Reeder v. Wayne, County of
Filing
47
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 30 AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 31 . Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TBan)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
YASIN REEDER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 15-cv-10177
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
COUNTY OF WAYNE,
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DAVID R. GRAND
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE [30] AND
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE [31]
I. INTRODUCTION
Yasin Reeder (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on January 16, 2015,
against his former employer, Wayne County (“Defendant”). See Dkt. No. 1, p. 1
(Pg. ID No. 1). Plaintiff alleged ten violations of state and federal law, under the
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (Counts I and II); Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act (ADA) (Counts III and IV); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”) (Counts V and VI); Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil
Rights Act (PWDCRA) (Counts VII and VIII); and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil
Rights Act (Counts IX and X). Dkt. No. 3, pp. 10–22 (Pg. ID No. 30–42). In April
2016, the Court granted Defendant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII
claims. Dkt. No. 28, p. 43 (Pg. ID No. 570).
-1-
Plaintiff and Defendant have each filed Motions in Limine in preparation for
trial. Dkt. No. 30, 31. The Court has reviewed and considered the Motions,
supporting briefs, and the entire record of this matter. Additionally, the Court
conducted a hearing on this matter on June 27, 2016, where counsel presented
arguments on the issues.
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s
Motion in Limine [30] and GRANT in part and DENY in part Plaintiff’s Motion in
Limine [30]. The Court’s Opinion and Order is set forth in detail below.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion in limine refers to “any motion, whether made before or during
trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually
offered.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). The purpose of a
motion in limine is to eliminate “evidence that is clearly inadmissible for any
purpose” before trial. Ind. Ins. Co. v. GE, 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio
2004). A district court rules on evidentiary motions in limine “to narrow the issues
remaining for trial and to minimize disruptions at trial.” United States v. Brawner,
173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999). The guiding principle is to “ensure evenhanded
and expeditious management of trials.” Ind. Ins., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
Although neither the Federal Rules of Evidence, nor the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure explicitly authorize a court to rule on an evidentiary motion in
-2-
limine, the Supreme Court has allowed district courts to rule on motions in limine
“pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.”
See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 n.4. District courts are granted very broad discretion in
determining whether the probative value of evidence outweighs any danger of
unfair prejudice. United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 1989).
A district court should grant a motion to exclude evidence in limine “only
when [that] evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Ind. Ins.,
326 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (emphasis added). In cases where that high standard is not
met, “evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of
foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.”
Id. Denial of a motion to exclude evidence in limine does not necessarily mean that
the court will admit the evidence at trial. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. “[E]ven if
nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of
sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.” Id. at 41–42.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant’s Motion in Limine seeks to preclude Plaintiff from introducing
expert testimony at trial based on his failure to comply with Rule 26(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 30, p. 5 (Pg. ID No. 577).
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine seeks to exclude evidence in nine different areas:
-3-
(1) Plaintiff’s work disciplinary history prior to 2013;
(2) the arbitrator’s determination that Defendant had “just cause” to
terminate Plaintiff’s employment under the collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”);
(3) evidence challenging whether the content of Plaintiff’s doctor’s
note constituted sufficient notice under the FMLA to trigger
Defendant’s responsibility to obtain additional information;
(4) Plaintiff’s prior litigation;
(5) evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s
discharge;
(6) evidence that Deputy Chief Tonya Guy (“Guy”) requested to see
Plaintiff’s doctor’s notes;
(7) character evidence that Wayne County Personnel had a propensity
to give FMLA paperwork to employees who submitted doctor’s
notes;
(8) Plaintiff’s work as a football coach at Wayne State University
during his employment with Wayne County; and
(9) the details of the dispute between Plaintiff and his coworker,
Jessica Winward.
See Dkt. No. 31, pp. 2–3 (Pg. ID No. 606–07). A discussion of both Motions
follows.
A. The Court Will Grant Defendant’s Motion in Limine
In its Motion in Limine, Defendant moves to preclude expert testimony from
Dr. James Cowley, Dr. Leon Rubenfaer, and Dr. Nagashree Chandrashekar under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c). Dkt. No. 30, pp. 5–6 (Pg. ID No. 577–78).
The Rule states:
If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required
by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or
witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial,
unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.
-4-
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1). The Rule further provides that “the court, on motion and
after giving an opportunity to be heard . . . may impose other appropriate
sanctions.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)(C).
