Syzak v. Haas

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Granting a Certificate of Appealability. Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (CPic)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SCOTT SYZAK,
Case Number: 2:15-CV-10658
HON. ARTHUR J. TARNOW

Petitioner,
v.
RANDY HAAS,
Respondent.
/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND GRANTING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Petitioner Scott Syzak, a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of
Corrections, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner challenges his first-degree felony murder conviction on the grounds that the
trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress expert witness testimony and the trial
court admitted Petitioner’s custodial statement in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
Respondent, through the Attorney General’s Office, has filed an answer in opposition to
the petition arguing that the claims are meritless. For the reasons discussed, the Court
will deny habeas corpus relief.
I.

Background
Petitioner’s conviction arose from the death of Petitioner’s four-month-old

daughter Jessica, on October 12, 1995. Jessica sustained a skull fracture and cerebral
contusion several weeks before her death. Dr. Richard Anderson, the medical examiner

who performed an autopsy, determined that these injuries were the cause of Jessica’s
death. During the initial investigation, Jessica’s mother, Candace Syzak, claimed
responsibility for the fall that caused Jessica’s head injury. Syzak told authorities that she
accidentally dropped Jessica while bathing her. The investigation did not result in
Petitioner’s arrest until August 2010, when police re-interviewed Petitioner and Candace.
Petitioner was interviewed on August 25 and 26, 2010 in his then home state of Indiana.
He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the second interrogation. Following a hearing, the
trial court denied the motion.
At trial, Candace Syzak, Jessica’s mother, testified that Jessica was born on May
31, 1995. One day in August 1995, when Candace returned home from work, Jessica,
who had been alone with Petitioner all day, had a bump on her forehead. When Candace
asked Petitioner about the bump, Petitioner said that she kicked away from him when he
was bathing her and she hit her head on the bathtub’s faucet. Candace and Petitioner
waited two weeks to take Jessica to the hospital. Candace testified that, before taking
Jessica for medical treatment, they discussed what they would tell medical personnel.
Petitioner asked Candace to tell police that she had dropped Jessica. She agreed to do so
because she knew that Petitioner had previously gone to prison for assault. At the time,
she did not know that his previous conviction involved a child.
Jessica was kept over night at a hospital in Saginaw. When she was released the
next day, Candace and Petitioner were told to follow up with Dr. Gerald Schell. The
Syzaks took Jessica to Dr. Schell approximately one week later, on October 11, 1995. He
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drained Jessica’s bump and sent her home. That evening, Jessica woke up at
approximately 2:00 a.m., and Petitioner went to check on her. Candace woke up at
approximately 6:30 a.m. and, when she went to check on Jessica, found her lifeless in the
playpen where she had slept. Jessica’s playpen had a blanket and comforter in it.
Cocette Blay testified that she and Petitioner dated in the 1980s, when she was a
teenager. At some point in time, Petitioner was permitted to live with her and her family.
In March 1989, Blay came home one day to find Petitioner standing on the front lawn
crying. He said that the baby (Blay’s younger sister Candy) had been hurt. Petitioner
reported that Candy had fallen off the couch and landed on some toys. Eventually, Candy
was taken for medical treatment and Michigan State Police conducted an investigation.
Petitioner was charged with child abuse. Petitioner told Blay that his attorney had told
him he faced 12 years in prison, so they needed to leave the state. Blay agreed to move to
Florida with Petitioner. After they moved to Florida, they had a child together, Alisha
Syzak. In September 1990, when Alisha was about one month old, Blay was taking a
bath when she heard Alisha crying from the other room. Alisha ran into the room and
found Alisha’s foot swelling and bruising. Petitioner, who had been alone with Alisha,
told Blay that he had just been playing with Alisha. They decided to take Alisha to the
hospital. On the way there, Petitioner told Blay to tell medical personnel that she had
dropped Alisha in the bathtub because he was already in trouble regarding Candy.
Petitoiner also told Blay to give hospital personnel a false name for him. At the hospital,
they discovered that Alisha’s leg was broken. Ultimately, police discovered Petitioner’s
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true identity and he was extradited to Michigan. Petitioner pleaded no contest to seconddegree child abuse and was imprisoned in Michigan. After that time, Blay and Petitioner
did not continue their romantic relationship. When Blay learned what happened to
Jessica, she wrote a letter to the prosecuting attorney to inform him that the story about
the baby falling in the bathroom had previously been used by Petitioner when Alisha had
been hurt.
Dr. Anderson, who performed the autopsy, identified the cause of death as skull
fracture and cerebral contusion. He did not believe these injuries were consistent with a
fall from several feet. Dr. Anderson found evidence of nine posterior rib fractures.
During the autopsy, Dr. Anderson took several tissue samples and prepared slides. After
Jessica’s body had been released to a funeral home, Dr. Anderson consulted Dr. Werner
Spitz, a noted forensic pathologist, regarding the case. At Dr. Spitz’s suggestion, he had
Jessica’s body returned from the funeral home to allow him to take samples from her eyes
and from the broken ribs. Dr. Anderson testified that he did not obtain records from Dr.
Schell or any hospital before completing the autopsy report. None of the physical slides
of the tissue samples taken during the autopsy were available at the time of trial. On
cross-emanation, Dr. Anderson admitted that evidence of eye hemorrhages and rib
fractures possibly signified Shaken Baby Syndrome. He also testified that he could not
rule out asphyxiation as a cause of death. He found no evidence of subdural hematoma,
intercranial bleeding or brain stem involvement.

