent which shows the layout of the sensors on a passenger seat according
to an embodiment of the patented invention.

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The ‘375 Patent states a microprocessor reads each sensor four times, and the values are
then averaged and bias corrected. The microprocessor then essentially compares the sensor
readings to a table stored in the computer’s memory which correlates the readings from the
sensors to whether an infant carrier is present on the seat and the direction that the infant carrier
is facing. The Summary of the Invention section of the ‘375 Patent, reproduced below, describes
the processes performed by the microprocessor in more detail:
Total force [summed from all the sensors] is sufficient for proper
detection of adults in the seat, but the pattern recognition provides
improved detection of small children and infant seats. To detect
infant seats, all patterns of sensor loading which correspond to the
imprints of various seats are stored in a table and the detected
sensor pattern is compared to the table entries. Front and rear
facing seats are discriminated on the basis of total force and the
loading of sensors in the front of the seat.
The pattern recognition for detecting children is made possible by
applying fuzzy logic concepts to the pressure readings for each
sensor in the array and assigning a load rating to each sensor.
Pattern recognition is also enhanced by sampling several pairs of
sensors, applying leveling technique to them, and computing a
measure for the area of the seat covered by each pair. For all
measures calculated within the algorithm, a contribution is made to
an overall fuzzy rating which is used to handle marginal cases.

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’375 Pat. at col. 2:4-21. The overall method of the invention is shown in Figure 3 of the ‘375
Patent, which is reproduced below.

Figure 7 of the ‘375 Patent, reproduced below, shows how localized areas are checked for
force or weight concentrations. The sensors are divided into overlapping front, left, right and
rear areas, and the algorithm used by the computer determines whether all of the pressure is
concentrated in particular groups of sensors. The microprocessor then compares the readings of
the sensors to the table stored in the computer’s memory which determines whether the sensor
readings correlate with rails of an infant carrier and whether the infant carrier is facing forward
or rearward. The computer then determines whether or not to allow the airbag to deploy.

9

Signal has alleged that FCA has infringed Claim 11 of the ‘375 Patent.

The parties

request that the Court construe two claim terms in Claim 11: (i) “on the passenger seat” and (ii)
“load rating.” Below the Court will address the proper construction of these claim terms.
2. “on the passenger seat”
Disputed Term
“on the passenger
seat”

Signal’s Proposed
Construction
Plain and ordinary
meaning

FCA’s Proposed
Court’s
Construction
Construction
Located in or on the
The Court reserves
bottom cushion of the the right to address
seat
this claim
construction at
summary judgment or
trial, if necessary.

FCA requests that the Court construe the term “on the passenger seat” in Claim 11 of the
‘375 Patent.
Claim 11 of the ‘375 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim term underlined:
11. A method of airbag control in a vehicle having an array of
force sensors on the passenger seat coupled to a controller for
determining whether to allow airbag deployment based on sensed
force and force distribution comprising the steps of:
measuring the force sensed by each sensor;
calculating the total force of the sensor array;

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allowing deployment if the total force is above a total threshold
force;
assigning a load rating to each sensor based on its measured force,
said load ratings being limited to maximum value;
summing the assigned load ratings for all the sensors to derive a
total load rating; and
allowing deployment if the total load rating is above a predefined
total load threshold, whereby deployment is allowed if the sensed
forces are distributed over the passenger seat, even if the total force
is less than the total threshold force.
‘375 Pat. at col. 7 (emphasis added).
Claim 11 states that the patented system has “an array of force sensors on the passenger
seat.” Thus, the term “on the passenger seat” refers to the location of the sensors. The readings
from the sensors are used “for determining whether to allow airbag deployment based on sensed
force and force distribution” over the passenger seat. ‘375 Pat. at col. 7:3-4.
Signal argues that the claim language “sensors on the passenger seat” is clear and
understandable, and therefore does not need to be construed.

Signal argues that FCA’s

construction improperly imports example embodiments of the invention from the written
description section of the patent into the claims, specifically, by proposing a claim construction
that requires the sensors be “located in or on the bottom of the cushion of the seat.” Signal
argues that FCA’s proposed construction “‘violates the fundamental canon of claim
construction . . . that limitations from the specification may not be read into the claims.’” Pl. Br.
at 14 (Dkt. 32) (quoting Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
FCA argues that “on the passenger seat” should be construed to mean “located in or on
the bottom cushion of the seat.” FCA argues that it is not importing limitations from the written
description section of the patent into the claims.

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Rather, FCA states that its proposed

construction just makes clear that the sensors are located in or on the seat cushion itself and not,
for example, in the seat rails on the floor of the car.

