Copeland v. Palmer

Filing 8

OPINION and ORDER Granting 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CURTIS DIONTE COPELAND, # 600227,
Petitioner,
CASE NO. 2:14-CV-14363
HONORABLE DENISE PAGE HOOD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

v.
SHAWN BREWER,

Respondent.
____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Curtis Dionte Copeland, (“Petitioner”), presently confined at the G. Robert
Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 1 In his pro se application,
petitioner challenges his conviction for receiving and concealing a stolen motor
vehicle, M.C.L.A. 750.535(7) and being an habitual offender, M.C.L.A. 769.12.
For the reasons stated below, the application for writ of habeas corpus is
GRANTED.

I. Background
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When petitioner originally filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus, he was incarcerated at the
Michigan Reformatory, but has since been transferred to the Cotton Correctional Facility. The only proper
respondent in a habeas case is the habeas petitioner’s custodian, which in the case of an incarcerated
habeas petitioner would be the warden of the facility where the petitioner is incarcerated. See Edwards v.
Johns, 450 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757 (E.D. Mich. 2006); See also Rule 2(a), 28 foll. U.S.C. § 2254. Therefore,
the Court substitutes Shawn Brewer in the caption.

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Petitioner was charged with receiving and concealing a stolen motor
vehicle, concealing or misrepresenting identity with intent to mislead, felon in
possession of a firearm, and felony-firearm. Following a jury trial in the Wayne
County Circuit Court, petitioner was found guilty of the receiving and concealing
charge and was acquitted of the three remaining charges. 2 Petitioner was
sentenced to three years, four months to ten years in prison.
This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan
Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):
At trial, the evidence established that a tip received by police regarding
the location of several stolen vehicles resulted in the discovery of a
stolen black Chevrolet Impala parked in front of a residence at 3950
Joseph Campau in Detroit. Police determined that the black Impala
was stolen because the vehicle identification number (VIN) on the black
Impala was assigned to a white Impala. A subsequent search of the
3950 Joseph Campau residence revealed the presence of men’s
clothing and an unusual amount of automobile parts. Tierra Hinton,
who had tattoos bearing defendant’s name and indicating a romantic
relationship, and a small child identified as her son were present during
the search. Further, a woman who lived next door to the residence at
issue testified that she observed defendant coming and going from the
home at least two or three times a week since late 2009, and that she
always assumed he lived there. She also testified that she did not start
observing Hinton until about a year after she first noticed defendant,
and she assumed Hinton was there to visit defendant.
In addition, the prosecution presented the testimony of Rodney Lea,
owner of Lea’s Auto Body, that he recognized the white Impala, whose
VIN was taken and attached to the stolen black Impala, as a vehicle
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The judge directed a verdict of not guilty with respect to the two firearms charges and the jury
acquitted petitioner of the concealing or misrepresenting identity with intent to mislead charge.