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The defense presented a single witness, Dr. Brian Woodruf. Dr. Woodruf testified
as an expert in pediatric neurology. He testified that Jessica did not die as a result of a
skull fracture or injury to her brain. He found no medical support for the theory that
Jessica died from a seizure disorder caused by head trauma. Dr. Woodruf could not rule
out Sudden Infant Death Syndrome as the cause of Jessica’s death. He noted that
medically accepted risk factors for SIDS death include sleeping on a soft surface with
blankets, comforters or soft stuffed animals in the sleeping area.
II.

Procedural History
Petitioner was convicted by a jury in St. Clair County Circuit Court of first-degree

felony murder. On July 1, 2011, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals challenging
the admission of the medical examiner’s testimony, the admission of Petitioner’s
custodial statement, and the prosecution’s questioning of three government witnesses.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. Id. The Michigan
Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s application for leave to appeal. People v. Syzak, 495
Mich. 899 (Mich. 2013).
Petitioner, through counsel, then filed the pending habeas corpus petition.
Respondent has filed an answer and the related Rule 5 materials.
The petition raises these claims:
I.

The state trial court reversibly erred in denying the defense
motion to suppress the testimony by Dr. Anderson where the
State lost or destroyed evidence of material or exculpatory
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value to the defense, or lost that evidence through gross
negligence, in violation of Mr. Syzak’s constitutional due
process rights.
II.

III.

The state courts unreasonably applied the controlling United
States Supreme Court’s precedent in finding that Mr. Syzak’s
statement to police on the second day of interrogation,
following his detention on suicide watch, was the result of a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Fifth
Amendment rights, and thus the admission of his statements
at trial violation due process.

Standard of Review
This habeas petition is reviewed under the exacting standards set forth in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996). Under AEDPA, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief
with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in a state-court proceeding unless the
state adjudication of the claim either:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it
‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’”
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam), quoting Williams v. Taylor,
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529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). “[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of the statute
permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)
quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the
correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.86, 101 (2011),
quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). “Section 2254(d) reflects the
view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal
justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. . . . As a
condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show
that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87 (internal quotation
omitted). To obtain relief under § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must show an unreasonable
determination of fact and that the resulting state court decision was “based on” that
unreasonable determination. Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242, 250 (6th Cir. 2012).
Lastly, a federal habeas court must presume the correctness of state court factual
determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption
only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th
Cir. 1998).
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IV.

Discussion
A.