FCA correctly points out that the

specification repeatedly and consistently refers to the sensors being located either “in” or “on”
the seat and no other location is disclosed. For example, the “Abstract” section of the ‘375
Patent states “sensors on a vehicle passenger seat . . . .” The “Summary of the Invention” section
of the ‘375 Patent states “A dozen sensors, judicially [sic] located in the seat. . . .” Id. at col 1:59.
Likewise, the “Description of the Invention” section of the ‘375 Patent states “The mounting
arrangement of sensors 28 on a bottom bucket seat cushion is shown in Figure 2” and “It will
thus be seen that airbag deployment can be allowed or inhibited by a pattern of resistive sensors
embedded in a seat cushion. . . .” Id. at cols. 3:21-22 and 5:31-37. FCA also notes that the
relevant figures of the ‘375 Patent show the sensors in or on the seat cushion. Specifically,
Figures 2 and 7, reproduced below, show the sensors distributed in or on the bottom cushion of
the passenger seat.

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At oral argument, Signal stated that the construction of this claim limitation is not
material to the outcome of this case (i.e., not material to the infringement or invalidity issues in
this case).

8/3/2016 Hr’g Tr. at 7 (Dkt. 53).

Signal stated it opposed FCA’s proposed

construction simply because it may have collateral estoppel or otherwise be limiting in future
cases against unknown defendants.
On the other hand, at oral argument, FCA stated that the construction of this claim
limitation is material to the outcome of this case. Id. at 8. FCA stated that the accused infringing
FCA vehicles have sensors on the frame or rails that support the vehicle seat. FCA stated: “The
dispute is whether the term [is] broad enough to capture the supporting frame for the seat,
sensors in the supporting frame for the seat or whether they’re limited to the seat part which is
the cushion in our view. . . .” Id. at 9. However, the parties did not submit evidence of the
accused seats so that the Court can understand the context of the infringement dispute and give a
construction that is fully tailored to the issues involved in the case.
At this point in the case, given the disagreement between the parties as to the materiality
of this claim limitation and also due to the fact that parties have not briefed the Court as to
context of the claim construction dispute to the ultimate infringement or invalidity issues in the
case, the Court will exercise its discretion and wait to construe this claim limitation, if needed,
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until summary judgment motions are filed or until trial. As stated earlier, without “the vital
knowledge of the accused products,” a court’s claim construction decision “takes on the
attributes of something akin to an advisory opinion.” Lava Trading, 445 F.3d at 1350. To the
extent that nuanced constructions are proper and relevant to the infringement or invalidity
arguments, the Court can re-address its claim construction at summary judgment or trial, if
necessary. At summary judgment or trial, the Court can also determine whether the dispute is
one of claim construction for a district court judge to resolve or whether the dispute is really a
dispute of infringement to be decided by a jury.
3. “load rating”
Disputed Term
“load rating”

Signal’s Proposed
Construction
Plain and ordinary
meaning, or “a
measure of whether
the sensor is
detecting some load”

FCA’s Proposed
Construction
A measure of
whether the sensor is
detecting some load,
which is different
than the claimed
‘force,’ and is used
for pattern
recognition purposes.

Court’s
Construction
The load rating a
measure of whether
the sensor is
detecting some load
and is used for
pattern recognition
purposes.

FCA requests that the Court construe the term “load rating” in Claim 11 of the ‘375
Patent.
Claim 11 of the ‘375 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim term underlined:
11. A method of airbag control in a vehicle having an array of
force sensors on the passenger seat coupled to a controller for
determining whether to allow airbag deployment based on sensed
force and force distribution comprising the steps of:
measuring the force sensed by each sensor;
calculating the total force of the sensor array;
allowing deployment if the total force is above a total threshold
force;

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assigning a load rating to each sensor based on its measured force,
said load ratings being limited to [a] maximum value;
summing the assigned load ratings for all the sensors to derive a
total load rating; and
allowing deployment if the total load rating is above a predefined
total load threshold, whereby deployment is allowed if the sensed
forces are distributed over the passenger seat, even if the total force
is less than the total threshold force.
‘375 Pat. at col. 7 (emphasis added).
The parties dispute whether the claim term “load rating” can be the same as the
separately recited “force” value measured from each sensor. Signal argues it can; FCA argues
that the plain language of the claim dictates that it cannot. Signal also disputes whether “load
rating” must be used for “pattern recognition purposes,” despite what appears to be a clear
statement that it is used for such purposes in the written description section of the patent.
Claim 11 includes both the terms “force” and “load rating.” Claim 11 states that the
patented system “[measure[s] the force sensed by each sensor;” then “calculat[es] the total force
of the sensor array;” and then “allows deployment [of the airbag] if the total force is above a total
threshold force. . . .” Claim 11 ‘375 Pat. at col. 7:6-10. Even if the total force is below the total
force threshold required for deployment of the airbag, the system will assign a load rating to each
sensor based on its measured force, said load ratings being limited to [a] maximum value;” then
the computer/controller will “sum[] the assigned load ratings for all the sensors to derive a total
load rating; and then allow[] deployment [of the airbag] if the total load rating is above a
predefined total load threshold. . . .” Id. at col. 7:11-17.

