Southwest Metals, Inc. et al v. Detroit, City of et al
Filing
61
ORDER granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's 34 Motion to Compel--Signed by Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti. (MWil)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SOUTHWEST METALS,
INC. and JOSEPH FAWAZ,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 2:15-cv-11080
District Judge Marianne O. Battani
Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti
v.
CITY OF DETROIT, et al. ,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFFS’
JULY 26, 2016 AMENDED MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (DE 34)
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel on July 26, 2016, seeking a
Court order requiring that Defendants do the following: 1) produce Sergeant
Rebecca McKay for deposition; 2) produce Sergeant Bernadette Dunbeck for
deposition; 3) supply the last known address of retired officer Derek Hassan; and
4) turn over an unredacted copy of Sergeant Bernadette Dunbeck’s police report
(“the Dunbeck report”). (DE 34.) On August 25, 2016, this matter came before
me for a hearing, during which I made the following rulings: 1) that Defendants’
counsel must either certify that he is entitled to accept subpoenas on behalf of
Officer Hassan or provide Officer Hassan’s contact information to Plaintiffs’
counsel on or before September 1, 2016; 2) that Defendants must produce Sergeant
McKay for deposition after the conclusion of the state court criminal proceeding;
3) that Officer Hassan’s deposition must take place on the same day as Sergeant
McKay’s, the order to be determined by Plaintiffs; and 4) that Defendants are
entitled to depose Plaintiff Fawaz at some point after Sergeant McKay’s
deposition. (See DE 55.)
Thus, the only remaining issue was whether Defendants were required to
turn over to Plaintiffs an unredacted copy of the Dunbeck report, with Dunbeck’s
deposition delayed until the issue could be decided. Finding the briefing on this
question inadequate, I ordered that each party submit supplemental briefing on the
issue of the deliberative process and law enforcement privileges as they related to
internal police investigative reports. Defendants were also required to provide a
redacted and unredacted copy of the report for an in camera review. Both parties
timely submitted the required briefing, and Defendants provided the documents
necessary for an in camera review. (DE 56 and 57.)
II.
DISCUSSION
The Dunbeck report is a 58-page internal affairs summary of the results of
an investigation into the conduct of Detroit Police Sergeant Rebecca McKay,
initiated when Plaintiff Fawaz made a complaint about her. (See DE 38-5 at 2-59
2
(Redacted Dunbeck Report)).1 Defendants provided the report to Plaintiffs, but
redacted certain information based on the claims of privilege outlined below. (See
DE 56-8 (Summary of Redactions).)
A.
Deliberative Process Privilege
The deliberative process privilege protects “documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1974). “The primary purpose served by the
deliberative process privilege is to encourage candid communications between
subordinates and superiors.” Schell v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 843
F.2d 933, 939 (6th Cir. 1988). “The deliberative process privilege rests on the
obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves
if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, and its object
is to enhance ‘the quality of agency decisions’ . . . by protecting open and frank
discussion among those who make them within the government.” Dep’t of Interior
& Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 9
(2001).
The privilege, however, is not absolute and is narrowly construed. Gen.
Motors Corp. v. United States, No. 07-14464, 2009 WL 5171807, at *1 (E.D.
1
Attached to this report are an additional 18 pages and a one-page letter from Sgt.
Dunbeck to Joseph Fawaz. (See 56-8 at 1 n.2.)
3
Mich. Dec. 23, 2009) (Roberts, J.). Here, I am informed by an oft-cited decision
which reflects upon “sources of confusion in analysis of assertions of privilege by
law enforcement agencies,” in part, as follows:
Similarly, courts could apply the “deliberative process” privilege to
most kinds of information generated by police departments only if
they are willing to stretch, in some instances almost beyond
recognition, the policy rationale that supports that privilege. As
originally developed, the deliberative process privilege was designed
to help preserve the vigor and creativity of the process by which
government agencies formulate important public policies. See, e.g.,
Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873, 881–82 (5th
Cir.1981). The principal idea that inspires the privilege is that the
people who contribute to policy formulation will be less afraid to offer
honest (albeit painful) analyses of current and contemplated policies,
and will be less shy about suggesting bold, creative (and sometimes
hairbrained) policy alternatives, if they know that their work is not
likely to be disclosed to the public. As I will suggest below, it is not at
all clear to me that the basic assumption that informs this body of law
is well-made. For present purposes, however, the point is this: the
rationale that supports this privilege should fix the limits of its reach.
The “deliberative process” privilege should be available only to
communications that contribute to a deliberative process.
Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 658–59 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (Brazil, M.J.)
