American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan v. Trinity Health Corporation et al

Filing 44

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTSMOTION TO DISMISS 15 . Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (TBan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, on
behalf of its members, and
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION of
MICHIGAN, on behalf of its members,

Case No. 15-cv-12611

Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

v.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
R. STEVEN WHALEN

TRINITY HEALTH CORPORATION, an
Indiana corporation, et al.,
Defendants.
/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [15]
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan commenced this action, on
behalf of their members, on July 23, 2015 against Trinity Health Corporation and
Trinity Health-Michigan (“Defendants”). See Dkt. No. 1. On October 1, 2015,
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint adding the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) as a Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 4. Currently before the Court is Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss. See Dkt. No. 15. This matter is fully briefed. The Court held a
hearing on April 7, 2016, and heard oral argument on the motion. For the reasons
discussed below, the Motion will be GRANTED.

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II. BACKGROUND
Defendant Trinity Health Corporation is the parent corporation of a Catholic
health care system, which includes hospitals in multiple states. Dkt. No. 15 at 13
(Pg. ID No. 113). Among the purposes of Trinity Health Corporation is carrying
out the healthcare mission of Catholic Health Ministries on behalf of and as an
integral part of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States. Id. Trinity HealthMichigan is a subsidiary of Trinity Health Corporation that owns and operates
Catholic hospitals and provides other health care services in the state of Michigan.
Id.
The Defendants Trinity Health Corp. and Trinity Health-Michigan adhere to
a policy known as the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health
(“Directives”), published by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
(“USCCB”). Id. Directive 45 states: “Abortion (that is, the directly intended
termination of pregnancy before viability or the directly intended destruction of a
viable fetus) is never permitted.” Id. at 14 (Pg. ID No. 114).
The ACLU and the ACLU of Michigan (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are
membership organizations with members in every state where a Defendant hospital
with an emergency department is located. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 7, 9. The
members include women in those states who are currently pregnant, have been
pregnant in the past, and may become pregnant in the future. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 38, 41–

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42. At least one of Plaintiffs’ members has suffered emergency complications
during her pregnancy that required the termination of her pregnancy in order to
stabilize her condition.
Plaintiffs allege that women—including at least one of Plaintiffs’
members—have suffered severe harm as a result of Defendants’ adherence to the
Directives. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that women—including at least one
member who is currently pregnant—are at risk of suffering similar harm should
their pregnancies suffer complications in the future.
The Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that Defendants’ adherence to the
Directives is in violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, and the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab Act”),
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Plaintiffs further seek injunctive relief to prevent Defendants
from further adherence to the Directives that allegedly stand at odds with federal
statutory law. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing and have failed to state
a claim under the statutes.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs lack standing, and thus the Court does
not have subject matter jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1).

The Defendants have also raised additional challenges pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). However, the Court is “bound to
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consider the 12(b)(1) motion first, since the Rule 12(b)(6) challenge becomes moot
if this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Moir v. Greater Cleveland Regional
Transit Authority, 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990). “Where the subject matter
jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to [Rule 12(b)(1)], the plaintiff has the burden
of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion.” General Retirement System
of City of Detroit v. Snyder, 822 F. Supp. 2d 686, 693 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
“Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction fall into two
general categories: facial attacks and factual attacks.” United States v. Ritchie, 15
F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). Whereas a facial attack is a challenge to the
sufficiency of the pleading itself, a factual attack challenges the factual existence
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Where the motion makes a facial attack, the court
must construe the petition’s allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and take the material allegations as true. Id. Conversely, on a factual
attack, there is no presumption of truthfulness applied to factual allegations,
allowing the court to “weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its
power to hear the case.” Id.
Here, Defendants are making a facial attack to the sufficiency of the
pleadings. Therefore, the presumption of truthfulness applies to the allegations in
the complaint and the Court will view all factual disputes in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiffs.

