MacEachern v. Quicken Loans Inc. et al

Filing 17

ORDER denying 16 plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel without prejudice. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HUGH MacEACHERN,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 15-CV-12448
HONORABLE GEORGE CARAM STEEH

v.
QUICKEN LOANS INC.,
and TITLE SOURCE, INC.,
Defendants.
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (Doc. 16) WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Pro se plaintiff Hugh Maceachern filed this employment discrimination action alleging
wrongful termination based on his gender, age, and Caucasian race in violation of Title VII,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and retaliation under the American’s
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The court previously granted plaintiff’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis. Now before the court is plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel.
“Appointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right. It is a privilege that is
justified only by exceptional circumstances.” Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605-06 (6th
Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In determining whether

exceptional circumstances exist, courts consider the type of case, the chance of success
of plaintiff’s claims, and the plaintiff’s ability to represent himself. See Johnson v. City of
Wakefield, 483 F. App’x 256, 260 (6th Cir. 2012).
Most significantly, the fact that this matter involves alleged employment discrimination
weighs heavily against the appointment of counsel. Besides ordinary contingency fee
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arrangements that allow indigent plaintiffs to secure their own counsel, Congress has
enacted the recovery of statutory attorney fees in employment discrimination cases which
provide for even greater access to the judicial process for those with civil rights grievances.
Attorney fees are available to prevailing plaintiffs under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), the
ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12205, and the ADEA which incorporates the remedies provision of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). EEOC V. Memphis Health Ctr., Inc., 526 F.
App’x 607, 612 (6th Cir. 2013). The statutory provisions allowing for recovery of attorney
fees to prevailing plaintiffs reflect Congressional intent to provide incentives for attorneys
to represent those who have suffered discrimination but lack the financial ability to retain
their own counsel. In his motion, plaintiff states that he has contacted at least six attorneys
seeking representation but has been unable to retain any of them. Given the availability of
attorney fees in these types of cases, plaintiff’s inability to secure representation on his own
may reflect unfavorably on the merits of his case.
Finally, the court considers plaintiff’s ability to represent himself. The court has
considered the complaint and plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff’s papers are cogent and his motion
demonstrates his familiarity with the Local Rules.

Having found no extraordinary

circumstances to warrant deviation from the general rule that attorneys are not appointed
in civil cases, plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 3, 2015
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
September 3, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and
also on Hugh MacEachern, 22126 Hayes Street,
Taylor, MI 48180-2422.
s/Barbara Radke
Deputy Clerk

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