Medical Examiner’s Testimony

Petitioner’s first claim concerns the admission of Dr. Richard Anderson’s
testimony. The medical examiner’s office failed to preserve slides of tissue and other
samples taken during the 1995 autopsy, which prevented Petitioner from retaining an
expert to perform an independent analysis of the samples. He argues that admission of
Dr. Anderson’s testimony violated his right to due process.
Dr. Anderson performed the autopsy of Jessica Syzak on October 12, 1995, the
morning of her death. Dr. Anderson was qualified to testify as an expert in pathology, but
not forensic pathology because he was not board certified in that sub-specialty. Dr.
Anderson first noted that Jessica had a rounded, soft bulge on her head. He performed an
internal examination, taking tissue samples for microscopic slides. He also examined the
area of Jessica’s head where he found the bulge. Under the bulge was a fracture site and
an accumulation of fluid. The fracture site showed some signs of healing, so it was not a
new injury. The brain located underneath the fracture site showed liquefication of the
brain tissue. He found nine posterior rib fractures. Following the autopsy, Dr. Anderson
consulted Dr. Werner Spitz, who was known to Dr. Anderson to be a respected forensic
pathologist, to inquire whether any further examinations should be performed. Dr. Spitz
suggested Dr. Anderson remove the victim’s eyes to examine the orbital roofs, and
remove some of the fracture for documentation. Dr. Anderson followed Dr. Spitz’s
recommendations. Dr. Anderson concluded that Jessica’s cause of death was skull
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fracture and cerebral contusion. He surmised that the mechanism of death may have been
a posttraumatic seizure. Dr. Anderson testified that, although he struggled with
determining a mechanism of death, he was certain that the cause of death was a skull
fracture and cerebral contusion.
On cross-examination, Dr. Anderson testified that he did not obtain medical
records from the neurosurgeon who treated Jessica prior to her death nor did he receive
records from the hospital where Jessica was first seen. He did not obtain any medical
records from Jessica’s medical treatments from her head injury. Dr. Anderson took these
slides: a biopsy of the brain cyst; a biopsy of the eyes; a sample of the fractured ribs; and
biopsies of the lungs, heart, liver, pancreas, kidneys, uterus, and intestines.
The Due Process Clause requires that the State disclose to criminal defendants
“evidence that is either material to the guilt of the defendant or relevant to the punishment
to be imposed.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). “Separate tests are
applied to determine whether the government’s failure to preserve evidence rises to the
level of a due process violation in cases where material exculpatory evidence is not
accessible, see Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489, versus cases where ‘potentially useful’
evidence is not accessible. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 109 S. Ct. 333,
102 L. Ed.2d 281 (1988).” United States v. Wright, 260 F.3d 568, 570-71 (6th Cir. 2001).
A defendant’s due process rights are violated where material exculpatory evidence is not
preserved. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. For evidence to meet the standard of
constitutional materiality, it “must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent
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before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id. at
488-89. The destruction of material exculpatory evidence violates due process regardless
of whether the government acted in bad faith. See id. at 488; Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.
However, “the Due Process Clause requires a different result when . . . deal[ing]
with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said
than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated
the defendant.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56. “[U]nless a criminal defendant can show
bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process of law.” Id. at 58. A habeas petitioner has the burden
of establishing that the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve potentially
exculpatory evidence. See Malcum v. Burt, 276 F.Supp.2d 664, 683 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
In short, to prevail on a destruction-of-evidence claim, a defendant needs to show that the
evidence was exculpatory or that the police acted in bad faith. Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S.
544, 547-48 (2004).
The Michigan Court of Appeals found no due process violation. Syzak, 2013 WL
1748596 at *2. The state court first determined that the missing slides were merely
potentially useful evidence, not material exculpatory evidence. Therefore, the state court
placed the burden on Petitioner to establish that the slides were lost or destroyed in bad
faith. Id. The state court found that Petitioner failed to offer any evidence to satisfy this

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burden, and held that the trial court did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress.
Id.
Petitioner argues that the Michigan Court of Appeals applied the incorrect
standard. He argues that bad faith did not need to be established because the evidence
“might have been expected to play a significant role” in his defense. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
at 488. The Court finds that the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly applied the standard
articulated in Youngblood, and that its application of Youngblood was not unreasonable.
In Youngblood, government officials did not preserve semen samples that could have
eliminated the defendant as the perpetrator, but the Supreme Court held that a showing of
bad faith was required because “[t]he possibility that the semen samples could have
exculpated respondent if preserved or tested is not enough to satisfy the standard of
constitutional materiality.” 488 U.S. at 56 n. *. Just as the semen samples in Youngblood
were only potentially exculpatory because there was just a possibility that the test results
would aid the defense, there was only the possibility that review of the missing slides in
this case would yield exculpatory evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals holding that
the slides were potentially exculpatory is not unreasonable.
Because the slides contained only potentially useful evidence, Petitioner’s claimed
due process violation is reviewed under Youngblood, which requires a showing that: (1)
the State acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence; (2) the exculpatory value of
the evidence was apparent before its destruction; and (3) Petitioner would be unable to
obtain comparable evidence by other means. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57. Bad faith is
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not shown where the failure to preserve evidence is the result only of negligence. Id. at
58 (finding no bad faith where police negligently failed to refrigerate clothing and to
perform tests on semen samples). Even gross negligence in failing to preserve potentially
exculpatory evidence does not satisfy the bad faith requirement. United States v. Wright,
260 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2001). Petitioner presents no evidence of bad faith. The state
court’s rejection of Petitioner's claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application
of clearly established Supreme Court law.
B.

