Ewing v. Woods
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood (1) Directing the Clerk of Court to Reopen the Case, (2) Modifying the Terms of the Conditional Grant, (3) Denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on the Remaining Claims, (4) Denying a Certificate of Appealability, and (5) Granting Petitioner Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis.. (Grimes, K.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DARRELL RASHARD EWING,
Petitioner,
Civil No. 2:15-CV-10523
HONORABLE DENISE PAGE HOOD
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
v.
JEFFREY WOODS,
Respondent.
/
OPINION AND ORDER ON REMAND (1) DIRECTING THE CLERK OF
THE COURT TO REOPEN THE CASE, (2) MODIFYING THE TERMS OF
THE CONDITIONAL GRANT, (3) DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS ON THE REMAINING CLAIMS, (4) DENYING A
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND (5) GRANTING PETITIONER
LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
This case is before the Court on remand from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Court orders the Clerk of the Court to
reopen the case to the Court’s active docket. The Court modifies the terms
of its previous order granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The
Court denies the petition with respect to the remaining claims.
I. Background
Darrell Rashard Ewing, (“Petitioner”), confined at the Kinross
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Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Michigan, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, through his attorneys Phillip
D. Comorski and Byron Pitts, challenging his convictions for first-degree
murder, M.C.L. § 750.316, three counts of assault with intent to commit
murder, M.C.L. § 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), M.C.L. § 750.227b.
Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne County
Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by
the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See e.g. Wagner v. Smith, 581
F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):
These consolidated appeals arise from a shooting at the
intersection of Harper and Van Dyke, in the city of Detroit on
December 29, 2009. At the time of the shooting, J.B. Watson and
his girlfriend, LaRita Thomas, were in Thomas’s van along with
Phillip Reed and Willie Williams. The van was stopped at the
intersection of Harper and Van Dyke in Detroit for a traffic signal.
Raymond Love testified that while driving on Harper, a turquoise
vehicle turned onto Harper and the two vehicles drove side by
side for a short while. Love identified the driver of the turquoise
vehicle as Searcy. In that turquoise vehicle, there were also two
other black males, one of which was later identified as Ewing.
When Love reached the red traffic light at the Van Dyke
intersection, the turquoise car pulled to the curb, staying back
about six or seven car lengths. Ewing then exited the vehicle with
a handgun drawn, approached Thomas’s van, and fired many
shots into the rear of the van. After shooting, Ewing retreated to
the turquoise car, which by that time had moved into the middle
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of Harper, and the car left in the opposite direction on Harper.
Watson died of injuries he received from the gunshot wounds.
Reed was injured in the attack, with a bullet striking him in his left
hand. Watson, Reed, and Williams are cousins and members of
a gang identified as the Knock Out Boys (KOB). Searcy and
Ewing were alleged to be members of a rival gang called the
Hustle Boys.
People v. Searcy, Nos. 301751, 301758, 2013 WL 4609125, at *1 (Mich. Ct.
App. Aug. 29, 2013).
Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id., lv. den. 495 Mich.
935, 843 N.W.2d 200 (2014).
Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:
I.
Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial
court failed to give the deadlocked jury instruction, thereby
depriving petitioner of his federal constitutional rights of due
process of law and a fair and impartial verdict, as
guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
II.
Petitioner was denied a fair trial and impartial jury
under the federal constitution where, during jury
deliberations, the jurors brought in extraneous
information from Facebook and the internet about
petitioner Ewing, Mr. Watson, gangs, and gang
pecking orders, and the jurors used this information to
convict petitioner Ewing.
III.
Where Tyree Washington signed an affidavit after trial
in which he confessed to the instant offenses, this
newly discovered evidence requires that this petition
be granted or, at least, that an evidentiary hearing be
ordered.
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This Court granted habeas relief on petitioner’s second claim, finding
that extraneous information had been brought into the jury room during
deliberations, that the jurors had used this information to convict petitioner,
and that the error was not harmless. This Court ordered the State of
Michigan to either conduct a new trial or release petitioner from custody.
This Court declined to address the other two claims. Ewing v. Horton, No.
2:15-CV-10523, 2017 WL 5564603 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2017).
