Chomos v. Woodhaven Police Department et al

Filing 160

OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS 156 ; Adopting 152 Report and Recommendation, DENYING 137 Motion to Enforce Settlement and Dismiss filed by Defendants and in the absence of a settlement, the Referral Order 129 Remains in Effect Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARK CHOMOS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 15-10103

WOODHAVEN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION AND ORDER (1) OVERRULING DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS;
(2) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; AND
(3) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLMENT AND DISMISS
Pending before the court is the report and recommendation (Dkt. # 152) of United
States Magistrate Judge David R. Grand, to whom the case had been referred to for
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). Defendants Woodhaven Police
Department, Frank Zdankiewcz, Ryan Smith, Brian Baker, Toth, Burst, City of
Woodhaven, and Michael Graham have filed a motion to enforce a purported settlement
agreement and dismiss the case. (Dkt. # 137.) The magistrate judge recommends that
this motion be denied, finding that there has been no “meeting of the minds” as to
whether Defendants would structure the payment such that the State Treasurer would
not be able to seize it under the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act, Mich.
Comp. Laws § 800.401 et seq. (Id.)
Defendants filed objections (Dkt # 156) to the report and recommendation and
Plaintiff Mark Chomos has filed a pro se response. (Dkt. # 158). The court will overrule
the objections, adopt the report and recommendation, and deny the motion for the
reasons provided below.

The filing of timely objections requires the court to “make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations
to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). See United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667 (1980); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). This de novo
review requires this court to examine the relevant pleadings and such evidence as may
have been submitted in support of the motions. A failure to file objections, or a failure to
file specific objections, constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. United States
v. Walters, 638 F2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v.
Sec’y of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991).
In order for this court to apply meaningful de novo review, it is insufficient for the
objecting party to simply incorporate by reference earlier pleadings or reproduce an
earlier unsuccessful motion for dismissal or judgment (or response to the other party’s
dispositive motion). Insufficient objections to a magistrate judge’s analysis will ordinarily
be treated by the court as an unavailing general objection. See Spencer v. Bouchard,
449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Overly general objections do not satisfy the
objection requirement.”).
Defendants raise two objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation. First, Defendants contend that the magistrate judge erroneously
applied a subjective standard, as opposed to an objective standard, in finding that the
parties’ agreement lacked a “meeting of the minds.” (Dkt. # 156, Pg. ID 3244-47.)
Second, Defendants argue that the magistrate judge erred in noting that “Defendants
were to make a $500 initial deposit into Chomos’ [sic] prisoner account, and no such

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payment is reflected in Defendants’ proposed settlement agreement (or was ever
made), arguing that Plaintiff waived that requirement. (Id. at Pg. ID 3247-51.)
District courts have an equitable power to enforce a settlement agreement,
Brock v. Scheuner Corp., 841 F.2d 151, 154 (6th Cir.1988). A valid settlement
agreement, like a contract, requires a meeting of the minds on all the essential terms.
Burkhardt v. Bailey, 260 Mich.App. 636, 655, 680 N.W.2d 453 (2004). “A meeting of the
minds is judged by an objective standard, looking to the express words of the parties
and their visible acts, not their subjective states of mind.” Kamalnath v. Mercy Mem.
Hosp. Corp., 194 Mich.App. 543, 548, 487 N.W.2d 499 (1992).
In exercising its equitable power to enforce a settlement, such exercise is
restricted to cases where there is no dispute or ambiguity as to either the entry into, or
the terms of the agreement. Kukla v. National Distillers Products Co., 483 F.2d 619, 621
(6th Cir.1973). To enforce a settlement, a “district court must conclude that agreement
has been reached on all material terms.” Brock, 841 F.2d at 154. See also ThermaScan
Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 217 F.3d 414, 419–20 (6th Cir.2000).
Defendants’ first objection is entirely premised on the assertion that “the objective
actions of the parties clearly indicate a settlement without [terms relating to payment in
such a way as to be protected from seizure] and Plaintiff has offered nothing more than
his subjective understanding of the terms to counter this evidence.” (Dkt. # 156, Pg. ID
3444-45.) Defendants further aver that the parties agreed to settle for $ 12,500 at the
settlement conference, thus establishing the contract, and that “Plaintiff’s only argument
against these facts is an affidavit of his own testimony . . . indicating that he understood

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the terms differently.” (Id. at Pg. ID 3246-47 (emphasis in original).) The court
disagrees.
Defendants point to a December 5, 2016 email with a “Proposed Full and Final
Release and Stipulated Order of Dismissal,” claiming that it shows a memorialization of
the settlement agreement. (Dkt. # 156-2.) But, as the magistrate judge noted, Plaintiff’s
power of attorney responded the next day, December 6, 2016, stating that the “full and
final release” contained multiple terms that were not agreed upon during the settlement
conference and that Plaintiff would not accept the additions. (Dkt. # 147, Pg. ID 3193.)
The magistrate judge quoted the following particularly relevant paragraph:
Also, you specifically stated during [] the mediation that you would
structure the settlement so that the MDOC would not be able to go after
Mr[.] Chomos for any of the settlement money. Please include this
language in the revised release as well, as it was a major factor in Mr.
Chomo’s [sic] decision to settle.
(Dkt. # 152, Pg. ID 3232 (quoting Dkt. # 147, Pg. ID 3193).)
This communication constitutes objective evidence that there was no mutual
assent to the same material terms. Further, it took place a full week before the State
Treasurer’s action was filed, severely undermining Defendants’ contention in their
underlying brief that “the overwhelming and obvious implication is that Plaintiff’s
decision to reject settlement was wholly driven by the initiation of the State Treasurer’s
lawsuit.” (Dkt. # 156-2, Pg. ID 3259) (emphasis in original).) Curiously, Defendants do
not address this communication in their objections at all.
Notwithstanding that the magistrate judge and Defendants’ counsel deny any
representation about the structure of the payments taking place at the settlement
conference, the agreement was not placed on the record and the court is presented with
conflicting evidence regarding the essential terms purportedly agreed to. As the court’s

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equitable power to enforce settlement may only be exercised “where there is no dispute
or ambiguity as to either the entry into, or the terms of the agreement[,]” Kukla, 483 F.2d
at 621, it may not use that power here. Accordingly, Defendants’ first objection is
overruled and the motion must be denied.
The court need not address Defendants’ second objection. The court has read
the report and recommendation and finds that it is well-reasoned, thorough, and correct.
The court has reviewed all the accompanying briefing and finds Defendants’ second
objection to be without merit. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ objections (Dkt. # 156) are OVERRULED. The
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (Dkt. # 152) is ADOPTED in its entirety
and incorporated by reference.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to enforce the purported
settlement agreement and dismiss (Dkt. # 137) is DENIED.
The court notes that, in the absence of settlement, the issues identified in the
court’s prior order referring all pretrial matters to the magistrate judge (Dkt. # 129)
remain unresolved, and the referral order remains in effect.
s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Dated: May 10, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, May 10, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
[phone]
S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C1 ORDERS\15-10103.CHOMOS.R&R.enforce.settlment.dismiss.TLH.docx

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