Taylor-Walton v. Social Security, Commissioner of
Filing
23
ORDER denying 21 Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 22 Motion for Summary Judgment - Signed by Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub. (LBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TAMMY DEE TAYLOR-WALTON,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-12419
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB
Defendant.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT [21] AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT [22]
Plaintiff Tammy Dee Taylor-Walton seeks judicial review of Defendant Commissioner of
Social Security’s determination that she is not entitled to Social Security benefits for her physical
and mental impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 21) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (docket no. 22). With consent of the parties, this case has been referred to the
undersigned for final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 73. (Docket no. 18.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, dispenses with a hearing
pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), and is now ready to rule.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed applications for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits on August 9, 2012, alleging that she has been disabled since April 2, 2010, due to her
physical and mental impairments. (TR 26, 135-41.) The Social Security Administration denied
Plaintiff’s claims on November 8, 2012, and Plaintiff requested a de novo hearing. (TR 92, 99100.) On December 13, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with a representative and testified at the hearing
before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Ramona Fernandez. (TR 42-77.) In a January 31, 2014
decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because she was capable of
performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy. (TR 37.) The Appeals
Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision (TR 1-6), and Plaintiff commenced this action for
judicial review. The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment, which are currently
before the Court. (Docket nos. 21, 22.)
II.
HEARING TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE
In her brief, Plaintiff sets forth a short summary of the procedural history of this matter
and highlights a few points from the medical record. (Docket no. 21 at 2-3.) Defendant (docket
no. 22 at 6-10) and the ALJ (TR 31-36) each set out a detailed, factual recitation with regard to
Plaintiff’s medical record and the hearing testimony. Having conducted an independent review
of Plaintiff’s medical record and the hearing transcript, the undersigned finds that there are no
material inconsistencies among these recitations of the record.
Therefore, the undersigned
incorporates the factual recitations by reference. Additionally, the undersigned will include
comments and citations to the record as necessary throughout this Report and Recommendation.
IV.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DETERMINATION
The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act through September 30, 2015; that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged onset date of April 2, 2010; and that Plaintiff suffered from the following
severe impairments: headaches, osteoarthritis, hypertension, chronic pulmonary disease (COPD),
non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, obesity, depression, and anxiety. (TR 28.) Next, the
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ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments, either individually or when combined, did not meet or
medically equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. (TR 28-30.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the extent of her
symptoms were not “entirely credible” and that Plaintiff had the following Residual Functional
Capacity (RFC):
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), with the following limitations: the claimant can
stand and/or walk for no more than six hours of an eight-hour workday. She can
lift no more than twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. The
claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and can only occasionally
stoop, kneel, crawl, balance, or climb ramps or stairs. She must be able to change
positions after sitting or standing for twenty minutes. The claimant can frequently
(but not constantly) handle, finger, and grip. She must avoid concentrated
exposure to fumes or other respiratory irritants, as well as work at unprotected
heights. The claimant is limited to unskilled work with simple instructions; no
more than routine changes; only occasional contact with supervisors; and only
brief or superficial interaction with coworkers or the public.
(TR 30.) Subsequently, in reliance on the testimony of the Vocational Expert (VE), the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing a number of jobs in the national economy.
(TR 37.) Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act
at any time from April 2, 2010, through the date of the decision. (TR 38.)
IV.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s
final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining
whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper
legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but
less than a preponderance; it is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
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adequate to support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court
to try cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See
Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v.
Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).
In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the Court must examine the
administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524,
536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide
the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if
substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203
F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(noting that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within
which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”).
B.
Framework for Social Security Determinations
Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a fivestep sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that:
(1)
Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and
(2)
Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and
(3)
the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or
(4)
Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform relevant
past work.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past
work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past
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work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be
deemed disabled. See id. § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on
“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can
perform.” Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding
“supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to
perform specific jobs.” Varley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir.
1987).
C.
Analysis
The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in
conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner]
(a sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material
evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six
remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter upon
the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the
decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is
reversal and a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, No. 10-207,
2011 WL 2292305, at *8 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174). The court
can only “reverse the [ALJ’s] decision and award benefits . . . if all essential factual issues have
been resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits.”
Faucher, 17 F.3d at 176.
