Baker v. Stewart

Filing 30

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (LHos)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CORRINE BAKER,
v.

Civil No. 2:15-CV-11629

Petitioner,

Honorable George Caram Steeh

SHAWN BREWER,
Respondent.
_________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE
A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING
LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Corrine Baker, (“Petitioner”), confined at the Huron Valley Women’s
Correctional Facility in Ypsilanti, Michigan, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, through her counsel David S.
Steingold, in which she challenges her conviction for second-degree
murder, M.C.L.A. 750.317; and second-degree child abuse, M.C.L.A.
750.136(b)(3). For the reasons that follow, the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is DENIED.
I. Background
Petitioner’s case arises out of the tragic death of her four year old son
at the hands of her boyfriend, Brandon Hayes. This Court recites verbatim
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the relevant facts regarding petitioner’s conviction from the trial judge’s
lengthy opinion denying her post-conviction relief, since they are presumed
correct on habeas review. See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th
Cir. 2009):
Over the course of 3–4 days in April, 2010, four-year-old [DC]1
was beaten to death by his mother’s boyfriend, Brandon Hayes.
The murder took place in an apartment in Argentine Township in
southern Genesee County. Mr. Hayes went to trial and was
convicted by a jury of multiple (10) offenses ranging from drug
possession to 1st degree murder. Mr. Hayes did not appeal any
of his convictions and he is currently serving life without parole
on the murder conviction. His judgment of sentence is attached
as Exhibit 1. Corrine Baker, the mother of [DC], was charged with
2nd degree murder, MCL 750.317; and 2nd degree child abuse,
MCL 750.136b (3). In exchange for her testimony at the trial of
Mr. Hayes, the prosecutor agreed that if she pled guilty to the
charges, the sentence on 2nd degree murder would not exceed
13 years on the minimum to 30 years on the maximum. Ms.
Baker accepted the plea agreement, testified as required, and
was sentenced to 13 – 30 years. Michigan Department of
Correction records show her earliest release date to be April 22,
2023 - approximately 5 years from now. Her judgment of
sentence is attached as Exhibit 2. The victim in this case, [DC],
is pictured below. [picture omitted] It is difficult to convey to
others the manner in which [DC] was murdered. Several
photographs are being submitted with this opinion. The scope of
the injuries sustained by [D] is simply incomprehensible. Dr.
Brian Hunter, M.D. is the Medical Examiner for Genesee County,
Michigan. Dr. Hunter testified at the preliminary examination held
for Brandon Hayes. His testimony was made admissible at the
preliminary examination of Corrine Baker by stipulation of the
parties.
Because the victim was a minor at the time of the offense, the Court will refer to him by
his initials only to preserve his privacy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a).
1