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that he bought from a salvage auction in August 2011. In addition, he
testified that defendant and Hinton came to his body shop and
purchased the white Impala he obtained from the salvage auction.
Specifically, he recalled that defendant was the one who actually did all
of the talking about the sale of the white Impala and paid him in cash
for the Impala, but that the receipt was made out to Hinton. Also, two
other employees of the auto body shop from which the white Impala
was purchased confirmed that defendant examined the vehicle,
negotiated the sale, paid cash for the vehicle, and arranged for the
vehicle's transportation.
People v. Copeland, No. 311129, 2013 WL 6182646, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov.
26, 2013)(footnote omitted).
Two judges on the Michigan Court of Appeals voted to uphold the conviction,
finding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction:
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to
conclude that the elements of the charged crime were proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. In particular, it is reasonable to infer from the
evidence presented at trial that defendant possessed the black Impala
and knew that it was stolen.
Id., at * 2 (majority opinion)(footnote omitted).
Judge Wendy Jansen dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that there
was insufficient evidence to sustain petitioner’s conviction:
I respectfully dissent. I conclude that the prosecution presented
insufficient evidence to prove that defendant received, concealed, or
had actual or constructive possession of the stolen car in this case. See
MCL 750.535(7); People v. Pratt, 254 Mich. App 425, 427; 656 NW2d
866 (2002).
The stolen, black Chevrolet Impala was located in front of a residence
at 3950 Joseph Campau Street in Detroit. It is true that defendant was
seen frequenting the residence. In addition, defendant was present at
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the time a different, white Chevrolet Impala was purchased from Lea’s
Auto Body in August 2011. The evidence established that the VIN plate
was removed from this white Impala and subsequently attached to the
stolen black Impala.
The problem, however, is that there was no evidence directly linking
defendant to the falsification of the vehicle’s VIN. Nor was there any
evidence to prove that defendant received, concealed, or had actual
possession of the black Impala. No paperwork or documentation
bearing defendant’s name was located in the black Impala. Moreover,
the evidence tended to establish that Tierra Hinton, defendant’s
apparent girlfriend, lived in the residence on Joseph Campau Street.
Indeed, Hinton and her small child were present when the police
searched the residence. Additionally, Hinton was present with
defendant at the time the white Impala was purchased in August 2011.
The sales receipt for the white Impala was made out to Hinton and the
white Impala was registered in Hinton’s name. In short, there was
significantly more admissible evidence tying Hinton to the falsified VIN
and stolen Impala than there was tying defendant to the VIN and stolen
vehicle.
In light of the evidence presented at trial, I conclude that it is at least
equally as likely that Hinton falsified the VIN plate and concealed or
possessed the stolen vehicle. “When a jury is confronted, as here, with
equally persuasive theories of guilt and innocence it cannot rationally
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Andujar, 49 F3d
16, 22 (CA 1, 1995). Moreover, it cannot be disputed that defendant’s
mere presence at 3950 Joseph Campau Street was insufficient to prove
that he constructively possessed the black Impala. See People v.
Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 520; 489 NW2d 748,amended441 Mich. 1201
(1992); People v. Vaughn, 200 Mich.App 32, 36; 504 NW2d 2 (1993).
In my opinion, no rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant received, concealed, or possessed the
stolen black Impala. For this reason, I would reverse defendant's
conviction.
Id. at * 2-3 (Jansen, J.)(dissenting opinion).
The Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v.
Copeland, 496 Mich. 865, 849 N.W.2d 339 (2014).
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Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following ground:
I. [Petitioner] is entitled to a new trial where there was insufficient
evidence to find for the conviction of receiving and concealing stolen
property. As such, the motion for directed verdict as to this count
should have been granted.
II. Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for
habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if
the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme
Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the
Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An “unreasonable application” occurs
when “a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme
Court] to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may
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not “issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established
federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 410-11.
III. Discussion
The Court grants petitioner a writ of habeas corpus because the evidence
was insufficient to convict him of receiving and concealing a motor vehicle.
It is beyond question that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In Re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970). But the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is, “whether the record evidence could