Petitioner’s Custodial Statement

Petitioner next argues that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s custodial
statement, given on August 26, 2010. He argues that his statement was involuntary and
unknowing as a result of his “extreme mental state” and the prolonged interrogation. Pet.
at 37.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v. Walker, 374
Mich. 331 (1965),1 to determine the voluntariness of Petitioner’s statement to police.
Dennis Eaton testified that he was employed as a deputy commander with the Lake
County, Indiana Sheriff’s Department. In August 2010, the Port Huron Police
Department requested his department’s assistance in a cold case investigation into the
death of Jessica Syzak in 1995.

1

People v. Walker, 374 Mich. 331 (1965) requires that an evidentiary hearing be
conducted when a defendant challenges the admissibility of a confession.
12

On August 24, 2010, a detective left a card at the Syzak’s home asking that the
Syzaks contact the sheriff’s department. The next day, two sheriff’s deputies went to
Petitioner’s home and told him that they wanted to discuss a drive-by shooting that
occurred near his home in Indiana. When he arrived at the sheriff’s department, Deputy
Eaton and Detective Huber informed Petitioner that they wanted to talk to him about his
infant daughter’s death. Deputy Eaton testified that Petitioner was advised of his
Miranda rights and given a Miranda rights form which he signed. When officers told
Petitioner they wanted to talk to him about Jessica’s death, he became “somewhat
distraught” and showed “some signs of nervousness and stress.” 4/15/11 Tr. at 15, ECF
No. 9-8, Pg. ID 452. Initially, Petitioner told police his wife Candace dropped Jessica
while bathing her. Deputy Eaton testified that, after police told Petitioner they had
already talked to Candace, his story morphed from both of them being with Jessica to
Petitioner being alone with Jessica when the injury occurred. At first he said he was
bathing her in the kitchen sink, then in the bathroom bathtub. Petitioner finally said that,
at the conclusion of the bath in the cast iron tub, he was holding Jessica in one hand while
putting baby oil on her in the other when he dropped her on the corner of the bathtub. He
also admitted that he previously had been involved in an incident where a child was
dropped and injured under his care.
At some point during the interview, Petitioner began holding his chest and
appeared to be having a panic attack. Deputy Eaton called medics. Medics arrived and
advised that Petitioner’s blood pressure was normal, respirations were normal and that it
13

was just anxiety. At one point, Petitioner got the dry heaves. Until about midway
through the interview, Deputy Eaton did not believe that Petitioner would be kept
overnight. In his opinion, Petitioner would have been physically and mentally capable of
driving himself home. Petitioner also told Deputy Eaton that he felt capable of driving
himself home despite the anxiety. This turned out to be a non-issue as Deputy Eaton
learned that Michigan asked Indiana to detain Petitioner. Based upon Petitioner’s
numerous statements during the interview that he could not and would not go back to
prison, Deputy Eaton ordered that Petitioner be housed in the medical wing of the County
Jail so that he could be placed on suicide watch. In that facility an inmate on suicide
watch is stripped of their clothing and monitored by a camera. Petitioner was housed in
the jail on the evening of August 25th.
Late in the evening on August 26th, Detective Brian Kerrigan and Deputy George
Maschke from the St. Clair County Sheriff’s Department arrived for the purpose of
interviewing Petitioner. When he arrived in the interview room, Petitioner told Deputy
Eaton he was “having an extreme mental breakdown.” Id. at 50-51, ECF No. 9-8, Pg. ID
487-88. He told Deputy Eaton he had been “naked in a room filled with gnats” and had
been unable to sleep. Id. at 51, ECF No. 9-8, Pg. ID 488. Deputy Eaton testified that
Petitioner attributed his inability to sleep, at least in part, to the many thoughts running
through his head all night. Deputy Eaton did not view Petitioner’s condition as extreme
or conclude that Petitioner’s cognitive ability had deteriorated since the previous day.

