Carter v. Redford Township et al

Filing 21

OPOINION AND ORDER granting 15 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DEJUAN CARTER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 15-11370

v.
REDFORD TOWNSHIP, et al.
Defendants.
/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Now before the court is Defendant Redford Township’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, (Dkt. # 19), on Plaintiff’s Monell claim. The matter has been fully briefed,
and the court concludes that a hearing is unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2).
For the reasons detailed below, the court will grant the Defendant Township’s Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 20, 2013, Plaintiff DeJuan Carter attended the wedding reception of a
family member in Redford Township. (Dkt. # 15, Pg. ID 74; Dkt. # 17, Pg. ID 135.) The
evening did not go well, and at some point during the event, Plaintiff entered into a
verbal dispute with the groom. (Id.) The police were called, and when Defendant
Officer Jason Haas arrived on the scene, he saw Plaintiff standing outside in the parking
lot, screaming and being restrained by one or two individuals. (Id.) While the parties
disagree about the exact sequence of events, there is no dispute that Defendant Officer
Haas struck Plaintiff at least twice. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this constituted an assault
and was unprovoked, (Dkt. # 17, Pg. ID 136), while Defendant Haas claims he did not

punch Plaintiff until he “attempted to pull away and squared up . . . in an aggressive
posture,” (Dkt. # 15-3, Pg. ID 101.) As a result of this encounter, Plaintiff claims he
suffered an “acute nasal fracture” and was diagnosed with a “mild cerebral concussion
and post concussive syndrome.” (Dkt. # 17, Pg. ID 137.) He subsequently filed this
Complaint against Defendant Haas in his official and individual capacities and
Defendant Redford Township, (Dkt. # 1), seeking damages under § 1983 for Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment violations.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 497
(6th Cir. 2003). The movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine
dispute as to a material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
“[T]hat burden may be discharged by showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence
to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810,
817 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must put forth enough evidence to
show that there exists “a genuine issue for trial.” Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909
(6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is not appropriate when “the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 243 (1986). In evaluating a summary judgment
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motion, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial . . . .
[C]redibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited.” Moran v. Al Basit
LLC, 788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Township violated his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by “failing to adequately train and/or supervise its police officers.”
(Dkt. # 1, Pg. ID 6.) In Monell v. New York City Dept. Of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978), the Supreme Court held that civil rights plaintiffs could sue municipalities under
§ 1983 if they could show that their injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom.
Under Monell and its progeny, a municipality may be held liable only (1) “when
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury,” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, and (2) when there is an “affirmative link between the
policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged,” Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 823(1985); see also Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir.
2007). A plaintiff must establish that the municipality’s official policies or customs (or
lack thereof) were a “moving force” behind the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights and
arose as a result of “deliberate indifference” to his rights. See Doe v. Claiborne Cty.,
103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996). As the Sixth Circuit has phrased it,
The key inquiry thus becomes whether, in viewing the [municipality]’s
policy in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], there was sufficient evidence
for reasonable minds to find “a direct causal link” between the County’s
policy and the alleged denial of [Plaintiff’s] right . . . . See, e.g., Blackmore
v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A municipality
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can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the plaintiff can demonstrate
that his civil rights have been violated as a direct result of that
municipality’s policy or custom.”) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct.
2018); Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)
(“[T]o satisfy the Monell requirements[,] a plaintiff must identify the policy,
connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was
incurred because of the execution of that policy.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Ford, 535 F.3d at 497 (6th Cir. 2008). The court will address Plaintiff’s failure to train
and failure to supervise claims separately.
A. Failure to Train
Defendant Redford Township argues it is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s “failure to train” claim because “Plaintiff cannot offer any evidence to show that
the Township’s training policies are inadequate . . . , much less that any alleged
inadequacy is the result of deliberate indifference.” (Dkt. # 15, Pg. ID 86.) For
inadequacy of police training to serve as the basis for § 1983 liability, it is not enough for
a plaintiff “to show that his injury could have been avoided if the officer had more or
better training.” Mayo v. Macomb Cty., 183 F.3d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 1999). He must
show the “failure to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by a municipality.”
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff claims that it is “patently obvious that Defendant Redford Township has
routinely failed to properly train its officers as to the proper use of force,” (Dkt. # 17, Pg.
ID 145). This argument is hollow, and not supported by the evidence. In fact, the
evidence demonstrates without contradiction that Defendant Haas, and other officers,
received some training in the use of force. Defendant Township has provided the court
with Officer Haas’ certificates of completion for several courses related to use of force,

