Neumann v. Neumann

Filing 73

OPINION AND ORDER Denying Respondent's Motion to Stay (Dkt. 67 ). Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Sandusky, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEVEN MICHAEL NEUMANN,
Petitioner,

Civil Action No. 15-CV-11995
HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH

vs.
JULIE ANNE NEUMANN,
Respondent.
_______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO STAY (Dkt. 67)
On May 17, 2016, this Court issued a decision granting in part Petitioner Steven
Neumann’s petition for return of children pursuant to the Hague Convention and the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 9001, et seq.

That

decision ordered Respondent Julie Neumann to return two of the three minor children, JSN and
MKN, to Mexico by June 30, 2016. See 5/17/2016 Op. & Order (Dkt. 58). On June 23, 2016,
just a week before the return date, Julie filed the instant motion to stay the Court’s return order
pending appeal (Dkt. 67). The Court expedited the hearing on the motion and ordered a response
from Steven. After reviewing the submissions and hearing from both parties, the Court issued an
interim order adjourning the original return date to July 27, 2016, in part so that the Court could
fully consider the motion and set forth a decision in writing. See 6/29/2016 Order (Dkt. 72).
The Court now denies Julie’s motion, concluding that none of the four factors relevant to the
appropriateness of a stay weighs in favor of issuing one here.
I. ANALYSIS
The four traditional stay factors guide the Court’s analysis: “(1) whether the stay
applicant has made a strong showing that [s]he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the
1

applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public
interest lies.” Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1027 (2013). The Court addresses each in turn.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Julie posits that she is likely to succeed on two issues: (i) whether Mexico was the
children’s country of habitual residence; and (ii) whether there is a grave risk that returning the
children to Mexico would expose them to physical or psychological harm. Resp’t Mot. at 9. To
meet the “strong showing” standard, “[i]t is not enough that the chance of success on the merits
be ‘better than negligible.’” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting Sofinet v. INS,
188 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1999)). More than the “possibility” of relief on appeal is required.
Id. In light of the existing record, the applicable burdens of proof, and the current state of the
law, Julie cannot meet the necessary threshold on either issue.
1. Habitual Residence
As part of the prima facie case for wrongful removal, Steven needed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mexico was the children’s country of habitual residence.
Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994-995 (6th Cir. 2007). That term is defined as “the nation
where, at the time of their removal, the child has been present long enough to allow
acclimatization, and where this presence has a degree of settled purpose from the child’s
perspective.” Id. at 993. The parties agree on the basic facts relevant to this first issue; the
disagreement is over the legal implications of those facts.
Julie asserts that the children perceived their time in Mexico as a transient, time-bound
dead end. Julie argues that despite the children’s physical location in Mexico, they never truly
acclimated to the Mexican culture, pointing to their attendance at an English-speaking school

2

with an English-style curriculum, and the non-Mexican citizenship of their friends. Resp’t Mot.
at 12. She contrasts this alleged lack of acclimatization to the children’s strong, enduring
personal bonds to Michigan, maintaining that the stay in Mexico was merely a temporary sojourn
away from their permanent home in Michigan. Id. at 13.
To be sure, the children’s residence in Atizapán de Zaragoza, Mexico, a suburb of
Mexico City, was prompted by Steven’s work assignment with Ford Motor Company, but Julie
conflates the notion of non-permanence with that of transience. A “degree of settled purpose”
does not require that the residence be “permanent.” See Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886,
898 (8th Cir. 2003) (“This settled purpose need not be to stay in a new location forever, but the
family must have a ‘sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.’”); Koch
v. Koch, 416 F. Supp. 2d 645, 651-652 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (“Courts that focus on the duration of a
family’s stay in a country and the objective facts surrounding it will generally be able to
distinguish between temporary visits such as sabbaticals and/or limited stays involving only one
parent and situations where parties establish habitual but not necessarily permanent
residences.”), aff’d on other grounds, 450 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2006).1

Rather, it looks to

“‘whether [the child] developed a certain routine and acquired a sense of environmental
normalcy by forming meaningful connections with the people and places [he] encountered in a
country prior to the [removal] date’”; it “is experience-driven,” “focus[ing] on the child’s
1