Defendant asserts that although the three doctors were named as potential
experts in initial pre-trial disclosures, Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant with the
required disclosures for expert witnesses, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26. These disclosures are required to have been made at least 90 days
before the trial date, and that date has since passed. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(a)(2)(D)(i). In his response, Plaintiff argues that he does not intend to use the
doctors as expert witnesses. Dkt. No. 35, p. 9 (Pg. ID No. 969). Instead, “Plaintiff
is only calling his treating physicians for the purpose of authenticating documents
and testifying to Plaintiff’s treatment.” Id. at 10.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion in Limine, to the
extent that the three doctors were to provide any expert testimony. However, the
doctors may provide lay witness testimony. They may testify to matters within
their personal knowledge, such as authenticating documents, and to observations
made during the course of treatment. The doctors may not testify as to the legal
requirements of Plaintiff’s claims, such as the governing law or how the law
applies to the facts of the case, or to the credibility of witnesses.
-5-
B. The Court Will Grant In Part and Deny In Part Plaintiff’s Motion in
Limine
1. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to Excluding
Evidence of Plaintiff’s Work Disciplinary History Prior to 2013
In his Motion in Limine, Plaintiff moves to exclude the “number of
disciplines” he received while working for Defendant. Dkt. No. 31, p. 18 (Pg. ID
No. 622). Plaintiff argues that his refusal to work overtime was the sole reason for
his termination and that his disciplinary history was to be destroyed or removed
after twenty-four months of satisfactory service, according to the CBA. Id.
Here, the Court is unable to resolve Plaintiff’s motion because he has not
identified any particular piece of evidence that should be excluded. As a result, the
Court cannot assess the likely relevancy or prejudice of the challenged evidence.
Although Plaintiff’s personnel records, for example, may include extraneous,
irrelevant, or unduly prejudicial information, the Court is not in a position to rule
on the admissibility of any such evidence, or related testimony, without reviewing
the materials in context. There are many types of discipline to which an officer
may be subject—including disciplines for dishonesty, unapproved sick leaves,
failure to report for duty—and it would be improper for the Court to make a
blanket ruling that all disciplines are excluded. The Court will not issue a blanket
ruling on evidence not fully identified and arguments not yet fully developed. See
Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975)
-6-
(“Orders in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely be
employed.”); United States v. Phillips, No. 14-CR-20611, 2015 WL 7008576, at *2
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2015) (stating that a district court should grant a motion in
limine to exclude evidence only when that evidence is clearly inadmissible on all
potential grounds); Mitchell v. Cty. of Wayne, No. 05-73698, 2007 WL 850997, at
*4–5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2007) (deciding not to issue a blanket exclusion of
disciplinary actions in a FMLA case).
The Court also notes that the CBA provides that discipline is removed from
an employee’s personnel record after twenty-four months of satisfactory service.
At this time, the Court does not have undisputed evidence that establishes Plaintiff
had a record of satisfactory service in the twenty-four months following August
2013. More significantly, the CBA does not control the admissibility of evidence
in this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied, without prejudice to
renewal in the context of the trial, insofar as it seeks a blanket exclusion of
disciplines assessed against him.
2. The Court Will Grant Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to the
Arbitrator’s Determination that Defendant Had “Just Cause” to
Terminate Plaintiff Under the CBA
Next, Plaintiff argues that FRE 401, 402 and 403 operate to bar evidence of
the arbitrator’s determination and decision that Defendant had “just cause” to
terminate Plaintiff under the CBA. Dkt. No. 31, p. 20 (Pg. ID No. 624). Plaintiff
-7-
argues that the arbitration is not relevant because he is pursuing his statutory rights
instead of his contractual rights under the CBA. Id.
Although the Court “should defer to the arbitrator’s construction of the
contract,” the Court is not conclusively bound by an arbitrator’s decision that a
plaintiff is discharged for just cause. Becton v. Detroit Terminal of Consol.
Freightways, 687 F.2d 140, 142 (6th Cir. 1982) (suing for employment
discrimination after an arbitrator ruled that the employer discharged the plaintiff
for “just cause”). In the present case, the arbitrator’s decision involved construction
of the CBA, which does not have bearing on Plaintiff’s rights under the FMLA and
ADA. See Mitchell, 2007 WL 850997, at *5; Shaltry v. City of Saginaw, No. 0910609-BC, 2011 WL 252518, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2011) (“Both Michigan
courts and the Sixth Circuit have held that collateral estoppel does not apply to an
action under anti-discrimination statutes where a previous arbitration addresses
only contractual issues, such as collective bargaining rights under a collective
bargaining agreement.”).
The issues arising in the present case are distinct from the CBA’s grievance
procedure, and are to be determined by a jury, rather than by deference to an
arbitrator’s decision. Thus, insofar as Plaintiff’s Motion seeks to exclude evidence
of the Arbitrator’s decision that Defendants had just cause to terminate Plaintiff,
the Motion is granted.
-8-
3. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to Whether the
Content of Plaintiff’s Doctor’s Note Constituted Sufficient Notice
Under the FMLA
The third issue Plaintiff seeks to exclude is any evidence challenging
whether the content of Plaintiff’s doctor’s note constituted sufficient notice under
the FMLA to trigger Defendant’s responsibility to obtain additional information.