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Signal argues that the claim term “load rating” does not need to be construed and should
be left to its plain and ordinary meaning or be construed to mean “a measure of whether the
sensor is detecting some load.” Pl. Br. at 14.
FCA argues that this claim term should be construed to mean “a measure of whether the
sensor is detecting some load, which is different than the claimed ‘force,’ and is used for pattern
recognition purposes.” Def. Br. at 13 (Dkt. 39).
Both parties point out that the “Description of the Invention” section of the ‘375 Patent
gives a full or partial explicit definition or explanation of the term “load rating.” It states: “The
load rating a measure of whether the sensor is detecting some load and is used for pattern
recognition purposes.” ‘375 Pat. at col. 4:2-4.
FCA also points out that the prosecution history evidences that “load rating” and “force”
have different meanings.

To overcome the prior art during prosecution, the patent owner

amended Claim 11, explaining that “Claim 11 has been re-written in independent format, and
recites a method of airbag control in which deployment is allowed based on total force above a
threshold or a total load rating above a threshold.” File Wrapper for ‘375 Patent, Ex. 10 pg. 2 of
FCA’s resp. br. (emphasis added); see also Ex. 10 pgs. 3-4 (distinguishing force from load rating
to overcome prior art).
As explained below, the Court finds that the term “load rating” should be construed to
mean “a measure of whether the sensor is detecting some load and is used for pattern recognition
purposes.” The Court reserves the right to modify or add to this claim construction as the

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litigation issues become more clear or as needed to fully explain the concept of a load rating to
the jury.2
Both parties agree that the patent owner acted as its own lexicographer when it stated that
“[t]he load rating is a measure of whether the sensor is detecting some load and is used for
pattern recognition purposes.” ‘375 Pat. at col. 4:2-4. By submitting the definition directly into
the written description section of the patent the patent owner acted as his own “lexicographer.”
CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that to be a
lexicographer a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term” other
than its plain and ordinary meaning). At this point in the case, the Court will adopt the exact
language set forth in the written description of the ‘375 Patent.
The Court’s construction differs slightly from the construction proposed by either party.
The Court did not adopt FCA’s proposed language that the “load rating be different from the
claimed ‘force.’” While the language of the claim requires that the load rating be “based on” the
“measured force,” the language of the claim does not require that the values be different numbers.
It may be possible that some systems could be designed where the load rating and force are the
same value in some scenarios, although the “units” may be different. For example, the written
description section of the ‘375 Patent gives an example embodiment of the invention within the
scope of the ‘375 Patent. It states “if a load is below a base value d, which may be four, the
rating is zero and if it is above the base value it is the difference between the base load and the
measured load up to a limit value of, say four.” ‘375 Pat. at col. 4:6-8; see also Claim 12 at col.
7:21-27. In this embodiment, the load rating and the force would be the same — not different —
2

In their written briefs, the parties did not explain why this claim term needs to be construed in
light of the infringement or invalidity issues in the case. Lava Trading, 445 F.3d at 1350
(holding that a court should construe a claim term in the context of the infringement or invalidity
dispute).
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if either “d” or the force has a zero value. Requiring the load rating to be “different from” the
force, at least numerically, may be therefore inconsistent with the embodiment in the written
description.
The Court also rejects Signal’s proposed construction at this time to the extent that it
removes the language “for the purposes of pattern recognition” from the definition set forth by
the patent owner in the written description section of the patent. This language makes clear that
the load rating “is used for pattern recognition purposes.” Quoting from Marrin v. Griffin, 599
F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010), Signal argues claim language such as this “merely states the
purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the
claim.” Signal argues that “[h]ere, the purpose is recited in the specification, so there is even less
of a reason to limit the claim in this manner.” Pl. Br. at 16.
Marrin v. Griffin is distinguishable from this case. Marrin addressed whether claim
language in the preamble of a claim should be interpreted to be a claim limitation. The Federal
Circuit noted that language from the preamble is normally not construed as a claim limitation,
especially language from the preamble of an apparatus claim that merely states the use or
intended purpose of the invention. Id. Moreover, the patent owner in Marrin expressly stated in
the prosecution history that the disputed language in the preamble was not a requirement of the
claim. Id. In contrast, the present case does not involve language in the preamble, but rather
language in the written description section of the patent expressly defining a claim term located
in the body of the claim and describing its purpose. In Marrin, the Federal Circuit noted that
statements of purpose or intended use are generally not treated as claim limitations for apparatus
claims which normally set forth structure. The claim at issue here, Claim 11, is a method claim.

