Jewel v. UAW International

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 6 AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AS MOOT 3 . Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TBan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DORRINUS JEWEL,
Case No. 15-cv-12322

Plaintiff,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

v.
UAW INTERNATIONAL and UAW LOCAL 7,

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
R. STEVEN WHALEN

Defendants.
/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AS MOOT
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Dorrinus Jewel (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on June 26, 2015 against
UAW International and UAW Local 7 (“Defendants”). See Dkt. No. 1. On the same day,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. See Dkt. No. 3. In the Complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants were negligent in their representation of Plaintiff while she was
employed at Chrysler Group, LLC. On July 20, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 6. For the reasons discussed
herein, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DENY Plaintiff’s request for
appointment of counsel as MOOT.
The matter is fully briefed. After reviewing the briefing, the Court concludes that oral
argument will not aid in the resolution of this matter. Accordingly, the Court will resolve the
Motion on the briefs as submitted. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2).

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II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dorrinus Jewel worked as an hourly employee for Chrysler Group, LLC
(“Chrysler”) from about October 21, 1994 until December 4, 2009. Jewel v. Chrysler, LLC.,
2014 WL 764660, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 2014). She was represented in collective bargaining by
UAW Local 7. Id. On or about November 13, 2009, an application was submitted to Chrysler for
Jewel’s participation in a buy-out program. Id. Under the terms of this buy-out program, an
employee’s application became irrevocable after November 13, 2009 - the last day the
employees could apply. Id. Plaintiff contends that she never applied for the buy-out and that her
signature on the application was forged by Chrysler. Id.
On November 16, 2009, there was an incident at Chrysler which resulted in Plaintiff
going on medical leave the next day. Plaintiff maintains that in response to the occurrences of
November 16, 2009, Chrysler forged her name on the participation program form, and
terminated her on December 4, 2009. Id.
It wasn’t until January 31, 2011, that the UAW filed a grievance on behalf of Ms. Jewel
alleging that she was not eligible to participate in the buy-out program because she was on
disability leave when her employment was terminated. Id. at *2. Chrysler denied the grievance
and the grievance was subsequently withdrawn on April 4, 2012. Plaintiff filed an appeal with
the union, but lost. Id.
On October 8, 2013, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an action against Chrysler, as well
as her former union, the UAW, in the United States District court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. Id. at *1. Plaintiff asserted ten claims: 1) wrongful termination/retaliation in violation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 2) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; 3)
intentional infliction of emotional distress; 4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; 5)

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defamation of character; 6) civil conspiracy/concert of action ; 7) loss of consortium; 8) breach
of contract; 9) fraud; and 10) innocent misrepresentation. Id.
On December 26, 2013, Chrysler filed a motion to dismiss the case. Id. On December 27,
2013, the UAW filed a motion to dismiss. Id. On February 25, 2014, the Court granted both
motions because all of the Plaintiff’s claims were either time barred or failed to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id at *8. Over a year later, this action was filed.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows the court to make an assessment as to
whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice
of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Even though the
complaint need not contain “detailed” factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough
‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level’ on the assumption that all of the allegations
in the complaint are true.” Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545,
548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555).
The court must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, accept the allegations of
the complaint as true, and determine whether plaintiff’s factual allegations present plausible
claims. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s pleading for relief must provide
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. at 678.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. The
plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not ‘show[n]’– ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679.
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the present action should be dismissed “because: (1) Plaintiff’s
claims are barred by claim preclusion; (2) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by issue preclusion; and
(3) Plaintiff’s claims are either preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA, time barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, or fail to state viable causes of action.” Dkt. No. 6 at 14, Pg. ID
No. 105. The issue of claim preclusion, however, is dispositive and an analysis of Defendants’
secondary arguments is not necessary.
A. Claim Preclusion
When considering claim preclusion, this Court is to rely on the law of the state in which
the first judgment occurred. Heyliger v. State Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. Of Tenn., 126 F.3d 849,
851-852 (6th Cir. 1997). Since the prior action occurred in Michigan, Michigan law will govern
the action at hand.
“Michigan law requires a court to apply claim preclusion if (1) there was a prior and final
decision on the merits, (2) the parties in both lawsuits are the same, and (3) the matter in the
second case was, or could have been, resolved in the first lawsuit.” Reid v. Thetford Tp., 377 F.
Supp. 2d 621, 625 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citing Adair v. State, 470 Mich. 105, 121 (2004)). Once

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the three elements are met, claim preclusion will operate in two ways. “It will bar ‘not only
claims already litigated, but every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties,
exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.’” Id. (quoting Sewell v. Clean
Cut Mgmt., Inc., 463 Mich. 569, 575 (2001)) (emphasis added).
a. Undisputed Elements
The first two elements of claim preclusion are not in dispute. There was a final judgment
on the merits in the prior case. See Jewel, 2014 WL 764660 at *8 (dismissing all claims); see
also Gonzalez v. City of New York, 396 F. Supp. 2d 411, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (a motion to
dismiss is a final judgment on the merits). Additionally, the Defendants and the Plaintiff were
opposing parties in the 2013 litigation. See Jewel, 2014 WL 764660 at *1. Accordingly, these
two elements have been satisfied.
b. The Matter Could have been Brought in the First Action
To determine if the matter could have been resolved in the first case, Michigan applies
two alternative tests: the “same evidence” test and the “same transaction” test. Adair, 470 Mich.
at 123-125.
The same evidence test looks to whether the same facts or
evidence are essential to the maintenance of the two actions. The
broader same transaction test provides that the assertion of
different kinds or theories of relief still constitutes a single cause of
action if a single group of operative facts give rise to the
assertion of the relief.
Rehab Solutions, LLC v. Diversa Care Therapeutics, Inc., 2011 WL 4088300 at *5 (E.D. Mich.
2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). “Whether a factual grouping
constitutes a transaction for purposes of [claim preclusion] is to be determined pragmatically, by

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considering whether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, and whether they
form a convenient trial unit.” Adair, 470 Mich. at 105.
Here, Plaintiff’s current allegations all arise from the same events of the prior litigation.
In 2013, Plaintiff’s claims revolved around the UAW’s representation of her grievance and
subsequent termination. See Jewel, 2014 WL 764660. Now, Plaintiff is alleging negligence and
other claims arising from that same representation. Thus, this action arises from the same
operative facts as the prior litigation and could have been brought in 2013. Therefore, the final
element has been satisfied.
Accordingly, as all three elements of claim preclusion have been satisfied, the current
action is barred.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will GRANT the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Further, the Court will DENY the
Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel as MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 31, 2015
/s/Gershwin A Drain
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Court Judge

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