Respondent appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed
in part this Court’s decision, agreeing that extraneous information had been
used to convict petitioner. Ewing v. Horton, 914 F.3d 1027, 1030 (6th Cir.
2019). The Sixth Circuit, however, concluded that the proper remedy for
this constitutional violation would not be a new trial but would be granting a
writ of habeas corpus conditioned upon the state trial court conducting an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227,
229–30 (1954) to determine what impact, if any, this extrinsic evidence had
on the jurors’ decision. Id., at 1031-34. The Sixth Circuit remanded the
matter to this Court to issue an amended order granting habeas relief. The
Sixth Circuit also left it to this Court’s discretion whether to address
petitioner’s remaining claims. Id., at 1034.
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II. Discussion
A. The Clerk of the Court is ordered to reopen the case.
Federal courts have the power to order that a habeas petition be
reinstated in various contexts. See e.g. Rodriguez v. Jones, 625 F. Supp.
2d 552, 559 (E.D. Mich. 2009). In light of the fact that this case has been
remanded by the Sixth Circuit to this Court to amend the original order
granting habeas relief and to consider petitioner’s remaining claims, the
Court will reopen the petition and order the Clerk of the Court to reinstate
this case to the Court’s active docket.
B. The Court Amends the Terms of the Conditional Grant.
As per the directive from the Sixth Circuit, the original terms of the
order granting habeas relief dated November 20, 2017, are amended as
follows. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is again granted on
petitioner’s second claim involving the use of extraneous influence. The
grant is conditioned upon the state trial court conducting an evidentiary
hearing on petitioner’s juror misconduct claim within 120 days of this
Court’s order and making a determination as to whether the extraneous
information had a prejudicial effect upon the jury’s verdict. If the judge so
finds, he or she shall order a new trial for petitioner. Ewing v. Horton, 914
F.3d at 1031-34.
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C. The remaining claims.
1. Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of
review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of
the claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal
law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by
the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a
case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).
An “unreasonable application” occurs when “a state court decision
unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a
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prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not “issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 410-11.
The Supreme Court explained that “[A] federal court’s collateral
review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due
state courts in our federal system.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340
(2003). The “AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for
evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be
given the benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773
(2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997);
Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)(per curiam)). “[A] state
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of
the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101
(2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In order
to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show
that the state court’s rejection of his claim “was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S.
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at 103. A habeas petitioner should be denied relief as long as it is within
the “realm of possibility” that fairminded jurists could find the state court
decision to be reasonable. See Woods v. Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1152
(2016).
2. Claim # 1. The jury instruction claim.
In his first claim, petitioner claims that his due process rights were
violated when the trial court failed to give the deadlocked jury instruction,
CJI 2d 3.12, after the jury indicated that they were unable to reach a
verdict. Petitioner further alleges that failure to give the instruction lead
some jurors to conduct outside research. Respondent contends that this
claim is procedurally defaulted, as petitioner failed to object at trial.
The Court notes that the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed and
rejected petitioner’s first claim under a plain error standard because
petitioner failed to preserve the issue as a constitutional claim.1
The AEDPA deference applies to any underlying plain-error analysis
of a procedurally defaulted claim. See Stewart v. Trierweiler, 867 F.3d
633, 638(6th Cir. 2017); cert. den. 138 S. Ct. 1998 (2018).
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Respondent urges this Court to deny this claim on the ground that it is procedurally defaulted
because petitioner failed to object at trial. This Court notes that procedural default is not a jurisdictional
bar to review of a habeas petition the merits. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997). In addition,
“[F]ederal courts are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the
petitioner on the merits.” Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir.2003)(citing Lambrix v. Singletary,
520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)). This Court believes it would be easier to proceed to the merits of the claim.
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The power of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend beyond the
application of federal law and the federal courts cannot intervene in order
to correct a perceived violation of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.
62, 67-68 (1991); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 1987).
Furthermore, the burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction
was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack upon the
constitutional validity of a state court conviction is even greater than the
showing required in a direct appeal. The question in such a collateral
proceeding is whether the ailing instruction so infected the entire trial that
the resulting conviction violates due process, not merely whether the
instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”
and an omission or incomplete instruction is less likely to be prejudicial
than a misstatement of the law. See Henderson v. Kibbee, 431 U.S. 145,
154-155 (1977).