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At the very least, the purpose of the claim term “load rating” will assist the jury in understanding
the disputed claim term “load rating.”
4. “Whereby deployment is allowed if the sensed forces are distributed over
the passenger seat, even if the total force is less than the total threshold
force” in Claim 11
Disputed Term

“whereby deployment
is allowed if the
sensed forces are
distributed over the
passenger seat, even if
the total force is less
than the total threshold
force”

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction
Plain and ordinary
meaning.
Alternately, the
phrase “the sensed
forces are distributed
over the passenger
seat” may be
construed as “the
sensed forces are
distributed over the
sensors, such that
each sensor bears
some force”

Defendant’s
Proposed
Construction
Defendant adopts
Signal’s alternate
proposed
construction

Court’s
Construction
This claim limitation
is no longer disputed.

Before claim construction briefing, the parties disputed the proper construction of the
claim language “whereby deployment is allowed if the sensed forces are distributed over the
passenger seat, even if the total force is less than the total threshold force” in Claim 11 of the
‘375 Patent. In its opening brief, Signal proposed an alternate construction. Specifically, Signal
proposed that the claim language “the sensed forces are distributed over the passenger seat” may
be construed as “the sensed forces are distributed over the sensors, such that each sensor bears
some force.”
In its response brief, FCA states that it agrees with Signal’s alternate construction of
“distributed over the passenger seat” to mean “such that each sensor bears some force.” Def. Br.
at 15-16.

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In reply brief (Dkt. 41), Signal did not further argue this claim limitation. Accordingly,
this claim limitation is no longer at issue.
B. Airbag Deployment Patent: the ‘007 Patent
The ‘007 Patent, which is entitled “Occupant Detection Method and Apparatus for Air
Bag System,” was filed on June 3, 1997 and issued to Delphi Technologies Inc. on January 4,
2000. The ‘007 patent is a continuation-in-part (“CIP”) of the ‘375 Patent, which means that the
‘007 patents builds off invention taught in the ‘375 Patent and adds additional new subject matter
to the invention taught in the ‘375 Patent.
The ‘007 Patent describes a system “to discriminate in [an airbag deployment] system
between large and small seat occupants for a determination of whether an airbag deployment
should be permitted” and to “maintain reliable operation in spite of dynamic variations in sensed
pressures” such as when the person is moving around or bouncing. ‘007 Pat. col. 1:52-57 (Dkt.
33-2). It is an object of the invention to “disable the airbag when a small person occupies the
seat or when the seat is empty.” Id. at col. 1:28-30. The system includes a microprocessor that
is programmed to calculate a “relative weight parameter” and make airbag deployment decisions
by comparing that parameter to three thresholds: a “first threshold,” a “lock threshold,” and an
“unlock threshold.” Signal has asserted Claim 17 of the ‘007 Patent.
In Claim 17, the system will deploy the airbag when the total measured weight on the
passenger seat is above a “first threshold”; if the total measured force is above a measured “lock
threshold” for a sufficient time, the system will set a “lock flag” to “lock” the deployment
decision, until the total measured force drops below an “unlock” threshold for a time, at which
time the flag is cleared. The idea behind the patent is that the airbag deployment system will do
a better job of accounting for moving or bouncing passengers and not immediately assume that

20

no one in the passenger seat just because the weight sensed by seat sensors is low for a short
period of time.
1. “relevant weight parameter” in Claim 17 of the ‘007 Patent
Although the parties originally disputed the construction and definiteness of the claim
term “relevant weight parameter,” FCA states in its response brief that this claim term is no
longer disputed. Accordingly, the Court will not address this claim limitation.
2. “at a level indicative of an empty seat” in Claim 17 of the ‘007 Patent
Disputed Term
“at a level indicative
of an empty seat” in
Claim 17

Signal’s Proposed
Construction
“A force/pressure
measurement
corresponding to an
empty seat
classification”

FCA’s Proposed
Construction
A force/pressure
measurement of zero
or substantially zero
weight on the seat

Court’s
Construction
No construction is
needed at this time
because the claim
term is not material to
the outcome of the
case.

Alternatively, plain
and ordinary
meaning. Reply brief
at 2.
The parties request that the Court construe the claim language “at a level indicative of an
empty seat” in Claim 17 of the ‘007 Patent.
Claim 17 of the ‘007 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim language
underlined:
17. In a vehicle restraint system having a controller for deploying
air bags, means for inhibiting and allowing deployment according
to whether a seat is occupied by a person of at least a minimum
weight comprising:
seat sensors responding to the weight of an occupant to produce
sensor outputs;
a microprocessor coupled to the sensor outputs and programmed to
inhibit and allow deployment according to sensor response and
particularly programmed to

