Mann v. Schlottman et al

Filing 64

OPINION AND ORDER (1) Granting Defendants' 44 Motion to Dismiss, (2) Denying Plaintiff's 40 Motion for Summary Judgment, (3) Denying Plaintiff's 39 Motion for Judgment on the Merits of the Case, (4) Denying Plaintiff's [4 2] Motion for Depositions and Interrogatories, (5) Denying Plaintiff's 52 Motion to Compel Alternative Resolution, (6) Denying Plaintiff's 58 Motion for Judgment, and (7) Denying Plaintiff's 62 Motion in Opposition to Rule 56 Motion. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (HMon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JACK MANN,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 15-cv-12869
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
SOE SCHLOTTMAN et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS (ECF #44), (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #40), (3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE (ECF #39),
(4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEPOSITIONS AND
INTERROGATORIES, (5) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
COMPEL ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTION (ECF #52), (6) DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT (ECF #58), AND (7) DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO RULE 56 MOTION (ECF
#62)
Plaintiff Jack Mann (“Mann”) is an inmate currently incarcerated at the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (the “BOP”) facility in Ashland, Kentucky (“FCI
Ashland”).

Between 2011 and 2014, Mann was incarcerated at the Federal

Detention Center in Milan, Michigan (“FCI Milan”). A published BOP policy in
effect at that time prohibited federal inmates from using BOP computers for personal
use. Despite that policy, Mann (1) used a BOP computer to draft a manuscript
entitled “Grimace and Me” and (2) stored the manuscript on a BOP computer. The

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BOP later transferred Mann to its facility in Allenwood, Pennsylvania (“FCI
Allenwood”). After the transfer, Mann asked a BOP employee at FCI Milan to send
him a copy of his manuscript. That employee declined to do so because Mann had
created and stored the manuscript on a BOP computer in violation of BOP policy.
Mann, acting pro se, then brought this civil action against the United States, the
BOP, the Department of Justice, and several BOP employees. (See Compl., ECF #1;
First Am. Compl., ECF #31.) Mann seeks $11,000,000 in damages for the refusal
to return the manuscript and $1,500,000 in legal fees. (See First Am. Compl., ECF
#31 at 4, Pg. ID 199.)
There are two dispositive motions now pending before the Court: the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF #44) and Mann’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF #40). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss and DENIES Mann’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court
also DENIES Mann’s other motions that are pending in this case. (See ECF ## 52,
58, 62.)
I. Factual Background and Mann’s Amended Complaint
In 2011, Mann was convicted of solicitation to commit murder, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 373(a), in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. See United States v. Mann, 10-cr-00035 at Docket #86 (N.D. Illinois, July
27, 2011). He was sentenced to a term of 105 months in custody. See id. The BOP
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housed Mann at FCI Milan from October 2011 to November 2014. (See Inmate
Quarters History, ECF #44-2 at 1-2, Pg. ID 362-63.)
During Mann’s time at FCI Milan, the BOP had an official published policy
concerning inmate use of BOP computers. This policy, known as BOP Program
Statement 1237.13, generally “prohibited inmates from using [BOP] computers for
personal use.” (ECF #44-5 at 18, Pg. ID 416.) However, it contained an limited
exception allowing inmates to use BOP computers to “generate” materials “as a
result of” their enrollment in an “Educational or Vocational program.”1

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BOP Program Statement 1237.13 provided as follows: 