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“ ... this is the worse - - worse beating I’ve ever seen
on any individual at any time during my forensic
pathology career, and I’ve done over 2,500
autopsies. And just the sheer number of injuries is
overwhelming, but when you look at sort of the
distribution of some of the injuries which I think are
thermal injuries, burns to the groin area and to the tip
of the penis, it’s, ah, probably the -- the pain is
unimaginable, and especially in the back of the left
hand where you have thermal injuries that are
severe. It’s as severe as any burn. I mean, when you
look at burn victims, I see burn victims that have
already gone to just charred ashes and that’s just one
step back.” (Pages 192-193)
Dr. Hunter testified at length regarding the multiple injuries
sustained by [D]. The photographs which have been included
with this opinion visually confirm Dr. Hunter’s testimony.
At the time defendant Baker was witnessing the beatings of her
son, at the hands of her boyfriend (Brandon Hayes), Baker was
on absconder status from a drug conviction and a probationary
sentence in Livingston County, Michigan. As such, she was in no
position to seek help from the police station, which was within
walking distance from the apartment she shared with her kids
and Brandon Hayes. Apparently, she also was in no position to
knock on the doors of her neighbors and request them to call the
police on [D]’s behalf. She did nothing. In fact, she hardly did
anything during the four days of assaults upon her son. A relative
of hers (who came to her apartment to buy drugs) was the
individual who finally summoned police assistance. However, by
then, it was too late.
***
From the time that the assault on [D] began until the time of his
death (3-4 days) Corrine Baker deflected any suggestion that she
take [D] to the hospital. Phone calls from her mother urging her
to take [D] to the doctor were ignored by Ms. Baker. Arnold
Hayes, the father of Brandon Hayes (the boyfriend), testified that
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he raised the issue of seeking medical care for [D]’s hand with
Corrine. He testified that he said “we should take him to
emergency.” Corrine Baker’s response to him was “I can’t. I can’t
really do that because they’ll think that I did it.” (July 19, 2010
Preliminary Exam Transcript at p 49).
Brandon Delong lived in close proximity to the apartment where
Brandon Hayes and Corrine Baker were living at the time of the
incident. Mr. Delong testified that on Saturday, April 10, 2010, at
approximately 4-5 P.M., he saw Brandon Hayes walk past his
home. Mr. Hayes was alone. He appeared to be headed towards
the Sunoco Gas Station on Silver Lake Road. (PE Transcript, p
67).
Michael Delong testified that he knew Brandon Hayes and
Corrine Baker. He testified that on “the Saturday before my
nephew was rushed to the hospital he (Brandon Hayes) had
walked up to the store.” The store was at the Sunoco Gas
Station. He testified that Hayes came back from the store
approximately 15 minutes later. (PE Transcript, p 69-73)
The next witness to testify was Christine Baker, defendant’s
younger sister. She and several friends had come to Corrine
Baker’s apartment. When they knocked on the door Corrine
came out of the apartment and closed the door behind her.
Eventually, Christine and her friends were let into the apartment.
She saw [D]’s face and said it looked “beat up”. The rest of [D]’s
body was covered with blankets. He appeared to be “sleeping.”
She was asked “Did you say anything to your sister about [D]’s
condition?”
Answer: “I told her that I was gonna call the cops.”
Question: “What was her response when you said you were
going to call the cops?”
Answer: “She shook her head no.”
Question: “Did she say anything to you?”
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Answer: “I’ll get in trouble.”
Question: “Did she say why she would get in trouble?”
Answer: “No, but I knew why.”
Question: “Do you remember Corrine saying anything about
being out of her district?”
Answer: “Yeah.”
Question: “What did she say in regards to being out of her
district?”
Answer: “I’m out of my district”
Question: “And what does that mean?”
