Taylor v. Combs et al

Filing 5

OPINION and ORDER summarily dismissing 1 Complaint Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (CMul)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRETT TAYLOR, #602447,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 15-cv-10883
HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

THOMAS COMBS, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
I.

Introduction
Michigan prisoner Brett Taylor (“plaintiff”), currently confined at the Woodland Center

Correctional Facility in Whitmore Lake, Michigan, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While the handwritten complaint is somewhat difficult to read, plaintiff seems
to assert that prison employees refused to help him file and/or resolve grievances, refused to clean
his room, are committing medical malpractice, and are discriminating against him based upon his
race and economic status. He also asserts that schools have discriminated against him and that he
has been subjected to legal malpractice, human rights violations, and First Amendment violations.
He names Michigan Parole Board Chairperson Thomas Combs as a defendant, as well as “judges,
court staff, prosecutors in MI” and “all employees of the MDOC and health care” and sues them in
their personal and official capacities. He seeks to have his criminal record cleared, to have his sons
placed in his sole custody, billions of dollars in damages, to be released from prison or removed to
federal custody, and to be given money for braces, laser surgery, and body augmentation. The Court
has granted the plaintiff leave to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs for this action. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
II.

Discussion
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), a federal court is required to sua

sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it determines that
the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A federal court is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress
against government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable
basis in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989).
A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a
demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). While this notice pleading standard does
not require “detailed” factual allegations, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal
principles or conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned,
the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

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action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 557).
To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was
deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United
States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros.
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Harris v. Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint fails to satisfy the aforementioned pleading standards. First,
plaintiff only identifies Michigan Parole Board Chairperson Thomas Combs as a defendant in this
action. Plaintiff, however, does not allege any facts demonstrating Combs’ personal involvement
in any alleged improper conduct. It is well-settled that a plaintiff must allege the personal
involvement of a defendant to state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v.
Department of Social Svs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (Section 1983 liability cannot be based
upon a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th
Cir. 2009) (same); see also Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 69 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir.
1995) (plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant participated, condoned, encouraged,
or knowingly acquiesced in alleged misconduct to establish liability). Plaintiff does not do so as to
Combs, the only defendant identified by name.
Second, the other defendants named by plaintiff are “judges, court staff, prosecutors in MI”
and “all employees of the MDOC and health care.” Such identifications are too broad and too vague
to provide notice to any particular defendants, to effectuate service on any defendants, and to satisfy
the pleading standards of Rule 8 and Iqbal and Twombly, as discussed supra. The plaintiff also

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provides no indication as to what any particular defendant did or did not do that resulted in a
violation of his constitutional rights. He thus fails to sufficiently allege the personal involvement
of any particular defendant in unconstitutional conduct so as to state a viable civil rights claim under
§ 1983.
Third, as to the grievance issues, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The First Amendment guarantees “the right of the people . . . to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. While a prisoner has a First Amendment right
to file grievances against prison officials, Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000),
the First Amendment does not impose an affirmative obligation on the government to consider,
respond to, or grant any relief on a petition for redress of grievances. Smith v. Arkansas State Hwy.
Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979); Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.
1999) (“A citizen’s right to petition the government does not guarantee a response to the petition
or the right to compel government officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s views.”). Plaintiff does not
allege what actions, if any, defendants took to intentionally deny him access to the grievance
procedure. Conclusory allegations without factual support are insufficient to state a civil rights
claim. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998); Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th
Cir. 2003); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57.
Moreover, a prisoner does not have a constitutionally-protected interest in an inmate
grievance procedure or the right to an effective procedure.

Walker v. Michigan Dep’t of

Corrections, 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing cases). To the extent that plaintiff is dissatisfied with the investigation of his
concerns and responses to his grievance, he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
See Carlton v. Jondreau, 76 F. App’x 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2003); Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp.

