Canfield v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER granting 15 Motion to remand pursuant to Sentence Four and denying 16 Motion for summary judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti. (DPer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BURTON CANFIELD, JR.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:15-cv-10195
Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti

v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
REMAND PURSUANT TO SENTENCE FOUR (DE 15) AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 16)
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Burton Canfield, Jr., brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§405(g)

and 1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance
benefits. On March 12, 2012, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for
disability insurance benefits, alleging that he has been disabled since February 3,
2012. (R. at 19.) Plaintiff’s application was denied and he sought a de novo
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). ALJ James Kent held a
hearing on August 6, 2013 and subsequently determined that Plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 19-58.) On

November 25, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R.
at 1-4.) ALJ Kent’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. Plaintiff
then timely commenced the instant action.
II.

THE INSTANT MOTIONS
In his motion for remand, Plaintiff asserts that ALJ Kent committed

reversible error by violating the treating source rule, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2)
and S.S.R. 96-8p. (DE 15.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to
provide good reasons for discounting the March 11, 2013 opinion of his treating
physician, Dr. Wiggins.1 The Commissioner opposes the motion and has filed a
motion for summary judgment, noting that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision.
The parties have consented to my authority. (DE 14.) A hearing was held
on January 7, 2016, at which Plaintiff’s counsel (Lewis M. Seward) Defendant’s
counsel (AUSA Sean Santen) appeared by telephone. Having considered the
motion papers and oral arguments of counsel for the parties and for the reasons
stated on the record, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED, Defendant’s motion is
DENIED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner and the ALJ for

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Although Plaintiff initially challenged the ALJ’s treatment of several of Dr.
Wiggins’ opinions, after receiving the Commissioner’s response and participating
in oral argument Plaintiff significantly narrowed the focus of his appeal in his reply
brief (DE 17 at 2) and yet further at the hearing, and agreed that the only issue
remaining was Dr. Wiggins’ opinion dated March 11, 2013. (R. at 289-292.)
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rehearing under Sentence Four of § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with
the following:
1. ALJ Kent assigned “little weight” to Dr. Wiggins’ March 11, 2013 opinion
because he found it inconsistent with Dr. Wiggins’ clinical findings, other
medical evidence of record, and the claimant’s testimony, specifically, his
“testimony that he had no difficulty with foot controls or gross
manipulation.” (R. at 29, 41-42.) On remand, if the ALJ makes the same
conclusion, he or she must explain, specify, and identify the inconsistencies
he or she finds with respect to: 1) Dr. Wiggins’ clinical findings; 2) other
medical evidence in the record; and 3) Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his
ability to push and pull.
2. If the ALJ does not give Dr. Wiggins’ opinion controlling weight, he or she
must address the length of the treatment relationship between Dr. Wiggins
and Plaintiff, as well as the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, in
accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 1527(c)(2)(i)-(ii),
3. ALJ Kent found Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain to be less than
credible, in part because he had “not generally received the type of medical
treatment one would expect for a totally disabled individual,” specifically
noting that all of Plaintiff’s care “has been rendered by his primary care
physician,” Dr. Wiggins. (R. at 27.) However, the record is replete with

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evidence that Plaintiff lacked insurance during the relevant period and was
“self-pay” with Dr. Wiggins. (See R. at 217 (“When he gets insurance we’ll
discuss other possibilities such as a neurosurgery consult . . .”), R. at 276
(“he has no insurance and cannot afford an MRI”), and R. at 205, 208, 210,
and 212, where it is noted that he is “self pay”)). On remand, the ALJ must
explain and re-assess any discounting of Plaintiff’s credibility on the basis
that he failed to seek specialized treatment in light of his well-documented
lack of insurance
4. Similarly, the ALJ must explain whether he or she has discounted Dr.
Wiggins’ opinion because Dr. Wiggins is not a specialist, and, if so, assess
that factor in light of Plaintiff’s lack of insurance.
5. ALJ Kent did not address the fact that Dr. Wiggins’ March 11, 2013 opinion
was made after Plaintiff’s date last insured (“DLI”) of December 31, 2012.
Nor did Dr. Wiggins indicate that the opinion related back to the relevant
period. Upon questioning at the hearing, Defendant conceded that, on
remand, the ALJ could possibly find that the opinion related back to the
relevant time period. The Court agrees and concludes that the weighing of
Dr. Wiggins’ opinion and fact-finding with respect to the DLI is a task
reserved to the ALJ. Accordingly, on remand the ALJ must further evaluate
Dr. Wiggins’ March 11, 2013 opinion in light of Plaintiff’s DLI of

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December 31, 2012 and determine whether it relates back to the relevant
period.
III.

CONCLUSION
Due to the errors stated on the record and outlined in part above, and in

order for this Court to have an appellate record which would “permit meaningful
review of the ALJ’s application of the [treating physician] rule,” Wilson v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004), Plaintiff is entitled
to an order remanding this case to the Social Security Administration pursuant to
Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for remand is
GRANTED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2016

s/Anthony P. Patti
Anthony P. Patti
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record
on January 11, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail.
s/Michael Williams
Case Manager for the
Honorable Anthony P. Patti

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