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such as a “PPCT Defensive Tactics System Basic Certification” course taught by PPCT
Management Systems, Inc., (Id. at Pg. ID 111); a “Criminal Law and Procedure” course
at Grand Valley State University (Id. at Pg. ID 112); and a “Range 3000 XP Use of
Force” training through Michigan Mobile Ranges, Inc., (Id. at Pg. ID 113). Indeed,
Plaintiff’s own argument agrees that “Haas and other Redford Township police officers .
. . have sporadically received use of force training.” (Dkt. # 17, Pg. ID 145).
Furthermore, the Redford Police Department’s official “Policy and Procedure”
with respect to “Less than Lethal Use of Force” dictates that the defensive tactics
“preferred by Redford Township Police Department are those from PPCT. These
techniques are required subjects in basic police training as mandated by the Michigan
Commission on Law enforcement [sic] Standards.” (Dkt. # 5-6, Pg. ID 119 (emphasis
added).) “The simple fact that [Redford Township] did have a written policy as to when
an officer” can engage in less than lethal force and requires officers to receive training
in the preferred methods of force before even being hired “seems to obviate the
plaintiff’s argument.” Mayo v. Macomb Cnty., 183 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff has
failed raised a genuine dispute of material fact on this point. The court will grant
summary judgment on this aspect of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
B. Failure to Supervise
Defendant Township also claims it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
“failure to supervise” claim. This is a sub-species of Monell in which the allegedly
offensive government “custom” is one of inaction. Doe v. Claiborne Cty., 103, F.3d 495,
508 (6th Cir. 1996). For a municipality to be found liable under this theory, the plaintiff
must demonstrate:
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(1) The existence of a clear and persistent pattern of illegal activity;
(2) Notice or constructive notice on the part of the municipality;
(3) Tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that failure to act
constitutes deliberate indifference and amounts to an official policy of inaction;
and
(4) That the custom was the moving force or a direct causal link in the
constitutional deprivation.
Id.
Plaintiff has failed to provide the court with evidence that raises a genuine issue
of material fact on any of these factors. Nothing in the record suggests that Defendant
Haas had a history of using excessive force or otherwise violating suspects’
constitutional rights, and no evidence shows that Defendant Township was aware of
any such conduct. Without such knowledge, no deliberation can occur, and inaction on
the part of the Township cannot be the product of deliberate indifference. It cannot be
the moving force behind any constitutional deprivation that may have occurred.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff still attempts to argue that the Defendant Township’s
“complete and utter failure to review its officers’ performances on the job” permitted
“officers to continuously violate individuals [sic] constitutional rights, thereby causing
severe physical injuries similar to what occurred in the instant matter.” (Dkt. # 17, Pg.
ID 144; see also, e.g. Dkt. # 17-4, Pg. ID 175-76.) Plaintiff supports his claim on a thin
reed: a single, unpublished case, Kammeyer v. City of Sharonville, No. 01-00649, 2006
WL 1133241 (S.D. Ohio April 27, 2006), in which the district court held that a lack of
performance reviews under the prevailing circumstances could show that a detective did
not receive needed supervision in the course of an allegedly faulty murder investigation;
the court therefore allowed Plaintiff’s Monell claim to be submitted to the jury. But unlike
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the instant action, in Kammeyer the municipality was fully briefed on the allegations
against the detective. Not only did several people “sen[d] letters to the mayor . . . which
should have put [the city] on notice of the need to supervise” the detective, the
department’s “entire command staff reported their dissatisfaction with [the detective’s]
arrogance, failure in communications, and failures to follow through on his policing
efforts.” Kammeyer, 2007 WL 1133241, at *11. No similar history or notices exist in the
case at hand. Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden. The court will grant this aspect of
Defendant’s Motion, as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to claims
against Redford Township (Dkt. # 19) is GRANTED. A separate judgment will issue at
the conclusion of this litigation.

s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: June 15, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, June 15, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
[phone]

S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C1 ORDERS\15-11370.DEJUANCARTER.sj.jah2.wpd

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