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2d 743, 766-67 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (Borman, J., adopting magistrate judge’s report). Additionally,
any assertion that defendants failed to supervise another employee, should be vicariously liable for
another employee’s conduct, erred in denying grievances, and/or did not properly respond to his
complaints is insufficient to state a civil rights claim. See, e.g., Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300
(6th Cir. 1999); see also Martin v. Harvey, 14 F. App’x 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2001).
Fourth, as to the medical care issue, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The Supreme Court has held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The deliberate indifference standard
requires an inmate plaintiff to show that prison official defendants acted with a reckless disregard
of a known risk of serious harm to the prisoner. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). A
plaintiff may establish deliberate indifference by a showing of grossly inadequate medical care.
Terrance v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff, however, makes no such showing. The grievances and other documents attached
to his complaint indicate that he has received, and continues to receive, medical attention for his
mental health issues. When there is an ongoing pattern of treatment, a prisoner’s constitutional
rights are generally not infringed. See, e.g., Pate-El v. Gluch, 848 F.2d 193 (Table), 1988 WL
49054, *1 (6th Cir. 1988); accord Huff v. Manfredi, 504 F. App’x 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2012); Ali v.
Howard, 353 F. App’x 667, 671 (3d Cir. 2009). Plaintiff in this case alleges no facts that show that
the defendants ignored his problems, acted with deliberate indifference, or intentionally caused him
injury or pain. Conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a civil rights claim. Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998); Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 2003); see also
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57.

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While certain treatments may not have been fully effective and/or plaintiff may disagree with
the course of treatment provided and believe that additional treatment should be done, he does not
allege facts or present documents which show that the defendants acted unconstitutionally. See
Jennings v. Al–Dabagh, 97 F. App’x 548, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) (prisoner’s personal opinion that his
care was substandard or that he was not given treatment he requested because of costs raises a claim
of state-law medical malpractice, not constitutionally defective medical care); Owens v. Hutchinson,
79 F. App’x 159, 161 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A patient’s disagreement with his physicians over the proper
medical treatment alleges no more than a medical malpractice claim, which is a tort actionable in
state court, but is not cognizable as a federal constitutional claim.”). The Supreme Court has ruled
that decisions about whether to order additional diagnostic tests or treatment are classic examples
of the exercise of medical judgment and do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle,
429 U.S. at 107. Further, it is well-settled that claims of negligence concerning a prisoner’s medical
treatment, i.e. medical malpractice, are not cognizable in a civil rights action under § 1983. Id. at
106. An “injury caused by negligence does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutionallyprotected interest” and a claim that officials have been negligent does not state a claim under §1983.
Collins v. City of Harker Hgts., 503 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1992); Lewellen v. Metropolitan Gov't. of
Nashville & Davidson Co., Tenn., 34 F.3d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff fails to state a claim
under § 1983 in his complaint.
Fifth, as to legal malpractice and other issues related to his criminal proceedings, the plaintiff
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A claim under § 1983 is an appropriate
remedy for a prisoner challenging a condition of imprisonment, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 499 (1973), not the validity of continued confinement. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486-87 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner does not state a cognizable civil rights claim challenging

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his imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his continuing confinement
invalid, until and unless the reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question
by a federal court’s issuance or a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). This holds true
regardless of the relief sought by the plaintiff. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-89. Heck and other Supreme
Court cases, when “taken together, indicate that a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent
prior invalidation) – no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target
of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success
in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). If plaintiff were to prevail on his claims concerning
his criminal proceedings, the validity of his continued confinement would be called into question.
Such claims are barred by Heck and must be dismissed.
Lastly, as to the remaining issues regarding room cleaning, discrimination, human rights, and
the First Amendment, the plaintiff’s claims are purely conclusory as to any defendants, as to any
perceived unconstitutional conduct, and as to any resulting prejudice or injury. As discussed supra,
conclusory allegations without factual support are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.
Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 588; Lanier, 332 F.3d at 1007; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555-57. Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint must therefore be dismissed.
III.

Conclusion
The Court concludes that plaintiff’s civil rights complaint fails to satisfy the pleading

standards set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as Supreme Court
precedent, and that plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in his pleadings. Accordingly, the Court dismisses with prejudice the civil rights complaint

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). The Court further concludes that an appeal from
this decision cannot be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
SO ORDERED.

S/ Bernard A. Friedman___________
BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 1, 2015

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