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Plaintiff asserts that this matter should be reversed and remanded for an award of
benefits, or in the alternative for further development of the record under sentence four because:
(1) “[t]he Administrative Law Judge had no basis” for giving Plaintiff’s treating physician’s
opinions “little weight;” (2) the ALJ erred in relying on Plaintiff’s “GAF” (Global Assessment of
Functioning) score; (3) the ALJ also erred in relying on the fact Plaintiff completed online
college classes; and (4) the “ALJ’s conclusion the claimant was employable because she told a
counselor she wanted to attend school on a full time basis is erroneous.”1 (Docket no. 21 at 5-6.)
1.
The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Treating Physician’s Opinions
An ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion complete deference if it is supported by
clinical and laboratory diagnostic evidence and it is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). When an ALJ determines
that a treating source’s medical opinion is not controlling, he must determine how much weight
to assign that opinion in light of several factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and the
frequency of examination; (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) supportability
of the opinion; (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (5) specialization of the
treating source; and (6) other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6).
There is no per se rule that requires an articulation of each of the six regulatory factors
listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
11-CV-11974, 2012 WL 3584664, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2012) (citing Tilley v. Comm’r of
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Plaintiff also states, without further argument, that “[t]he Administrative Law Judge improperly
evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility.” (Docket no. 21 at 4.) The extent of Plaintiff’s “argument” on this issue
is a citation to Social Security Ruling 96-7p, which is applicable to credibility determinations made prior
to the issuance of SSR 16-3p, and a recitation of the two steps involved in a credibility analysis. (Docket
no. 21 at 4-5.) “Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the
most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.” McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989,
995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Soc. Sec., 394 F. App’x 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2010)). An ALJ’s failure to discuss the requisite
factors may constitute harmless error (1) if “a treating source’s opinion is so patently deficient
that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it;” (2) “if the Commissioner adopts the opinion
of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion;” or (3) “where the
Commissioner has met the goal of [§ 1527(c)]—the provision of the procedural safeguard of
reasons—even though she has not complied with the terms of the regulation.”
Nelson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App’x 462, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004)).
The Commissioner requires ALJs to “always give good reasons in [their] notice of
determination or decision for the weight [they] give [a] treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Those good reasons must be “supported by the evidence in the
case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the
weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that
weight.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996)). The
district court should not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has failed to identify the
weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion and provide good reasons for that weight. See
Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 939 (6th Cir. 2011) (“This Court has made clear that ‘[w]e do not
hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has not provided ‘good reasons’ for the weight given
to a treating physician’s opinion and we will continue remanding when we encounter opinions
from ALJ’s that do not comprehensively set forth the reasons for the weight assigned to a
treating physician’s opinion.”) (citing Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Plaintiff’s long time treating physician is Dr. Ali A. Fadel, M.D. (TR 32.) Dr. Fadel
provided a number of “disability claim forms” to Plaintiff, indicating that Plaintiff was unable to
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work at various points from April 2010 through June 2011. (TR 229-32.) Regarding these
opinions, the ALJ stated:
Although Dr. Fadel is a long-time treating source, little weight is given to
his opinions that the claimant was disabled from April 2010 through June 2011.
The claimant requested excusal from work due to stress. Dr. Fadel’s treatment
records do not support his opinion that the claimant’s impairments were severe
enough to render her unable to work. There are no tests or lab work supporting
the alleged severity of the claimant’s impairments. The claimant was not
receiving any mental health treatment for depression. Dr. Fadel stated in
December 2010 that the claimant would likely be unable to work for a year, but
he cleared her to return to work in April 2011. It was noted in March 2011 that
the claimant was independent in her activities of daily living.
(TR 32.) Plaintiff does not dispute any of these findings, but argues that the ALJ nevertheless
erred by relying on “the lack of diagnostic testing.” (Docket no. 21 at 4.) Plaintiff argues that
Dr. Fadel “is in the best position to decide her present condition,” because Dr. Fadel “treated
Plaintiff regularly, prescribed her medications, and referred her to a specialist for further
evaluation of her depression and COPD.” (Id.)
The ALJ did not err in relying on, among other reasons, the “lack of tests or lab work
supporting the alleged severity of the claimant’s impairments.” (TR 32.) To the contrary, it is
well-settled that the Commissioner “is not bound by the treating physician’s opinions, and that
such opinions receive great weight only if they are supported by sufficient clinical findings and
are consistent with the evidence.” Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c)(2). Plaintiff does not point to any specific
medical evidence in Dr. Fadel’s treatment records, or any other medical records, which would
support his opinion regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms. Near the end of her decision,
the ALJ specifically notes that there are no “images” to support Plaintiff’s allegations of knee
and back pain, that the evidence shows her carpal tunnel syndrome is “mild” and that she had no
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neurological abnormalities, and that her headaches and dizziness were controlled by medication.