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Port Huron Police Department detective Brian Kerrigan testified that, in August
2010, he was assigned to investigate the 1995 death of Jessica Syzak. In connection with
the investigation, he and Deputy Maschke traveled to Indiana to interview the Syzaks.
After interviewing Candace Syzak, Detective Kerrigan and Deputy Maschke interviewed
Petitioner. To start the interview, Deputy Maschke advised Petitioner of his Miranda
rights.
At the outset, Petitioner told the detectives that he accidentally dropped Jessica
while rubbing baby oil on her after giving her a bath. Petitioner reported that he caught
Jessica in his feet, but she hit her head on the bathtub, causing a bump on her head.
Candace was at work when he dropped Jessica. Petitioner told police that he and
Candace originally said Candace dropped Jessica because he was an ex-con and people
would put him back in prison. Petitioner repeatedly mentioned that he knew he was
going to be put back in prison. Petitioner told police that, around the time of Jessica’s
death, he was having a hard time integrating into public life after his incarceration.
Candace was the primary caregiver for Jessica. Petitioner tried not to be alone with
Jessica because he was afraid of her and his temper.
As the interview progressed, Petitioner admitted that he had been having a bad day
and forcefully shoved Jessica to the ground. Petitioner also told police: “I may have used
more force than I meant to.” Id. at 82, ECF No. 9-8, Pg. ID 519. At one point during the
interrogation, Petitioner said he wasn’t “doing very well at all” and was “confused.” Id.
at 85, ECF No. 9-8, Pg. ID 522. Detective Kerrigan testified that Petitioner was shaking
15

for a few minutes at the beginning of the interview. Petitioner expressed confusion
during the interview about why the case was being investigated 15 years after Jessica’s
death, but, Detective Kerrigan testified, Petitioner did not express confusion about the
proceedings themselves or his rights.
Finally, Scott Syzak testified about the police interrogations. He testified first that
he told the two detectives who came to his home and asked him to come to the station that
he did not want to go with them. He only decided to go the station when the detectives
told him that he would be permitted to drive his own vehicle to the station and drive
himself home. As he was driving to the station, one detective was in a vehicle in front of
his car and one behind. Petitioner was interviewed by Detective Eaton beginning
sometime during the afternoon of August 25th. Petitioner testified that he had not eaten
since the previous evening, and had consumed one beer on the 25th. Petitioner felt
“confused” “disoriented” and “tired.” Id. at 100-01, ECF No. 9-8, Pg. ID 537-38. He
only vaguely remembered bits and pieces of the interview. Petitioner testified that he
took medication for an anxiety disorder. He had no recollection of being seen by medics
during the first interview, but did recall feeling sick to his stomach and dry heaving.
When he learned that he was not going to be able to go home that night, he felt
“physically and emotionally drained.” Id. at 101, ECF No. 9-8, Pg. ID 538.
Petitioner described his confinement on the medical floor of the jail as subjecting
him to “abnormal conditions.” Id. at 113, ECF No. 9-8, Pg. ID 550. He testified that
when he was taken to the medical floor his clothes were taken away and he was put into a
16

paper hospital gown. He was placed into a six by nine cell with a stainless steel toilet, a
concrete bed and sink. Neither the sink nor the toilet were in working condition and the
cell bore a strong odor of urine and feces. (104). Officers gave him an indestructible
blanket. He vomited in the cell and used his gown to clean it. He testified that he was
naked until someone came to his cell to bring him for his interview with the Port Huron
detectives. His cell contained a call button, but he received no response when he pressed
it. Petitioner was not seen by a doctor, but a nurse did enter his cell at one point during
the night and give him a pill. He did not know what the pill was for. Petitioner was
provided with food but the food fell to the floor so he did not eat it. Petitioner did not
recall talking to Deputy Eaton prior to the second interview or being informed of his
Miranda rights by Deputy Maschke. He did not recall informing Deputies Eaton or
Maschke or Detective Kerrigan about the vast majority of the complaints to which he
testified at the Walker hearing. He did recall one of the detectives threatening to kill
Petitioner’s wife.
Following the Walker hearing, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to
suppress. The trial court summarized the relevant caselaw and then explained the court’s
opinion as follows:
This Court has reviewed the testimony of Deputy Dennis Eaton of the Lake
County Sheriff’s Department, and also the testimony of Detective []
Kerrigan, ... and also the testimony of the Defendant Scott Syzak. The
Court has also reviewed three separate DVDs that contained a recording of
the questioning of the Defendant and the Defendant’s statements that
occurred on August 25, 2010, and also on August 26th, 2010. ... [T]he
Court reviewed all of those DVDs in their entirety.
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... [T]he People have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the
statement given by the Defendant on August 26, 2010 was voluntary, and
that it was also knowing and intelligent.
In reaching this conclusion the Court relies upon the testimony of Deputy
Eaton and Deputy Kerrigan, which was corroborated by the Court’s review
of the, of the interviews that were taken of the Defendant and of the
statements that the Defendant gave.
The Court is convinced in addition to that statement being voluntary, that
the People have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
Defendant’s statement was also knowing and intelligent.
There is little question that when Defendant was first brought to the
interview room for questioning on the 26th of August, that he was at first in
an emotionally distraught state. However, it was also apparent, especially
from the ... video recordings ... that once given a coffee and a cigarette, the
Defendant calmed down significantly and he was then read his rights. His
Miranda rights. By the time he was read his Miranda rights on the 26th,
the state that he was obviously in prior to that had subsided.
It is obvious to the Court from a review of the videotapes that when the
Defendant was read his Miranda rights on August 26, 2010, that he
understood what those rights encompassed and what their waiver entailed.
And that at all times he was cognizant that his statements would likely be
used against him at trial.
5/3/11 Tr. at 5-7, ECF No. 9-12, Pg. ID 673-75.
The Michigan Court of Appeals also denied this claim, ultimately deferring to the
trial court’s credibility determination and finding that although Petitioner had been placed
on suicide watch prior to giving his statement to police, there was no indication that his
statements were coerced or that “his emotional state was so extreme that he could not
knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.” Syzak, 2013 WL 1748596 at *3.

