Wright v. Rivard
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Denying a Certificate of Appealability, and Granting Permission to Appeal In Forma Pauperis. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (SBur)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAM RAY WRIGHT,
Petitioner,
Case No. 2:14-cv-14167
Hon. Denise Page Hood
STEVEN RIVARD,
Respondent.
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OPINION AND ORDER 1) DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, 2) DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
AND 3) GRANTING PERMISSION TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner William Wright’s petition for
a writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted
in the Kalamazoo Circuit Court after he pled guilty to assault intent to commit
murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.83, third-degree fleeing and eluding an
officer, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.479(3), and one count of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.227b. He
was sentenced as a third-time habitual felony offender to 30-to-75 years for
the assault conviction, 78-to-120 months for the fleeing and eluding
conviction, and a consecutive 2-years for the firearm conviction.
The petition raises four claims: 1) Petitioner’s guilty plea was not
adequately supported by a factual basis, 2) Petitioner’s guilty plea was not
knowing and voluntary, 3) the trial court incorrectly scored the sentencing
guidelines, and 4) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
The Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are without merit. Therefore, the
petition will be denied. The Court will also deny Petitioner a certificate of
appealability, but it will grant him permission to proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The case against Petitioner concerned a police traffic stop at which he
fired a handgun twice at a police officer, and then sped away.
At Petitioner’s plea hearing, the prosecutor indicated that the terms of
the plea bargain called for Petitioner to plead guilty as a third time habitual
felony offender to the three offenses indicated above, and that four other
charges would be dismissed. The prosecutor also agreed to make a sentence
recommendation of a 30-year minimum sentence on the assault charge, to be
served consecutively with the 2-year sentence for the firearm charge. Defense
counsel and Petitioner indicated their understanding of the agreement.
Petitioner denied that anyone had promised him anything else or that
anyone had threatened him in any way to obtain the plea. He testified that it
was his own choice to plead guilty.
The trial court then read the charges to Petitioner, including the
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maximum sentences that could be imposed for each charge. Petitioner
indicated his understanding of the nature of the charges and the maximum
potential penalties.
The Court then advised Petitioner of all the trial rights he would be
waiving by entering his plea. Petitioner indicated his agreement and then
indicated his desire to plead guilty.
Petitioner then testified under oath that he was driving a car in
Kalamazoo on January 6, 2012, when a patrol car pulled him over. He
testified that he was armed with a handgun and fired it at one of the two
officers with the intent to commit the crime of murder. Petitioner testified that
he then sped away.
The trial court found that Petitioner entered his plea knowingly,
understandingly, and voluntarily. Petitioner was subsequently sentenced as
indicated above.
Petitioner then requested and was appointed appellate counsel who
filed a motion to withdraw the plea. Petitioner asserted that during the plea
colloquy, the trial court asked Petitioner if he shot at the officer with the intent
to murder him, rather than with the specific intent to kill him, as required by
state law. Petitioner asserted that he did not understand this element of the
crime, and therefore his plea was not knowingly entered. Petitioner also
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asserted that his counsel told him he would get a life sentence if he did not
accept the plea agreement, and that his judgment was clouded by long-term
methamphetamine use. The trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing.
On Jaunary 11, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on Petitioner’s
claims. Petitioner only called his trial attorney as a witness. She testified that
she did not investigate or consider hiring an expert witness on the issue of
whether Petitioner’s methamphetamine use could have been used to support
a defense regarding Petitioner’s mental state at the time of the shooting.
Counsel testified that she was aware of the mental state required to support
a charge of assault with intent to commit murder. Counsel testified that she
was aware that voluntary intoxication was a possible defense to the charge
and that she discussed it with Petitioner. Defense counsel testified that she
attempted to negotiate a more favorable sentencing agreement, but the
prosecutor would not reduce the offer. Ultimately, she discussed the plea offer
with Petitioner, and he decided to accept it.
The trial court entertained oral argument at a second hearing date, held
on February 25, 2013, after which it denied Petitioner’s motion. The Court
found that defense counsel was not ineffective for recommending Petitioner
accept the plea agreement instead of attempting to use Petitioner’s drug use
as a defense at trial. The Court also found that even if defense counsel had
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done more research on the issue, there was no reasonable likelihood that
Petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and instead gone to trial.
Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the
Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the following claims:
I. The guilty plea is invalid because it is not supported by an
adequate factual basis in violation of Defendant’s constitutional
rights to an accurate plea.
II. The guilty plea is invalid because it was not knowing and
voluntary, in violation of Defendant’s state and federal
constitutional rights.