Even courts employing the “parental intent” test, rejected by the Sixth Circuit, have agreed that
the fact that a stay in a new country was of a limited or agreed-upon duration does not preclude
that new country from becoming the place of habitual residence for the child. See, e.g., Ermini
v. Vittori, 758 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A] habitual residence may be established even
when a move is for a ‘limited period’ and indeed ‘indefinit[e].’” (quoting Shah v. Barnet London
Borough Council and other appeals, [1983] 1 All E.R. 226, 235 (Eng. H.L)) (emphasis in
original)); Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 550 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he fact that the agreedupon stay was of a limited duration in no way hinders the finding of a change in habitual
residence. Rather . . . the parties’ settled purpose in moving may be for a limited period of
time.”).
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physical presence and the objective connections he has with a country.” McKie v. Jude, No. 10103-DLB, 2011 WL 53058, at *8-9 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 2011) (quoting Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk,
445 F.3d 280, 292 (3d Cir. 2006)).
That some of the children’s connections were not specifically with native-born Mexicans
does not persuade the Court otherwise. For instance, the fact that the children’s friends were of a
variety of nationalities or that they received their instruction in English fails to demonstrate that
the children were not comfortably settled in their home in Mexico, such that their situation had
failed to stabilize or normalize.2 “The Hague Convention is intended to prevent a case where
‘the child is taken out of the family and social environment in which its life has developed.’”
Robert, 507 F.3d at 991 (quoting Elisa Perez–Vera, Explanatory Report ¶ 12, in 3 Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session, Child
Abduction 1069 (1982)). What that environment looks like will vary from family to family. For
the Neumanns (and many other expatriate families) it may have consisted of an international,
English-speaking school and a community of internationally diverse friends. That does not make
it any less settled from the children’s perspective.3 And while the Court does not doubt that the

2

Julie appears to rely on Robert for the proposition that speaking the native language and
attending a native school points in the direction of acquiring that country as a habitual residence.
See Resp’t Mot. at 12. While Robert did note that the children in that case were fluent in French
and attended a French school, the court did not suggest that attendance at an international school
or a school with a different instructional language would have undercut a finding of habitual
residence. Rather, like this Court, it focused on aspects of daily living to determine habitual
residence, such as the limited clothing the children had brought to France, the borderline
unlivable state of the father’s residence, and the actual amount of time (three weeks) spent in
France by the children. Robert, 507 F.3d at 997-998.
3

Additionally, Julie’s argument that “[w]itnessing their Greengates schoolmates routinely
returning to their respective countries of origin can only have solidified the perception that their
own stay in Mexico was temporary,” Resp’t Mot. at 13 (internal citation omitted), relies on
Julie’s testimony that after the children moved to Michigan many of their friends departed
Mexico for elsewhere, Redacted Tr. Vol. 2 22:15-22:23 (Dkt. 52). This testimony hardly
4

children maintained strong connections back in Michigan, the record reveals only that while in
Mexico the children maintained relationships and kept in contact with their Michigan friends and
family; it does not demonstrate that their primary or most significant social interactions and
connections were tied to Michigan.4
That the children were aware that their time in Mexico might come to an end when the
current term of Steven’s contract is set to expire in 2017 — a contract that had been previously
renewed in 2014 and might be again — does not somehow diminish that the Neumann family,
including the children, built and experienced their day-to-day lives there. For almost four years,
Mexico was the place where the children went to school, played with friends, and spent time
together as a family. The Court would be hard-pressed to conclude that this amount of time was
insufficient for the children to become settled in their physical environment. Indeed, as MKN
expressed in his interview with the Court, Steven’s actions prompting the children’s relocation
establishes anything about what the children “routinely” experienced, and any claimed impact on
them is entirely speculative.
4

Julie’s citations to the record hardly establish the primacy of the Michigan connections. Resp’t
Mot. at 13. For instance, she points to the unremarkable proposition that the children remained
close with their grandmother. Redacted Tr. Vol. 2 25:25-26:18 (describing the children as
having a good relationship with their maternal grandmother, who lives in Michigan). Other
evidence she points to states in conclusory fashion that the children maintained some unspecified
form of contact with friends and relatives in Michigan. See id. 19:24-20:5 (Julie testifying that
the children “continue[d] to have contact” with Michigan, by being “in touch” with friends and
family through Facebook); id. 20:18-20:25 (Julie testifying that the children “[kept] in contact”
with friends from Michigan while in Mexico); id. 25:12-25:17 (Julie testifying that the children
“maintained their relationships” with friends and family from Michigan while in Mexico). Other
evidence merely shows that the children socialized with their friends and relatives when visiting
Michigan during the summer. Id. 20:6-20:7 (Julie testifying that when the children visited
Michigan “they went right back with their friends and their family”). Other evidence speaks to
the children’s experiences after relocating from Mexico to Michigan. See Redacted Tr. Vol. 1
79:12-79:23 (Dkt. 51) (counsel for Julie questioning Steven regarding the extent of JMN’s
communications with her cousins after the children’s return to Michigan); Redacted Tr. Vol. 2
20:25-21:1 (Julie testifying that upon return to Michigan the children rejoined their old groups of
friends and made new friends); id. 99:15-99:22 (Julie testifying that the children associated with
their paternal relatives while visiting the family cottages, and that the children were invited to a
party by Steven’s sister-in-law after returning to Michigan).
5