21

determine measures represented by individual sensor outputs and
calculate from the sensor outputs a relative weight parameter,
establish a first threshold of the relative weight parameter,
allow deployment when the relative weight parameter is above the
first threshold,
establish a lock threshold above the first threshold,
set a lock flag when the relative weight parameter is above the lock
threshold and deployment has been allowed for a given time,
establish an unlock threshold at a level indicative of an empty seat,
clear the flag when the relative weight parameter is below the
unlock threshold for a time, and
allow deployment while the lock flag is set.
‘007 Pat. at col. 17 (emphasis added).
The disputed claim language “at a level indicative of an empty seat” is directed to the
principle that the airbag deployment system will establish an unlock threshold at a weight sensor
reading indicative of an empty seat. The parties agree that the claim language does not require
that the seat actually not have something on the seat; rather, the claim language means that the
weight reading from the sensors is so low that it does not correspond to a person or child being
on the seat. With a basic understanding of the ‘007, the claim language is quite clear.
In the parties written briefs, and in FCA’s motion for collateral estoppel, the dispute
between the parties on this claim term related to whether the Court must give collateral effect to
Judge Kronstadt’s prior art claim construction decision involving Signal and other automotive
companies. In that decision, the California court construed the term “at a level indicative of an
empty seat” to mean “a force/pressure measurement of zero or substantially zero weight on the
seat.”

Claim Constr. Order at 65-67, Ex. E to Pl. Br. (Dkt. 33-4).

22

The California court

ultimately granted Defendants Mazda and Kia summary judgment of non-infringement based on
the court’s claim construction decision.

Before the California court issued a final formal

judgment, Signal settled with Mazda and Kia. Accordingly, no appeal took place.
At oral argument, the parties agreed that the construction of this claim limitation is not
material to the outcome of this case (i.e., not material to the infringement or invalidity issues).
For example, at oral argument, FCA’s counsel stated: “I personally don’t think that there’s much
dispute between the parties. The Court has asked how this matters? I don’t think this one
matters.” 8/3/2016 Hr’g Tr. at 44. Because the parties do not believe that the construction of
this claim limitation is material to the outcome of this case, the Court will not construe this claim
limitation at this time and will deny as moot Defendant’s motion for collateral estoppel as to this
term.
3. “seat sensors” in Claim 17 of the ‘007 Patent
Disputed Term
“seat sensors” in
Claim 17

Signal’s Proposed
Construction
Plain and ordinary
meaning

FCA’s Proposed
Construction
“Sensors located in or
on the bottom
cushion of the seat”;
however, at oral
argument FCA stated
that this term is likely
not material to the
outcome of the case

Court’s
Construction
No construction
needed at this time
because the claim
term is not material to
the outcome of the
case.

FCA requests that the Court construe the claim term “seat sensors” in Claim 17 of the
‘007 Patent.
Claim 17 of the ‘007 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim language
underlined:
17. In a vehicle restraint system having a controller for deploying
air bags, means for inhibiting and allowing deployment according

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to whether a seat is occupied by a person of at least a minimum
weight comprising:
seat sensors responding to the weight of an occupant to produce
sensor outputs;
a microprocessor coupled to the sensor outputs and programmed to
inhibit and allow deployment according to sensor response and
particularly programmed to
determine measures represented by individual sensor outputs and
calculate from the sensor outputs a relative weight parameter,
establish a first threshold of the relative weight parameter,
allow deployment when the relative weight parameter is above the
first threshold,
establish a lock threshold above the first threshold,
set a lock flag when the relative weight parameter is above the lock
threshold and deployment has been allowed for a given time,
establish an unlock threshold at a level indicative of an empty seat,
clear the flag when the relative weight parameter is below the
unlock threshold for a time, and
allow deployment while the lock flag is set.
‘007 Pat. at col. 17 (emphasis added).
Signal argues that the claim term “seat sensors” does not need to be construed and should
be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
FCA argues that the claim term “seat sensors” should be construed to mean “sensors
located in or on the bottom cushion of the seat.” FCA states that it wants to make clear that the
sensors are located on the bottom cushion of the seat and not in the seat subassembly or the on
the floor of the vehicle. FCA points out that the ‘007 Patent consistently refers to the seat
sensors as being located “in” or “on” the seat. For example, in the Field of the Invention section

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of the patent, the patent states that “This invention relates to an occupant restraint system using
an occupant detection device and particularly to an airbag system having seat pressure detectors
in the seat.” ‘007 Pat. col. 1:10-12.
Similar to the arguments made with respect to the claim limitation “on the passenger
seat” in Claim 11 of the ‘375 Patent, at oral argument, FCA made particular arguments
concerning whether the claim limitation “seat sensor” is broad enough to capture the accused
FCA vehicle seats which apparently have sensors on a seat frame or rail. However, the parties
did not submit evidence of the accused seats in their briefs so that the Court can understand the
context of the infringement dispute and give a construction that is fully relevant to the issues
involved in the case.
At this point in the case, due to the fact that parties have not the briefed the Court as to
context of the claim construction dispute on the ultimate infringement or invalidity issues in the
case, the Court will exercise its discretion and wait to construe this claim limitation, if needed,
until summary judgment motions are filed or until trial. To the extent that nuanced constructions
are proper and relevant to the particular infringement or invalidity arguments being made, the
Court can re-address its claim construction at summary judgment or trial.

