Garrison v. Klee
Filing
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Memorandum and Order Granting Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition and Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Declining to Issue a Certificate of Appealability. Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (SCha)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL GARRISON,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 14-14375
HON. AVERN COHN
PAUL KLEE,
Respondent.
________________________________/
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO AMEND PETITION (Doc. 8)
AND
DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE
A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
I. Introduction
This is a habeas case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Michael Garrison,
(“Petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Petitioner challenges the Michigan
Parole Board’s decision to place him on parole on July 7, 2015, and not an earlier date
which Petitioner says is due to his status as a Native American. Petitioner also filed a
motion to amend the petition to add a claim that Michigan’s parole laws violate the
Supremacy Clause. The motion to amend is GRANTED. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(c).
The Court will consider the claims raised in the petition and as amended.
For the reasons that follow, the petition will be denied. The Court will also deny a
certificate of appealability.
II. Background
In July 2013, Petitioner pled no contest to a controlled substance offense in the
Tuscola Circuit Court. While on probation for this offense, Petitioner pled no contest to
assaulting a police officer, fleeing and eluding, and possession of a firearm in the
Washtenaw Circuit Court. On March 3, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced to prison terms
of 16-to-24 months for the assault and firearm offense, and 19-to-60 months for the
fleeing and eluding offense. On March 28, 2014, he was sentenced to a prison term of
1-to-8 years for his initial narcotics offense.
Petitioner was considered for parole for the first time on March 25, 2015. The
Parole Board issued a decision to parole Petitioner, with a projected parole date of July
7, 2015.
III. Discussion
A. Equal Protection Claim
Petitioner asserts in conclusory fashion that his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are being violated because “he is not
being allowed to be released upon parole . . . after serving half of his minimum sentence
based solely upon his nationality or place of origin.” Doc. 1, at p. 2. This claim does not
form the basis for habeas relief.
There is no constitutional right of a convicted person to be conditionally released
before the expiration of a valid sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482
U.S. 369, 377, n. 8 (1987). Simply stated, there is no federal constitutional right to be
paroled. Lee v. Withrow, 76 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
However, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
states from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To prevail on an equal protection claim a plaintiff
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must adequately plead that the government treated him disparately as compared to
similarly situated persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a
fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis. Ctr. for Bio—Ethical
Reform v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011).
Petitioner makes only a vague allegation of discrimination based on his status as
a Native American. Petitioner does not allege how he or other Native American
prisoners are being treated differently from similarly situated persons who are granted
parole. Moreover, the parole board record simply notes that Petitioner was considered
for and granted parole based on its own eligibility scoring system. There is no indication
that Petitioner’s parole was delayed or affected in anyway due to his status as a Native
American. Accordingly, Petitioner’s equal protection claim is without merit.
B. Supremacy Clause Claim
Petitioner next argues that his parole order violates the Supremacy Clause
because Michigan’s parole law has been preempted by some unspecified act of
Congress. This claim also fails to provide grounds for habeas relief.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a State law that conflicts
with federal law is “without effect. “ McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316,
427, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819). Where federal law preempts State regulation, the States are
disabled from enforcing criminal statutes. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497 (1956) (reversing State conviction for sedition because Congress had preempted
the field, even though State law was not inconsistent with federal act). Because a
preempted State law is a nullity, a prisoner may seek habeas relief based on a
preemption theory. Corcoran v. Sullivan, 112 F.3d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1997).
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However, Petitioner’s claim fails because he does not identify any Federal law
that has preempted Michigan’s parole law. As such, there can be no basis for habeas
relief.
III. Certificate of Appealability
Before Petitioner may appeal the Court’s decision, a certificate of appealability
(COA) must issue. In order to obtain a COA, Petitioner must make a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner must
show that reasonable jurists could debate whether, or agree that, the petition should
have been resolved in a different manner, or that the issues presented were adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84
(2000). A federal district court may grant or deny a certificate of appealability when the
court issues a ruling on the habeas petition. Castro v. United States, 310 F.3d 900, 901
(6th Cir. 2002).
Here, jurists of reason would not debate the Court’s conclusion that Petitioner is
not entitled to habeas relief on his parole based claims. As such, he is not entitled to a
COA.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the petition is DENIED. A COA is also
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
S/Avern Cohn
AVERN COHN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: June 11, 2015
Detroit, MI
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14-14375 Garrison v. Klee
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of
record on this date, June 11, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Sakne Chami
Case Manager, (313) 234-5160
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