“had changed his life forever,” causing “the children to move and change schools when the
family was supposed to stay in Mexico for four more years.” 5/17/2016 Op. & Order at 7 n.5.
The cases on which Julie relies for support for her argument either apply the “parental
intent” standard — rejected by the Sixth Circuit, see id. at 6-7 (citing Robert, 507 F.3d at 990991) — or are distinguishable on their facts. See Papakosmas v. Papakosmas, 483 F.3d 617 (9th
Cir. 2007) (finding no settled parental intent to move the children’s habitual residences to
Greece, and concluding objective facts did not demonstrate Greece had become the new country
of habitual residence when children lived there for barely a four-month period); Armiliato v.
Zaric-Armiliato, 169 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (child’s habitual residence was Italy, the
place to which she continually returned between trips abroad and where she most frequently
attended school; travel to other countries up to two months at a time with her father, who
performed operatic engagements, did not undermine that conclusion).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Julie has not established a likelihood of prevailing
on appeal as to whether Steven proved Mexico was more likely than not the children’s country of
habitual residence.
2. Grave Risk of Harm
In contrast to the “preponderance of evidence” burden imposed on Steven to demonstrate
a wrongful removal, the standard for Julie to establish a “grave risk” defense under the
Convention is a heightened one, requiring clear and convincing evidence.

See Simcox v.

Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 604 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The ‘grave risk’ exception is to be interpreted
narrowly, lest it swallow the rule.”).

In her attempt to illustrate that “[t]he Court’s

determinations [in the May 17 decision] are inconsistent with the overwhelming facts in this
case,” Resp’t Mot. at 15, Julie not only raises new arguments that were not presented to this

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Court in her post-hearing briefing, she also overstates and distorts the facts of record. Putting
those facts in proper perspective, the Court concludes that Julie has not demonstrated that she is
likely to prevail on the issue of whether she provided clear and convincing evidence that a return
to Mexico creates a grave risk that the children will be exposed to psychological or physical
harm.
Julie contends for the first time that Steven’s alcoholism has “led to a repeated pattern of
domestic abuse — both physically and psychologically.” Id.; see also id. at 5.5 In support of her
sweeping assertion, Julie points to her testimony that “there were other instances” of domestic
violence by Steven against her prior to December 26, 2014. Redacted Tr. Vol. 2 28:10-28:13
(Dkt. 52). But she also acknowledged in her testimony that “[m]ost of them [were] just minor,”
id. 30:21-30:24; that they were “[n]ot near the level” reached during the December 26, 2014
incident, id. 28:10-28:13; and that she did not “have a count” as to how many instances of
domestic violence there had been, id. 30:21-30:24.
Julie also asserts that Steven “habitually push[ed] and shov[ed her] as a form of
intimidation and instigation.” Resp’t Mot. at 15. Julie had testified that Steven “always bumped
[her] with his belly and it would knock [her] and sometimes [she] would go flying.” Redacted
Tr. Vol. 2 28:24-29:3. But she only described a single concrete incident in which this occurred.
Id. 28:20-29:6. Notably, the children did not appear to be present; and Julie herself stated
alcohol was not involved. Haynes Report at 26. Beyond this, Julie indicated only that the “belly
5

In her post-hearing briefing, Julie never asserted that the evidence demonstrated a “repeated
pattern” of abuse to either her or the children — physical or psychological. Her proposed
findings of fact referenced only the December 26, 2014 domestic incident and briefly
acknowledged, without indicating any type of frequency or alleging any kind of pattern, that
Steven “[i]n the past” had been mentally abusive to the children. Resp’t Proposed Findings of
Fact & Conclusions of Law at 4-5, 6, 7, 9 (Dkt. 50). The remaining arguments focused on
Steven’s alcohol and substance-use disorders, and his failure to appropriately treat them. See
generally id.
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bumping” occurred “more than ten times,” noting that sometimes Steven “did it when joking and
sometimes he did it in anger.” Id. at 25-26. Approximately ten instances, an unknown subset of
which was not abusive in nature, over 17 years do not qualify as a “habitual” form of
“intimidation and instigation.”
Thus, the concrete instances of domestic violence against Julie during the course of a
marriage that lasted almost two decades consist of two discrete events — the December 26, 2014
incident and the 2003 Thanksgiving incident when Steven struck Julie while she was driving —
and the belly-bumping conduct of uncertain frequency and severity. While any incident of
domestic violence is unacceptable, the record does not bear out Julie’s characterization of a
“repeated pattern” of domestic violence.6
Moreover, the abuse of Julie, while certainly distressing, is relevant under the Hague
Convention only insofar as it affects the children. See 5/17/2016 Op. & Order at 24 (citing
Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 103-104 (2d Cir. 2013)). The only domestic incident that placed
the children at physical risk was the 2003 Thanksgiving incident, in which the children were
endangered indirectly by Steven’s interference with Julie’s ability to control the vehicle.
However, there is no evidence that the children were harmed by that instance.
Julie also characterizes the children as being “in the immediate zone of danger created by
Mr. Neumann’s rage” on December 26, 2014, Resp’t Mot. at 16, but, as the Court previously
6