Answer: “She’s supposed to be in Livingston County and she
was living in Genesee.”
Question: “Did you know why she was supposed to be living in
Livingston County and not Genesee?”
Answer: “She was on felony probation.”
When Christine Baker, defendant’s sister, left the apartment, she
called Rick Calhoun, [D]’s grandfather. Shortly thereafter, the
police arrived on the scene.
Cassandra Miller confirmed Christine Baker’s account as to why
Corrine Baker did not seek help from the police. Corrine Baker
told her that she was “not in her district.” (PE p 129- 130).
The next witness, Rodney Keen, was an uncle to Brandon
Hayes. He had helped move Corrine Baker and Brandon Hayes
into the apartment where these events occurred. Some of the
furniture they were using came from Keen’s house. Mr. Keen was
at the Baker/Hayes apartment on the Friday when the assaults
on [D] had just started. He does not remember which hand on
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[D] was injured but, “his whole hand was all swelled up, big,
blustery, red looking;” He said he told Corrine “the baby needs
medical attention and they both told me that they could not do
that because they had warrants for arrest and they had - - - didn’t
want Child Protective Services involved.”
He testified that he confronted Corrine a second time about
getting medical attention for [D] and on this occasion Brandon
was not in the room where this conversation was held. Corrine
did not ask him to do anything further. Later on, the issue of
whether Corrine had a warrant was brought up again. He testified
that he was told by her that she had a warrant for her arrest.
Angelo Panos, police officer with the Argentine Police
Department was the last witness to testify at Ms. Baker’s
preliminary examination. While on duty he was approached by
Richard Calhoun and he was told that he needed help at the
Pinehurst Apartment complex because there was a child that
was injured. He recalls the time being approximately 2:30 in the
afternoon. Apartment complex is just a couple blocks away from
the Police Department. Upon arrival at the apartment he was
directed to a bedroom inside and saw a young boy laying on his
back with a young lady sitting next to him. The young lady was
Corrine Baker. He said the child appeared to be ‘‘just beat up all
over”. (PE p 177) He described his first look at [DC] as
“devastatingly shocking.” He acknowledged that he lost his
professional demeanor when he turned and said to Corrine
Baker “What the f*** kind of animals are you? Look at this boy.
He’s crucified.”
People v. Baker, No. 10-27347-FC, pp. 1-4, 10-14 (Saginaw County Circuit
Court, March 23, 2018)(ECF No. 21-2, PageID.1602-05, 1611-15).
Petitioner moved to withdraw her plea on the ground that trial counsel
was ineffective. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, after which the trial court denied
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the motion to withdraw the plea. People v. Baker, No. 10-27347-FC
(Saginaw County Circuit Court, June 25, 2013). Petitioner’s conviction was
affirmed on appeal. People v. Baker, No. 317395 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 4,
2013)(Ronayne Krause, J., would grant leave to appeal); lv. den. 496 Mich.
853 (2014).
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254, which was held in abeyance to permit her to return to the
state courts to exhaust additional claims. Baker v. Stewart, No. 2:15-CV11629, 2017 WL 2334937 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 2017).
Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment,
which was denied on the merits in a lengthy opinion. People v. Baker, No.
10-27347-FC (Saginaw County Circuit Court, Mar. 23, 2018)(ECF No. 212). The Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal.
People v. Baker, No. 343321 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2018); lv. den. 503
Mich. 955, 923 N.W.2d 243 (2019).
This Court subsequently reopened the case and permitted petitioner
to amend her petition. The petition was again held in abeyance during the
pendency of petitioner’s request for a review of her criminal conviction by
the Michigan Attorney General Office’s Conviction Integrity Unit. (CIU).