Lava Trading, 445

F.3d at 1350. At summary judgment or trial, the Court can also determine whether the dispute is
one of claim construction for a district court judge to resolve or whether the dispute is really a
dispute of infringement to be decided by a jury.
4. “unlock threshold” in Claim 17 of the ‘007 Patent
Disputed Term

Signal’s Proposed
Construction

FCA’s Proposed
Construction

“unlock threshold”

25

Court’s
Construction
No longer disputed.
The parties have
agreed upon a
construction

In their briefs, the parties request that the Court construe the claim language “unlock
threshold” in Claim 17 of the ‘007 Patent.
Claim 17 of the ‘007 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim language
underlined:
17. In a vehicle restraint system having a controller for deploying
air bags, means for inhibiting and allowing deployment according
to whether a seat is occupied by a person of at least a minimum
weight comprising:
seat sensors responding to the weight of an occupant to produce
sensor outputs;
a microprocessor coupled to the sensor outputs and programmed to
inhibit and allow deployment according to sensor response and
particularly programmed to
determine measures represented by individual sensor outputs and
calculate from the sensor outputs a relative weight parameter,
establish a first threshold of the relative weight parameter,
allow deployment when the relative weight parameter is above the
first threshold,
establish a lock threshold above the first threshold,
set a lock flag when the relative weight parameter is above the lock
threshold and deployment has been allowed for a given time,
establish an unlock threshold at a level indicative of an empty seat,
clear the flag when the relative weight parameter is below the
unlock threshold for a time, and
allow deployment while the lock flag is set.
‘007 Pat. at col. 17 (emphasis added).
At oral argument, the parties had a meet and confer with the Court’s special master and
agreed upon a construction for this claim limitation. This claim limitation is no longer disputed.

26

8/3/2016 Hr’g Tr. at 5. FCA’s motion for collateral estoppel as to this claim term is denied as
moot.
C. Blind Spot Monitoring: the ‘927 Patent
1. “if the alert signal was active for the threshold time, sustaining the alert
signal for the variable sustain time” in Claim 1 of the ‘927 Patent
Disputed Term

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction

Defendant’s
Proposed
Construction

“if the alert signal
was active for the
threshold time,
sustaining the alert
signal for the
variable sustain
time”

Court’s
Construction
No longer disputed.
The parties have
agreed upon a
construction

As to the claim limitation “if the alert signal was active for the threshold time, sustaining
the alert signal for the variable sustain time” in Claim 1 of the ‘927 patent, at oral argument, the
parties had a meet and confer with the Court’s special master and agreed upon a construction for
this claim limitation. This claim limitation is no longer disputed. 8/3/2016 Hr’g Tr. at 5.
D. Tire Pressure Monitoring and Remote Keyless Entry: the ‘374 Patent
The USPTO issued the ‘374 Patent on October 31, 1995. It discloses a method and
apparatus for combining tire pressure monitoring and keyless entry control using common
hardware. In other words, the ‘374 Patent describes having a single computer or controller in the
vehicle for controlling key fob functions and monitoring tire pressure from the tires on the
vehicle.
The ‘374 Patent also teaches a system of using magnetic switches to inform the vehicle of
the location of specific tires when the tires are rotated.

27

1. “A combined keyless entry and low tire pressure warning system for a
vehicle having electric door locks and a warning display comprising” in
Claim 3
Disputed Term

Signal’s Proposed
Construction

FCA’s Proposed
Construction

“A combined keyless
entry and low tire
pressure warning
system for a vehicle
having electric door
locks and a warning
display comprising”

Court’s
Construction
The parties agreed at
oral argument that the
preamble of Claim 3
is generally a claim
limitation.

The parties dispute
whether the above
preamble of Claim 3 is
a claim limitation

In their briefs, the parties disputed whether the preamble of Claim 3 of the ‘374 Patent is
a claim limitation.
Claim 3 of the ‘374 Patent is reproduced below:
A combined keyless entry and low tire pressure warning system for
a vehicle having electric door locks and a warning display
comprising:
a set of remote transmitters comprising radio frequency tire
transmitters one mounted in each tire for transmitting data
messages including modulated data and an identification code;
a radio frequency keyless entry transmitter for transmitting lock
operation commands;
a radio receiver mounted on the vehicle for receiving data
messages from the tire transmitters and lock operation commands
from the keyless entry transmitter;
a processor coupled with the receiver, the electric door locks and
the warning display for controlling the locks and the display
according to transmitted commands and messages;
a controller coupled with each tire transmitter having a pressure