III. The trial court assess 25 points under OV 6 where this
assessment did not reflect aggravating factors for the instant
crime as compared to others in its class, and the plea bargain
ostensibly based on these incorrect guidelines calculations;
Defendant is entitled to resentencing as a matter of constitutional
due process.
IV. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions.
The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s delayed application
“for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” People v. Wright, No. 315286
(Mich. Ct. App. April 17, 2013). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to
appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the same claims. The Michigan
Supreme Court denied the application because it was “not persuaded that the
questions presented should be reviewed by” it. People v. Wright, 838 N.W. 2d
559 (Mich. 2013) (table).
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II. Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review
for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it
‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court
cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from
a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different
from [this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per
curiam), quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). “[T]he
‘unreasonable application’ prong of the statute permits a federal habeas court
to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to
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the facts’ of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)
quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “A state court’s determination that a claim
lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S.86, 101 (2011), quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.
652, 664 (2004). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a
guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not
a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. . . . As a condition for
obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that
the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Id. at 786-87 (internal quotation omitted).
To obtain relief under § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must show an
unreasonable determination of fact and that the resulting state court decision
was “based on” that unreasonable determination. Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242,
250 (6th Cir. 2012). However, a federal habeas court must presume the
correctness of state court factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
A petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing
evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
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III. Analysis
A. Factual Basis for Plea
Petitioner’s first claim asserts that the trial court did not elicit a sufficient
factual basis for the guilty plea. Specifically, Petitioner faults the trial court for
asking him whether he shot the officer with the intent to “murder” him rather
than with the intent to “kill” him. Petitioner notes that the offense of assault
with intent to murder requires a specific intent to kill rather than any of the
lesser forms of malice sufficient to constitute murder. See People v. Lipps,
167 Mich. App. 99, 105-106 (1985). Respondent argues that whether
Petitioner is correct or not about the adequacy of the factual basis, the claim
cannot form the basis for granting habeas relief because there is no federal
constitutional requirement for a factual basis to be placed on the record during
a guilty plea hearing.
Under Michigan law, before a trial court may accept a criminal
defendant’s plea, “the court, by questioning the defendant, must establish
support for a finding that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged or the
offense to which the defendant is pleading.” MICH. CT. R. 6.302(D)(1). A
violation of a state law procedural rule, however, does not provide a basis for
federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“We
have stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for
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errors of state law. Today, we reemphasize that it is not the province of a
federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law
questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding
whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, there is
no federal constitutional requirement that a factual basis be established to
support a guilty plea. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“An
individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable
to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”); United States v.
Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1995); Roddy v. Black, 516 F.2d 1380,
1385 (6th Cir. 1975); Bonior v. Conerly, 416 F. App’x 475, 478 (6th Cir. 2010)
(stating that “[t]here is no constitutional requirement that a trial judge inquire
into the factual basis of a plea” and affirming denial of habeas relief on similar
claim).
Petitioner’s claim that the trial court failed to establish a sufficient factual
basis to support his guilty plea therefore does not provide a basis for federal
habeas relief because there is no federal constitutional requirement that a
factual basis supporting a guilty plea be established, or that the defendant
admit factual guilt, so long as the plea is intelligently and voluntarily made. As
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such, Petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the factual basis of his plea
is not cognizable on federal habeas review. The Court therefore determines
that habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
B. Knowing and Voluntary Nature of Plea
Petitioner next asserts that his plea was unknowing and involuntary
because he did not understand that the assault charge required the
prosecutor to prove that he specifically intended to kill the officer. Petitioner
claims that he did not have that intent and would not have pled guilty if he
knew of this requirement.
The only question on collateral review of a guilty plea is whether the
plea was counseled and voluntary. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569
(1989); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). A guilty plea is
voluntary if the accused understands the nature of the charges against him
and the constitutional protections that he is waiving. Henderson v. Morgan,
426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976). A plea is knowing and intelligent if it is done
“with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The
defendant must also be aware of the maximum sentence that can be imposed
for the crime for which he or she is pleading guilty. King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d
151, 154 (6th Cir. 1994).
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When a petitioner brings a federal habeas petition challenging his plea
of guilty, the state generally satisfies its burden by producing a transcript of
the state-court proceedings showing that the plea was made voluntarily.
Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 1993). The factual findings of
a state court that the guilty plea was properly made are generally accorded a
presumption of correctness. Id. The petitioner must overcome a heavy burden
if the federal court is to overturn these findings by the state court. Id. at 328.