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The case was reopened following completion of that review. Baker v.
Brewer, No. 2:15-CV-11629, 2020 WL 1952520 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2020).
Petitioner in her amended petition seeks habeas relief on the
following grounds:
I.

Corrine Baker’s plea was not made knowingly,
understandably, and voluntarily due to counsel’s
ineffectiveness, in violation of Ms. Baker’s due process
rights.

II.

Corrine Baker’s due process rights were violated when the
trial court accepted a guilty plea without a sufficient finding
of guilt.
II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal
law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the
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Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case
differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).
An “unreasonable application” occurs when “a state court decision
unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a
prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not “issue the writ
simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 410-11.
III. Discussion
A. Claim # 1. The ineffective assistance of counsel/involuntary
plea claim.
Petitioner first contends that her guilty plea was not knowingly,
voluntarily, or intelligently made because she was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
Initially, the Court observes that petitioner has no federal
constitutional right to withdraw her guilty plea. See Hynes v. Birkett, 526 F.
App’x 515, 521 (6th Cir. 2013). Unless a petitioner’s guilty plea otherwise
violated a clearly-established constitutional right, whether to allow the
withdrawal of a habeas petitioner’s plea is discretionary with the state trial
court. See Shanks v. Wolfenbarger, 387 F. Supp. 2d 740, 748 (E.D. Mich.
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2005). Moreover, “[i]t is well-settled that post-sentencing ‘buyer’s remorse’
is not a valid basis” to set aside an otherwise valid guilty plea. Meek v.
Bergh, 526 F. App’x 530, 536 (6th Cir. 2013)(internal quotations omitted).
A guilty plea that is entered in state court must be voluntarily and
intelligently made. See Shanks, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 749; Doyle v. Scutt, 347
F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (E.D. Mich. 2004)(both citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242 (1969)). In order for a plea of guilty to be voluntarily and
intelligently made, the defendant must be aware of the “relevant
circumstances and likely consequences” of his or her plea. Hart v. Marion
Correctional Institution, 927 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1991). The defendant
must also be aware of the maximum sentence that can be imposed for the
crime for which he or she is pleading guilty. King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151,
154 (6th Cir. 1994). When a petitioner brings a federal habeas petition
challenging his or her plea of guilty, the state generally satisfies its burden
by producing a transcript of the state court proceedings showing that the
plea was made voluntarily. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 324, 326 (6th Cir.
1993). The factual findings of a state court that the guilty plea was properly
made are generally accorded a presumption of correctness. The petitioner
must overcome a heavy burden if the federal court is to overturn these
findings by the state court. Id.
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It is only when the consensual character of a guilty plea is called into
question that the validity of a guilty plea may be impaired. Mabry v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1984). A plea of guilty entered by one fully
aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any
commitments made to him or her by the court, prosecutor, or his or her own
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or
unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature
improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (i.e.
bribes). Id. Federal and state courts will uphold a state court guilty plea if
the circumstances demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature
and consequences of the charges and voluntarily chose to plead guilty.
See Thirkield v. Pitcher, 199 F. Supp. 2d 637, 652 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Petitioner’s plea was voluntary and not coerced. Petitioner was
advised of the charges against her and the possible penalties. Petitioner
was advised of the plea and sentencing agreement, in which she would
plea guilty as charged and in exchange for her truthful testimony against
Hayes, the prosecution would recommend a sentence of 13 to 30 years on
the second-degree murder charge. (ECF No. 6-6, PageID.440-42); see
also 8/30/11 Plea Agreement Form, which Baker signed on August 30,
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2011 and which is submitted as part of the Rule 5 material. Under oath,
the trial court asked petitioner if she understood the plea and she replied
affirmatively; she had no questions about the plea agreement or its
consequences. Petitioner acknowledged that she had reviewed the advice
of rights form with her counsel and all of the rights she would be giving up
by pleading guilty. (Id., PageID.441-45). Petitioner was advised of the
rights that she would waive by pleading guilty. (Id., PageID.445-47). The
trial court again read the charges to petitioner and she indicated she
understood; when asked how she wanted to plead, petitioner replied
“[g]uilty.” When asked whether she understood that by pleading guilty she
would be giving up all of the rights she would have at trial, petitioner
answered that she did. Petitioner told the judge that it was her choice to
plead guilty. Petitioner denied that anyone threatened her or used undue
influence or force her to plea. Petitioner denied that there were any
promises used to get her to plea. The trial court asked petitioner if she was
pleading guilty “freely and voluntarily” and she replied yes. (Id.,
PageID.447-50). The transcript clearly shows that the plea was voluntary.
Petitioner now contends that it was counsel’s ineffectiveness that
convinced her to plead guilty. Petitioner alleges she was coerced into
pleading guilty by her defense counsel’s threat that she could be sentenced
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to up to life in prison or that the judge could at least exceed the sentencing
guidelines if she went to trial and lost.
To show that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel
under federal constitutional standards, a defendant must satisfy a two
prong test. First, the defendant must demonstrate that, considering all of
the circumstances, counsel’s performance was so deficient that the
attorney was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In so
doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
behavior lies within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Id. In other words, petitioner must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action might be sound trial strategy.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Second, the defendant must show that such
performance prejudiced her defense. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, the
defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
In order to satisfy the prejudice requirement for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
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errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on
going to trial. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 129 (2011)(citing Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985)). An assessment of whether a
defendant would have gone to trial but for counsel’s errors “will depend
largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at
trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Hill to require a
federal habeas court to always analyze the substance of the habeas
petitioner’s underlying claim or defense to determine whether but for
counsel’s error, petitioner would likely have gone to trial instead of pleading
guilty. See Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2003). The
petitioner must therefore show a reasonable probability that but for
counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty, because there
would have been a reasonable chance that he or she would have been
acquitted had he or she insisted on going to trial. See Garrison v. Elo, 156
F. Supp. 2d 815, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The test of whether a defendant
would have not pleaded guilty if he or she had received different advice
from counsel “is objective, not subjective and ‘to obtain relief on this type of
claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.’” Pilla v. U.S.,