Dkt. No. 31, p. 21 (Pg. ID No. 625).
In support of his argument, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the Court’s statement
in a previous order. Id. (“Based off of the January note alone, the notice that
Plaintiff provided could be considered sufficient under 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b),
shifting the burden of obtaining further information and supplying the applicable
leave forms onto Defendant.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s argument not only
omits the footnote that took notice of the fact that submission of the notes is a
disputed fact, to be resolved by the jury, but also misreads the Court’s use of the
word “could” to mean “would.” See id. at 22 (“This argument should not be
presented to the jury because the January 27th doctor’s note, if presented to
Defendant, would have been sufficient to trigger Defendant’s obligations as a
matter of law.”) (emphasis added).
It is a matter for the jury to determine if the notes Plaintiff allegedly
submitted provide sufficient detail about a qualifying position such that he
provided sufficient notice to shift the burden to his employer. Accordingly,
-9-
Plaintiff’s Motion is denied as to excluding any evidence that challenges whether
the content of Plaintiff’s doctor’s notes constituted sufficient notice.
4. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as to Plaintiff’s
Prior Litigation
Next, Plaintiff argues that any evidence of his prior litigation should be
excluded. Dkt. No. 31, p. 24 (Pg. ID No. 628). These suits allegedly involved an
on-the-job motor vehicle accident and an off-the-job “incident.” Id. He argues that
this evidence is irrelevant, risks misleading the jury, and is otherwise
impermissible character evidence. Id. at 24–25.
“The Federal Rules of Evidence set a low bar for relevance.” Cambio Health
Solutions, LLC v. Reardon, 234 Fed. App’x. 331, 338 (6th Cir. 2007). Here, there
is not sufficient information provided about the suits for the Court to make a
decision as to their relevance to the present suit, or the prejudice they might
engender in a jury. The lawsuits may be relevant to the extent that Defendant’s
decision to terminate Plaintiff was based in any part on them. Accordingly, the
Court will deny, without prejudice to renewal in the context of the trial, Plaintiff’s
request to exclude the lawsuits since they may be conditionally relevant, provided
Defendant considered them in making decisions at the heart of the present suit.
-10-
5. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as Any Evidence of
A Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason for Plaintiff’s Discharge
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for
discharging Plaintiff was mere pretext, and evidence related to it should be
excluded. Dkt. No. 31, p. 26 (Pg. ID No. 630).
In its opinion and order on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court
found that Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s right to FMLA
leave. Dkt. No. 28, p. 18 (Pg. ID No. 545). In viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court found that Plaintiff’s alleged insubordination
appeared to be based off his refusal to work mandatory overtime. See id. at 17.
However, the jury is not obliged to view the facts in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff. Instead, they may evaluate the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses to make their own factual determinations, including whether Defendant
had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging Plaintiff. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s Motion to exclude any evidence of Defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Plaintiff is denied.
-11-
6. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine As To Any
Evidence That Deputy Chief Tonya Guy Requested To See Plaintiff’s
Doctor’s Notes
Plaintiff argues that the fact Guy asked to see his doctor’s note is irrelevant,
and should be excluded, since he was not legally obligated to share the note with
her. Dkt. No. 31, pp. 27–28 (Pg. ID No. 631–32).
However, the Guy’s request to see the note does appear relevant to whether
Defendant had or should have had notice that Plaintiff was requesting leave
pursuant to his FMLA rights. Additionally, this issue also appears relevant to
whether Defendant had a honest belief that its adverse employment action against
Plaintiff was legitimate and nondiscriminatory. See Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., No.
15-1479, 2016 WL 3443646, at *7 (6th Cir. June 23, 2016) (noting that the Sixth
Circuit “employ[s] a version of the ‘honest belief’ rule with regard to pretext,”
such that “as long as the employer honestly believed the reason it gave for its
employment action, an employee is not able to establish pretext even if the
employer’s reason is ultimately found to be mistaken.”).
The Court does not agree that admission of this evidence would result in a
substantial risk of unfair prejudice to Plaintiff. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Plaintiff is
welcome to question Guy about her intentions with regard to viewing Plaintiff’s
doctors’ notes and provide testimony from Plaintiff as to why he refused her
request. The Court will deny, without prejudice to renewal in the context of the
-12-
trial, Plaintiff’s Motion as to any evidence that Guy requested to see Plaintiff’s
doctors’ notes.
7. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine As To Character
Evidence That Wayne County Personnel Had A Propensity To Give
FMLA Paperwork To Employees Who Submitted Doctors’ Notes
Next, Plaintiff seeks to exclude any evidence that Wayne County Personnel
have a propensity to give FMLA forms to employees who submit doctors’ notes,
claiming that such evidence is impermissible character evidence. The Court
disagrees.