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IV. DISCUSSION
“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
‘[c]ases’ and ‘[c]ontroversies.’ ” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct.
2334, 2341 (2014). “In an attempt to give meaning to Article III’s ‘case or
controversy’ requirement, the courts have developed a series of principles termed
‘justiciability doctrines.’ ” National Rifle Assoc. of America v. Magaw, 132 F.3d
272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997). Those doctrines include both standing and ripeness.
Snyder, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
A. Article III Standing
“Before bringing a case in federal court, a plaintiff must establish standing
to do so.” Klein v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 753 F.3d 576, 579 (6th Cir. 2014). The
law of Article III standing “serves to prevent the judicial process from being used
to usurp the powers of the political branches.” Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013)).
Plaintiffs have brought this lawsuit in representative capacity on behalf of
their members. “An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the
interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in

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the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
“To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an ‘injury in
fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of,’ and (3) a ‘likelihood’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a
favorable decision.’ ” Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S.Ct. at 2341 (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
a. Injury In-Fact
“An injury sufficient to satisfy Article III must be ‘concrete and
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ ” Id.
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). “An allegation of future injury may suffice if the
injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk that the harm will
occur.’ ” Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013)).
Plaintiffs argue two theories of standing: (1) at least one of Plaintiffs’
members was denied appropriate treatment under EMTALA and the Rehab Act at
Defendants’ hospitals as a result of the Directives, consequently suffering severe
injury; and (2) at least one member, who was pregnant at the time the case was
filed, had a history of severe pregnancy complications requiring the directly
intended termination of the pre-viability pregnancy, and feared she would be

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unable to get the care she needed if she once again experienced complications. Dkt.
No. 32 at 15 (Pg. ID No. 435).
In response, Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead any
past harm suffered with sufficient particularity to gain standing. Dkt. No. 15 at 19
(Pg. ID No.) (“Here, the amended complaint does not identify any individual that
suffered an injury, what that injury was, where or when the injury occurred, or how
EMTALA and/or the Rehabilitation Act were violated.”). Further, Defendants
argue that any alleged future harm is too speculative to gain standing in the present
matter as of yet. Id.
i. Plaintiffs’ First Theory of Standing
Plaintiffs argue that “[c]ontrary to what Defendants assert in their brief,
Plaintiffs have alleged numerous past incidents where women (including at least
one of Plaintiffs’ members) were denied appropriate treatment” under EMTALA
and the Rehab Act. Dkt. No. 32 at 15 (Pg. ID No. 435). In the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that
[a]t least one of Plaintiffs’ members has already been denied
stabilizing treatment (termination of the pregnancy) at one of
Defendants’ hospitals, in violation of EMTALA, solely because that
treatment conflicted with the Directives.
Amended Complaint at 9, ¶ 38. The Amended Complaint alleges a violation of the
Rehab Act with near identical phrasing. See Amended Complaint at 13, ¶ 64.

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“At the pleadings stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from
the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presume that
general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the
claim.’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)). However, “ ‘[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not
in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at
564 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyon, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)); see Fieger v. Ferry,
471 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In the context of a declaratory judgment
action, allegations of past injury alone are not sufficient to confer standing. The
plaintiff must allege and/or ‘demonstrate actual present harm or a significant
possibility of future harm.’ ”) (quoting Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of
Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 1998)).
Here, Plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief. See Amended
Complaint at 16. Therefore, even assuming that the complaint contains sufficient
factual matter to establish past actual harm—considering the vagueness of the
allegation, this is dubious—the allegations of past exposure to Defendants’ illegal
conduct is not sufficient to create standing.

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ii. Plaintiffs’ Second Theory of Standing
Plaintiffs next argue that at least one member “was pregnant at the time the
case was filed, had a history of severe pregnancy complications requiring the
directly intended termination of a pre[-]viability pregnancy . . . lives in a county
where the only hospital was a Trinity Hospital, and feared she would be unable to
get the care she needed if she once again experienced complications.” Dkt. No. 32
at 15 (Pg. ID No. 435); Amended Complaint at 10, ¶ 43. The Amended Complaint
also includes a similar passage with regards to the Rehab Act. Amended Complaint
at 14, ¶ 66. These are allegations of future harm.
Defendants argue that the allegations are too speculative to be considered
injury in-fact. In response, Plaintiffs rely on Sandusky County Democratic Party v.
Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004) for the proposition that a harm that has yet
to materialize against an unidentified member, “does not transform this Article III
injury into non-cognizable speculation.” Dkt. No. 32 at 16 (Pg. ID No. 436).
However, Plaintiffs reliance on Sandusky is misplaced.
In Sandusky, the Sixth Circuit held that the Sandusky Democratic Party and
several labor unions had standing to bring a prospective claim for their members’
voting rights even though they had “not identified specific voters who will seek to
vote at a polling place that will be deemed wrong by election workers . . . ”. Id. at