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668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2012)(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.
356, 372 (2010)).
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on her ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, because she failed to show a reasonable probability that
she could have prevailed had she insisted on going to trial, or that she
would have received a lesser sentence than she did by pleading guilty. See
Shanks v. Wolfenbarger, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
Petitioner’s claim that her counsel coerced her into pleading guilty is
defeated by the fact that petitioner stated on the record at the plea hearing
that no threats or coercion had been made to get her to plead guilty.
Petitioner’s bare claim that she was coerced into pleading guilty is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of verity which attaches to
petitioner’s statements during the plea colloquy, in which she denied that
any threats had been used to get her to enter her plea. See Shanks v.
Wolfenbarger, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 750-51.
Moreover, even if counsel advised petitioner that she could receive
up to life in prison or at least an above the guidelines range sentence if
convicted after a trial, “accurate information regarding the possible
ramifications of proceeding to trial cannot be construed as coercive.
Rather, it is exactly the kind of accurate information regarding sentencing
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exposure which the defendant must have in order to make an informed
decision about whether to accept a plea offer.” U.S. v. Green, 388 F.3d
918, 923 (6th Cir. 2004). Contrary to counsel’s advice being misleading,
the information in fact was correct. Second-degree murder is punishable
by up to life in prison. The trial judge, in denying petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on post-conviction review, noted that trial
counsel negotiated a sentencing agreement of 13-30 years. The judge
observed that this was below the sentencing guidelines range of 22.5 to
37.5 years and a maximum of life in prison. 2 The judge concluded that in
light of the egregious facts of this case, “an argument could be made that
[petitioner] received a much better result than she deserved.” (ECF No. 212, PageID.1615). It is clear from the judge’s comments that had petitioner
gone to trial and lost, she could have faced a sentence of life in prison or at
least one at the top of the sentencing guidelines.
Petitioner also claims that trial counsel pressured her into pleading
guilty by showing her gruesome photographs of her deceased son which
she claims would have been inadmissible at trial.

Michigan’s Sentencing Guidelines, unlike the federal sentencing guidelines, only
provide for a minimum sentence; the maximum is determined by statute. See, e.g.,
Montes v. Trombley, 599 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2010).
2

