Hemphill v. City of Taylor et al

Filing 25

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion to Compel - Signed by Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub. (LBar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRANDON MAURICE HEMPHILL,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-cv-14958

v.

DISTRICT JUDGE DENISE PAGE HOOD

CITY OF TAYLOR, et al.,

MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB

Defendants.
__________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL [20]
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants City of Taylor, Taylor Police
Department, Brian Wojtowicz, Jason Hall, and Nick Hill’s Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories and Extend Discovery by 90 Days. (Docket no. 20.) Plaintiff Brandon Maurice
Hemphill responded to Defendants’ Motion. (Docket no. 21.) This matter has been referred to
the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. (Docket no. 8.) The undersigned has reviewed the
pleadings and dispenses with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule
7.1(f). The undersigned is now ready to rule pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
I.

BACKGROUND
This matter arises from Plaintiff’s August 4, 2012 “personal encounter” with Defendants

Wojtowicz, Hall, and Hill, who, at all times relevant hereto, were police officers employed by
the City of Taylor’s Police Department. (Docket no. 1 ¶¶ 7-9, 14.) The encounter allegedly
resulted in the filing of “falsif[ied] trumped up” charges of armed robbery, unarmed robbery,
resisting/obstruction, and assault on an officer against Plaintiff, which were eventually dismissed

with prejudice.1 (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights action against Defendants on
December 22, 2014, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42,
alleging that Defendants violated and deprived him of his civil rights on the basis of race. (Id. ¶¶
1, 3, 10, 14-20.) Plaintiff also sets forth state-law claims of gross negligence and “intentional
infliction of mental and emotional pain.” (Id. ¶¶ 29-34.)
Defendants filed the instant Motion on December 28, 2015, seeking (1) an order from the
Court that compels Plaintiff to provide full and complete answers to Defendants’ interrogatories;
and (2) a ninety-day extension of discovery to allow Defendants an opportunity to depose
Plaintiff and any eye witnesses identified by Plaintiff in his answers to Defendants’
interrogatories. (Docket no. 20.)
II.

GOVERNING LAW
The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is traditionally quite

broad. Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998). Parties may obtain
discovery on any matter that is not privileged, is relevant to any party’s claim or defense, and is
proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Relevant evidence” is “evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. Information need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). But the scope of discovery is not unlimited. “District courts have
discretion to limit the scope of discovery where the information sought is overly broad or would

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Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Kinross Correctional Facility as the result of a conviction on charges
unrelated to those in the instant Complaint. See Mich. Dep’t of Corr. Offender Tracking Info. Sys. (OTIS). (The
Court is permitted to take judicial notice of the information contained on OTIS. Ward v. Wolfenbarger, 323
F.Supp.2d 818, 821 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2004).)
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prove unduly burdensome to produce.” Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474
F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007).
Rules 33 and 34 allow a party to serve interrogatories and requests for production of
documents on an opposing party.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 33, 34.

A party receiving these types of

discovery requests has thirty days to respond with answers or objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(2),
34(b)(2)(A). If the party receiving discovery requests under Rules 33 or 34 fails to respond
properly, Rule 37 provides the party who sent the discovery the means to file a motion to
compel. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3)(B). If a court grants a Rule 37 motion to compel, or if discovery
is received after a Rule 37 motion is filed, then the court must award reasonable expenses and
attorney’s fees to the successful party, unless the successful party did not confer in good faith
before the motion, the opposing party’s position was substantially justified, or other
circumstances would make an award unjust. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A).
As provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), a court’s scheduling order may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent. Good cause is met by determining
the moving party’s diligence in attempting to meet the scheduling order and whether the
opposing party will suffer prejudice by amending the scheduling order. Leary v. Daeschner, 349
F.3d 888, 906 (6th Cir. 2003).
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Defendants’ Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories

Defendants served Plaintiff with their First Set of Interrogatories on October 26, 2015.
(Docket no. 20 at 7-15.) On December 28, 2015, Defendants filed the instant Motion, asserting
that they had not yet received Plaintiff’s answers to those interrogatories and seeking a court
order compelling Plaintiff to provide full and complete answers to the interrogatories, without

