Santana v. Camp Brighton

Filing 8

ORDER Summarily Dismissing Plaintiff's 1 Complaint Without Prejudice. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
YOLANDA SANTANA,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-cv-12017
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
CAMP BRIGHTON,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
WITHOUT PREJUDICE (ECF #1)
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Yolanda Santana (“Santana”) is in the custody of the Michigan
Department of Corrections. On June 3, 2015, Santana filed a pro se civil-rights
Complaint in this Court (the “Complaint”). (See ECF #1.) Santana appears to allege
that she was exposed to contaminated water while housed at the Camp Brighton
facility. (See id. at 3, Pg. ID 3.) She names a single defendant, Camp Brighton. (See
id.) For the reasons stated in this Order, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.

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ANALYSIS
On July 24, 2015, the Court granted Santana’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis in this matter. (See ECF #7.) Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the
“PLRA”), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
before service of a defendant if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact.
See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief
sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While this notice pleading standard does not
require “detailed” factual allegations, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, it does require more
than the bare assertion of legal conclusions or “an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements
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of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A pro
se complaint should be liberally construed and held to a “less stringent standard” than
one drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) the deprivation of
a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the
United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978).
Santana’s entire Complaint, in which she attempts to state a civil-rights claim,
states as follows:
I was being housed at a [sic] M.D.O.C.
prisoner camp.
I was exposed to
contaminated water. (Can’t remember exact
date or year, please check [roster]).
I was exposed to drinking contaminated water
which effected [sic] my physical health (such
as liver and kidney). It made me sick and
break [sic] out in rashes.
I was exposed to drinking contaminated water
which effected [sic] my mental state causing
me to have anxiety and having to talk to a
therapist.
I want the Defendant to be held responsible
for their [sic] actions and I would like to
receive monetary damages for having to
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receive mental and medical help because of
this.
(Compl. at 2-4, Pg. ID 2-4.)
In her Complaint, Santana names Camp Brighton as the sole Defendant in this
action. That prison facility, however, was an institution operated by the Michigan
Department of Corrections and is not a “person” or legal entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Parker v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65 Fed. App’x 922,
923 (6th Cir. 2003) (“the [Michigan Department of Corrections] is not a ‘person’
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Hix v. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections, 196
Fed. App’x 350, 355–356 (6th Cir. 2006) (and cases cited therein) (holding that
neither the state department of corrections, as an “administrative department of the
state,” nor the state prison's medical department, which “may be seen as nothing more
than an arm” of the department of corrections, is a “person” within the meaning of §
1983); see also McCoy v. Chesapeake Corr. Ctr., 788 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Va.)
(reasoning local jails are part of the Commonwealth of Virginia and are not
appropriate defendants in a § 1983 action). Indeed, this Court has recently dismissed
two lawsuits brought by other prisoners against Camp Brighton – similar to the one
Santana has filed here – on the basis that Camp Brighton cannot be sued under §
1983. See Walker v. Camp Brighton Prison, No. 15-12153, 2015 WL 3968229 (E.D.
Mich. June 30, 2015); McIntosh v. Camp Brighton, 14-11327, 2014 WL 158173 (E.D.
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Mich. Apr. 21, 2014). The Court must therefore dismiss Santana’s Complaint because
she has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the only
defendant identified in this action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint
(ECF #1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B). This dismissal is without prejudice to Santana filing a new Complaint
against a properly-named defendant. Any such new Complaint must comply with the
afore-mentioned federal pleading standards. The Court further concludes that an
appeal from this order would be frivolous and cannot be taken in good faith. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th
Cir. 1997).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2015

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on July 29, 2015, by electronic means and/or ordinary
mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]
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