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). This inquiry, however, does not require a
court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Instead, the relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 318-19(internal citation and footnote
omitted)(emphasis in the original). Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to
support a conviction, and it is not necessary for the evidence at trial to exclude
every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F. 3d
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987, 992 (6th Cir. 2000)(internal quotations omitted).
More importantly, a federal habeas court may not overturn a state court
decision that rejects a sufficiency of the evidence claim simply because the
federal court disagrees with the state court’s resolution of that claim. Instead, a
federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court decision was an
objectively unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. See Cavazos v.
Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011).
Under Michigan law, the elements of receiving and concealing stolen
property are:
“(1) that the property was stolen;
(2) the value of the property;
(3) the receiving, possession or concealment of such property by
the defendant with the knowledge of the defendant that the property
had been stolen;
(4) the identity of the property as being that previously stolen; and
(5) the guilty constructive or actual knowledge of the defendant that
the property received or concealed had been stolen.”
People v. Hooks, 139 Mich. App. 92, 96, 360 N.W. 2d 191 (1984)(quoting
People v. Matuja, 77 Mich. App. 291, 295, 258 N.W.2d 79 (1977).
In the present case, petitioner is entitled to habeas relief, because there
was insufficient evidence presented for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that petitioner received, concealed, or had actual or
constructive possession of the stolen black Chevrolet Impala. The facts relied
upon by the majority of the Michigan Court of Appeals in affirming petitioner’s
conviction may have supported a “reasonable speculation” that petitioner
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received, concealed or possessed this car, but these facts do not amount to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion cannot sustain a verdict of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Jenkins, 345 F. 3d 928,
942 (6th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Hayter Oil Co., Inc. of Greeneville,
Tennessee, 51 F. 3d 1265, 1271, n. 5 (6th Cir. 1995)(quoting United States v.
Van Hee, 531 F. 2d 352, 357 (6th Cir. 1976))(“‘[e]vidence that at most establishes
no more than a choice of reasonable probabilities cannot be said to be
sufficiently substantial to sustain a criminal conviction upon appeal.’”).
In Fuller v. Anderson, 662 F. 2d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 1981), the Sixth Circuit
held that in a prosecution for felony-murder, the evidence established, at most,
that the petitioner was present when another individual firebombed the house.
That was held to be insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
petitioner took conscious action to aid in the commission of the underlying arson.
Id. at 424. The evidence in Fuller was the petitioner had looked around while
another person started the fires that caused the victim’s death. Although it may
have been reasonable to speculate from this evidence that petitioner acted as a
lookout, a rational jury could not find it to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that the petitioner aided and abetted in the offense, where there was no
evidence that the petitioner intended to burn the victims’ home and the evidence
that he knew that this other individual planned to burn it was “simply too meager”
to support his conviction.
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In Hopson v. Foltz, 818 F. 2d 866 (Table); 1987 WL 37432, * 2 (6th Cir.
May 20, 1987), the Sixth Circuit granted a writ of habeas corpus, finding that
there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the petitioner participated as an aider and abettor in the murder for which he was
convicted. The testimony at most indicated that the petitioner in Hopson was
present at the shooting, that he may have argued with the victim during the
evening prior to the shooting, that he may have known that someone else
intended to harm the victim, and that he may have taken the empty shell casings
after the shooting. However, there was no proof that the petitioner “acted in
pre-concert” with the shooter to commit the murder or that he said or did
anything to “support, encourage, or incite the commission of the crime.” Id.
In Brown v. Palmer, 441 F. 3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2006), the Sixth Circuit
indicated that although Fuller and Hopson were pre-AEDPA [Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act] cases, “[t]heir holdings that distinguish reasonable
speculation from sufficient evidence are still persuasive in establishing that the
state court’s application of federal constitutional law as set forth in Jackson, was
objectively unreasonable.”
In the present case, without impermissibly stacking inferences, there is
insufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that petitioner
received, concealed, stole, or possessed the black Chevrolet Impala. See Kelly
v. Roberts, 998 F. 2d 802, 808-09 (10th Cir. 1993). “[A]lthough a jury may infer