28

detector for providing pressure data to the tire transmitter, an
identification code for transmission with the pressure data, and a
switch activated by a vehicle user for transmitting a sign-up
message including the identification code for that tire location, the
receiver unit including means for storing identification codes from
the transmitted sign-up messages for comparison with
subsequently transmitted data messages to differentiate data
transmitted from various tire locations. (Emphasis added.)
‘374 Pat. at col. 7 (Dkt. 33-5) (emphasis added).
A patent claim has three sections: (i) a preamble, (ii) a transition word or phrase, and
(iii) a body of the claim. The preamble is the language of the claim before the transition word or
phrase. In Claim 3 of the ’374 Patent, the transition word is the word “comprising,” which has
been underlined above. Accordingly, the preamble of Claim 3 is the following language: “A
combined keyless entry and low pressure warning system for a vehicle having electric door locks
and a warning display. . . .” ‘374 Pat. at col. 7:2-4.
Generally, a preamble that just states an intended purpose for the claimed invention does
not limit the scope of a claim and patent attorneys do not intend for preambles to limit the scope
of the claims. Patent attorneys often use preambles to set forth an intended use or purpose of the
claimed invention to make a terse patent claim more understandable. However, sometimes
patent attorneys do intend that the preamble be a claim limitation.
Prior to oral argument, the parties disputed whether the preamble of Claim 3 of the ‘374
Patent is a claim limitation. However, at oral argument, the parties had a meet and confer with
the Court’s special master and agreed that is a claim limitation. This claim limitation is no
longer disputed. 8/3/2016 Hr’g Tr. at 6.
2. “A switch activated by a vehicle user for transmitting a sign-up message”
in Claim 3
Disputed Terms

Plaintiff’s Proposed
Construction

Defendant’s
Proposed

29

Court’s
Construction

“A switch activated
Plain and ordinary
by a vehicle user for
meaning
transmitting a sign-up
message”

Construction
“A magnetic switch
activated with a
magnet by a vehicle
user to cause a signup message to be sent
to the receiver.”

The term “switch”
means a “magnetic
switch”

FCA requests that the Court construe the following claim language in Claim 3 of the ‘374
Patent “a switch activated by a vehicle user for transmitting a sign-up message. . . .”
Claim 3 of the ‘374 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim language
underlined:
A combined keyless entry and low tire pressure warning system for
a vehicle having electric door locks and a warning display
comprising:
a set of remote transmitters comprising radio frequency tire
transmitters one mounted in each tire for transmitting data
messages including modulated data and an identification code;
a radio frequency keyless entry transmitter for transmitting lock
operation commands;
a radio receiver mounted on the vehicle for receiving data
messages from the tire transmitters and lock operation commands
from the keyless entry transmitter;
a processor coupled with the receiver, the electric door locks and
the warning display for controlling the locks and the display
according to transmitted commands and messages;
a controller coupled with each tire transmitter having a pressure
detector for providing pressure data to the tire transmitter, an
identification code for transmission with the pressure data, and a
switch activated by a vehicle user for transmitting a sign-up
message including the identification code for that tire location, the
receiver unit including means for storing identification codes from
the transmitted sign-up messages for comparison with
subsequently transmitted data messages to differentiate data
transmitted from various tire locations.
‘374 Pat. at col. 7 (emphasis added).

30

The issue before the Court is whether this disputed claim term should be limited to a
“magnetic” switch based on a disclaimer in the prosecution of the ‘374 Patent.
Signal argues that the claim language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning and
that the claim language does not specify that the switch must be a magnetic switch. Signal also
argues that prosecution history relied upon by FCA does not amount to a clear disclaimer of
broader claim scope as required by the Federal Circuit case law.
FCA on the other hand argues that the patent owner made clear statements during the
prosecution history of the ‘374 Patent which limit the scope of Claim 3 to magnetic switches.
The prosecution history (also called the “file wrapper”) of a patent is the complete public
record of the proceedings before the USPTO. The prosecution history is the record of the
attempt by the patentee to explain the language in the patent application and obtain a patent. The
public is entitled to rely on the statements made in the prosecution history as to the meaning of
claim language. Because the prosecution history is an ongoing negotiation between the USPTO
and the patentee, rather than the final product of the negotiation, it often not as clear as would be
desired. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Nonetheless, the prosecution history can often provide
insight into the meaning of claim language and whether the inventor limited the invention in the
course of prosecution of the patent, making the claim scope narrower than it would be otherwise
be.

Id.

In practice, the prosecution history of a patent frequently becomes relevant where,

during the prosecution of the patent, the patentee sets forth a definition or explanation as to what
the claim is to cover in response to an official rejection by the USPTO. Such a definition or
explanation may be accompanied by a narrowing amendment to the claims of the patent
application.

Where the patentee gives such a definition or explanation, the definition or

31

explanation limits the scope of the claim, preventing the patentee from later recapturing what
was previously surrendered.
In addition to using the prosecution history to interpret ambiguous claim terms, the
prosecution history of a patent is also relevant where a patentee disclaims or disavows during
prosecution otherwise clear claim language which would normally have a broader meaning. In
Omega Engineering Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the Federal Circuit
stated that it would refer to such narrowing statements in the prosecution history as the “doctrine
of prosecution disclaimer.” Pursuant to the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer, where a patentee
unequivocally disavows a broader plain and ordinary meaning of claim language during
prosecution to a narrower meaning to obtain the patent, a court should construe the claim
language to have the narrower meaning.