The challenged instruction must not be judged in isolation but must
be considered in the context of the entire jury charge. See Jones v. United
States, 527 U.S. 373, 391 (1999). Further, any ambiguity, inconsistency
or deficiency in a jury instruction does not by itself necessarily constitute a
due process violation. See Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190
(2009). It is not enough that there might be some “slight possibility” that
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the jury misapplied the instruction. Id. at 191. A habeas petitioner’s
burden of showing prejudice is especially heavy when a petitioner claims
that a jury instruction was incomplete, because an omission, or an
incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement
of the law. See Hardaway v. Withrow, 305 F.3d 558, 565 (6th Cir. 2002).
While Petitioner argues that the judge should have given the jurors
the deadlocked jury instruction, CJI 2d 3.12, a trial court’s failure to do so,
in response to a jury’s indication of possible deadlock, “is not invariably
fatal to the conviction.” See Bedford v. Collins, 567 F.3d 225, 238 (6th Cir.
2009). The failure to give the jurors the deadlocked jury instruction, with its
caveat about not surrendering one’s honest beliefs, does not entitle
petitioner to relief.
Petitioner further argues that the judge’s instruction to the jurors to
continue deliberating precipitated individual jurors to engage in improper
outside research. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s
claim, finding no evidence to establish when jurors engaged in the outside
research and noted “that a trial court is not required to immediately provide
the deadlocked jury instruction when a jury indicates that it is at an
impasse[,]”. Searcy, 2013 WL 4609125, at *7 (citing People v. Lett, 466
Mich. 206, 222–223; 644 N.W.2d 743 (2002)).
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On the second full day of deliberations, the jury sent a message
asking if it could “declare a hung jury” based on “a serious difference of
opinion on the verdict.” The trial court judge informed defense counsel of
the inquiry and then instructed the jury to continue their deliberations. The
next day, the jury was able to render a verdict.
It is axiomatic that “a trial court may properly encourage a
deadlocked jury to continue its deliberations and attempt to reach a
verdict.” U.S. v. Aloi, 9 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 1993)(citing Allen v. United
States, 164 U.S. 492, 501–02 (1896)). “A charge that strays too far from
the charge approved in Allen will rise to the level of a constitutional
violation only if ‘in its context and under all the circumstances, [the charge]
... was coercive.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Parke, 741 F.2d 847, 850 (6th
Cir. 1984)(quoting Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446(1965)).
The judge’s instruction to the jurors to continue deliberating was not
unduly coercive, because the judge “did not pressure a decision in a
particular direction.” U.S. v. Lash, 937 F.2d 1077, 1086 (6th Cir. 1991).
The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably determined that it was in the
trial court’s discretion whether to provide the deadlock jury instruction and
that failure to provide the instruction did not lead to juror misconduct;
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therefore, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his first claim. See
Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10-11 (2002).
3. Claim # 3. The newly discovered evidence claim.
Petitioner finally contends that he is entitled to a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence. Petitioner alleges that his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights where violated when the trial court denied his motion
for a new trial to allow petitioner to present the affidavit of Tyree
Washington, which petitioner submits is new, reliable, and trustworthy
evidence of petitioner’s innocence.
To the extent that petitioner seeks habeas relief based on his actual
innocence, he would not be entitled to the issuance of a writ. In Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993), the Supreme Court held that claims of
actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence fail to state a claim
for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation
occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding. Federal habeas
courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
constitution, not to correct errors of fact. Id., see also McQuiggin v.
Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013)(“We have not resolved whether a
prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of
actual innocence”). Freestanding claims of actual innocence are not
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cognizable on federal habeas review, absent independent allegations of
constitutional error at trial. See Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3d 844, 854-55
(6th Cir. 2007)(collecting cases).