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Petitioner offers no argument to support her claim that these
photographs would have been inadmissible. Reviewing potential evidence
with a client during trial preparation and possible plea negotiations is one of
a defense counsel’s duties.
Petitioner further claims that although she did not want to plead guilty,
she wanted to testify against Mr. Hayes in his separate trial. Petitioner
claims that she pleaded guilty only because her trial attorney falsely
informed her that the only way she could testify against Mr. Hayes is if she
pleaded guilty first.
Petitioner is correct that neither Michigan nor federal law would
prevent her from testifying against Mr. Hayes without pleading guilty.
However, had petitioner testified against Mr. Hayes at his trial without
pleading guilty, there is a very real risk that she could have given extremely
damaging information which could then have been used against her at her
own trial. Counsel was not ineffective for not advising his client that she
could testify against her co-defendant at his trial and still go to trial in her
own case, as this strategy would likely have backfired. See Brent v. State,
916 S.W.2d 34, 40 (Tex. App. 1995)(Defendant had no right to testify at his
own murder trial free from impeachment, and defendant’s counsel was thus
not ineffective for not advising defendant not to testify at trial of
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codefendant because of the danger that State might impeach the
defendant in his own trial with his testimony from codefendant’s trial).
Petitioner next contends that trial counsel misled her into believing
that she would receive good time credits if she pleaded guilty when such
credits, in fact, are no longer available in Michigan. Under the Truth in
Sentencing Law, a defendant is now required to serve his or her minimum
sentence.
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim because she “has
alleged no special circumstances indicating that [she] might have placed
particular emphasis on [good-time] credit in deciding whether or not to
plead guilty, particularly when she was looking at significantly more prison
time after a trial. See Ewing v. United States, 651 F. App’x 405, 411 (6th
Cir. 2016).
Petitioner also argues that she was coerced into pleading guilty by
virtue of the fact that counsel failed to attempt to obtain a change of venue
due to adverse pre-trial publicity, even though her co-defendant was
successful in obtaining a change of venue to St. Clair County based on the
negative media coverage of the case in Genesee County. Counsel did file
a motion for change of venue but never argued it. Petitioner’s claim that
her plea was involuntary because counsel was ineffective for failing to seek
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a change of venue is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish prejudice
because even if a change of venue had been granted, petitioner failed to
show any reasonable probability that the outcome of her case would have
been any different in a different venue, given the “overwhelming evidence
against [petitioner].” See Braun v. Ward, 190 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir.
1999).
Petitioner next contends that trial counsel gave her inaccurate or
misleading advice about available defenses.
Petitioner first claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
explore a duress defense.
At the time of petitioner’s trial, duress was not a defense to murder in
Michigan. See People v. Dittis, 157 Mich. App. 38, 40, 403 N.W.2d 94
(1987); See also Gimotty v. Elo, 40 F. App’x 29, 32 (6th Cir. 2002).
Recently, the Michigan Supreme Court modified that rule and held that
duress can be a defense to felony-murder if duress is a defense to the
underlying felony. People v. Reichard, 505 Mich. 81, 96, 949 N.W.2d 64, 73
(2020). However, the Michigan Supreme Court in Reichard clarified that a
“defendant’s duress defense to the underlying felony would only prevent
the enhancement of second-degree murder to first-degree murder.” Id.
Duress is still not a defense to second-degree murder in Michigan. Id., at
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95-96. Because petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, seconddegree murder, duress was an unavailable defense in this case.
Petitioner next contends that trial counsel failed to consider pursuing
a Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS) defense.
“Michigan law does not permit a defendant to plead battered spouse
syndrome as a freestanding defense but rather as part of a self-defense
claim.” Shimel v. Warren, 838 F.3d 685, 699 (6th Cir. 2016)(citing Seaman
v. Washington, 506 F. App’x 349, 360 (6th Cir. 2012)(citing People v.
Christel, 449 Mich. 578, 537 N.W.2d 194, 202 (1995)). Had petitioner used
deadly force against Mr. Hayes to repel his attack against her or her child,
she may have been able to assert a BWS defense but she could not use
this defense under Michigan law to defend her failure to protect her child
from the extensive and severe abuse at Mr. Hayes’ hands.
Buttressing counsel’s decision to forego a Battered Women’s
Syndrome Defense is that petitioner’s counsel and co-counsel each spoke
with an expert on domestic violence, Holly Rosen and Erica Schmittdiel.
Both experts informed counsel that BWS was not a valid defense to this
case because “that defense is outdated, and when used, it is to explain
why a domestic violence victim may kill their abuser in a kill-or-be-killed
situation.” (6/22/20 Declaration of Holly Rosen, ECF No. 26-1,
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PageID.3227, ¶ 9; 6/22/20 Declaration of Erica Schmittdiel, ECF No. 26-2,
PageID.3237, ¶ 9. Rosen and Schmittdiel informed counsel “that a jury
would most likely not be compassionate and may not acquit Ms. Baker” due
to several adverse factors, including:
• Domestic violence is not, and was not at the time, widely
understood.
• Mothers are held to a higher standard than fathers or nonbiological parental figures.
• The police report from Ms. Baker’s case indicated that visitors
came to the home, asked what was wrong with her son, and she
said nothing to indicate that he had been harmed.
• The general public often responds to victims of domestic