Inmate Personal Use of Computer Equipment. Inmates
are prohibited from using computers for personal use, such
as legal activities or correspondence to relatives (except
under certain conditions). This includes the use of printers
and printing materials, diskettes, CD-ROM burning, and
other such activities.
Exception.
Certain computing materials may be
authorized for inmate use and possession, which may
include certain kinds of printouts as authorized by local
policy and screened by appropriate staff. An example is
some materials generated as a result of an Educational or
Vocational program or as specified in the Program
Statement on Legal Activities, Inmate. Only the facility
CEO can authorize other personal uses of computer
equipment, such as legal activities or other
correspondence, in writing.
(ECF #44-5 at 18, Pg. ID 416, emphasis added.) 
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While Mann was an inmate at FCI Milan, he wrote and saved a personal
manuscript titled “Grimace and Me” (the “Manuscript”) on a prison computer. (See
Am. Compl., ECF #31 at 4-7, Pg. ID 199-202.) At the time he wrote the Manuscript
he was not enrolled in a BOP educational or vocational program. Instead, he was
“patient[ly] … wait[ing]” for a writing class to be scheduled in the future. (Resp. to
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF # 51 at 4-5, Pg. ID 478-79; see also Am. Compl., ECF # 31 at
6, Pg. ID 201.) In fact, while Mann hoped to be able to enroll in an upcoming class,
he was never able to do so. Notably, Mann does not allege that he was directed to
prepare the Manuscript in preparation for his hoped-for enrollment in the future
class, nor does he claim that the instructor gave him permission to prepare the
Manuscript or bring it to a future class. Instead, Mann claims only that he asked the
instructor if there would be a class at some point in the future, and the instructor said
“yes.” (Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF # 51 at 25, Pg. ID 500.) Given these
circumstances, Mann plainly did not write the Manuscript “as a result” of a BOP
educational or vocational program, and he thus violated BOP Program Statement
1237.13 by using the computer to create and store it.
Despite his violation of BOP Program Statement 1237.13, Mann asked
Defendant Schlottman, a BOP employee at FCI Milan, to retrieve the Manuscript
(for Mann) from the BOP computers. (See ECF #31 at 7, Pg. ID 202.) Schlottman
allegedly told Mann that he would “handle” the matter, but Schlottman did not obtain
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the Manuscript for Mann. (Id.) According to Mann, Defendants Sauter and Gillespie
were additional FCI Milan employees who were “aware of [his] need for the content
saved [on the educational] computers” but neither provided him a copy of the
content. (Id.) Mann also contacted Defendant Rische, a correctional officer at FCI
Milan, who told Mann that “[w]e do not print off personal work on an educational
only computer.” (Id. at 10, Pg. ID 205.)
The BOP later transferred Mann to FCI Allenwood. (See Inmate Quarters
History, ECF #44-2 at 1, Pg. ID 362.)

