Zammit v. Internal Revenue Service et al

Filing 37

OPINION & ORDER Adopting Report and Recommendation 26 and Granting Motion to Dismiss filed by Internal Revenue Service 32 and denying pltf's 31 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

PIO PETER ZAMMIT
Case No.14-14155
Plaintiff,
Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ET AL.,
Defendants.
/

ORDER ACCEPTING AND ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION [32], GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [26],
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [31]
This matter comes before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the Internal Revenue Service1 illegally distributes tax
dollars to fund abortions. Plaintiff filed nearly 100 pages of objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s report and recommendation and an additional 35 pages replying to Defendant’s
single-paragraph response. Having reviewed and fully considered each objection, the
pleadings, and the record, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections, ACCEPTS and
ADOPTS the report and recommendation in full, and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to
dismiss. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is accordingly DENIED.

1

The United States, asserting itself as the proper party in place of the IRS, filed the
pending motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 26.)

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff’s objections do not comply with the Magistrate
Judge’s notice requiring any objections to be “concise” and “specific.” (Dkt. 32, at 6-7.) For
example, Plaintiff’s second objection—which objects to the first sentence of the
report—goes on for 15 single-spaced pages, includes an article from a website and three
pages of user-comments (annotated by Plaintiff), as well as Plaintiff’s musings about a
variety of topics ranging from Henry VIII, to President Obama, to Adolf Hitler, to “Red China
Atheism.” (See, e.g., Dkt. 34, at 3-18.) Not only do these 15 pages fail to raise a valid
objection, but they are a poignant example of Plaintiff’s general failure to comply with the
instruction to make his objections concise and specific.
In addition, the majority of Plaintiff’s objections do not address the substance of the
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and are irrelevant to the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction. For example, Plaintiff’s first objection is to the use of the title “Report
and Recommendation.” (Dkt. 34, at 3.) He claims the title is a “prejudicial attempt to act as
a lawyer for the Defendant” and “Judge Nancy Edmunds is perfectly capable of coming to
her own conclusions and does not need any recommendations from her staff.” (Id.) The
objection to the title of the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is unavailing.
Not only is a magistrate judge (who is, of course, not a district court judge’s “staff”) required
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to “enter a recommended disposition,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(1), but challenging the longstanding practice of how to caption certain papers fails
to raise an appropriate objection and is simply unhelpful here.
Plaintiff’s objections that do address relevant issues primarily rehash previous
arguments. Those arguments were addressed and properly rejected by the Magistrate
Judge. The Court is not obligated to address objections that are mere recitations of earlier
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arguments and that fail to specifically identify errors in the report and recommendation. See
Nork v. Comm’r of Social Sec., No. 14-12511, 2015 WL 3620482, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June
9, 2015); Davis v. Caruso, No. 07-10115, 2008 WL 540818, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25,
2008). The Court, therefore, does not address such objections.
One objection that appears to not merely repeat a prior argument claims the
Magistrate Judge’s report is flawed in finding that the injury alleged is held in common by
all members of the public. (Dkt. 34-1. at 14-18.) Plaintiff objects, arguing that “using [his]
particular tax monies to kill particular individual babies ... causes [him] a concrete and
particular and devastating injury which is not held in common by the public.” (Id. at 16.) But
a particular and concrete injury does not exist simply because a litigant uses the words
“particular” and “concrete.” See, e.g., Morris v. Sullivan, 897 F.2d 553, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(“[C]ourts are not required to entertain frivolous claims merely because they are cloaked
in constitutional garb.”). Plaintiff has failed to allege the type of concrete and particularized
injury required to establish constitutional standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Rather, his alleged injuries rely on his status as taxpayer and as
“sovereign citizen”2—both

of which the Magistrate Judge correctly determined are

insufficient to establish constitutional standing. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found.,
Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (noting that except for narrow Establishment Clause

2

Because the Magistrate Judge has already done so, the Court does not address in
detail Plaintiff’s argument that he is invoking his status as “sovereign citizen” and not his
status as taxpayer as his basis for standing. The Court notes, however, that even within his
objections Plaintiff clearly invokes his status as a taxpayer as a basis for this suit. (See e.g.,
Dkt. 34-1, at 10 (“My whole case is about my stake in this case to stop misallocation of tax
monies for abortion on demand – MOST ESPECIALLY MY TAX MONIES.”) (emphasis in
original); Dkt. 34-1, at 16 (“My standing is upon my personal injury of using my particular
tax monies to kill particular individual babies.”).)
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exception, “the payment of taxes is generally not enough to establish standing to challenge
an action taken by the Federal Government”); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982) (“This Court repeatedly
has rejected claims of standing predicated on the right, possessed by every citizen, to
require that the Government be administered according to law.” (citation omitted)). In light
of this, and the additional reasons discussed in the report and recommendation, the Court
agrees with the Magistrate Judge that dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
Finally, Plaintiff’s objections include several allegations of bias on the part of the
Magistrate Judge. (See, e.g., Dkt. 34-1, at 2 (“I begin to wonder if Her Honor’s need ... for
judicial advancement is and was her prime ‘extra-judicial’ motive in her writing this.”)
(emphasis in original)). The Court finds such allegations entirely unfounded.
The Court, being fully advised in the premises, OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections to
the report and recommendation, ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the report and recommendation
in full, and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment is accordingly DENIED.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge
Dated: December 7, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
on December 7, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Carol J. Bethel
Case Manager

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