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facts from other facts that are established by inference, each link in the chain of
inferences must be sufficiently strong to avoid a lapse into speculation.”
Piaskowski v. Bett, 256 F. 3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2001). In this case, the chain of
inferences that the prosecution attempted to forge fails in many places. Id.
The only evidence relied upon by the majority of the Michigan Court of
Appeals and by the Attorney General in the answer to the petition for writ of
habeas corpus to support petitioner’s conviction is the fact that he went with
Tierra Hinton to purchase the white Chevrolet Impala from which the VIN plate
was removed and later placed on the stolen black Impala and that the stolen
black Impala was parked in front of a residence that petitioner may have
frequented. However, as Judge Jansen indicated in her dissenting opinion,
there was no evidence which showed that petitioner played any part in removing
the VIN plate from the white Impala or placed it on the stolen black Impala.
There was no evidence proving that petitioner ever received, concealed, stole,
drove, or was otherwise in actual possession of the black Impala. Petitioner’s
fingerprints were not recovered from this vehicle, nor was any paperwork or
documentation bearing petitioner’s name located in the black Impala. The
evidence tended to suggest that Tierra Hinton lived in the residence on Joseph
Campau Street. Hinton and her small child were present when the police
searched the residence. Hinton was also present with petitioner at the time the
white Impala was purchased. The sales receipt for the white Impala was made
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out to Hinton and this vehicle was registered in her name. “In short, there was
significantly more admissible evidence tying Hinton to the falsified VIN and
stolen Impala than there was tying defendant to the VIN and stolen vehicle.”
Copeland, No. 311129, 2013 WL 6182646, at * 2 (Jansen, J.)(dissenting
opinion).
“Although circumstantial evidence alone can support a conviction, there
are times that it amounts to only a reasonable speculation and not to sufficient
evidence.” Newman v. Metrish, 543 F. 3d 793, 796 (6th Cir. 2008). In this case,
the “meager circumstantial evidence” is simply too innocuous to convict
petitioner of this crime, particularly since much of it is “conjecture camouflaged
as evidence.” Piaskowski, 256 F. 3d at 693. While the evidence may have lead
to a reasonable speculation that petitioner may have had some involvement with
the stolen black Impala, without stacking inferences there is insufficient evidence
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner received, concealed, or
possessed this vehicle. The evidence is simply too speculative to support
petitioner’s conviction. See, e.g., Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 452 (6th
Cir.2007)(evidence that Parker was in a car containing guns with men who
planned a murder was too speculative to support a finding that Parker
constructively possessed the firearm). As Judge Jansen noted in her dissent,
the evidence just as equally suggests that Tierra Hinton was the person who
received and concealed this vehicle. “[W]hen a jury is confronted, as here, with
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equally persuasive theories of guilt and innocence it cannot rationally find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Andujar, 49 F3d 16, 22 (1st Cir.
1995).
The Michigan Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the evidence was
sufficient to convict petitioner is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
Jackson v. Virginia. The decision is also an unreasonable determination of the
facts. Judge Jansen’s sharp dissent in this case offers a compelling and
persuasive argument that the majority’s conclusion was unreasonable, justifying
habeas relief for petitioner. See Rockwell v. Yukins, 341 F. 3d 507, 516-17 (6th
Cir. 2003)(Clay, J., dissenting). Petitioner is therefore entitled to habeas relief.
Because the Court finds that the state has failed to meet its burden of
proof, the appropriate remedy is to issue a writ of habeas corpus outright, rather
than conditioning the grant of the writ on the state’s failure to retry the petitioner.
See Brown v. Palmer, 358 F. Supp. 2d 648, 656 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby granted with respect to
petitioner’s insufficiency of evidence claim and the Court orders that petitioner’s
conviction for receiving and concealing a stolen motor vehicle and being an
habitual offender be vacated or set aside. Because petitioner has been
incarcerated for almost three years for a crime that the State of Michigan failed
to prove, this Court will order that petitioner shall be released immediately from
incarceration. See Kelly, 998 F. 2d at 809, n. 11; Brown, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
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IV. ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS IS UNCONDITIONALLY GRANTED. PETITIONER’S
CONVICTIONS FOR RECEIVING AND CONCEALING A STOLEN MOTOR
VEHICLE AND BEING AN HABITUAL OFFENDER ARE ORDERED TO BE
VACATED AND SET ASIDE. RESPONDENT IS ORDERED TO RELEASE
PETITIONER FROM CUSTODY IMMEDIATELY.
SO ORDERED.

S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
United States District Judge
Dated: April 15, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon
counsel of record on April 15, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager

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