Macklin v. Wayne, County of, et al

Filing 5

ORDER (1) Granting Plaintiff's 2 Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs and (2) Dismissing Plaintiff's 1 Complaint Without Prejudice. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CARLET MACKLIN,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-cv-11646
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
WAYNE COUNTY et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED
WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF FEES OR COSTS (ECF #2) AND (2)
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT (ECF #1)
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
INTRODUCTION
On May 7, 2015, Plaintiff Carlet Macklin (“Plaintiff”) filed this action
against Defendant Wayne County and various other Defendants. (See the
“Complaint,” ECF #1.) Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed without the
prepayment of fees or costs. (See the “Application,” ECF #2.) Having reviewed
Plaintiff’s submissions, the Court GRANTS the Application and DISMISSES the
Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
ANALYSIS
A.

The Application
Applications to proceed without prepayment of fees or costs are governed by

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). This statute provides that a federal court “may authorize
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the commencement ... of any suit, action, or proceeding ... by a person who
submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets ... that the person is
unable to pay such fees....” Id. In her Application, Plaintiff says that she earns no
wages, has no money in any bank accounts, and has no sources of income. (See
Application at 1-2, Pg. ID 11-12.) The Court has reviewed the Application and is
satisfied that the prepayment of the filing fee would cause an undue financial
hardship on Plaintiff. The Court therefore grants the Application and permits
Plaintiff to file the Complaint without prepaying the filing fee.
B.

Dismissal of the Complaint
The Court is required to screen all complaints filed by plaintiffs proceeding

without the prepayment of fees or costs and dismiss those that (i) are frivolous or
malicious, (ii) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and/or (iii)
seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While the Court is obligated to liberally construe documents
filed by pro se plaintiffs, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a
complaint must still plead sufficient specific factual allegations, and not just legal
conclusions, in support of each claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–
679 (2009); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–471 (6th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the dismissal standard of Iqbal applies to a Court's review of a
complaint under § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim). The Court will therefore
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dismiss a complaint that does not state a “plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679.
It appears that Plaintiff is alleging, among other things, that Defendants have
stolen her personal property and her Social Security, Medicaid, and/or insurance
benefits. (See Compl. at 1-2, Pg. ID 1-2.) It also seems as if Plaintiff is claiming
that she received inadequate medical care and was the target of an extortion
scheme. (See id.) Plaintiff also says that her children were “taken” away from her.
(See id. at 2, Pg. ID 2.) Plaintiff asserts that these actions amount to “racketeering”
and she seeks “a full court hearing with all parties involved … who have broken
the law of the RICO Act.” (Id. at 1-2, Pg. ID 1-2.) Finally, Plaintiff has attached a
two-page, single-spaced typed document to her Complaint that appears to expand
upon the Complaint’s hand-written allegations. (See id. at Pg. ID 6-10.) Even if
the Court construed this document as part of the Complaint, in the manner
presented, it is largely indecipherable.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to state a claim under the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (the “RICO Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et
seq., her Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief. The civil remedies
section of the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), provides that “[a]ny person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter
may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court....” To demonstrate
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a violation of § 1962, Plaintiff must show the Defendants engaged in “(1) conduct
(2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). Plaintiff, however, has not
asserted, or even attempted to plead, any of the elements of a civil RICO claim.
Indeed, the Complaint fails to link the factual allegations alleged to the elements of
the RICO Act. The Court, therefore, dismisses Plaintiff’s RICO claim without
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Foster
v. Public Storage, Inc., 14-11396, 2014 WL 2154137 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2014)
(dismissing complaint under § 1915(e)(2) that alleged violation of the RICO Act);
Otworth v. Williams, Hughes & Cook, PLLC, 2011 WL 1542114, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 21, 2011) (dismissing complaint under § 1915(e)(2) and noting that the
plaintiff’s “bare reference to the RICO statute is insufficient to state a claim”).
The remaining claims in the Complaint – to the extent the Court can discern
them – appear to be claims brought under state law. The Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (A
“district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if
... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claims are dismissed without

prejudice.

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CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Application (ECF #2) is GRANTED and the Complaint (ECF #1) is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: June 10, 2015

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on June 10, 2015, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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