Although not described as such in her motion, during oral argument Julie’s counsel
characterized the December 26, 2014 event as an attempt by Steven to kill Julie, thwarted only
by the intervention of the children. While the December 26 event, as described by Julie, was
unquestionably a serious assault, the Court does not conclude that Steven harbored an actual
intent to kill Julie or that he attempted to do so. The record is clear that Steven brandished the
knife toward Julie in a menacing manner, but there is no evidence that he wounded her or thrust
it at her in a way designed to wound her. Further, there is no suggestion in the Haynes Report
that the children perceived Steven’s actions as an attempt to “kill” their mother; nor was there
any such suggestion made to the Court when it interviewed the children.
8

noted, the record reveals that, despite the children’s intervention, Steven did not turn his
aggression upon them, 5/17/2016 Op. & Order at 21. And as the Court explained in its May 17
decision, because Julie and Steven are estranged — and now divorced by a Mexican court —
even upon JSN and MKN’s return to Mexico, the risk that the children would be exposed to any
future abuse is remote.
Similarly, the evidence fails to substantiate Julie’s assertions regarding the alleged
repeated pattern of direct abuse against the children. For the first time in her motion, Julie
asserts that Steven “habitually” slapped JSN in the head for no reason. Resp’t Mot. at 15.
Although Julie had not raised the issue before, the Court did address the issue of slapping in its
decision, noting that JSN mentioned the head-slapping to Dr. Haynes, who then reported that
JSN had stated that the slapping was sometimes done when Steven was “horsing around” and
sometimes when he was angry. See 5/17/2016 Op. & Order at 21 n.10; see also Haynes Report
at 41. In addition, there was no evidence that the alleged slapping physically harmed JSN or
exceeded traditional measures of discipline.7
As for the psychological and mental abuse of the children, Julie relies on statements from
the children to Dr. Haynes that, as the Court previously concluded, are indicative of some limited
emotional and/or verbal abuse of uncertain intensity, frequency, and purpose. 5/17/2016 Op. &
Order at 21-22. The evidence cited by Julie indicates that Steven did yell at or swear at the
children, at times while intoxicated, and that in the children’s view such yelling was
unwarranted. See Haynes Report at 35, 37, 41, 45. JMN and JSN also described Steven as
short-tempered, angry, or impatient. Id. at 36, 41, 42. While this conduct may be less than
exemplary, there is insufficient detail as to the frequency and circumstances of the “yelling” and
7

In fact, Dr. Haynes noted that “Julie stated that Steve never hit the children,” Haynes Report at
26; that “[MKN] stated that his father never has hit the children,” id. at 45; and that JMN had
stated that “her father never has been physically violent,” id. at 35.
9

“swearing” to justify a conclusion that it was never for any proper parental purpose. Notably,
Julie never testified that Steven’s yelling at the children was excessive or unjustifiable, or that
she ever urged Steven to refrain from this behavior. Her failure to criticize Steven for yelling at
the children suggests that the behavior was not nearly as egregious as she now claims, especially
considering that Julie did not shy away from confronting Steven over conduct she found
objectionable, such as his excessive drinking. See Redacted Tr. Vol. 2 30:25-32:7, 32:22-33:5.
Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that Steven’s behavior amounted to a repeated pattern of
psychological and mental abuse of the children.
Importantly, and as explained in detail in the May 17 decision, neither JSN nor MKN, in
their separate interviews with the Court, expressed or communicated a concern about a return to
Mexico that raised the specter of physical or psychological harm, let alone of a significant
nature. 5/17/2016 Op. & Order at 14. In fact, while both expressed a fierce desire to stay in
Michigan and unhappiness with their father, neither boy expressed a specific fear of their father
or identified specific concerns about being with him.
Nor did Dr. Haynes assert that a return to Mexico posed a “grave risk” of physical or
psychological harm. Rather, he opined that “there are multiple significant risks of different
kinds. . . . affect[ing] each of the parties and the children in different ways.” Haynes Report at
50. He noted risks of bad behavior associated with Steven’s alcoholism, but those risks exist
regardless of the location of the children. The mere fact that the children will be in the same
country as their father does not mean that they are more likely to be harmed — especially
because Steven’s interactions with them will be monitored and managed by the court making
custody and visitation decisions. Dr. Haynes also cited stress associated with divorce generally,
and especially if there is parental cohabitation. Id. at 50. But the former does not present any

