Dorman v. Clinton, Township of

Filing 64

ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' 43 Motion for Interim Attorney Fees and Costs. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL DORMAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 15-cv-12552
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF CLINTON,
Defendant.
__________________________________________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR INTERIM ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS (ECF #43)
I
Plaintiff Michael Dorman is the pastor of River of Life Ministries, INT
(“RLF”), a church located in the Charter Township of Clinton (“Clinton Township”).
(See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 1-2, ECF #8 at Pg. ID 113.) In this action, Dorman and RLF
allege, among other things, that Clinton Township violated the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (“RLUIPA”),
when it prohibited them from using property located at 22515 Laurel (the “Laurel
Property”) as a church. (Id. at Pg. ID 112-13.) More specifically, Dorman and RLF
allege that Clinton Township (1) improperly required them to obtain a “Special Use
Permit” before it would allow them to use the Laurel Property as a church and (2)

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then wrongly refused to grant them such a permit. (See id. at ¶¶ 27, 81-82, Pg. ID
120, 137.)
On December 8, 2017, more than two years after Dorman and RLF filed this
action, Clinton Township agreed to permit them to use the Laurel Property as a
church. On that day, the parties submitted, and the Court signed and entered, a
“Stipulated Order Granting Plaintiffs Land Use Approval.” (ECF #40.) The parties
approved the order as to both “form” and “content.” (Id.) Among other things, the
order provided that:
[T]he [Laurel] Property shall be permitted to be used as a
church effective immediately, and [Clinton Township]
shall issue … all necessary land use permits such that
[Dorman and RLF] shall be permitted to utilize the
[Laurel] Property for operation of a church subject to the
terms of this stipulated order.
(Id. at Pg. ID 905.)
II
On February 12, 2018, Dorman and RLF filed a motion for interim attorney
fees and costs.1 (See ECF #43.) In the motion, Dorman and RLF seek $62,322.00 in
attorney fees and $1,280.29 in costs. (See id. at Pg. ID 911.) They argue that the
Court should award these fees and costs pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“Section 1988(b)”). (Id. at Pg. ID 923.)

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The Court held a hearing on the motion on April 23, 2018.
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Section 1988(b) permits a court to award interim attorney fees and costs to a
“prevailing party” in a RLUIPA action. It provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n any
action or proceeding to enforce a provision of …. [RLUIPA] … the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). To be considered a
“prevailing party,” a plaintiff must obtain “a judicially sanctioned change in the legal
relationship of the parties.” Buckhannon Bd. of Care Home, Inc., 532 U.S. 598, 603
(2001) (internal punctuation omitted). See also Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129
(1980) (holding that a respondent was a “prevailing party” under Section 1988(b)
where the court entered a consent decree memorializing a settlement that granted her
“substantially all” of the relief sought in her complaint).
Dorman and RLF insist that they are a “prevailing party” under Section
1988(b) because the Court entered an order that “change[d]” the parties’ “legal
relationship” and required Clinton Township to allow them to use the Laurel
Property as a church – the primary relief that Dorman and RLF sought in their
Amended Complaint. Clinton Township initially countered that Dorman and RLF
are not “prevailing parties” as a matter of law because the Court has not made any
determination of the merits of their claim. (See Resp. to Mot., ECF #44 at Pg. ID
1057.)