Federal Rule of Evidence 406 provides that:
Evidence of a person’s habit or an organization’s routine practice may
be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or
organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine practice.
The court may admit this evidence regardless of whether it is
corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness.
“Conduct that is admissible under this rule generally satisfies the following three
elements: (1) it should be of such a nature that it is unlikely that the individual
instance can be recalled or the person who performed it can be located; (2) it must
be specific conduct that is engaged in frequently by the group; and (3) the number
of instances of such behavior must be large enough that doubt about a single
instance does not destroy the inference that the practice existed.” Martin v. Thrifty
Rent A Car, 145 F.3d 1332 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Such conduct must have been uniform over an adequate number of
-13-
instances, such that the conduct in question was semi-automatic in nature. Id. A
court may find that a government agency has a habit and routine practice of
providing forms, such that they acted in conformity with that habit and custom. See
In re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 567, 574 (D.
Colo. 1980).
Provided Defendant can satisfy the standard provided by the Sixth Circuit in
Martin, evidence of the personnel department’s routine practice of providing
FMLA forms to individuals who submit doctors’ notes may be admissible. This
request for exclusion is denied without prejudice to renewal in the context of the
trial.
8. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine As To Work As A
Football Coach At Wayne State University During His Employment
With Wayne County
Plaintiff would also like the Court to exclude any evidence relating to the
paid services he performed for Wayne State’s football program. Dkt. No. 31,
pp. 32–33 (Pg. ID No. 636–37). Plaintiff argues that this evidence is irrelevant and
would be prejudicial to admit, because it would be onerous for him to rebut such
testimony. See id.
Defendant argues that the evidence should be admitted because Guy
believed that Plaintiff was choosing not to work overtime so he could rest before
working as a football coach for Wayne State University. Dkt. No. 34, p. 17 (Pg. ID
-14-
No. 872). Much like the analysis of evidence related to Guy’s request to see
Plaintiff’s medical note, this issue relates to whether Defendant had knowledge
that Plaintiff was requesting FMLA leave because of a qualifying disability.
Accordingly, it is relevant to whether Defendant had notice of Plaintiff’s disability
and whether Defendant had an honest belief that disciplining Plaintiff for refusing
to work overtime was legitimate and nondiscriminatory.
Plaintiff is free to testify about the work he performed for Wayne State, the
time period in which it took place, and whether it factored into his decision to
refuse overtime work. The Court does not find that providing such testimony will
be overly burdensome to him. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion
in Limine regarding evidence related to the work he performed for Wayne State
University.
9. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine As To Details Of
The Dispute Between Plaintiff And His Coworker
Finally, Plaintiff seeks to exclude any evidence related to the dispute he had
with his coworker, Jessica Winward, who accused him of sexual harassment in
May 2013. Dkt. No. 31, pp. 33–34 (Pg. ID No. 637–38). He argues that this
evidence is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, and that the dispute with Winward
did not interfere with his ability to perform his job duties. Id.
-15-
Nevertheless, Defendant has presented evidence that Plaintiff’s altercation
with Windward was part of Plaintiff’s motivation to continually refuse direct
orders to work overtime. Dkt. No. 34, pp. 12–13 (Pg. ID No. 867–88). Plaintiff’s
supervisor testified in deposition that Plaintiff told him “he was going to refuse
[mandatory overtime] every time” because “he was upset about a situation that
happened in Division One and, until the County makes him whole, he is going to
continue to refuse.” Id. at 13. Since there is evidence that Plaintiff’s decision to
decline to work mandatory overtime, which began far in advance of his submitted
doctor’s notes, may be related to his dispute with his coworker, such evidence is
relevant to the present dispute.
Nevertheless, the Court has not been provided sufficient information about
the subject of this dispute, outside of the general allegation of sexual harassment.
Should additional detail give rise to concern that the topic of the dispute is
substantially more prejudicial than probative, the Court may opt to allow evidence
that there was a dispute, generally, without admitting details of the specific topic of
the dispute. Alternatively, the parties are welcome to stipulate to the fact that a
dispute occurred between Plaintiff and Winward, without admitting the subject.
Thus, Plaintiff’s request to exclude evidence of his dispute with his coworker is
denied without prejudice to renewal in the context of the trial.
-16-
IV. CONCLUSION
These are the preliminary rulings of the Court. The Court emphasizes that
“[a] ruling on a motion in limine is no more than a preliminary, or advisory,
opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court . . . the district
court may change its ruling at trial for whatever reason it deems appropriate,” and
“where sufficient facts have developed to warrant the change.” United States v.
Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Luce, 713 F.2d
1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983) aff’d, 469 U.S. 38 (1984)).
Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion in Limine [30], to
exclude any expert witness testimony from the three listed doctors. The Court will
GRANT in part and DENY in part Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [31].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
June 30, 2016
/s/Gershwin A Drain
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Court Judge
-17-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?