McPike-McDyess v. Regents of the University of Michigan

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER Dismissing Plaintiff's 1 Complaint, in its Entirety. Signed by District Judge Gerald E. Rosen. (JOwe)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TIA D. McPIKE-McDYESS,
Plaintiff,

No. 14-14658

vs.

Hon. Gerald E. Rosen

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN,
Defendants.
________________________________/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT, IN ITS ENTIRETY
At a session of said Court, held in
the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit, Michigan
on February 12, 2015
PRESENT: Honorable Gerald E. Rosen
United States District Chief Judge

On December 9, 2014, Plaintiff Tia D. McPike-McDyess, acting pro se, filed the
instant action against the Regents of the University of Michigan seeking compensatory
and punitive damages arising out of the termination of her parental rights and her
allegedly involuntary hospitalization in the adult psychiatric unit of the University of
Michigan Hospital in May-June 2010.1 On January 22, 2015, the Court issued an Order
1

This is not the first suit Ms. McPike-McDyess has filed arising out of the
termination of her parental rights and her hospitalization at the University of Michigan.
In April 2014, Plaintiff filed two suits in State court, Michigan Ct. of Claims Nos. 1400065 and 14-00066 against the Regents and the Michigan Department of Human
1

to Show Cause, directing Plaintiff to show cause in writing why this case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or because the action is barred by the applicable
statute of limitations or by application of the doctrines of res judicata or collateral
estoppel. Plaintiff timely responded to the Show Cause Order.
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, her response to the Order to Show Cause,
and the entire record of this action, the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to
entertain Plaintiff’s suit.
It is settled that a court may sua sponte raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction
because of the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment. See Estate of Ritter v.
University of Michigan, 851 F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Application
of the Eleventh Amendment “partakes in the nature of a jurisdictional bar” that may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings and even sua sponte. Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of the State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 462,
65 S.Ct. 347, 349 (1985).

Services - Washtenaw County, respectively. See Civil Cover Sheet, p. 2; see also
http://courts.mi.gov/courts/coc/pages/case-inquiry.aspx. In both of these cases, the state
court granted the defendants’ motions for summary disposition. See id. On November
11, 2014, Plaintiff’s appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. See id. It was following the dismissal of her state court appeal that Plaintiff
filed the instant action in this Court. The Court notes that Plaintiff also initiated a
separate federal court action that same day against the Department of Human Services
See McPike-McDyess v. Washtenaw County Department of Human Services, E.D. Mich.
No. 14-14659, which is currently pending review on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed
Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs. The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed the
identical complaint in both of the federal court actions.
2

The Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, bars suits against
a State or its agencies or employees acting in their official capacity, unless Congress has
abrogated its sovereign immunity or the state has expressly waived it. Virginia Office for
Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1637-38, 179 L. Ed. 2d
675 (2011). This sovereign immunity bars not only federal constitutional claims against
state agencies but ancillary state law claims, as well. See Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120-21, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1983)
(“This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.”). The Board of Regents of
the University of Michigan is an arm of the State of Michigan, and hence is cloaked with
sovereign immunity. Estate of Ritter v. University of Michigan, 851 F.2d at 850-51. That
immunity has not been waived. The Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
Complaint because the Eleventh Amendment constitutes a bar to her action.2
2

Even if the Court were to conclude that it had jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s
Complaint, or any portion of it, the Court would nonetheless find that Plaintiff has failed
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. First, to the extent that Plaintiff’s
Complaint can be read as attempting to assert a federal constitutional claim under 42
U.S.C. 1983, it is well-established that states, state entities -- such as the University of
Michigan Board of Regents -- and state officials sued in their official capacities are not
“persons” subject to suit for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v.
Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Dillon-Barber v. University of
Michigan, 51 F. App’x 946, 952 n.6 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Moreover, the
limitations period for bringing a Section 1983 action is three years. M.C.L. §
600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir.1986). As for any
possibility that Plaintiff can make out a state law claim for assault, battery, false
imprisonment or for malpractice, the statute of limitations for such a claim is two years,
see M.C.L. § 600.5805(2), (6), and the limitations period for state law tort claims to
recover damages for injury to a person is three years. M.C.L. § 600.5805(10). Because
Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that the actions giving rise to her claims occurred in
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For all of the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be, and hereby is,
DISMISSED, in its entirety.

s/Gerald E. Rosen
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: February 12, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or
counsel of record on February 12, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Julie Owens
Case Manager, [phone]

May and June 2010, i.e., more than four years before she filed this action, her claims
would be time barred. Finally, under the doctrine of res judicata, “[a] final judgment on
the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that
were or could have been raised in that action.” W.J. O’Neil Co. v. Shepley, Bullfinch,
Richardson & Abbott, Inc., 765 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Federated Dep’t
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1981) .
Similarly, where a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment and the same parties had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue, collateral estoppel applies and the issue may not be
relitigated in a subsequent proceeding. Marshall v. City of Farmington Hills, 578 F.
App’x 516, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2014). As noted above, Plaintiff previously filed actions
arising out of the same events upon which her Complaint in this action is predicated.
Those actions have all been dismissed, with prejudice, and the dismissals were upheld on
appeal. The final judgments in those actions preclude Plaintiff from relitigating in this
action issues that were or could have been raised in the prior actions.
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