Griffin v. Klee et al

Filing 44

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 43 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RANDLE GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-cv-14290
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
PAUL KLEE et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION (ECF #43)
In this action, Plaintiff Randle Griffin (“Plaintiff”) – an inmate in the
custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) – alleges that
several MDOC officials retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment
rights. On September 28, 2015, the assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation (the “R&R”) recommending that the Court grant summary
judgment in favor of MDOC Defendants Paul Klee (“Klee”), Roy Vest (“Vest”),
Joe Barrett (“Barrett”), and Michelle Parsons (“Parsons”) (collectively,
“Defendants”). (See ECF # 35.) On February 23, 2016, the Court entered an
Order (the “February 23 Order”) adopting the R&R and granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendants. (See ECF #41.)

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On March 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed “Objections” to the February 23 Order. He
argues that the Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants
Klee, Vest, and Parsons. (See ECF #43.) The Court will construe Plaintiff’s
Objections as a motion for reconsideration (hereinafter, the “Motion”) under
Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h)(3).
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
On a motion for reconsideration, a movant must demonstrate that the Court
was misled by a “palpable defect.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). A palpable defect is
a defect that is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain. See Witzke v.
Hiller, 972 F. Supp. 426, 427 (E.D. Mich. 1997). The movant must also show that
the defect, if corrected, would result in a different disposition of the case. E.D.
Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to rehash old
arguments, or to proffer new arguments or evidence that the movant could have
presented earlier. See Sault Ste. Marie v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir.
1998).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff is not entitled to reconsideration of the February 23 Order because
he has not shown a palpable defect in the order. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
the Motion.

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The Court will, however, address below certain arguments that Plaintiff
presents in the Motion.
A.

Paul Klee
In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Defendant Klee was

entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed, among other things, to
satisfy the causation element of his retaliation claim against Klee. (ECF #35 at 1416, Pg. ID 396-98.) The Magistrate Judge explained that Plaintiff fell short of the
causation element for two independent reasons: (1) Plaintiff failed to overcome the
rule that corrections officials have broad discretion in administering prisons, and
(2) Plaintiff failed to present evidence that Klee acted against him based upon his
allegedly-protected conduct. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge noted that Plaintiff’s sole
evidence of causation was the fact that Klee allegedly acted against Plaintiff one
week after Plaintiff engaged in the allegedly-protected conduct. The Magistrate
Judge determined that Plaintiff’s evidence of temporal proximity was not sufficient
to create a material factual dispute on the causation issue under the circumstances
of this case. (Id. at 16, Pg. ID 398, citing Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1038
(6th Cir. 2001).) In the February 23 Order, the Court adopted this aspect of the
R&R and granted summary judgment in favor of Klee based upon Plaintiff’s
failure to create a material factual dispute on the causation element of his claim.
(ECF #41 at 9-11, Pg. ID 447-49.)
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In the Motion, Plaintiff argues that the Court’s causation analysis is flawed,
and he insists that his evidence of temporal proximity was sufficient to create a
material factual dispute on the causation issue. (ECF #43 at 3, Pg. ID 458.)
However, Plaintiff did not object to the portion of the R&R concerning the
insufficiency of Plaintiff’s temporal proximity evidence (see ECF #39 at 3-5, Pg.
ID 418-20), and thus he may not complain that the Court erred in adopting that
portion of the R&R. Indeed, the R&R advised Plaintiff that he must specifically
raise all of his objections. (ECF #35 at 22, Pg. ID 404.)
B.

Michelle Parsons
In the February 23 Order, the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to

establish the causation element of his retaliation claim against Parsons because he
did not present evidence that Parsons had the authority to reduce his security
classification from Level IV to Level II in contravention of her superior’s orders.
(See February 23 Order, ECF #41 at 13, Pg. ID 451.) In the Motion, Plaintiff
argues that he did present evidence that Parsons had the authority to move him
from Level IV to Level II. (ECF #43 at 7-8, Pg. ID 462-63.)
To support his argument, Plaintiff cites the MDOC’s responses to the
grievance that he filed challenging his continued placement in Level IV. (Id.)
More specifically, Plaintiff directs the Court to following language in the MDOC’s
Step II grievance response:
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At Step II the grievant reiterates his retaliatory complaint
and offers other prisoners that were placed in level II
bunks before him.
A review of the control center movement log was made
and it was found that the grievant is correct with the
information provided at Step II. ARUS Parsons and
Housing Unit ADW Engstrom were interviewed and it
was found that he was immediately placed on the move
down list after arriving in level IV and ride-ins take
precedence. In this case the grievant should have been
moved first but because this situation is rare, it was an
administrative error but was not intentional.
(See Grievance Appeal Response, ECF #43 at 27, Pg. ID 482.) Plaintiff insists that
this language shows that Parsons had the authority to reduce his security
classification even though Deputy Warden Barrett, her superior, had directed that
Plaintiff remain housed in Level IV. The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff filed the grievance in question against Barrett, not against Parsons
(see ECF #33, Pg. ID 354), and thus the response to the grievance cannot fairly be
read as drawing any conclusions about Parsons’ conduct or authority to act on
Plaintiffs’ request to be moved to Level II. Moreover, the language on which
Plaintiff relies simply says nothing about whether Parsons had the authority to
move Plaintiff. The sole reference to Parsons – in the passive voice – indicates
that she was interviewed. (ECF #43 at 27, Pg. ID 482.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has
shown no palpable defect with the Court’s conclusion that he failed to present

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evidence that Parsons had the authority to move him (Plaintiff) to Level II in direct
contravention of Barrett’s determination that he should remain in Level IV.
C.

Roy Vest
The Court’s February 23 Order fairly addressed all of Plaintiff’s objections

to the portion of the R&R in which the Magistrate Judge recommended that the
Court grant summary judgment in favor of Vest. The Motion has not shown any
error in the Court’s analysis of the claim against Vest. But the Court does wish to
supplement its analysis with the observation that the claim against Vest was flawed
from its inception.
The factual basis of the claim against Vest appears in paragraph 32 of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (ECF #22, Pg. ID 129.)

In its entirety, that

paragraph states:
32. On 1/10/2012, Inspector Vest ordered Acting Lt.
C. Reincke to lock plaintiff up, and issued plaintiff a
Notice of Intent. Lt. Reincke stated to Plaintiff that the
reason why Inspector Vest ordered plaintiff to be locked
up and transferred was due to Warden Paul Klee’s memo
permanently prohibiting plaintiff’s participation in any
Warden’s Forums.
Plaintiff’s allegations against Vest do not state a viable retaliation claim
because they do not assert that Vest took action against Plaintiff because Plaintiff
engaged in protected activity. Plaintiff says that Vest acted against him based
upon a memo by Klee, not based upon any protected conduct in which Plaintiff
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engaged. And Plaintiff does not allege that the memo by Klee described any
protected conduct in which Plaintiff engaged. Thus, in addition to the reasons
identified in the R&R and adopted by the Court, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against
Vest fails because Plaintiff has neither alleged nor presented evidence that Vest
acted against him based (even in part) on his protected conduct.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Motion (ECF #43) is DENIED.

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 4, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on April 4, 2016, by electronic means and/or ordinary
mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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