10

special kind of risk to the children, and there is no reasonable likelihood of cohabitation given
the estrangement — and now Mexican divorce — of Steven and Julie.
The one specific risk raised was “feelings of apprehension regarding reunification with
their father.” Id. However, this view was expressed in the context of unsupervised time with
Steven and being placed into his custody. Haynes Suppl. Report at 3; see 5/17/2016 Op. &
Order at 15-16. Importantly, nothing in this Court’s decision requires reunification. The Court
did not, and does not, order the children returned directly to Steven’s custody. 5/17/2016 Op. &
Order at 30. It orders only a return to Mexico, following which another court can sort out the
question of custody and visitation.
Dr. Haynes recognized the children’s turbulent and contradictory emotions: they
expressed concerns about reunification with their father, and yet they “want to improve and
expand their relationship” with him. Haynes Suppl. Report at 3. This mix of emotions does not,
without more, translate into a grave risk of exposure to psychological harm.
Julie marshals other facts to support her theory that Steven generally is a destructive and
dangerous individual. For instance, she recalls two drunk-driving charges, an arrest for assault
of a police officer, and a single road-rage incident that took place in Mexico. Resp’t Mot. at 5, 6,
15. However, the legal charges stem from incidents that took place between 1991 and 1994, well
before the Neumanns were even married. Haynes Report at 17. And those incidents are
unconnected to the allegations of abuse at issue here.

Notably, Julie and Steven were in

agreement that Steven did not generally drink and drive, id. at 17, 26, and there has been no
evidence presented to the Court that Steven ever transported the children while intoxicated.
With regard to the 1993 assault, there is absolutely no information as to the
circumstances surrounding that incident (including whether alcohol was involved); therefore, the

11

Court declines to draw any type of conclusion from it, particularly considering it occurred over
20 years ago and was ultimately expunged. See id. at 17; Maple Grove Records, Resp’t Ex. II, at
330064.8
The road-rage incident — where another driver and Steven alternately passed each other
while on a highway — reflects irresponsible behavior, but, even by Julie’s account, Steven
exited the situation when it posed a significant level of risk to the family. See Redacted Tr. Vol.
2 66:4-67:13. While Julie claims that this is another example of how Steven has endangered the
children, Resp’t Mot. at 16 n.3, the Court cannot reach the same conclusion. Reckless driving is
certainly not what one would expect of a responsible father transporting children, but it does not
appear to the Court to be indicative of the type of “grave risk” contemplated by the Convention,
particularly given the singularity of the event.
Julie also refers to Dr. Haynes’s observation that Steven “endorsed a number of extreme
and bizarre thoughts which raises the question of the possibility of delusions or hallucinations.”
Haynes Report at 20; Resp’t Mot. at 15. But she has not pointed to specific instances where this
has occurred or how it has affected the children in the past. See 5/17/2016 Op. & Order at 29
n.16.
Finally, Julie’s motion contends that “the Children have been diagnosed by two
independent psychiatrists as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder [“PTSD”],” arising out
of the December 26, 2014 events. Resp’t Mot. at 7, 9, 17. At the stay hearing, Julie’s counsel
opined that returning JSN and MKN to Mexico would trigger such PTSD, causing them grave
psychological harm. Not only is this a new argument, but on the current record these statements
are both false and misleading.
8

Exhibits of Petitioner and Respondent referred to in this opinion are exhibits admitted into
evidence at the evidentiary hearing.
12

