MacEachern v. Quicken Loans Inc. et al

Filing 82

ORDER denying 81 Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HUGH MacEACHERN,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 15-CV-12448
HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

v.
QUICKEN LOANS INC.
and TITLE SOURCE, INC.,
Defendants.
/

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND OR ALTER JUDGMENT
On September 21, 2016, this court entered summary judgment in favor
of defendants Quicken Loans Inc. and Title Source, Inc., dismissing the
reverse race and gender discrimination claims, retaliation claims, and claims
for defendants’ alleged failure to pay him overtime in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), of pro se plaintiff Hugh MacEachern, a white
male, who was discharged at age 59. Now before the court is plaintiff’s
motion to amend or alter judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). “A court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend if
there is (1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an

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intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest
injustice.” Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff has not met the standard under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the
judgment. Most of the arguments presented merely reiterate those already
considered and rejected by this court. Those not previously addressed are
discussed below. In his motion, plaintiff alleges that the court improperly
stated that plaintiff made his complaint of discrimination on March 24, 2014,
when in reality, he filed his complaint on March 17, 2014. This court’s prior
order, however, specifically recognized that the record evidence was unclear
as to whether the complaint was made on March 17, 2014 or March 24, 2014,
but found that the six day time difference was irrelevant to the court’s
determination. (Doc. 77 at 4 n.1).
Plaintiff also contends that he did not consent to defendants’
confidentiality policy until after sending the e-mails which defendants
maintained contained confidential information. The record as discussed in the
court’s opinion, however, shows that plaintiff was informed of defendants’
policy that employees were not to send non-public information to an e-mail
account as early as 2012. Plaintiff received defendants’ confidentiality policy
in 2013, and he signed an employment agreement consenting to it on July 15,

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2013. Id. at 12-13. Thus, plaintiff was on notice of his employer’s prohibition
of sending confidential information to a personal e-mail account before
sending the e-mails for which he was terminated.
Plaintiff also argues that the company completed its investigation after
he was terminated which he suggests is evidence that his discharge was
based on race and gender discrimination or in retaliation for making a
complaint of such discrimination. The fact that the investigative report is
dated on March 28, 2014, but plaintiff was notified of his dismissal on March
26, 2014, does not support his discrimination or retaliation claims, or suggest
that the court’s application of the honest-belief doctrine to bar plaintiff’s claims
was in error. His argument merely shows that the results of the investigation
were memorialized in writing on that date, not that the investigation was
incomplete at the time of his termination. In fact, defendants notified him that
he was being suspended for violating company policy that employees not
distribute confidential information outside the company, including to personal
e-mail accounts, on March 24, 2014, indicating that a preliminary investigation
of plaintiff’s misconduct was already complete at that time.
Plaintiff reiterates the argument that he could not be terminated for
violating his employer’s confidentiality rules because the ALJ in the National

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Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) action found some of those rules to be overly
broad. As stated in the court’s prior order granting defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, the issue here was whether the reason given for plaintiff’s
discharge was the true reason for the discharge, or whether it was pretext for
discrimination or retaliation. Id. at 14. Plaintiff’s renewed argument here fails
to support his Rule 59(e) motion. Likewise, plaintiff’s arguments regarding his
overtime claim under the FLSA merely reiterate arguments previously
considered and rejected by this court.
Finally, the court considers plaintiff’s argument that new evidence
obtained from his Freedom of Information Act request supports his Rule 59(e)
motion. Specifically, plaintiff relies on defendants’ argument before the ALJ
in the NLRB case that the employee handbook, known as the “Big Book,” was
not uniformly provided to all employees, and was not used or relied upon by
employees or managers and supervisors. This court’s prior order granting
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, however, was based, in part, on
the affidavit of Yasmeen Jasey, the Director of Team Relations for Quicken
Loans, attesting to specific security training that plaintiff received in person
where the company informed him that he could not forward company e-mail
to an external e-mail address if it contained non-public information. Id. at 12.

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The court also relied upon a copy of an employment agreement that plaintiff
signed acknowledging his receipt of the company’s confidentiality provisions.
Id. at 13. Thus, even if knowledge of the company’s security policies could
not be attributed across the board to all employees based solely on the
existence of the “Big Book,” the court’s decision here was not limited to that
publication, but was based on in person training as well as personal
acknowledgment of the company’s confidentiality policies. For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the
judgment (Doc. 81) hereby is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 30, 2016
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
November 30, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and
also on Hugh MacEachern, 22126 Hayes Street,
Taylor, MI 48180-2422.
s/Marcia Beauchemin
Deputy Clerk

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