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574. The Court of Appeals held that the harms, resulting from human error, were
“inevitable . . . not speculative or remote; they are real and imminent.” Id.
The concept of “imminence” distinguishes this case from that of Sandusky.
Plaintiffs assert that
[g]iven the concreteness of the threat posed to Plaintiffs’ pregnant
member, coupled with the fact that all of Defendants’ hospitals adhere
to the Directives; and the biological inevitability that women will
continue to become pregnant and that some of those women will
experience complications that require the direct termination of their
pregnancy prior to viability, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to
show Article III injury.
Dkt. No. 32 at 17–18 (Pg. ID No. 437–38). But this “inevitability” is only true
given an indefinite (if not an infinite) timeline and membership list. Unlike
Sandusky, where voting dates were fixed, there is no telling when Plaintiffs’
members are to suffer this harm. Plaintiffs’ complaint has only presented the Court
with a mathematical probability of harm. Furthermore, the risk of Plaintiffs’ lone
pregnant member experiencing severe complications from her pregnancy does not
rise to the level of inevitability displayed in Sandusky. Sandusky involved the
inevitable likelihood that one of thousands of voters would be accidentally
identified as a non-resident, and mistakenly turned away from their polling place
by a volunteer on voting day. Sandusky, 387 F.3d at 574. In this case, Plaintiffs
cannot guarantee that their pregnant member will experience complications,

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choose to get treated at Defendants’ hospitals,1 or even require hospitalization.
They have plead no facts, nor brought any supplemental evidence to explain why
this member in particular faces a substantial risk of having pregnancy
complications. Given the events that must materialize, her risk of harm, as
currently plead, cannot be characterized as “certainly impending.” Clapper, 133
S.Ct. at 1148.
B. Article III Ripeness
Plaintiffs also request declaratory judgment. “Declaratory judgments are
typically sought before a completed ‘injury in-fact’ has occurred, but must be
limited to the resolution of an ‘actual controversy.’ ” Snyder, 822 F. Supp. 2d at
693 (quoting National Rifle Assoc. of America, 132 F.3d at 279).
“When seeking declaratory relief, a plaintiff ‘must show actual present harm
or a significant probability of future harm in order to demonstrate the need for preenforcement review.’ ” Id. at 694. “ ‘Ripeness requires that the ‘injury in-fact be
certainly impending’ and ‘separates those matters that are premature because the
injury is speculative and may never occur from those that are appropriate for the
court’s review.’ ” Id. (quoting National Rifle Assoc. of America, 132 F.3d at 280).

1

Plaintiffs do make note that the only hospital in her county is owned by Defendants, but this
does not discount the possibility that she may move, or may go into labor while in another
county etc.
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When challenging a health policy or statute, the Supreme Court has required
“a showing that ‘in discrete and well-defined instances a particular condition has or
is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used.’ ”
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007). In this context, the Plaintiff should
identify “discrete factual circumstances” that are detailed by medical records or
other similarly concrete evidence. Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v.
DeWine, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1067 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
At issue in DeWine was an Ohio law that banned physicians from
administering or prescribing mifepristone to induce an abortion after the 49th day
of pregnancy. Id. at 1062. The Plaintiffs argued that the restriction was
unconstitutional due to its failure to include an exception allowing mifepristone
abortions where necessary to protect a woman’s life or health. Id. at 1063. The
Plaintiffs identified certain medical conditions—such as large uterine fibroids and
cervical stenosis—that would require the use of the banned protocol, else the
patients would have to undergo riskier surgical abortions. Id. at 1067. The DeWine
court noted that both parties were able to articulate discrete instances in which an
off-label mifepristone abortion may be medically necessary. Id. Furthermore, the
DeWine court noted that “the articulated circumstances are not hypothetical, as
Plaintiffs have alleged and the record includes testimony that they have patients

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with the specified conditions.” Id. As a result, the DeWine court held that the claim
was ripe under Gonzales. Id. at 1068.
Here, Plaintiffs have not identified similar circumstances. Plaintiffs have
not explained what medical conditions would place their members at risk, or if any
of their members have such a condition that would place them at risk. They have
only alleged that one of their members was pregnant at the time the claim was
filed, and that other members will likely become pregnant in the future. Obviously,
pregnancy alone is not a “particular condition” that requires the termination of said
pregnancy. To find the claim to be ripe for review on the facts pleaded before this
Court would be to grant a cause of action to every pregnant woman in the state of
Michigan upon the date of conception. Accordingly, the alleged harm has not risen
beyond a speculative nature and is not ripe for review.
Having found that there is no subject matter jurisdiction, the Court declines
to address the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [15] is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 11, 2016
Detroit, MI

/s/Gershwin A Drain
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Court Judge
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