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The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination bars the
admission of involuntary confessions. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64
(1986). A confession is considered involuntary if: (1) the police extorted the confession
by means of coercive activity; (2) the coercion in question was sufficient to overbear the
will of the accused; and (3) the will of the accused was in fact overborne “because of the
coercive police activity in question.” McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 454, 459 (6th Cir.
1988). The ultimate question is “whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the
challenged confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the
Constitution.” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). Factors to consider include
the presence or absence of police coercion (a “crucial element”), length of interrogation,
location of interrogation, continuity of interrogation, the suspect’s maturity and
education, the suspect’s physical condition and mental health, and whether the suspect
was advised of his or her Miranda rights. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693-94
(1993). A confession may not be deemed involuntary absent coercive police activity.
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (stating that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to
the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause”).
The decision of the state court to credit the police officers’ testimony and not
Petitioner’s testimony is “presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also
Ramonez v. Berghuis, 490 F.3d 482, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that § 2254(e)(1)
standard of review applies to a state court’s credibility determinations in the context of a
19

hearing on a motion to suppress a confession). Petitioner, therefore, bears “the burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1). Petitioner has not satisfied this burden. Certainly there is evidence that
Petitioner was under a great deal of stress and that the jail conditions were unpleasant.
But, a suspect’s “distressed mental state” at the time of questioning does not alone render
a statement involuntary. Poole v. Stewart, No. 16-1729, 2017 WL 3014000, *3 (6th Cir.
July 14, 2017), citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 1164-65. Petitioner has not shown that his
stress was beyond that any suspect would experience under those conditions, particularly
where he was obviously stunned that the investigation was ongoing so many years after
Jessica’s death. While Petitioner testified at the Walker hearing that he recalled little of
either the August 25th or 26th interviews, during those interviews, he asked relevant
questions about extradition, potential charges, and probable cause hearings, which
indicated an adequate degree of comprehension, lucidity, and rational thought.
The conditions Petitioner experienced during his incarceration on the jail’s medical
floor undoubtedly were extremely unpleasant. But Petitioner has not shown that these
conditions were sufficiently harsh to render his custodial statement involuntary.
Petitioner complained to Deputy Eaton about the gnats in his cell but did not mention lack
of food or clothing, or the non-functioning toilet and sink. Petitioner did not ask for food
before or during the interview. He requested and was provided coffee and a cigarette.
The trial court observed that, after these were provided, Petitioner visibly settled down.

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In addition, the interview following Petitioner’s night on the medical floor was relatively
short, approximately one and a half hours.
Considering the totality of these circumstances, the Michigan Court of Appeals’
decision that Petitioner’s statements were made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.
V.

Certificate of Appealability
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed

unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings now requires that the Court “must issue or
deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.”
A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). A petitioner must show “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should
have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(citation omitted).
The Court concludes that reasonable jurists could debate its resolution of
Petitioner’s claims. Thus, the Court grants a COA.

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VI.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. Furthermore, the Court GRANTS a certificate of appealability on both claims
raised in the petition. The Court finds Petitioner may proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis because an appeal could be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
SO ORDERED.
S/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge
Dated: March 15, 2018

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
on March 15, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Catherine A. Pickles
Judicial Assistant

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