After Mann was transferred to FCI

Allenwood, he wrote Schlottman a letter stating that he “want[ed] a copy of the
[Manuscript]” and instructing Schlottman to mail the Manuscript to his new address
at FCI Allenwood. (See ECF #31 at 39, Pg. ID 234.) In response, Schlottman
emailed Defendant Bittenbender, who is the Assistant Supervisor of Education at
FCI Allenwood, to tell her that the Manuscript was “non-educational” and “for
personal use” – and was thus created in violation of BOP Program Statement
1237.13. (Id. at 41, Pg. ID 236.) He told Bittenbender that he would not be providing
the Manuscript to Mann.
Mann felt aggrieved by the refusal to provide the Manuscript, and he decided
to assert tort claims based upon the refusal. To begin the process of asserting tort
claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), on March 2, 2015,
Mann filed a “Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death” on BOP Standard Form 95
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(“Mann’s Form 95”). (Id. at 30-35, Pg. ID 225-30.) In Mann’s Form 95, he sought
$11,000,000 for (1) “property damage” caused by loss of the Manuscript and (2)
“personal injury” caused by “emotional distress, abuse of process, tortious
interference with contract rights,” “assault through menacing,” and “loss of use.”
(Id.)
By letter dated June 25, 2015, the BOP responded to, and denied, the tort
claims asserted in Mann’s Form 95 (the “Denial Letter”). (See id. at 37-38, Pg. ID
232-33.) The Denial Letter explained that the BOP had denied Mann’s claim for
personal injury damages because the BOP’s investigation “did not reveal [that
Mann] suffered any personal injury as a result of the negligent acts or omissions of
BOP employees acting within the scope of their employment.” (Id.) Likewise, the
Denial Letter said that the BOP denied Mann’s claim for property damages based
upon the results of its investigation. (See id.)
On August 7, 2015, Mann filed suit in this Court. In his Amended Complaint,
Mann asserts the following claims and identifies the following damages:
(a) Abuse of Process
(b) Fifth Amendment Violations
(c) First Amendment Violations
(d) Deliberate indifference
(e) Intentional Torts
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(f) Non-intentional torts
(g) Conversion of Intellectual Property
(h) Theft of Intellectual Property
(i) Personal Injury
(j) Tortious Interference with Contract Rights
(k) Fraud
(l) Loss of Manuscript Valued Over $1,000,000
(m) Loss of Use of Money Valued Over $250,000
(n) Delay Damages
(o) Punitive Damages
(p) Compensatory Damages
(Id. at 9, Pg. ID 204.) In his briefing to the Court, Mann appears to suggest that he
is asserting additional claims, such “illegal seizure” in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. (Id. at 18, Pg. ID 213.)
For ease of reference, the Court divides Mann’s claims into two categories:
(1) state-law tort claims (the “Tort Claims”) that Mann presented in Mann’s Form
95, and (2) constitutional claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (the “Bivens Claims”). Mann asserts both categories of claims
against three classes of Defendants: (1) the United States; (2) the BOP and the
Department of Justice (an agency and department of the United States, respectively),
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and (3) six individuals employed by the BOP. The individual Defendants (to whom
Mann refers by last name) are: Sauter (a BOP employee at FCI Milan), Schlottman
(a BOP employee at FCI Milan), Gillespie (a BOP employee at FCI Milan), Rische
(a BOP employee at FCI Milan), Terris (the warden at FCI Milan), and Bittenbender
(a BOP employee at FCI Allenwood).
II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
A. Standard of Review
Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1),
12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “FRCP”). (See
Motion to Dismiss, ECF #44 at 1, Pg. ID 330.)
Rule 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. “When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion to dismiss.” Giesse v.
Sec. of Dept. of Health and Human Services, 522 F.3d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 2008).
Rule 12(b)(2) provides for dismissal of a complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant. “The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing through
specific facts that personal jurisdiction exists over the non-resident defendant, and
the plaintiff must make this demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 711 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Where, as here, a court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, “the plaintiff
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need only make a prima facie case that the court has personal jurisdiction.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court does “not weigh the facts disputed by
the parties but instead consider[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Id. The Court may, however, “consider the defendant's undisputed factual
assertions.” Id.
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To
survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that
permits a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged
misconduct. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When assessing the sufficiency
of a plaintiff’s claim, a district court must accept all of a complaint's factual
allegations as true. See Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir.
2001). “Mere conclusions,” however, “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. While the Court must liberally construe documents filed by
a pro se plaintiff, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a complaint filed
by such a plaintiff must still plead sufficiently specific factual allegations, and not
just legal conclusions, in support of each claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–679.
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B. All Claims against Bittenbender
Bittenbender is uniquely situated among the individual Defendants because
she works at a BOP facility outside of this State and this judicial district – FCI
Allenwood in Allenwood, Pennsylvania. Given her lack of connection to this forum,
she has moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(2) because the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over her.
Mann may proceed with his Bivens and tort claims against Bittenbender only
if this Court may assert personal jurisdiction over her. See Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 765
F.2d 1455, 1459 (6th Cir. 1985); Robertson v. Merola, 895 F.Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C.
1995). For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that it lacks the
required personal jurisdiction.
Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. See Air Products and
Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2007). General
jurisdiction “depends on continuous and systematic contact with the forum state,”
whereas specific jurisdiction “grants jurisdiction only to the extent that a claim arises
out of or relates to a defendant's contacts in the forum state.” Miller v. AXA
Winterthur Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Kerry Steel, Inc. v.
Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 149 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Bittenbender is plainly not subject to general jurisdiction here. She has
submitted a sworn declaration in which she explains that she has never resided in
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Michigan nor owned property in Michigan and that her only contact with the state
of Michigan is occasional communication with BOP personnel in Michigan. (See
ECF #44-4.) She lacks the type of continuous or systematic contacts with this State
to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over her.
Nor is she subject to limited personal jurisdiction here. In order for a court to
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant, “the defendant must be
amenable to suit under the forum state’s long-arm statute and the due process
requirements of the Constitution must be met.” CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89
F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996). Here, because “Michigan’s long-arm statute
extends to the limits imposed by federal constitutional due process requirements …
the two questions become one.” AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, 836 F.3d 543, 549
(6th Cir. 2016). Thus, the Court must only “determine whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over [Bittenbender] comports with constitutional due process.”
Id.
Constitutional due process requirements are satisfied when an out-of-state
defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l
Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal citations omitted). In
Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968), the
Sixth Circuit established a three-part test to guide this determination:
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First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the
privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a
consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of
action must arise from the defendant’s activities there.
Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused
by the defendant must have a substantial enough
connection with the forum state to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.