First, while several mental health professionals have been involved in this dispute, none
of them is a psychiatrist. Julie’s contention about that is simply wrong.
Second, in support of her contention that the children have been diagnosed with PTSD,
Julie offers Steven’s testimony of what he believes were the conclusions of other mental health
professionals — Steven Ceresnie (a Ph.D. psychologist and the children’s former therapist) and
social worker Chuck Snyder (Julie’s therapist who also treated the children). See id. at 7, 17
(citing to Redacted Tr. Vol. 1 73:4-73:18 (Dkt. 51)). The parties submitted no documentation
from Dr. Ceresnie, so any view he had on PTSD was relayed second-hand to the Court via
Steven’s testimony. Steven testified that Dr. Ceresnie (and Chuck Snyder) had informed him
that the children were either suffering from PTSD or showing signs of it. Redacted Tr. Vol. 1
73:4-73:15. Because of the hearsay and foundation problems with this testimony, it is not
trustworthy.
By contrast, Chuck Snyder’s views are documented. He wrote a letter to Julie’s lawyer
stating that the children were “report[ing] symptoms consistent with [PTSD],” Snyder Report,
Resp’t Ex. J, at 200002, and he set out a similar opinion at his deposition, Snyder Dep., Resp’t
Ex. O.9 But his conclusion is suspect, because he was hardly independent. His role was as
Julie’s therapist. In fact, he told Dr. Haynes that “Julie[ ] was his client, not the children.”
Haynes Report at 50. And he also claimed to treat the children by treating Julie. Snyder Dep. at
16 (“[M]y primary role in the children’s therapy is treating the mother.”). Moreover, according
9

It is unclear whether this was a firm diagnosis for each individual child. For instance, while
Chuck Snyder stated in his deposition that he made a diagnosis of PTSD for all three children,
Snyder Dep. at 14, other portions of the deposition and his notes suggest that the diagnoses were
less definitive and served only as a comparison to Julie’s own diagnosis of PTSD. See id. at 19
(indicating that the children’s symptoms were to a lesser degree than Julie); Snyder Notes, Ex. A
to Snyder Dep., at 300003 (“Kids likely have same diagnosis [of PTSD] with less intensity.”
(emphasis added)). As the Court mentioned supra, there has been no developed argumentation
or analysis on this point.
13

to Dr. Haynes, Chuck Snyder’s “orientation” was that of “trying to protect the children,” and he
made “diagnostic statements” in connection with the case that were “speculative and illadvised.”

Haynes Report at 52.

Dr. Haynes’s assessment of Chuck Snyder’s overall

recommendations concerning the Neumann family cast further doubt on both the accuracy and
reliability of Chuck Snyder’s conclusions regarding the children.
The only credible opinion about PTSD was that of Ph.D. psychologist Dr. Haynes, the
independent expert appointed by the Court in this case. He evaluated the children in July 2015
— several months after Chuck Snyder had. While Dr. Haynes stated that Chuck Snyder’s PTSD
diagnosis “at the time may have been accurate,” id. at 51, he opined that “[t]he children are not
diagnosed by this examiner at the present with [PTSD],” id. at 52. He explained that “the
children were struggling more with the experience of their family being significantly disrupted,
rather than . . . experiencing symptoms of PTSD.” Id. at 51.10
Third, no mental health professional has opined to this Court that returning the children
to Mexico would trigger a recurrence of PTSD.
Taken together, the evidence offered by Julie paints a portrait of Steven as an individual
with significant mental health issues. But most of the complaints Julie makes against Steven
speak to his general character and his fitness as a parent — all relevant considerations for the
question of custody, which looks to the children’s best interests and other factors relevant to
determining appropriate arrangements for rebuilding relationships fractured by divorce. That
task, however, is not the province of this Court.
10

Rather, this Court’s task is limited to

Dr. Haynes’s opinion regarding the source, and extent, of JSN and MKN’s distress is in line
with the Court’s own, admittedly non-clinical impressions after speaking with the two boys.
And despite Julie’s counsel’s claim of psychological harm arising from the children’s witnessing
their father trying to “kill” their mother, as the Court previously mentioned, none of the children
actually reported the incident as such, either to Dr. Haynes or to the Court. Indeed, MKN was
not even present for the dispute; he heard about it after the fact.
14

determining whether Julie has presented clear and convincing evidence that a return to Mexico
would expose JSN and MKN to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. She has not
done so.11
This Court’s conclusion that she failed to do so does not somehow render that burden
insurmountable, as she claims. Julie may take issue with the law as established under the Hague
Convention, but it is not the district court’s prerogative to bend that law to accommodate the
sympathetic facts of her case. Because the Court concludes that the relief Julie seeks cannot be
justified on the record she has developed and the law as it has developed, she is not likely to
succeed on appeal.
For those reasons, this first factor does not counsel in favor of a stay.
B. Irreparable Injury to Julie
Julie argues that returning the children to Mexico will necessarily require her to return as
well, causing her irreparable harm in three ways: (i) Julie’s presence in Mexico will place her at
“inordinate risk” of abuse from Steven; (ii) Julie faces the threat of criminal prosecution upon
her return to Mexico; and (iii) Julie will suffer a derivative irreparable injury resulting from the
children being removed from the place they have been living for approximately a year and a half.