(emphases in original). In addition, as described more recently by our Court of
Appeals:
To come within [the] deliberative process privilege, a document must
be both “predecisional,” meaning it is “received by the decisionmaker
on the subject of the decision prior to the time the decision is made,”
and “deliberative,” the result of the consultative process. Although
this privilege covers recommendations, draft documents, proposals,
suggestions, and other subjective documents that reflect the opinions
of the writer rather than the policy of the agency, the key issue in
applying this exception is whether disclosure of the materials would
4
expose an agency’s decisionmaking process in such a way as to
discourage discussion within the agency.
Rugiero v. Dep’t of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
In this case, the parties are generally in agreement about these legal
standards, but dispute whether the privilege applies to the redacted portions of the
report at issue here and, if so, whether the qualified nature of the privilege can be
overcome. First, as a preliminary matter, Defendants argue that the deliberative
process privilege can be asserted by counsel - a position which Plaintiffs dispute –
but, alternatively, provide an affidavit asserting the privilege from DeShaune Sims,
a Commander in the Professional Standards Bureau of the Internal Affairs Section
of the Detroit Police Department. (Compare DE 56 at 8-9, DE 57 at 2-3; see also
DE 56-7.) Having reviewed the affidavit, I conclude that it cures any defect in the
assertion of such privilege by counsel and provides factual support for the privilege
asserted. Accordingly, I conclude that Defendants have properly asserted the
privilege, without having to determine who has standing to assert it.
Second, Defendants assert that the privilege applies to portions of internal
affairs reports containing advisory opinions, recommendations, or deliberations,
and therefore applies to certain redacted portions of the Dunbeck report. (DE 56 at
7, citing Perry v. City of Pontiac, 07-14036, 2011 WL 4345239, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 16, 2011) (Lawson, J.)). Plaintiffs counter that the Dunbeck report contains
5
“purely factual investigative materials,” and not advisory opinions protected by the
privilege. (DE 57 at 5, citing id.) Thus, the only dispute is not over whether the
privilege generally applies to a police department’s internal investigation reports,
or to the specific portions of the Dunbeck report (if any) containing advisory
opinions, recommendations, or deliberations, but whether the specific redacted
portions of the report at issue are purely factual in nature.2
Defendants have provided the Court with redacted and unredacted copies of
the Dunbeck report for an in camera review, and claim the deliberative process
privilege for the redacted portions of pages 55-57 and 59.3 (See DE 56-8.) The
title of the section beginning on page 55 has been entirely redacted and will be
referred to as the “Issues” section. The other two sections at issue are labeled
“Conclusion and Recommendation.” and “Second Endorsement.” (See DE 38-5 at
55-57 and 59.) I will address each section in turn.
1.
“Issues” Section of Report (DE 38-5 at 55-56)
2
In any case, the Court is satisfied that the deliberative process privilege could
apply to internal affairs reports of police departments, based upon Perry and other
authorities cited in the Defendants’ briefs.
3
There are two page numbers on the reports—one typewritten and one handwritten
in the upper right hand corner of the page. For the purposes of this order, the Court
will refer to the handwritten numbers, which includes the transmittal letter as page
1. This manner of referencing the page numbers is consistent with the case
management pagination in DE 38-5. (See also DE 56-8 at n. 2.)
6
The information in this section is not protected by the deliberative process
privilege, because it consists only of factual investigative information. It merely
summarizes who Sergeant McKay interviewed during her investigation, the facts
on which she based her determinations, and the actions taken by Sergeant McKay
during the investigation. See EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-907, 2010
WL 748250, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2010).4 There is nothing in this section
that is in any way deliberative. Nor would it expose the agency’s decision-making
process in such a way as to discourage discussion within the agency. As such, I
conclude that this section should be unredacted in its entirety and provided to
Plaintiffs, because it is not protected by the deliberative process privilege.
2.
“Conclusion and Recommendation” Section of Report (DE
38-5 at 56-57)
To be clear, Defendants assert both the deliberative process privilege and the
informant privilege to justify the redactions on these pages. (DE 56-8 at 2.) Here,
too, I conclude that the deliberative process privilege does not apply to the
redacted information in this section. It is merely a summary of the internal affairs
4
In the context of an internal investigation, an example of items not protected by
the privilege include: “who the [agency] interviewed during its investigations; who
conducted the investigations; the facts on which the [agency] based its cause
determinations; the documents or testimony on which the [agency] based its
finding of fact included in the determination; the actions taken during the
investigation by the [agency], the communications between the [agency] and
witness . . .; and the dates on which the investigations were started and finished.”
Peoplemark, 2010 WL 748250 at *2
7
investigation, contains only factual information, and is devoid of advisory
opinions. As such this section should be unredacted and provided to Plaintiffs.
However, the provisions relating to the confidential informant (seemingly limited
to six lines in the second full paragraph) are protected by the law enforcement
privilege, as noted below, and may remain redacted to the extent that they would
identify this individual.
3.