Id. at 381.
None of the three prongs of the Southern Machine test are satisfied with
respect to Bittenbender. First, Mann does not allege any facts or present any
evidence suggesting that she personally availed herself of the privilege of acting in
this State. The Amended Complaint alleges that Bittenbender did two things: (1)
she received the email in which Schlottman stated that he believed the Manuscript
was “non-educational” and that he (Schlottman) would not be providing it to Mann,
(Id. at 41, Pg. ID 236.), and (2) she confiscated Mann’s legal materials on October
5, 2015, because she was allegedly angry about Mann including her as a defendant
in this lawsuit. (Id at 16, Pg. ID 211.) The first action was simply the passive receipt
in Pennsylvania of an email from an individual located in Michigan. This does not
amount to purposeful availment by Bittenbender in Michigan. See Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (The “purposeful availment requirement
ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of . . .
unilateral activity of another person.”) (internal citations omitted). Likewise, the
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second alleged action occurred entirely in Pennsylvania and does not amount to
purposeful availment of this forum.
Second, because Bittenbender did nothing in this forum, Mann’s claims
cannot possibly arise out of her contacts with Michigan.
Finally, given the lack of any meaningful connection between Bittenbender
and this forum, it would be wholly unreasonable for this Court to assert personal
jurisdiction over her.
Mann counters that this Court may nonetheless proceed with the claims
against Bittenbender because “there is Diversity Jurisdiction” over his claims against
her. (ECF #51 at 17, Pg. ID 492.) Mann fails to recognize that (1) diversity
jurisdiction is a form of subject matter jurisdiction and (2) subject matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction must be established separately. Simply put, Mann has not
established that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Bittenbender.
Accordingly, all claims against Bittenbender are DISMISSED for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
C. Tort Claims
1. Against the DOJ and BOP
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mann’s tort claims against
the DOJ and BOP because their sovereign immunity has not been waived. See
Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol, 741 F.3d 668, 672 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Without a
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waiver of sovereign immunity, a court is without subject matter jurisdiction over
claims against federal agencies.”). Although the Federal Tort Claims Act (the
“FTCA”) waives sovereign immunity for certain tort claims against the United
States, it does not waive sovereign immunity for suits against federal agencies. See
Allegeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the FTCA
does not waive the sovereign immunity of federal agencies such as the United States
Postal Service); McCracken v. Brookhaven Science Associates LLC, 376 Fed. App’x
138 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that federal agencies “were properly dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, because the agencies were not subject to suit under the
Federal Tort Claims Act”). Because there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for
Mann’s Tort Claims against the BOP and DOJ, such claims are DISMISSED for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Against Schlottman, Terris, Gillespie, Rische and Sauter
The remaining individual Defendants are also immune from Mann’s tort
claims. They enjoy this immunity under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C § 2679(b),
which grants federal employees immunity from tort liability for actions taken within
the scope of their employment. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229 (2007) (The
Westfall Act “accords federal employees absolute immunity from common-law tort
claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties”). Here,
Mann alleges no facts suggesting that the individually-named defendants were acting
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outside the scope of their employment. Accordingly, the Tort Claims against
Schlottman, Terris, Gillespie, Rische, and Sauter are DISMISSED.
3. Against the United States
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mann’s tort claims against
the United States because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity
with respect to those claims. See U.S. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S.
465, 472 (2003) (explaining that “[j]urisdiction over any suit against the [United
States] requires a clear statement from the United States waiving sovereign
immunity, together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver.”)
While the FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States with
respect to certain claims seeking “money damages . . . for injury or loss of property
. . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his or her employment,” 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(1), that waiver does not extend to Mann’s tort claims. The FTCA explicitly
exempts from its waiver of sovereign immunity “any claim arising in respect of the
. . . detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs
or excise or any other law enforcement officer” (the “Section 2680(c) Exception”).
28 U.S.C. §2680(c). In Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 218-21
(2008), the United States Supreme Court held that the Section 2680(c) Exception
applies to tort claims arising out of the allegedly wrongful seizure and retention of
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personal property by BOP officers. Here, Mann’s Tort Claims all arise out of the
BOP’s alleged unwillingness to return the Manuscript, which Mann alleges is his
personal property. Accordingly, the Section 2680(c) Exception applies to Mann’s
Tort Claims, and the United States’ sovereign immunity against Mann’s claims
remains intact. Mann’s Tort Claims against the United States are DISMISSED for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
D. Bivens Claims
1. Against the DOJ and BOP
The Supreme Court has held that there is no Bivens cause of action against
federal agencies. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). Accordingly, the
Bivens Claims against the BOP and DOJ are DISMISSED.
2. Against Schlottman, Terris, Gillespie, Rische, and Sauter
Mann’s Bivens Claims against the remaining individual Defendants fail
because Schlottman, Terris, Gillespie, Rische, and Sauter have qualified immunity
from those claims. “Qualified immunity protects public officials from liability from
civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Martin v.
City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Courts follow a “two-tiered inquiry to determine if an officer is
entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The first
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step is to determine if the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.
The second is to ask if the right was ‘clearly established’ when the event occurred
such that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated it. These
two steps may be addressed in any order.” Id. (internal citations omitted). With
respect to the “clearly established” prong of the qualified-immunity analysis, “[t]he
sources of clearly established law to be considered are limited. [Courts in this
Circuit] look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of [the Sixth
Circuit] and other courts within [the Sixth] [C]ircuit, and finally to decisions of other
circuits.” Id. at 961. “The plaintiff has the burden of showing that a right is clearly
established.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Barrett v.
Steubenville City Sch., 388 F.3d 967, 970 (6th Cir.2004)).
Mann has not shown that federal inmates have a clearly established
constitutional right to use a prison computer in violation of published BOP policy or
to have access to a document that was created in violation of BOP policy.2 Indeed,
he cites no authority from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, any federal court in
this Circuit, or any other circuit, that holds that a federal inmate has a constitutional
right to use a prison computer in violation of BOP policy or to access a document
that the inmate created in violation of BOP policy. Instead, Mann refers generally