Furthermore, the affidavit of Tyree Washington is not newly
discovered evidence as reasonably determined by The Michigan Court of
Appeals:
“For a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, a defendant must show that: (1) the evidence itself, not
merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly
discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not,
using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the
evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different
result probable on retrial.” “[N]ewly available evidence is not
synonymous with newly discovered evidence sufficient to warrant
a new trial.”
In this instance, Washington’s assertion that he was the
perpetrator of this crime is not newly discovered. Extensive
testimony was elicited at trial from Christopher Richardson and
LaJoia Stevenson indicating Washington’s assertions of guilt for
the death of Watson. Defense counsel was informed by the
prosecutor that Washington was in federal custody and had
implicated himself in this murder. Defense counsel was clearly
aware of Washington’s proposed testimony at the time of trial
and the information was used, in part, to buttress Ewing’s alibi
defense that he was elsewhere at the time of the homicide. As
such, it cannot be construed as newly discovered.
In addition, “Michigan courts have held that a defendant’s
awareness of the evidence at the time of trial precludes a finding
that the evidence is newly discovered, even if the evidence is
claimed to have been ‘unavailable’ at the time of trial.”
Specifically, when a defendant knew or should have known that
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a codefendant could provide exculpatory testimony, but did not
obtain that testimony because the codefendant invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination, the codefendant’s posttrial
statements do not constitute newly discovered evidence, but are
merely newly available evidence.
In the circumstances of this case, Washington’s assertion of
culpability cannot be construed as newly discovered evidence.
Information regarding Washington’s provision of exculpatory
information was made available during the trial, and two
witnesses even testified regarding his alleged statements. While
Washington has now provided an affidavit and indicated a
willingness to testify, this evidence is only newly available and,
therefore, insufficient to justify the grant of a new trial.
Searcy, 2013 WL 4609125, at *10 (internal citations omitted).
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his newly discovered
evidence claim, because the affidavit of Tyree Washington is cumulative
evidence of the trial testimony provided by Christopher Richardson and
LaJoia Stevenson regarding Washington’s assertions of guilt for the death
of Watson. See Pudelski v. Wilson, 576 F.3d 595, 612 (6th Cir. 2009).
III. A certificate of appealability
A habeas petitioner must receive a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) in order to appeal the denial of a habeas petition for relief from
either a state or federal conviction.2 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(c)(1)(A), (B). A
2
Effective December 1, 2009, the newly created Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, provides that “[t]he district court must
issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11(a),
28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; see also Strayhorn v. Booker, 718 F. Supp. 2d 846, 875 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
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court may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
When a federal district court rejects a habeas claim on the merits, the
substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claim debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484-85 (2000).
This Court denies a certificate of appealability because reasonable
jurists would not find this Court’s assessment of petitioner’s remaining
claims to be debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 484.
Although this Court will deny a certificate of appealability to
petitioner, the standard for granting an application for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (IFP) is a lower standard than the standard for certificates
of appealability. See Foster v. Ludwick, 208 F. Supp. 2d 750, 764 (E.D.
Mich. 2002)(citing United States v. Youngblood, 116 F.3d 1113, 1115 (5th
Cir. 1997)). Whereas a certificate of appealability may only be granted if
petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right, a court may grant IFP status if it finds that an appeal is being taken
in good faith. Id. at 764-65; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App.24 (a).
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“Good faith” requires a showing that the issues raised are not frivolous; it
does not require a showing of probable success on the merits. Foster, 208
F. Supp. 2d at 765. Although jurists of reason would not debate this
Court’s resolution of petitioner’s claims, the issues are not frivolous;
therefore, an appeal could be taken in good faith and petitioner may
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Id.
IV. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1). The Clerk of the Court shall reopen the case to the Court’s
active docket.
(2). The conditional grant of a writ of habeas corpus dated
November 20, 2017 is amended. The petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is GRANTED on petitioner’s second claim.
Unless the State of Michigan take action to afford petitioner an
evidentiary hearing on his juror misconduct claim in the Wayne
County Circuit Court within 120 days of this Court’s order, he
may apply for release from custody.
(3). The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED WITH
PREJUDICE with respect to the remaining claims.
(4) A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
(5) Petitioner will be granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
s/Denise Page Hood
HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 30, 2019
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