(TR 36.)
Moreover, it is clear that the lack of diagnostic evidence was not the only relevant point
in the ALJ’s analysis regarding the weight of Dr. Fadel’s opinion. The ALJ also relied on the
inconsistencies in Dr. Fadel’s “diagnoses” of disability. On December 22, 2010, Dr. Fadel stated
in one of the “disability forms,” that Plaintiff could be released to work on January 1, 2011. Just
eight days after giving that opinion, on December 30, 2010, Dr. Fadel indicated in a letter that
Plaintiff would be unable to work for at least one year, if not permanently. (TR 228.) Then, in
April 2011, Dr. Fadel released Plaintiff to work. (TR 232.) The ALJ also noted that, while
Plaintiff requested excusal from work due to her stress, she was not receiving any mental health
treatment at the time. (TR 32.)
Finally, the undersigned notes that it is well-settled that the ultimate issue of disability is
reserved to the Commissioner and not the treating or examining physician. Kidd v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 283 Fed. App’x 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, when a medical or non-medical
source offers an opinion on “an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether the
claimant is disabled, the ALJ need not accord that opinion controlling weight.” Id. (citing Bass
v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007)).
In addition to the disability claims forms, Dr. Fadel also completed a State of Michigan
Department of Human Services “Medical Needs” form. (TR 492-93.) Regarding this form, the
ALJ stated:
Dr. Fadel completed a Michigan Department of Human Services medical
needs form in September 2013 (Exhibit 12F). He gave diagnoses of hypertension,
asthma, COPD, dizziness, and chronic lumbago. He opined that the claimant
needed someone to transport her to medical appointments, and assist her with
shopping, laundry, and household chores. Dr. Fadel opined that the claimant
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could not work at her usual occupation or any job, and noted “12 months” next to
the question.
Some weight is given to Dr. Fadel’s statements. The claimant did testify
that she needs help with laundry and housework. However, the treatment records
reflect only mild carpal tunnel syndrome, and there are no images reflect[ing] any
back or knee abnormalities. Her cardiac workup was normal. While the claimant
may need some assistance with her household chores, the record does not support
the opinion that her impairments are severe enough to render her incapable of any
work. Her alleged musculoskeletal pain, dizziness, and breathing difficulties are
accounted for in the residual functional capacity.
(TR 34.) Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not give “good reasons” for discounting Dr. Fadel’s
opinion. (Docket no. 21 at 5.) This argument fails for essentially the same reasons stated above.
Plaintiff does not identify any evidence in the record supporting Dr. Fadel’s opinion regarding
the severity of Plaintiff’s medical conditions. It is clear that the ALJ considered the length of
Plaintiff’s relationship with Dr. Fadel (see TR 32 “[a]lthough Dr. Fadel is a long-time treating
source”), but found that factor outweighed by the fact that Dr. Fadel’s opinions were not
supported and were not consistent with Plaintiff’s medical record.
The undersigned concludes that the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Fadel’s
opinions in the disability forms, and her decision to give some weight to Dr. Fadel’s statements
in the Michigan DHS form, are both supported by substantial evidence and do not violate the
“treating physician rule.”
2.
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC because the ALJ
relied on 1) two Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores; 2) the fact that Plaintiff
completed five online college classes in a six-month period; and 3) the fact that Plaintiff
informed a counselor that she wanted to attend school full time. (Docket no. 21 at 5-6.)
Plaintiff’s arguments fail.
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First, the ALJ thoroughly discussed Plaintiff’s medical record, and it is clear from the
ALJ’s discussion that her decision is not based entirely on Plaintiff’s GAF scores and
educational achievements/goals. For example, the ALJ discusses how an electromyography
revealed only “mild” carpal tunnel syndrome, and an electroencephalogram, conducted after
Plaintiff’s complaints of dizziness and headaches, “was normal in wakefulness and sleep.” (TR
34.) The ALJ further discusses how Plaintiff’s “allegations of back and knee pain are not
supported by any images,” and her “cardiac and neurological workups did not reveal any
significant abnormalities.” (TR 36.) The ALJ also points out that Plaintiff was prescribed
physical therapy in late 2011, but that Plaintiff provided no records showing any treatment by a
physical therapist beyond an initial evaluation. (TR 33.) Plaintiff does not dispute any of these
findings.
