Williams v. Campbell

Filing 11

OPINION & ORDER denying 10 Motion to disqualify. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TAJUAN MARNEZ WILLIAMS,
Case No. 2:15-CV-12914
HON. NANCY G. EDMUNDS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Petitioner,
v.
SHERMAN CAMPBELL,
Respondent,
_______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
Before the Court is habeas petitioner Tajuan Marnez Williams’ motion to disqualify
this Court from adjudicating his habeas petition. For the reasons stated below, the motion
is DENIED.
I. Background
Petitioner was convicted in 2010 in the Genesee County Circuit Court of first-degree
premeditated murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and felony-firearm. Following the
exhaustion of his state court remedies, petitioner filed his application for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he seeks relief from his convictions.
Respondent has yet to file an answer to the petition.
Petitioner filed a motion for this Court to disqualify itself, on the ground that this
Court previously summarily dismissed petitioner’s civil rights complaint which raised claims
arising out of his criminal prosecution for the offenses he now challenges in his current
petition.
In 2009, after petitioner had been charged but not yet convicted of these crimes,
1

petitioner filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was assigned
to this Court.

Plaintiff sued the Flint Township Police Department and three of its

employees, an inmate who served as a confidential informant for the police, the Michigan
Department of Corrections (M.D.O.C.) and six of its employees, the State of Michigan and
two of its elected officials, the Michigan State Police Headquarters, its Technical Service
Unit, Jim McDonald, an employee in the Unit, and two prosecuting attorneys. Petitioner
alleged that state correctional employees cooperated with the police and prosecutors and
transferred him from one prison to another prison where petitioner’s conversation with an
inmate turned informant was secretly recorded.
This Court summarily dismissed petitioner’s civil rights complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). This Court ruled that
based on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994), petitioner’s claims were not
cognizable under § 1983 because they challenged criminal charges that had yet to be
vacated, set aside or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Williams v. Flint Twp. Police Dep't, No. 08-15334, 2009 WL 117837, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
16, 2009). The Court further concluded that it could not grant petitioner’s request for an
investigation under 18 U.S.C.§§ 241 and 242 because a private citizen has no authority to
initiate a federal criminal prosecution. Id. The Court further dismissed the claims against
some of the defendants because the allegations failed to show the personal involvement
of these individuals in the alleged constitutional violations and they could not be held liable
under a theory of respondeat superior. Id., * 3. The Court further held that the State of
Michigan, the Michigan Department of Corrections, and the Michigan State Police were
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
2

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court’s
decision, albeit on different grounds. Williams v. Flint Police Department, et. Al., No. 091204 (6th Cir. April 15, 2011). The Sixth Circuit ruled that this Court erred in dismissing
petitioner’s claims under Heck because petitioner’s charges were pending when he filed
his lawsuit and he had yet to be convicted. Id. at * 3. The Sixth Circuit, however, held that
to the extent that petitioner’s claims were based on state law or M.D.O.C. policies, § 1983
does not provide relief for such claims. The Sixth Circuit further ruled that petitioner’s
transfer from one prison to another did not violate his constitutional rights. The Sixth Circuit
finally concluded that regarding the recording by the prisoner informant, the federal
constitution did not prohibit the recording of conversations of persons in a prison, jail or
police station. Id. The Sixth Circuit further upheld this Court’s dismissal of petitioner’s
request to invoke 18 U.S.C.§§ 241 and 242 because there is no private right of action
under these statutes. The Sixth Circuit further upheld this Court’s dismissal of several of
the defendants because they could not be sued in their supervisory capacity or because
they were immune from suit. Finally, the Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the Flint
Township Police Department because petitioner failed to allege that his injuries were
caused by an official policy or custom of the department. Id. at * 4.
II. Discussion
Petitioner asks this Court to disqualify itself from adjudicating his habeas petition.
Petitioner argues that this Court is biased and cannot be fair because it previously
dismissed his civil rights complaint involving the same parties and arising out of the same
criminal charges.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United
3

States shall disqualify himself [or herself] in any proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must recuse himself
or herself “‘if a reasonable, objective person, knowing all of the circumstances, would have
questioned the judge’s impartiality.’” United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 599 (6th
Cir.1990) (quoting Hughes v. United States, 899 F.2d 1495, 1501 (6th Cir.1990)). The
Supreme Court has held that under § 455(a), opinions formed by judges on the basis of
facts introduced or events occurring “in the course of current proceedings, or of prior
proceedings, do not constitute bias or partiality” unless they display “such a high degree
of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). To state a claim that a judge is biased, a defendant must show
either actual bias or the appearance of bias creating a conclusive presumption of actual
bias. United States v. Lowe, 106 F. 3d 1498, 1504 (6th Cir. 1997). Adverse rulings are not
themselves sufficient to establish bias or prejudice which will disqualify a judge. See Hence
v. Smith, 49 F. Supp. 2d 547, 549 (E.D. Mich. 1999). A habeas petitioner’s “unsupported
accusations”and “unfounded surmise” of bias on the part of a federal judge presiding over
his or her habeas petition are insufficient to establish grounds for disqualification of that
judge from presiding over the case. See Bates v. Grant, 98 Fed. Appx. 11, 15 (1st Cir.
2004).
The only evidence of judicial bias that petitioner points to is the fact that this Court
previously dismissed petitioner’s civil rights complaint. The mere fact that this Court ruled
adversely against petitioner in his civil rights case does not establish judicial bias,
particularly where the legal standards for granting relief in a civil rights case are different
than the ones used to determine whether to grant relief in a habeas action. The Sixth
4

Circuit has repeatedly held that a habeas or post-conviction judge’s involvement in a
habeas petitioner or post-conviction movant’s prior criminal or civil case does not show bias
or require the judge to disqualify himself or herself. See United States v. Campbell, 59 Fed.
Appx. 50, 52 (6th Cir. 2003)(trial judge not required to recuse himself from hearing
movant’s § 2255 motion to vacate sentence, where movant’s dissatisfaction with judge’s
rulings in his criminal case and during post-conviction proceedings did not establish bias
that would warrant recusal); Kemp v. United States, 52 Fed. Appx. 731, 733-34 (6th Cir.
2002)(same); Browning v. Foltz, 837 F. 2d 276, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1988)(judge not required
to recuse himself from hearing petitioner’s second habeas petition merely because he
indicated in order denying petitioner’s first petition for habeas corpus that petitioner’s
release due to technicalities would be illogical and unjust); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776
F.2d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 1985); vacated on other grds, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993)(district
judge, who presided over denaturalization proceedings involving detainee was not required
to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) from hearing petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 following certification of detainee as extraditable to Israel
under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184, in that there was no evidence of actual bias on the part of
district judge).
This Court denies petitioner’s motion to disqualify itself from presiding over
petitioner’s habeas application. The Court has not formed an opinion as to the validity of
petitioner’s claims or whether or not he would be entitled to habeas relief. Under the
circumstances, a reasonably objective person would not question this Court’s objectivity.
III. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the motion to disqualify [Dkt. # 10] is DENIED.
5

s/ Nancy G. Edmunds
HON. NANCY G. EDMUNDS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Dated:February 1, 2016

6