The Federal Circuit has held that prosecution

statements that are vague or ambiguous do not qualify as a disavowal of claim scope, and has
required the alleged disavowing statements to be both clear and deliberate. Id.
FCA relies on two prosecution history events in arguing that the doctrine of prosecution
disclaimer applies to the “switch” claim term in this case. FCA states that in a recent Inter Partes
Review (“IPR”) proceeding in the USPTO, Signal argued for the patentability of Claim 3 over
the prior art based on the “switch” being a “magnetic switch.” Prosecution History, Ex. 12 to
Def. Br., at 1, 5, 19 (Dkt. 39-12). Repeatedly, Signal argued that the prior art combination did
not have a magnetic switch as in Claim 3, which did not contain language requiring the switch be
magnetic. FCA points to the following three statements by Signal:
In particular, claim 3 is patentable over the combined teachings of
Schuermann and Mock, and Schuermann, Mock and Wilson,
because even if one were to combine the teachings of these
references, that combination would not include the magnetic
switch as recited in claim 3. . . . Claim 3 is also patentable over the
combined teachings of Mock, Steele, and Williams because in such

32

a combination a magnetic switch is not required when an
integrated controller is used.
Id. at 1 (emphasis added). The above statements was made right up front
With no need for a sign-up process there is no need for a magnetic
switch for use in such a process. Accordingly, even if one were to
combine the teachings of Schuermann and Mock, that combination
would not include the magnetic switch as recited in claim 3; hence,
claim 3 is not obvious in view Schuermann and Mock.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, even if one were to combine the teachings of Mock
and Steele (with or with-out those of Williams), one learns that the
magnetic switch is not required when an integrated controller is
used. That is, Mock discusses the magnetic switch used in
conjunction with the sign-up process only in connection with the
use of the external, portable interrogation unit.
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
Likewise, in a footnote, FCA argues that during the original prosecution of the patent
application, the patentee amended the claim to include, inter alia, the claim language a “switch
activated by the vehicle user,” and explained that “[Claim 3 and other claims] are additionally
directed to the Applicants’ magnetic sign-up feature.” Ex. 11 to Def. Br. at 3 (Dkt. 39-13)
(emphasis added). Moreover, FCA points out that the patentee further stated “Applicants have
amended [Claim 3] to clearly provide that the magnetic switches in the sign-up procedure are
activated by the operator of the vehicle.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added).)
In response to FCA’s citation to statements in the prosecution, Signal argues that Judge
Kronstadt has already addressed this claim construction issue and rejected FCA’s argument.
FCA counters that the statements in the recent IPR were made after Judge Kronstadt’s decision
and, therefore, Judge Kronstadt did not consider the strong statements that rise to the level of a
clear disavowal of broader claim language. In addition, FCA argues that Judge Kronstadt

33

misapplied the doctrine of claim differentiation in deciding not to limit Claim 3 to magnetic
switches.
After considering the prosecution history, the Court finds that the statements in the
prosecution history, particularly during the recent IPR proceeding are unmistakable statements
disavowing the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “switch” to mean “magnetic switch.”
For example, directly up front in the “Introduction” of its patent owner’s response brief to in the
IPR proceeding, Signal stated: “In particular, claim 3 is patentable over the combined teachings
of Schuermann and Mock, and Schuermann, Mock and Wilson, because if one were able to
combine the teachings of these references, that combination would not include the magnetic
switch of claim 3.” Prosecution History at 1. Likewise, Signal stated: “Accordingly, even if one
were to combine the teachings of Schuermann and Mock, that combination would not include the
magnetic switch as recited in claim 3; hence, claim 3 is not obvious in view Schuermann and
Mock.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added). Signal made these statements in the IPR proceeding to
distinguish Claim 3 from the prior art systems. Such statements rise to the level of prosecution
disclaimer because they are clear and deliberate statements disavowing the plain and ordinary
meaning of broader claim language. These statements were statements made in a brief dated
January 11, 2016, which was after Judge Kronstadt’s claim construction ruling of April 17, 2015.
Therefore, the Court agrees with FCA that Judge Kronstadt did not have Signal’s statements
from the IPR proceeding when he construed this claim limitation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court construes the disputed claim terms as set forth above. The Court reserves the
right to modify its claim constructions as the infringement and validity issues of the asserted

34

patents become known. The Court denies as moot FCA’s motion for collateral estoppel (Dkt.
38).
SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2016
Detroit, Michigan

s/Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and
any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S.
mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on September 20, 2016.
s/Karri Sandusky
Case Manager

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