“Second Endorsement” Section in Report (DE 38-5 at 59)
As to this 10-line redaction, Defendants only assert the deliberative process
privilege. (DE 56-8 at 2.) This is the closest case for applying the privilege in the
Dunbeck report. However, construing the privilege narrowly, this paragraph is not
protected. It contains the results of the investigation into Sergeant McKay’s
conduct. It could be argued that it contains the opinion of Captain Brian Mounsey
as to Sergeant McKay’s compliance with department policy. However, a closer
reading reveals that it merely summarizes the facts on which Captain Mounsey
based his determination. The Court further notes an inconsistency in Defendants’
redactions to this section. Defendants released the first and third paragraphs of the
Second Endorsement, which contain Captain Mounsey’s findings and
recommendations. The Court fails to see why findings and recommendations in
the second paragraph, along with factual summaries, should not similarly be
8
produced. As such, this paragraph should likewise be unredacted and provided to
Plaintiffs in its entirety.
B.
Law Enforcement Privilege
Defendants assert the “informant privilege” with regard to certain
information redacted from 18 pages in this report. (See DE 56-8 at 1-2.) Plaintiffs
do not directly contest the portions of the Dunbeck report that Defendants claim
are protected by the law enforcement privilege. (Compare DE 56 at 10-13, DE 57
at 5-7.) Nonetheless, having performed an in camera review of the unredacted
report at issue here, and having made the foregoing rulings that the deliberative
process privilege does not apply to the above-discussed redactions, the Court feels
compelled to specifically address Defendants’ assertion of the “informant
privilege” as to certain redactions that appear on pages 50 and 56 (DE 38-5 at 50,
56).
The law enforcement privilege preserves the government’s ability to
“withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish to law enforcement
personnel information concerning violations of the law.” Holman v. Cayce, 873
F.2d 944, 946 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59
(1957) and 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2019
(1970)). Here, the privilege is properly asserted as to the redacted portions of the
Dunbeck report referring to the identity of the confidential informant. In
9
particular, I note Defendants have fairly asserted the “informant privilege” as to the
six lines redacted from the final paragraph on Page 50 (DE 38-5 at 50) and the
second through fifth sentences of the second full paragraph on Page 56 (DE 38-5 at
56.) (See DE 56-8 at 2.) In other words, even in the portions of the Dunbeck
report to be unredacted as set forth above, Defendants may retain the redactions
that would identify the confidential informant to whom they allude in their brief.
C.
Purely personal information
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that, even if a qualified privilege applies to the
redacted information at issue, their need for and interest in the information
outweighs the need to shield it. (DE 57 at 5-7.) In light of my conclusion that the
information at issue is not protected by the deliberative process privilege, in large
part the Court need not address this argument. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any
provisions relating to the confidential informant are protected by the law
enforcement privilege, as noted above, and may remain redacted to the extent that
they would identify this individual.
Moreover, to the extent, if at all, the parties disagree about whether
Defendant City of Detroit properly redacted other private and confidential
information contained within the Dunbeck Report (compare DE 56 at 13-15, DE
57 at 5-7), such as “pension numbers, social security numbers, addresses,
telephone numbers and birth dates[,]” Defendants may retain their redactions of
10
such private information (see DE 38-5 at 60), consistent with any applicable
Freedom of Information statutes.
III.
ORDER
In sum, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part.
Specifically, as outlined in my August 26, 2016 interim order, the following must
be done: 1) Defendants’ counsel must either accept subpoenas on behalf of Officer
Hassan or immediately provide Officer Hassan’s contact information to Plaintiffs’
counsel; 2) Defendants must produce Sergeant McKay for deposition after the
conclusion of the state court criminal proceeding; 3) Officer Hassan’s deposition
must take place on the same day as Sergeant McKay’s, the order to be determined
by Plaintiffs; and 4) Defendants are entitled to depose Plaintiff Fawaz after the
McKay and Hassan depositions have occurred. (DE 55.)
Additionally, Defendants must (at least two weeks prior to the McKay and
Hassan depositions) provide Plaintiffs with a copy of the Dunbeck report that has
been unredacted consistent with this order.
Finally, nothing in this order shall be interpreted as excusing the parties’
compliance with any obligations which may otherwise arise in this federal court
civil matter under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of the
Eastern District of Michigan, or case management orders, with regard to witnesses’
identities and contact information, subject to any legitimate privileges.
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Defendants’ counsel must certify to Plaintiffs’ counsel in writing that he (defense
counsel) will accept service of any subpoenas on behalf of any present or former
City of Detroit employees whose contact information is withheld.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 29, 2016
s/Anthony P. Patti
Anthony P. Patti
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record
on September 29, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail.
s/Michael Williams
Case Manager for the
Honorable Anthony P. Patti
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