Garrison v. Klee

Filing 18

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 16 . Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (MVer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL GARRISON,
Petitioner,

Case No. 14-14375

v.

HON. AVERN COHN

PAUL KLEE,
Respondent.
________________________________/
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc. 16)
I.
This is a habeas case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Michael Garrison
challenged the Michigan Parole Board’s decision to place him on parole on July 7, 2015,
and not an earlier date which Petitioner said is due to his status as a Native American.
Petitioner also filed a motion to amend the petition to add a claim that Michigan’s parole
laws violate the Supremacy Clause. On June 11, 2015, the Court granted Petitioner’s
motion to amend and denied the claims raised in the petition as amended. (Doc. 14).
Before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 16). For the
reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
II.
E.D. Mich LR 7.1(h)(3) governs motions for reconsideration, providing in relevant
part:
Generally, and without restricting the court’s discretion, the court will not
grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the
same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by implication.
The movant must not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the
court and the parties have been misled but also show that correcting the
defect will result in a different disposition of the case.

A “palpable defect” is a defect which is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest or plain.
Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 262, 278 (E.D. Mich.
1997)(citing Webster's New World Dictionary 974 (3rd ed. 1988)). A motion for
reconsideration which presents the same issues already ruled upon by the court, either
expressly or by reasonable implication, will not be granted. Czajkowski v. Tindall &
Associates, P.C., 967 F. Supp. 951, 952 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
III.
Petitioner has not satisfied this standard. Petitioner contends that
reconsideration is warranted because the Court denied his petition before Petitioner
filed his reply. The Court has received and read Petitioner’s reply (Doc. 17). Nothing in
the reply convinces the Court that it erred in dismissing the petition.
As the Court explained, Petitioner asserted that his rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because “he
is not being allowed to be released upon parole . . . after serving half of his minimum
sentence based solely upon his nationality or place of origin.” However, there is no
constitutional right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the
expiration of a valid sentence.
Moreover, Petitioner made only a vague allegation of discrimination based on his
status as a Native American. Petitioner did not allege how he or other Native American
prisoners are being treated differently from similarly situated persons who are granted
parole. There was no indication in the record that Petitioner’s parole was delayed or
affected in anyway due to his status as a Native American.
Finally, Petitioner’s claims that his parole order violated the Supremacy Clause
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lacks merit because he did not identify any Federal law that has preempted Michigan’s
parole law.
SO ORDERED.
S/Avern Cohn
AVERN COHN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated; July 1, 2015
Detroit, Michigan

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