violence with less compassion, and more judgement [sic], when
they are known to use illegal drugs.
(6/22/20 Declaration of Holly Rosen, ECF No. 26-1,
PageID.3227–28, ¶ 10; 6/22/20 Declaration of Erica
Schmittdiel, ECF No. 26-2, PageID.3237–38, ¶ 10.)
Finally, Rosen and Schmittdiel noted that while it was not in their area
of expertise to advise someone whether to plead guilty, in this case, if
asked for their opinions, both stated “it is possible I agreed a plea might be
a serious option for [Baker] to consider, given reasons stated in Declaration
#10.” (6/22/20 Declaration of Holly Rosen, ECF No. 26-1, PageID.3231, ¶
16; 6/22/20 Declaration of Erica Schmittdiel, ECF No. 26-2, PageID.3241, ¶
16). Although each expert believed that a plea to a child abuse charge
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rather than second-degree murder was more appropriate, their prior
statements and reservations about the case remained. Their affidavits
support counsel’s decision to seek a plea bargain rather than raise a BWS
defense.
Petitioner thus does not identify any viable defense she had.
Moreover, the favorable plea bargain that petitioner received weighs
against a finding that counsel was ineffective for advising a guilty plea. See
Plumaj v. Booker, 629 F. App’x 662, 667 (6th Cir. 2015)(citing Pilla, 668
F.3d at 373; Haddad v. United States, 486 F. App’x 517, 522 (6th Cir.
2012)). Furthermore, “the Supreme Court has never held that the benefits
of a plea agreement alone cannot suffice to answer the prejudice inquiry,
namely whether ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.’” Id. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59).
Petitioner received a very favorable sentence in this case. She risks
facing decades in prison if her plea is vacated, she goes to trial, and loses.
Petitioner’s earliest release date is April 22, 2023, only two years from now.
“The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty
plea—an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial—imposes its
own significant limiting principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty
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pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. Thus,
a different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a
habeas proceeding because, ultimately, the challenge may result in a less
favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a
conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar downside potential.”
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. at 372–73 (emphasis original). Were this
Court to grant the petitioner habeas relief and ordered that her plea be
vacated, petitioner would be facing the possibility of up to life in prison from
a judge who has already indicated his negative opinion of petitioner and
this case. The Court rejects petitioner’s first claim.
B. Claim # 2. The insufficient factual basis claim.
Petitioner next claims that there was an insufficient factual basis to
support her guilty plea.
A habeas petitioner’s claim that there was an insufficient factual basis
for a guilty plea is non-cognizable on habeas review. See Watkins v. Lafler,
517 F. App’x 488, 500 (6th Cir. 2013). There is no federal constitutional
requirement that a factual basis be established to support a guilty plea. Id.
While M.C.R. 6.302(D)(1) requires that a factual basis must be elicited from
a defendant prior to accepting his or her guilty plea, the failure of a
Michigan trial court to comply this rule does not establish a basis for
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habeas relief. Id. “[T]he requirement that a sentencing court must satisfy
itself that a sufficient factual basis supports the guilty plea is not a
requirement of the Constitution, but rather a requirement created by rules
and statutes.” United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir.1995).
The lack of a sufficient factual basis would not render petitioner’s plea
invalid.
To the extent that petitioner claims that there was insufficient
evidence to convict her of second-degree murder, her guilty plea waives
review of such a claim.
An unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all pre-plea nonjurisdictional constitutional deprivations. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 267 (1973). By entering a guilty plea, petitioner has waived her right
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her of this charge.
See United States v. Manni, 810 F.2d 80, 84 (6th Cir. 1987); see also U.S.
v. Hawkins, 8 F. App’x 332, 334 (6th Cir. 2001).
IV. Conclusion
The Court will deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The
Court will also deny a certificate of appealability to petitioner. In order to
obtain a certificate of appealability, a prisoner must make a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
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demonstrate this denial, the applicant is required to show that reasonable
jurists could debate whether, or agree that, the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner, or that the issues presented were adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 483-84 (2000). When a district court rejects a habeas petitioner’s
constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims to be debatable or wrong. Id. at 484. “The district
court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final
order adverse to the applicant.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule
11(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the Court will deny petitioner a
certificate of appealability because she failed to make a substantial
showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right. Myers v. Straub, 159
F. Supp. 2d 621, 629 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The Court will also deny petitioner
leave to appeal in forma pauperis, because the appeal would be frivolous.
Id.
V. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That a Certificate of Appealability is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner will be DENIED leave to
appeal in forma pauperis.
Dated: May 5, 2021

s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
May 5, 2021, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Leanne Hosking
Deputy Clerk

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