Ahmed v. Port City Marine Services Inc.

Filing 52

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider 47 and Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike 49 .. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SALEH AHMED,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 15-13037
HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD

v.
PORT CITY MARINE SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.
_________________________________________/
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER [#47]
and DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE [#49]
I.

INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court’s

order granting summary judgment for the Defendant. [Dkt. No. 47]. Defendant
filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion, and Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike
Defendant’s response on the grounds that the Local Rule 7.1(h)(2) does not permit
a response or hearing for a motion to reconsider “unless the Court orders
otherwise.” [Dkt. No. 49]. Having reviewed the Motion to Reconsider, the Court
concludes that it would have requested a brief from Defendant if Defendant had
not submitted one. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is denied. For the
following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider.

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II.

APPLICABLE LAWS & ANALYSIS

A.

Standard of Review
Under Local Rule 7.1(h), a party may file a motion for reconsideration

within fourteen days of a judgment or order being entered. E.D. Mich. L.R.
7.1(h)(1). The court “will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that
merely present the same issues ruled upon by the Court, either expressly or by
reasonable implication.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). See also Smith v. Mount
Pleasant Pub. Schs., 298 F. Supp. 2d 636, 637 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374) (6th Cir. 1998))
(“a motion for reconsideration is not properly used as a vehicle to re-hash old
arguments or to advance positions that could have been argued earlier but were
not.”). The Court may grant a motion to reconsider only if the movant shows that
both the court and the parties were misled by a “palpable defect” and that
correcting the defect would change the disposition of the case. E.D. Mich. L.R.
7.1(h)(3); see Brown v. Walgreens Income Protective Plan for Store Manager, No.
10-CV-14442, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35133, at **2-3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2013).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff’s motion is timely, as it was filed one day after this Court granted
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion
to Reconsider because it presents issues already ruled upon by the Court.
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Specifically, Plaintiff’s motion presents the same Jones Act and Seaworthiness
claims ruled upon by this Court but offers different case law. Each “new case”
Plaintiff cites was decided years prior to the filing of his response to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgement and should have been raised at that time. For this
reason, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is improper.
Plaintiff also fails to show a “palpable defect” by which the parties and the
Court were misled. Plaintiff claims that Richards v. Consolidated Rail Corp. is
controlling with respect to his Jones Act claim, such that the Court should have
found Plaintiff’s injuries were “within the risk” of having defective shipping
equipment. 330 F.3d 428, 437 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court is not persuaded. The
claims in Richards were based on a violation of the Federal Safety Appliances Act,
pursuant to which a plaintiff only needs to prove: (1) a violation of the statute; and
(2) that the injury was somehow related to the defective equipment. Id. at 432.
Plaintiff’s case is based on violations of the Jones Act and Federal Employers’
Liability Act, which require “reasonable foreseeability of harm” as an “essential
ingredient” of the claim. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 703 (2011);
Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. Palo, 64 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1933). The record suggests
that Defendant had not received complaints or injury reports related to shoveling
and sledgehammering on the St. Mary’s Conquest, on which employees frequently
shoveled concrete, without incident. The Court continues to conclude that
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Plaintiff’s injury was not reasonably foreseeable, and the Court finds that its
dismissal of the Jones Act claim was proper.
Plaintiff fails to show a “palpable defect” in the Court’s reasoning regarding
his seaworthiness claim. Plaintiff relies on Yehia v. Rouge Steel Corp., 898 F.2d
1178 (6th Cir. 1990), to suggest that injuries occurring while cleaning up
unseaworthy conditions are cognizable. The slip-and-fall injury in Yehia occurred
as a direct result of the oily and greasy floor conditions the plaintiff was not
instructed to clean. Id. at 1182. The reasoning of Yehia is not applicable to this
case, where Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence suggesting a direct relationship
between his injury and alleged unseaworthy conditions. Plaintiff fails to challenge
the absence of evidence suggesting that the defective loading arm or defective tools
were the proximate cause of his injury. See Dkt. No. 45, PgID 395. For these
reasons, the Court concludes that its dismissal of Plaintiff’s seaworthiness claim
was proper.
I.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s

Motion to Reconsider [#47] is DENIED.

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It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [#49] is DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED.

S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: August 13, 2018
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on August 13, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager

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