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Julie’s motion, and counsel at oral argument, also takes issue with the fact that the Court has
not enacted measures that will ensure the children do not suffer further upon the return to Mexico
— namely, the failure to impose undertakings. See Resp’t Mot. at 18 (“[T]he Court further
refused to put in place ameliorative undertakings to protect the Children upon return to
Mexico.”). Significantly, aside from a post-judgment request to appoint a guardian ad-litem and
a therapist for the children, Julie has not requested the Court to impose any type of undertaking
on the children’s return. Perhaps more importantly, the Court is not authorized to impose
undertakings, absent a finding of “grave risk.” Simcox, 511 F.3d at 608 (“Absent a grave risk
finding, the Convention leaves no room for a court to establish, as the district court did in this
case, ameliorative undertakings designed to protect children against the risk of harm upon their
return. . . . Once the district court determines that the grave risk threshold is met, only then is the
court vested by the Convention with the discretion to refuse to order return. It is with this
discretion that the court may then craft appropriate undertakings.” (emphasis in original)).
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Resp’t Mot. at 18-19. While not unsympathetic to the hardships a return to Mexico will cause
Julie, the Court disagrees that these claimed injuries are irreparable.
First, the Court has not been presented with any evidence that the threat posed to Julie by
Steven is any greater in Mexico than in Michigan. The Court has received testimony that
Mexican authorities take seriously domestic violence. Redacted Tr. Vol. 1 116:17-120:7. In
fact, Julie testified that when seeking treatment for her injuries in Mexico, she did not tell the
Mexican doctors the actual source of the injuries because she “knew” that “they would go and
arrest [her] husband and he would be thrown into a Mexican prison and [she] didn’t think that
was a good idea.” Redacted Tr. Vol. 2 55:18-55:21. Thus, Julie herself has acknowledged the
efficacy of Mexican law enforcement, which would be at her disposal should she fear for her
safety upon her return to Mexico.12
Second, the record is far from clear that Steven has threatened to press criminal charges
against Julie. Steven’s comment that he should have filed charges against Julie for the December
26 incident was a stray remark to Dr. Haynes during Steven’s evaluation, triggered by the
discussion of the personal protection order that Julie had obtained against him; there did not
appear to be any concrete plan by Steven to file a criminal complaint for assault. See Haynes
Report at 18.

There is also no evidence that Steven intends to bring charges of parental

alienation against Julie. Steven and his counsel have repeatedly pressed a theory of parental
alienation in this litigation, and Steven’s Mexican lawyer testified that parental alienation is
criminally prosecutable in Mexico. But the claim that Steven will bring charges against Julie on
that theory is just speculative.
Julie’s acknowledgement of the efficacy of Mexican law enforcement also rebuts any
suggestion that she had no alternative to fleeing Mexico with the children. The arrest of Steven
would have allowed her and the children to remain in the family home, or she could have made
arrangements to stay with friends in Mexico, which she did in fact do for two days before fleeing
to Michigan. See Redacted Tr. Vol. 2 50:16-50:21, 55:24-56:3, 56:7-56:13, 58:1-58:3.
12

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In any event, being called to answer criminal charges in another country is not an
irreparable injury in and of itself. There has been no indication that the courts of Mexico are
incapable of fairly adjudicating any charges filed. The Hague Convention itself is premised on
the trust courts place in their foreign counterparts to apply the law fairly relative to children who
are the subject of a Hague case. It would be inconsistent to presume otherwise when courts
apply their criminal law to parents accused of criminal wrongdoing.
Third, courts have made clear that parents who abscond with their children cannot then
reap the benefit of pointing to inconvenience or disappointment that may result from repatriating
children from the country to which they had grown accustomed following the wrongful removal.
See Friedrich v. Friedrich (“Friedrich II”), 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996). Accordingly,
Julie cannot claim that the personal loss she may feel by the children’s leaving Michigan
warrants a stay of the very order that returns the children to their country of habitual residence
from which they were wrongfully taken.
At oral argument, Julie’s attorney made a number of additional arguments, not presented
in Julie’s motion, which the Court pauses briefly to address. Among those arguments was a
concern that Steven would not return the children to Michigan should Julie prevail on appeal, on
the theory that Mexico has been found by the State Department to be a country that does not
return children. Significantly, there has been no evidence presented to the Court substantiating
this. Regardless, the Court does not believe this is a legitimate issue. Steven, like Julie, is a U.S.
citizen subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and other U.S. authorities, and he works for a U.S.
employer. Should Steven be disinclined to comply with any order to return the children to
Michigan, the Court has resources at its disposal to enforce any such order, including contempt