2

The issue before the Court is not whether Mann had a First Amendment right to
compose a manuscript or short story while at FCI Milan. Rather, the issue is whether
he had a clearly established right to do so on a BOP computer.
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to Defendants violating his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. (See ECF #51 at 25, Pg. ID 500.)
Such references, however, are at too high a level of generality to demonstrate a
clearly established constitutional right. See Ashcroft v. al-Kibb, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high
level of generality.”) (internal citations omitted). Because Mann has not shown that
he had a clearly established right to access the Manuscript that he created on a prison
computer in violation of BOP Program Statement 1237.13, the individual
Defendants are protected by qualified immunity. Thus, Mann’s Bivens Claims
against Schlottman, Terris, Gillespie, Rische, and Sauter are DISMISSED.
E. Injunctive Relief
In his Amended Complaint, Mann also seeks injunctive relief that (1) directs
the BOP to print and send the Manuscript to Mann; and (2) directs a third party to
oversee the deletion of the Manuscript from the BOP’s server. (Id. at 4, Pg. ID 199.)
Because Mann’s claims fail on the merits for the reasons stated above, he is not
entitled to such relief. Accordingly, Mann’s requests for injunctive relief are
DENIED.
III. Mann’s Motions
Because the Court dismissed all of the claims in Mann’s Amended Complaint,
his Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #40) is DENIED AS MOOT. In addition,
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Mann’s Motion for Judgment on the Merits of the Case (ECF #39), Mann’s Motion
for Depositions and Interrogatories (ECF #42), Mann’s Motion to Compel
Alternative Resolution (ECF #52), Mann’s Motion for Judgment (ECF #58), and
Mann’s Motion in Opposition and Response to Rule 56 Motion (ECF #62) are
DENIED AS MOOT.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, for the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(ECF #44) is GRANTED and Mann’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Mann’s other motions in this case (ECF ## 39, 42, 52, 58, 62) are DENIED AS
MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 22, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on March 22, 2017, by electronic means and/or ordinary
mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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