But during the hearing on this motion, counsel for Clinton Township

candidly acknowledged that Dorman and RLF are “prevailing parties” under the
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Supreme Court’s decision in Maher, supra, and that the Court does have discretion
whether to award them interim attorney fees and costs under Section 1988(b).
After acknowledging the Court’s discretion, counsel for Clinton Township
argued that the proper exercise of that discretion would be to deny the request for an
award of interim fees and costs. Counsel asserted that such an award would be
inappropriate because the Court’s December 8, 2017, stipulated order did not make
any findings with respect to the merits of Dorman’s and RLF’s claims and because
the merits remain in dispute. But as Maher makes clear, a fee award may be
appropriate even where a court never makes any findings on the merits. Indeed, in
Maher, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he fact that respondent prevailed through a
settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees. Nothing
in the language of § 1988 conditions the District Court’s power to award fees on full
litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff’s rights have
been violated.” Maher, 448 U.S. at 129 (emphasis added).
Nor is the Court persuaded that it should exercise its discretion to deny an
award of interim fees and costs to Dorman and RLF. Among the factors a Court
considers when deciding whether to award interim fees and costs are whether the
moving “party has prevailed on an important matter in [the] case, even if the party
ultimately does not prevail on all issues,” whether the case is “complex,” and
whether the case is “of long duration.” Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1036
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(6th Cir. 1988). Each of these factors supports an award of interim fees and costs
here. As described above, Dorman and RLF have “prevailed on an important matter
in the case” – perhaps the important matter in the case – namely, their ability to use
the Laurel Property as a church. This case is also somewhat “complex.” It raises
challenging and important RLUIPA issues that have been identified and explored
during the hearings before the Court. And this action has been pending for more
than three years. The lengthy duration of the proceedings has required Dorman and
RLF to spend considerable legal fees in their efforts to use the Laurel Property as a
church. In an unrefuted sworn certification, Dorman said that “[d]ue to delays in
this litigation, RLF has exhausted all of its financial resources,” that the church is
“essentially bankrupt and otherwise unable to pay any additional legal bills,” and
that since 2017, he has had to “pa[y] [the] litigation costs and attorney fees in this
matter on [his] own from [his] limited personal resources.” (Dorman Certification at
¶¶ 15-17, ECF #43-2 at Pg. ID 939.) Under these circumstances, the Court concludes
that an award of interim fees and costs is appropriate.
III
The Court now turns to how much in interim fees and costs to award Dorman
and RLF. As noted above, they seek $62,322.00 in attorney fees and $1,280.29 in
costs. (See ECF #43 at Pg. ID 911.) Dorman and RLF incurred these fees and costs

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“prior to and as part of this litigation through December 31, 2017, as [they] sought
and secured land use approval for their church.” (Id.)
Under Section 1988(b), Dorman and RLF are entitled to an award of their
“reasonable attorney’s fee[s]” and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). “A reasonable
attorney[‘s] fee is calculated by the lodestar method.” The Northeast Ohio Coal. for
the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 702 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984) and Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
Under this method, a “court multiplies a reasonable hourly rate by the proven
number of hours reasonably expended on the case by counsel.” Geier v. Sundquist,
372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004). “The primary concern in an attorney fee case is
that the fee awarded be reasonable, that is, one that is adequately compensatory to
attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers.” Id.
The Court first concludes that the hourly rates requested by Dorman’s and
RLF’s counsel are “reasonable.” “To arrive at a reasonable hourly rate, courts use
as a guideline the prevailing market rate, defined as the rate that lawyers of
comparable skill and experience can reasonably expect to command within the
venue of the court of record.” Id. Here, Dorman and RLF have presented evidence
that the hourly rates their attorneys charged were reasonable based on the average
hourly billing rate for similarly-experienced attorneys in the State of Michigan. (See
ECF #43-12.) Notably, Clinton Township has not argued that these rates are
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unreasonable. Indeed, Clinton Township has not offered any objection to the manner
in which Dorman and RLF calculated the fees and costs that they seek.
Next, the Court concludes that the “proven number of hours” that Dorman’s
and RLF’s counsel worked on this matter were “reasonably expended.” Dorman and
RLF have presented evidence – in the form of detailed bills of their counsel’s work
and a certification from their counsel justifying those billings (see ECF ## 41-9 –
41-11) – establishing the total “number of hours” that their counsel spent on this
matter during the relevant time period. That total was reasonable given the complex
nature of this case. Moreover, Clinton Township has not objected to any entry on
any of the legal invoices submitted by Dorman and RLF or otherwise argued that
any time counsel spent on the case was not “reasonably expended.”
Finally, the Court concludes that it is appropriate to award Dorman and RLF
fees and costs incurred through December 8, 2017, the date on which they obtained
the judicial relief that justifies the fee award (the ability to use the Laurel Property
as a church). At this point, the Court declines to award fees and costs incurred
beyond that date.2

When the Court multiplies the reasonable hourly rate of

Dorman’s and RLF’s counsel by the proven hours that counsel reasonably expended
through December 8, 2017, it determines that Dorman and RLF are entitled to

2

Nothing in this order precludes Dorman and RLF from later seeking fees and costs
incurred after December 8, 2017.
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$60,897.00 in fees. They are also entitled to $1,268.69 in unrefuted costs incurred
during this same time period.
IV
For all of the reasons stated above, Dorman’s and RLF’s motion for interim
attorney fees and costs (ECF #43) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART. Clinton Township shall pay to Dorman and RLF $60,897.00 in attorney fees
and $1,268.69 in costs by no later than October 21, 2018.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 13, 2018

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on September 13, 2018, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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