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fines or other sanctions that could be collected through Ford Motor Company, Steven’s
employer.
Counsel also posited that return to Mexico, the site of the December 26, 2014 trauma,
will trigger both Julie and the children’s PTSD. Regarding any harm to the children, as the
Court already has explained, the independent psychologist appointed by the Court, Dr. Haynes,
concluded that the children were not exhibiting symptoms of PTSD. And no mental health
professional — not even Julie’s own therapist Chuck Snyder — has opined that her return to
Mexico would trigger a recurrence of her PTSD. These allegations of irreparable harm are
simply unsubstantiated.
Accordingly, this factor weighs against a stay.
C. Substantial Injury to Other Interested Parties
Julie asserts that given the expedited nature of the appeal process for Hague cases, a stay
will not appreciably add to the amount of time the children have already been away from
Mexico, and Steven’s desire to have them return sooner rather than later is minimal in
comparison to the harm she faces upon return. Resp’t Mot. at 20. The Court agrees that a
minimal delay will not substantially prejudice Steven. However, the Court has already allowed
for this minimal delay, by adjourning the return date from June 30 to July 27, thereby allowing
the instant motion to be fully adjudicated and to permit the Sixth Circuit an opportunity to
meaningfully consider an emergency motion for a stay should Julie’s counsel file one. There is
no justification for an extended stay pending exhaustion of the appellate process.13
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In an effort to show that delay will not significantly harm Steven, Julie contends that he
delayed instituting this action for some six months after the children’s removal from Mexico.
Resp’t Mot. at 20. The Court disagrees. Steven attempted to initiate return of the children by
filing a petition in the Mexican courts, in accordance with the Hague Convention, on March 17,
2015 — a little over two months after their removal. See Pet’r Ex. 2.8. On April 13, 2015, the
Central Authority in Mexico transmitted a request to the United States Department of State for
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D. The Public Interest
Finally, Julie posits two public interest concerns that she claims favor a stay: (i) ensuring
that a full and proper adjudication of the issues on appeal is not undermined or compromised by
a “hasty return”; and (ii) the issue of domestic violence and how it should be treated under the
Convention. Resp’t Mot. at 20.
First, Julie’s motion does not explain how the children’s return could somehow
undermine or compromise appellate review of this matter. The Court perceives no reason why
the Sixth Circuit cannot fully adjudicate the relevant issues, even if the children are in Mexico.
Second, it is undoubtedly true that there is a public interest in preventing domestic
violence and protecting its victims — direct and indirect. However, this interest is taken into
account under the Hague Convention through the “grave risk” defense and with the use of
undertakings, where appropriate. If a removing parent fails to satisfy the standard required under
the Convention, she cannot then undercut the Convention by prolonging any return order until
the appellate process is completely exhausted. The goal of the Convention is to rectify the
wrongful taking of children as promptly as possible, taking into account any relevant harm that
may result to the children from the return. Julie cannot now, in the guise of a stay motion,

return of the children. Pet’r Ex. 3. This action was then filed on June 2, 2015. Steven’s efforts
do not suggest any lack of diligence, nor do they support an argument that further delay will not
prejudice him; otherwise, any petitioner following the protocols of the Convention, which
necessarily take some time, would find his or her efforts unfairly converted into evidence of no
prejudice from delay.
The remainder of the delay in this case is also not attributable to Steven and cannot be used
against him. Several months were consumed while the parties explored settlement, at the Court’s
urging. An additional block of time was consumed by Dr. Haynes’s evaluation of the five
members of the Neumann family, an undertaking that both parties urged the Court to adopt.
Preparation for, and conduct of, the nearly week-long evidentiary hearing also consumed
considerable time. Then post-hearing briefing was delayed because of the medical condition of
one of the attorneys. None of these circumstances can fairly be used to argue that further delay
will not prejudice Steven.
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impede the interest in a prompt return of wrongfully removed children by invoking concerns of
child abuse and domestic violence when the record, developed after an extensive evidentiary
hearing, fails to support her overbroad charges. While courts must be vigilant in protecting
against both domestic violence and child abuse, the international abduction of children is also a
scourge that must be battled and vanquished. The public interest is best served by court action
that accounts for these competing concerns through a thorough and prompt adjudication before
children are returned to the country from which they were taken. The Court believes that type of
adjudication has already been conducted here.
The public interest does not weigh in favor of a stay pending appeal.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Respondent Julie Neumann’s motion to stay (Dkt. 67) is
denied.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 11, 2016
Detroit, Michigan

s/Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and
any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class
U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on July 11, 2016.
s/Karri Sandusky
Case Manager

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