“Additionally, a habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden of rebutting the
presumption that his or her guilty plea, as evidenced by the plea colloquy, is
valid.” Myers v. Straub, 159 F. Supp. 2d 621, 626 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
In this case, the record establishes that Petitioner knowingly and
voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charges. Petitioner was advised of the
maximum penalties of the crimes that he was pleading to, as well as the rights
that he would be giving up by pleading guilty. The terms of the plea
agreement were placed on the record. Petitioner acknowledged several times
that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily and that no threats had been
made to get him to plead guilty.
Petitioner’s claim about his misunderstanding of the elements of assault
with intent to commit murder is not well taken. During the plea colloquy the
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trial court directed asked Petitioner if he intended to murder the officer, and
Petitioner indicated that he did. Of course it is true the mental state required
for murder includes ones other than a specific intent to kill.1 Without saying so
directly, Petitioner’s argument is premised on the idea that he understood this
nuance in substantive criminal law with respect to the elements for murder,
but at the same time he did not know that the crime of assault with intent to
murder required a specific intent to kill. Supreme Court law requires that a
defendant understand the nature of the charges against him. Henderson, 426
U.S. at 645 n.13. It was not unreasonable for the trial court to determine that
Petitioner understood the nature of the charges against when he admitted
under oath that he intended to murder the victim. It is not unreasonable to
conclude that Petitioner would have understood the phrase “intent to murder”
in the colloquial sense–that it meant an intent to kill. Petitioner is not an
attorney, and even if he was, it is beyond peradventure to believe that he
knew of the subtleties of the mens rea requirement for the offense of murder
but not for the offense of assault with intent to commit murder. Petitioner
There are three mental states sufficient to support murder under
Michigan law: 1) intent to kill, 2) intent to inflict great bodily harm, and 3)
wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of
the act is to cause death or great bodily harm. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich.
672, 722 (1980).
1
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simply has not shown that he somehow had knowledge of the alternative
mens rea for murder but misunderstood the mens era for the assault with in
intent to commit murder. The rejection of this claim by the state court and its
finding that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea was not an
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.
C. Sentencing Guidelines
Petitioner’s third claim asserts that his guidelines were improperly
scored. Specifically, Petitioner claims that he was erroneously scored too
many points for the offense variable dealing with a defendant’s intent to kill the
victim.
A state court’s interpretation and application of state sentencing laws is
a matter of state concern, Howard v. White, 76 F. App’x 52, 53 (6th Cir. 2003),
and “[a] federal court may not issue the writ [of habeas corpus] on the basis
of a perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).
Federal courts must “defer to a state’s judgment on issues of state law” and
“accept a state court’s interpretation of its statutes.” Israfil v. Russell, 276 F.3d
768, 771-72 (6th Cir. 2001). Consequently, Petitioner’s sentencing claim is not
cognizable on federal habeas review. Tironi v. Birkett, 252 F. App’x 724, 725
(6th Cir. 2007); McPhail v. Renico, 412 F. Supp. 2d 647, 656 (E.D. Mich.
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2006); Robinson v. Stegall, 157 F. Supp. 2d 802, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Habeas relief is therefore not warranted on Petitioner’s sentencing claim.
D. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner’s final claim asserts that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel prior to the entry of his plea. Specifically, Petitioner
asserts that his counsel should have investigated the long term effects of
methamphetamine use, which he says could have formed the basis for a
voluntary intoxication defense or at least be used as a mitigating factor at
sentencing.
An unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all pre-plea
nonjurisdictional constitutional deprivations. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 267 (1973)). Pre-plea claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are
also considered nonjurisdictional defects that are waived by a guilty plea. See
United States v. Stiger, 20 F. App’x 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Siebert
v. Jackson, 205 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733-734 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (habeas
petitioner’s claims regarding alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights
that occurred before his guilty plea, as a result of his trial counsel’s alleged
ineffective assistance, were foreclosed by his guilty plea, where he stated at
plea that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation, and he did not
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complain of counsel’s advice concerning plea agreement). When Petitioner
pleaded guilty, he waived any claim that his counsel’s pre-plea investigation
was ineffective. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to
habeas relief on this claim.
IV. Certificate of Appealability
Before Petitioner may appeal this decision, a certificate of appealability
must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). A certificate
of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When
a district court denies a habeas claim on the merits, the substantial showing
threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would
find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or
wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). “A petitioner
satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the
issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this
standard, a court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its
examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of the claims. Id.
at 336-37.
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The Court concludes that a certificate of appealability is not warranted
in this case because reasonable jurists could not debate the Court’s
assessment of his claims. The Court will, however, grant Petitioner permission
to appeal in forma pauperis, because an appeal would not be frivolous.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent’s motion
to dismiss is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that permission to appeal in forma pauperis
is GRANTED.
S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
United States District Judge
Dated: October 28, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon
counsel of record on October 28, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn Saulsberry
Case Manager
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