As for Plaintiff’s mental health records, the ALJ discussed how Plaintiff’s treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Phillip Parker, M.D., prescribed Zoloft, and how Plaintiff’s discussions with her
counselor “revolved around family and relationship issues.” (TR 35.) The ALJ also discussed
Plaintiff’s mental consultative examination, noting the examiner’s description of Plaintiff as
sitting “with her head in her hands and her eyes closed for most of the session,” but also noting
that Plaintiff reported to the examiner that she “takes her children to school, goes on
appointments and errands, picks her children up from school, . . . is able to independently care
for her hygiene and grooming needs, cook, do laundry once a month, . . . and is able to
independently manage her financial matters.” (TR 35; 402.) The ALJ also notes that Plaintiff
had a gap in mental health treatment between July and October 2013.
Finally, the ALJ discussed inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and her medical
records. For example, the ALJ notes Plaintiff’s testimony that she only smoked marijuana “a
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couple of years ago, to celebrate a birthday,” but that Dr. Parker diagnosed Plaintiff with
“cannabis dependence” in April 2013.
(TR 31, 35.)
The ALJ also points out Plaintiff’s
inconsistent testimony regarding Plaintiff’s efforts to find work since 2010; at first, Plaintiff
claimed that she did not look for work due to her carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms, but she later
admitted that she did look for work in 2012 while she was collecting unemployment benefits.
(TR 31.)
Moreover, the ALJ did not err by relying on the GAF scores and Plaintiff’s educational
history and future goals. Dr. Parker assigned Plaintiff a GAF score of 50 in May 2013, which
took into consideration the fact that Plaintiff had economic and housing problems. (TR 501.)
State disability examiner Terrance A. Mills, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, also assigned a GAF
score of 50. (TR 403.) Without disputing the accuracy of the scores or pointing to contradictory
evidence, Plaintiff simply argues that a GAF score “is nothing more than a subjective
determination that represents the clinician’s judgment of the individual[’]s functioning. It is not
medical evidence and should not [be] a substitute for medical evidence.” (Docket no. 21 at 5.)
As the ALJ points out, the Sixth Circuit has relied on GAF scores, and specifically stated that a
GAF score “in the high 40s to mid 50s . . . would not preclude [a person] from having the mental
capacity to hold at least some jobs in the national economy.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482
F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2007).
Regarding Plaintiff’s education, the ALJ stated that the “ability to attend school part-time
and desire to attend fulltime are inconsistent with the claimant’s allegations of disabling mental
and physical impairments.” (TR 36.) Plaintiff argues that her ability to complete the online
classes has “no correlation” with “one[’]s ability to concentrate, and function in a normal work
environment,” because Plaintiff was not required to follow a “schedule with deadlines,” in her
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online classes. Regardless of the specific nature of the coursework, the record supports the
ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did complete five classes in a six-month period. Moreover, the ALJ
specifically found that despite Plaintiff’s ability to complete this amount of coursework, Plaintiff
nevertheless had moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace, and the ALJ
accounted for this limitation in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC by limiting Plaintiff to “unskilled
work with simple instructions; no more than routine changes; only occasional contact with
supervisors; and only brief or superficial interaction with coworkers or the public.” (TR 30.)
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s desire to attend school full time
is “erroneous,” because “there is no testimony in the record that the Plaintiff was capable of
performing or attending school on a full time basis.” (Docket no. 21 at 6.) However, as the ALJ
points out, Plaintiff did inform her counselor that she wanted to attend school full time. (TR
509.) She later testified that “someone” told her that she “couldn’t go to school and try to get
Social Security.” (TR 47.) Regardless, and more importantly, it is clear from the ALJ’s decision
that she relied on more than Plaintiff’s stated desire to attend school full-time when formulating
Plaintiff’s RFC.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [21] is
DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [22] is GRANTED.
Dated: March 7, 2017
s/ Mona K. Majzoub
MONA K. MAJZOUB
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served upon counsel
of record on this date.
Dated: March 7, 2017
s/ Lisa C. Bartlett
Case Manager
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