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objection, within fourteen (14) days. (Id. at 2.) In response to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff
asserts that he submitted his answers to Defendants’ interrogatories to Defendants’ counsel on
November 3, 2015. (Docket no. 21 at 1.) To support this assertion, Plaintiff attached copies of
the following documents as exhibits to his Response: (1) an Expedited Legal Mail form dated
November 3, 2015 that contains Defendants’ counsel’s mailing address; (2) a page from a Legal
Mail and Court Filing Fee Logbook that contains entries dated November 3, 2015 with Plaintiff’s
name and prisoner number; (3) Plaintiff’s answers to Defendants’ interrogatories dated
November 2, 2015; and (4) a Proof of Service signed and notarized on November 2, 2015, in
which Plaintiff certifies that he sent his interrogatory answers to Defendants’ counsel. (Id. at 8,
9, 12-13, 18.)
Essentially, Plaintiff asserts that he responded to Defendants’ interrogatories, and
Defendants assert that they never received those responses. As a practical matter, any discord
between the parties related to this matter is now moot, as Plaintiff’s answers to Defendants’
interrogatories are attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff’s Response on the Court’s docket, and
Defendants have had notice of and access to those answers since January 26, 2016. (See id. at
12-13.) Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s answers to
Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories as moot.
B.

Defendants’ Motion to Extend Discovery by Ninety Days

The instant Motion also includes Defendants’ request to extend the discovery period by
ninety days to allow Defendants the opportunity to depose Plaintiff and any other witnesses who
may become known through Plaintiff’s interrogatory answers. (Docket no. 20 at 2-3 and 6.) On
July 28, 2015, the Court entered a Scheduling Order in this matter that set a discovery deadline
of December 11, 2015. (Docket no. 15.) Defendants explain that they were waiting to conduct

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any substantial deposition discovery until after they received Plaintiff’s discovery responses and
after Plaintiff’s July 9, 2015 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint was ruled upon; Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to Amend was denied on November 12, 2015. (Docket no. 20 at 2, 5; docket
no. 19.) Defendants further explain that Plaintiff’s deposition was tentatively scheduled for
November 24, 2015, but it was adjourned because of scheduling conflicts and because
Defendants had not yet received Plaintiff’s discovery responses. (Docket no. 20 at 2, 5.) It is for
these reasons that Defendants suggest that good cause exists to extend the discovery period.
Defendants also assert that this is the first time any discovery extension has been requested and
that a short extension would allow the parties to fully and effectively complete discovery in this
matter. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff “vehemently” objects to an extension of the discovery period in this matter.
(Docket no. 21 at 2.) In doing so, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not demonstrated the
good cause necessary to justify an extension of the discovery period because they have shown a
lack of diligence in filing the instant Motion, in obeying the Scheduling Order, and in conducting
discovery.2 (Id. at 4-6.)

Without further explanation, Plaintiff also asserts that he would be

prejudiced by an extension of the discovery period. (Id. at 2.)
Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds good cause to extend the
discovery period by ninety days to allow the parties to complete discovery, including the
depositions of Plaintiff and any witnesses identified by Plaintiff in his answers to Defendants’
interrogatories. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Defendants have not demonstrated a lack of
diligence in this matter; in fact, they filed the instant Motion in accordance with the discovery
motion deadline set forth in the Scheduling Order, and their election to not engage in substantial
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Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ counsel failed to confer with Plaintiff before filing the instant Motion;
however, pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(a)(2)(C), Defendants’ counsel was not required to
seek concurrence because Plaintiff is an incarcerated prisoner proceeding pro se.
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deposition discovery until after the Court ruled on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend and
after they received Plaintiff’s interrogatory answers was reasonable. Plaintiff does not explain
how the requested extension of the discovery period would cause him prejudice, and the Court
finds that any prejudice suffered by Plaintiff would be minimal. Accordingly, the Court will
grant Defendants’ Motion to Extend Discovery by 90 Days.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories and Extend Discovery by 90 Days [20] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART as follows:
a. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories is DENIED as moot; and
b. Defendants’ Motion to Extend Discovery by 90 Days is GRANTED. The parties
will have an additional 90 days from the date of this Opinion and Order within which
to conduct and complete discovery.

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), the parties have a period of fourteen
days from the date of this Order within which to file any written appeal to the District Judge as
may be permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Dated: May 23, 2016

s/ Mona K. Majzoub
MONA K. MAJZOUB
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of this Opinion and Order was served upon Plaintiff and
counsel of record on this date.
Dated: May 23, 2016

s/ Lisa C. Bartlett
Case Manager

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