Young et al v. International Union United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 651 et al

Filing 34

OPINION and ORDER denying pltf's motion for reconsideration 27 ; denying pltf's motion for leave to file amended complaint instanter 28 ; denying pltf's motion for leave to file amended complaint as to General Motors 31 Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EARLINE YOUNG, et al.,
Case No. 15-11151
Plaintiffs,
Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
v.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE &
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
OF AMERICA (UAW), LOCAL 651, et al.,
Defendants.
/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
[27], DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED
COMPLAINT INSTANTER [28], DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT AS TO GENERAL MOTORS [31]
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the Court's December 1,
2015 opinion and order granting UAW Defendants' motion to dismiss and denying Plaintiffs'
requests to amend complaint. (Dkt. no. 23.) On the same date that they filed the motion for
reconsideration, Plaintiffs also filed a motion for leave to amend complaint instanter. (Dkt.
no. 27.) On January 5, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file amended complaint
as to [Defendant] General Motors. (Dkt. no. 31.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court
finds that there is no palpable defect in the order, that Plaintiffs have not persuaded the
Court that it should rule differently, and that amendment would be futile, therefore the Court
DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and motions for leave to file amended
complaint.
Pursuant to Rule 7.1(h) of the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Michigan, a party

may file a motion for reconsideration within fourteen days after a court issues an order to
which the party objects. Although a court has the discretion to grant such a motion, it
generally will not grant a motion for reconsideration that “merely present[s] the same issues
ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication.” E.D. Mich. LR
7.1(h)(3). To persuade a court to grant the motion, the movant “must not only demonstrate
a palpable defect by which the court and the parties . . . have been misled but also show
that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case. Id.
Plaintiffs first ask the Court to reconsider its prior decision denying Plaintiffs leave to
amend the Complaint. In addition to addressing UAW Defendants' motion to dismiss, the
Court's December 1, 2015 opinion and order addressed Plaintiffs' general "requests" to
amend the Complaint. After referring to amendment in their responsive pleadings and at
the hearing, Plaintiffs were given the opportunity at the hearing to specifically address what
amendments they sought to make to the Complaint. As set forth in the opinion and order,
at footnote 5, Plaintiffs were unable to identify specific contractual provisions they allege
were violated. The Court also noted that the factual matter which Plaintiffs sought to add
at that time was already under consideration by the Court and did not change the Court's
analysis. The Court denied those requests to amend as futile. Although not a basis for the
Court's denial, it is worth noting that Plaintiffs had not complied with the Local Rule 15.1 in
seeking to amend their pleading, and had not provided a proposed amended complaint.1

1

Although the Court opted to consider Plaintiffs' prior and very general requests to
amend the complaint, the Sixth Circuit has noted that "[a] request for leave to amend
'almost as an aside, to the district court in a memorandum in opposition to the
defendant's motion to dismiss is . . . not a motion to amend.'" C & L Ward Bros., Co. v.
Outsource Solutions, Inc., 547 Fed. Appx. 741 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing La. Sch. Emps.'
Ret. Sys. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 622 F.3d 471, 486 (6th Cir. 2010)).
2

With respect to the Court's decision to deny Plaintiffs' prior requests to amend, Plaintiff has
not shown a palpable defect in the decision to deny the prior requests to amend.
Plaintiff also asks the Court to reconsider its decision that the only Plaintiffs for whom
the statute of limitations was tolled were the two Plaintiffs who had signed the internal
appeal of the prior grievance, in compliance with the appeal process set forth in the UAW
Constitution, which specifically requires that the appeal "must include an original physical
signature, signed by the member(s)." (Constitution of the International Union (UAW),
Adopted June 2010, Def.'s Mot. Dismiss dkt. no. 16, Ex. 9; Compl. ¶¶ 28-32.) The Court
considered the allegations in the Complaint and the appeal documents central to that
allegation to conclude that the appeal was signed by only two Plaintiffs: Shante Marshall
and Jakeiya Anderson. The Court relied on case law holding that the parties to such an
appeal were those who signed it, as required by the UAW Constitution. See VanRiper v.
Local 14, UAW, 2015 WL 45533 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 2, 2015); DeMott v. UAW Int'l Union, 2011
WL 824488 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2011) (Edmunds, J.). The Court found that "the Complaint
and documents show that the only two Plaintiffs who brought the appeal pursuant to the
UAW Constitution requirements were those who signed it." (Op. And Order 15, dkt. no. 23.)
Plaintiff has not submitted evidence that shows that the appeal was signed by anyone other
than these two Plaintiffs. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss Ex. 7, dkt. 16-8; Compl. ¶¶ 28, 29.) Plaintiffs'
proposed amended complaint does not change this analysis, despite adding the allegation
that Plaintiffs Marshall and Anderson were "intending it to be on behalf of all the other
members of the original group grievance, which includes all plaintiffs" and alleging that
other plaintiffs had made inquiry on the status of the appeal. (Proposed Amended Compl.
¶¶ 40, 43, dkt. no. 28-1.) Plaintiffs have alleged no new information that would warrant
3

reconsidering its earlier decision to dismiss all Plaintiffs except Marshall and Anderson,
those whose original signatures appear on the appeal.
Finally, Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider its decision related to Plaintiffs' claims
of breach of the collective bargaining agreements. That decision was based largely on
Plaintiffs' failure to identify specific contractual provisions to support their inferences and
legal conclusions that the Plaintiffs are entitled to higher pay rates and levels of seniority.
In arguing the issue, Plaintiffs rely on their "proposed amended complaint," which was not
before the Court at that time and was not a basis for the Court's December 1, 2015
decision. The Court herein considers the proposed amended allegations in concert with
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and motions for leave to amend.
As set forth above, Plaintiffs failed to show a reason to reconsider the Court's
December 1, 2015 dismissal of all Plaintiffs except Marshall and Anderson. Plaintiffs'
proposed amended complaint does not include allegations that state a plausible claim for
relief as to Plaintiffs Marshall and Anderson. The proposed amended complaint confirms
that Plaintiffs Marshall and Anderson were hired in 2006. (Proposed Amended Compl. ¶
10, Ex. H, dkt. nos. 28-1, 28-12.) They were, therefore, not subject to Plaintiffs' allegations
regarding contractual provisions relating to "employees hired prior to October 18, 1999."
(E.g., id. at ¶ 10, 23.) Other allegations relating to Marshall and Anderson were addressed
in the prior opinion and order and Plaintiffs do not show a palpable defect in that order,
even in consideration of the more specific allegations now presented in the proposed
amended complaint.
The Court has presumed the factual allegations in the complaint (and now the
proposed amended complaint) to be true and has drawn reasonable inferences in favor of
4

Plaintiff, the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross
and Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). Yet it remains "a basic tenet of
contract law that a party can only advance a claim of breach of written contract by
identifying and presenting the actual terms of the contract allegedly breached.”
Northhampton Restaurant Group, Inc. v. FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 492 Fed. Appx. 518, 522
(6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). When the Court considers Plaintiffs' conclusory
allegations next to the plain language of the cited provisions they purport to represent, the
Court is unable to draw the reasonable inferences necessary to support Plaintiff's claims.2
Plaintiffs have not show a palpable defect in the Court's opinion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that "a party may amend its pleading
only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely
give leave when justice so requires." The Sixth Circuit has held that "where a more carefully
drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to
amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice." U.S. ex
rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 644 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
“Denial may be appropriate, however, where there is ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory

2

For example, "In February, 2009, GM and the UAW signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) giving all Delphi Flint East employees who transferred to GM in
January, 2009 a retroactive March 17, 2008 GM Corporate Seniority date (Exhibit E). This
fictitious seniority date was created by defendants to avoid the requirements of listing these
plaintiffs as having 2006 (or earlier) seniority dates, which would have retroactively made
them Tier I employees pursuant to the 2007 GM-UAW CBA." (Proposed Amended Compl.
¶ 26, dkt. nos. 28-1 (emphasis added, proposed amendment underlined)). What remains
lacking are contract terms which have been breached. It is not enough to argue that
something else "should" have happened. (For example, Id. ¶ 22.) The Court addressed this
provision in the opinion and order and Plaintiff has not shown an error in the opinion, even
when considered with the proposed amended allegations.
5

motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). "A proposed amendment
is futile if the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Riverview
Health Institute LLC v. Medical Mutual of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted).
As the Court noted in its December 1, 2015 opinion and order, Plaintiffs failed to
identify specific contractual language that supported their vague and conclusory allegations
that Defendant General Motors violated the collective bargaining agreement and other
agreements by improperly determining Plaintiffs' pay rates and seniority. At that time, they
not only failed to identify the specific contractual provisions that were violated, but failed to
provide the relevant documents. Yet with the motion to dismiss, the Court considered those
documents that were both referred to in Plaintiffs' complaint and integral to Plaintiffs' claims.
Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2007);
Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.1999); Weiner v. Klais and
Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint now includes
the documents, most of which were considered in the motion to dismiss when referenced
in Plaintiffs' claims and provided by UAW Defendants, and contains specific excerpts from
those documents. As set forth above with respect to Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration,
the proposed amended complaint does not allege facts that provide a basis for finding that
Plaintiffs other than Marshall and Anderson submitted the internal appeal and thus tolled
the statute of limitations, and it does not provide allegations that would defeat a motion to
dismiss as to these two Plaintiffs. Such amendment would be futile.
6

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration [27], DENIES Plaintiff's Motion For Leave To File Amended Complaint
Instanter [28] and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion For Leave To File Amended Complaint As To
General Motors [31].

SO ORDERED.

S/Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge
Dated: February 15, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
on February 15, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Carol J. Bethel
Case Manager

7